United States of America et al v. Medixx Transport, LLC
Filing
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ORDER dismissing as moot 8 Motion to Unseal Case; denying 10 Motion to Maintain Seal; granting 12 Motion to Unseal Case. Signed by Judge G. R. Smith on 7/13/18. (jrb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ex rel. MASON LOCKLEAR, and
STATE OF GEORGIA, ex. rel.
MASON LOCKLEAR,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MEDIXX TRANSPORT, LLC,
Defendant.
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FILED
Scott L. Poff, Clerk
United States District Court
By jburrell at 11:56 am, Jul 13, 2018
CV617-139
ORDER
Relator Mason Locklear filed this False Claims Act (the “FCA”),
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, et seq., case against his former employer Medixx
Transport, LLC. See doc. 4 (Complaint). Pursuant to the provisions of
the FCA, it was filed in camera and under seal. Doc. 3. The United
States and the State of Georgia investigated Locklear’s allegations and
declined to intervene in the action.
Doc. 9.
Locklear voluntarily
dismissed the case, but he seeks to maintain the seal or, alternatively,
preserve his anonymity.
Doc. 10 (Motion to Maintain Seal); doc. 11
(Notice of Voluntary Dismissal). The Government and the State move to
lift the seal. Doc. 12.
Locklear argues that this now-defunct action should remain sealed
in order to protect the unserved defendant, Medixx Transport, LLC, from
negative publicity that may result from the public disclosure of
allegations to which it has not had an opportunity to respond, and to
protect him from any impact his filing of this action might have on his
future employment prospects. See doc. 10 at 2-3. The Government and
the State argue that none of Locklear’s arguments overcome the strong
presumption in favor of public access to judicial records. Doc. 12 at 2-4.
The Government and the State are right.
There is a strong presumption that judicial records shall be open to
public scrutiny. See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 480 F. 3d 1234,
1245 (11th Cir. 2007); Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v.
Emanuel County School System, 109 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2015)
(“‘Lawsuits are public events,’ and the public has a presumptive right to
know the identity of the litigants who use the courts to resolve their
disputes.” (cites omitted).
As other courts have explained, “the FCA
clearly contemplates that the complaint be unsealed once the
government has decided whether to intervene,” although it does not
expressly address whether other documents should be unsealed. United
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States, ex rel. Yannacopolous v. General Dynamics, 457 F. Supp. 2d 854,
858 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see United States ex rel. Herrera v, Bon Secours
Cottage Health Servs., 665 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784-85 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(“the [Act’s] imposition of a 60-day time period for sealing qui tam
complaints reflects Congress’ desire to have the seal lifted after the
Government conducts its initial investigation and decides whether to
intervene.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Aurora Diagnostics, Inc.,
2017 WL 8781118 at * 2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2017) (explaining that the
Act does not “provide for the record to remain under seal indefinitely; it
only specifies that pleadings will be kept under seal during the time in
which the United States makes its decision.” (quotes and cite omitted));
United States v. Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2016 WL 6071737 at * 1
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2016) (“In the absence of a privileged trade secret or
matter of national security being discussed in a qui tam complaint, qui
tam complaints should be automatically unsealed when the Government
declines to intervene.” (emphasis added)).
Locklear’s argument to
maintain the seal on this action permanently does not address that basic
point.
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Locklear’s alternative argument,1 that he be allowed to file a
redacted version of the operative Complaint protecting his identity, is
similarly flawed. See doc. 10 at 15.
As the Government points out,
allowing Locklear to do so would amount to granting him the privilege of
pursuing this case anonymously. Doc. 12 at 5. Such a privilege is not
automatically granted to plaintiffs, and there is nothing about qui tam
plaintiffs that distinguishes them. See, e.g., Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320,
323 (11th Cir. 1992) (“it is the exceptional case in which a plaintiff may
proceed under a fictitious name.”); see also Freedom From Religion
Foundation, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (“In some exceptional cases, the
public interest in knowing the identity of all the parties must yield to a
1
Locklear’s argument that the pleadings should be sealed despite the public concern
with their content because “the public cannot assess the reliability of the allegations
because Medixx will never be given an opportunity to respond . . . ,” doc. 10 at 6, is
notable only in its deficiency. The Amended Complaint includes factually specific
“observations of Medixx’s [alleged] fraudulent behavior . . . .” Doc. 5 at 18, ¶ 54.
Locklear doesn’t dispute that such allegations are a matter of public concern. See
doc. 10 at 6. However, he is concerned with the inferences the public might draw,
absent a more thorough judicial disposition. Id at 6-7. Such concerns are present in
every case where the public is provided access to information, but it is fundamental
to our system of government that the public be provided with information and
allowed to draw its own inferences, even if it draws the wrong ones. Courts have
roundly rejected arguments functionally identical to those Locklear raises here. See
Grover, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 26-27 (finding that qui tam plaintiff had no strong property
or privacy interests in permanent maintenance of the seal), 26 n. 2 (noting that the
Court afforded no weight to a relator’s assertion of defendants’ privacy interest, for
relator “has no standing to raise them,” and further finding such concerns
“disingenuous” because “[t]he Relator filed this action and made the allegations in
the Complaint with the expectation of proceeding towards trial and the pleadings
eventually being unsealed”).
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policy of protecting privacy in a very private matter.” (emphasis added)
(quotes and cite omitted); United States ex rel. Grover v. Related
Companies, LP, 4 F. Supp. 3d 21, 29 (D.D.C. 2013) (declining to allow
redaction of qui tam plaintiff’s identity because, among other reasons,
“redacting the Complaint before it is unsealed would permit relators to
assume all of the advantages of brining an FCA claim without bearing
any of the risks.”); Herrera, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 786 (rejecting qui tam
plaintiff’s alternative request to redact her name from unsealed
pleadings). The Hererra court specifically found that a plaintiff’s fear of
economic consequences from filing suit were not sufficient to overcome
the presumption of publicity. See 665 F. Supp. 2d at 785-86. Lockear’s
concerns appear identical to those rejected in Herrera. See Grover, 4 F.
Supp. 3d at 26 (explaining that public interest is implicated even in
dismissed qui tam action because “the Relator purported to be bringing a
claim on behalf of and in the interest of the public; the fact that the
Relator, himself, is abandoning the litigation does not lessen or change
the public’s interest in hearing allegations that the Government was
defrauded”).
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The Government, although it supports lifting the seal on the
Locklear’s pleadings, seeks to maintain the seal on its own pleadings “as
[the] information [they contain] was provided in camera for the limited
purpose of demonstrating to the Court that good cause existed to extend
the seal and period during which the Government could notify the Court
of its decision on intervention.” Doc. 12 at 1. Unlike a relator’s filings,
“documents filed by the Government that reveal its process of
investigating qui tam cases, such as requests for extensions of time to
intervene, may remain under seal indefinitely.”
Aurora Diagnostics,
Inc., 2017 WL 8781118 at * 2 (citations omitted).
A review of the
Government’s pleadings supports its contention that those documents
should remain under seal.
Accordingly, the Government and State’s joint motion to lift the
seal on the Complaint is GRANTED. Doc. 12. Their motion to maintain
the seal on documents filed by the Government is also GRANTED. Id.
The Government and State’s previous motion to partially lift the seal is
DENIED as moot. Doc. 8. Relator’s motion to maintain the seal, or, in
the alternative, redact his identity, is DENIED. Doc. 10. The Clerk is,
therefore, DIRECTED as follows:
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1. The Relator’s Complaint (doc. 4), Amended Complaint (doc. 5),
the Notice of Election to Decline Intervention (doc. 9),
Locklear’s Motion to Maintain the Seal (doc. 10), the
Government and State’s Motion to Lift Seal (doc. 12), and this
Order are to be unsealed;
2. All other documents filed by the Government and any orders
thereon shall remain under seal unless further ordered by the
Court;
3. The seal shall be lifted as to all other matters occurring in this
action, if any, after the date of this Order;
4. The parties shall serve any and all pleadings and motions filed in
this
action,
including
supporting
memoranda,
upon
the
Government as provided in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 and O.C.G.A. § 494-168.2. The Government may order any deposition transcripts
and is entitled to intervene in this action, for good cause, at any
time;
5. The parties shall serve all notices of appeal upon the
Government;
6. All orders of this Court shall be sent to the Government; and
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7. Should the Relator or Defendant propose that this action be
dismissed, settled, or otherwise discontinued -- except by
voluntary dismissal without prejudice by the relator, which the
Government and State have consented to -- the Court will solicit
the written consent of the Government and State before ruling
or granting its approval.
SO ORDERED, this 13th day of July, 2018.
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