Daker v. Dozier et al

Filing 21

ORDER denying 18 Motion for Recusal. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 3/12/2018. (pts)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOXJTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

WASEEM DAKER,

Plaintiff,

*
*

V.

*

CV 617-110

*

COMMISSIONER GREGORY DOZIER,
et al.,

*
*
*

Defendants.

*

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff's pro se Motion to Recuse.
(Doc.

18.)

undersigned
recuse

Therein,
and

United

themselves

Plaintiff
States

''from

requests

Magistrate

this

case

involving" Plaintiff.^
recusal

the

Baker

is

required

pursuant

history

of

Magistrate

to

orders

Baker

of

28

U.S.C.

shows

of

a

455(a)

pattern

treating

any

R.

both
Stan

further

the
Baker
cases

Plaintiff asserts that

undersigned
§

Judge

and

(Id. at 1.)

that

by

and

Magistrate

because
both

[Plaintiff]

"this

Judge

Judge

Court's

Hall

disparately

and

and

discriminatorily as compared to other cases, and saying anything

^ Notably, Plaintiff has filed identical motions for recusal in two other
matters he has brought in this Court, namely: (i) Daker v. Allen, Case No.
6:17-cv-23 (S.D. Ga. filed Feb. 3, 2017) (the "Allen I Case"); and (ii) Daker
V. Allen, et al., Case No. 6:17-cv-79 (S.D. Ga. dismissed Dec. 6, 2017) (the
"Allen II Case").
(See Allen I Case, Doc. 95; Allen II Case, Doc. 52.)

Short histories of the factual background and proceedings of the Allen I Case
and Allen II Case are available in the Orders entered in those respective
matters.

(See, e.g., Allen I Case, Docs. 10, 15, 52, 93, 94; Allen II Case,

Docs. 17, 21, 22, 30, 42.)

it

can

to

(Id. at 4.)

rubberstamp-dismiss

any and every case he files.

A short history of this case's factual background

and proceedings is available in the Court's Order dated January
14, 2018 and the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
entered herein.

(See Docs. 4, 14.)

Recusal is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.

Jones v.

Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 459 F. App'x 808, 810 (11th

Cir. 2012).

Under Section 144, a judge must recuse himself when

a

a

party

to

district

court

proceeding ''files

a

timely

and

sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is

pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or
in favor of any adverse party."
recusal under § 144,

28 U.S.C. § 144.

"To warrant

the moving party must allege facts

that

would convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists."
Christo V. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see

also

Jones,

459

F.

App'x

at 811

("The facts

alleged in

the

affidavit must show that the bias was personal, not judicial in
nature."

(citing

United

States

v.

Archbold-Newball,

554

F.2d

^ (See also Doc. 18, at 4 ("Magistrate Smith [sic] has displayed a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism

that

would make fair judgment impossible.

Judge

Story [sic] has ruled against [Plaintiff] on numerous issues and requests for
relief

such

that,

taken

pervasiveness

together,

that

an

demonstrate a pattern

outside

observer

of

could

judicial conduct of

fairly

district
court's
impartiality."
(internal
quotations,
alterations omitted)); id. at 9 ("[W]hatever Plaintiff

question

citations,
requests,

the
and
then

Magistrate Baker and Judge Hall do the opposite out of spite."); id. at 17
("In Judge Hall's biased and prejudiced eyes. Plaintiff can do no right, and
Judge Hall will find a pretext to dismiss anyways."); id. at 22 ("Magistrate
Baker and Judge Hall have acted as
quotations and citations omitted)).)

a

surrogate

prosecutor."

(internal

665, 682 (5th Cir. 1977))).

Section 455(a) requires recusal

where ''an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed
of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
would

entertain

impartiality."
(11th

Cir.

recusal.

1989).

a

significant

doubt

about

the

judge's

Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524

1988).

Any

doubts

must be

resolved in

favor

of

United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir.

Generally, judicial rulings "cannot serve as the basis

for recusal or cast doubts on impartiality unless [the moving

party] establishes pervasive bias and prejudice."^
App'x

at

811

(citing

Archbold-Newball,

554

Jones, 459 F.

F.2d

at

682).

See also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) ("[J]udicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.
In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or
accompanying
opinion),
they
cannot
possibly
show
reliance
upon
an
extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the
degree of favoritism or antagonism required (as discussed below) when no
extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds
for appeal, not for recusal.
Second, opinions formed by the judge on the
basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the
course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,

counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or
partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives
from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.
An
example of the latter (and perhaps of the former as well) is the statement
that was alleged to have been made by the District Judge in Berger v. United
States, 255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921), a World War I espionage case against GermanAmerican defendants: 'One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be
prejudiced against the German Americans' because their 'hearts are reeking
with disloyalty.
'
Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are
expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that
are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been
confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display.
A judge's ordinary efforts
at courtroom administration — even a stern and short-tempered judge's
ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune." (internal
citations and alterations omitted)).

"Neither a trial judge's comments on lack of evidence, rulings
adverse to a party, nor friction between the court and counsel
constitute pervasive bias."

Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents

of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted).

Here,

Plaintiff's

Motion

to

Recuse

is

rife

with

feeble

conclusions of impropriety as well as niomerous misstatements and

over-simplifications of the relevant cases' proceedings and the
Court's

Orders

importantly,

and

reasoning

in

relation

thereto.

More

however, Plaintiff's allegations stem solely from

his disagreements with the rulings of Magistrate Judge Baker and
myself

and

therefrom.

the

unsound

assumptions

Plaintiff

has

drawn

(See Doc. 18, at 6-22 (identifying seven purported

instances of alleged bias/prejudice, including disparate docket
management,

incorrect

application

"flipflopping"

instructions,

and

various

(i.e.,

as

issues

acting

of

sua
a

sponte

"surrogate

These are reasons for appeal, not recusal.
States,
motion

510
fails

prejudice

to:

against

unequivocal
(iii)

U.S.

540,
(i)

raise

(1994).

establish

Plaintiff;

antagonism

otherwise

555-56

an

objective

resolution

of

prosecutor")).)

Moreover,

judgment

doubt

Plaintiff's

judicial

demonstrate

fair

precedent,

See Liteky v. United

pervasive

(ii)

rendering

legal

bias

or

deep-seated

or

impossible;

or

about

the

assigned

judges'

impartiality.

Accordingly,

recusal

by

the

assigned

judges is not warranted.

Based on the foregoing and upon due consideration, IT IS
HEREBY

ORDERED

that

Plaintiff's

Motion

to

Recuse

(doc.

18)

is

DENIED.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this

day of March,

2018.

J. RANDMa^HALL, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITEDySTATES DISTRICT COURT
:RN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA