Rogers v. Claxton Poultry Company, Inc.
Filing
77
ORDER granting 50 Motion for Summary Judgment by Norman W. Fries, Inc., dba Claxton Poultry Farms. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and to CLOSE this case. Signed by District Judge R. Stan Baker on 9/27/19. (jrb) Modified on 9/27/2019 (jrb).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
CHARLES ROGERS,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:17-cv-00155
v.
NORMAN W. FRIES, INC. d/b/a CLAXTON
POULTRY FARMS,
Defendant.
ORDER
In this lawsuit, Plaintiff Charles Rogers alleges that Defendant Norman W. Fries, Inc. d/b/a
Claxton Poultry Farms violated his rights pursuant to Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, as amended by the ADA Amendment Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq.
(hereinafter the “ADA”) by refusing to hire him when he applied for a job in June 2016. (Doc. 5.)
The case is presently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, in which
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show that he was a qualified individual under the ADA.
(Doc. 50; doc. 50-1, pp. 10–21.) Defendant additionally argues that summary judgment should be
granted on the issue of damages pursuant to an “after-acquired evidence” defense. (Doc. 50-1, p.
21). In response, Plaintiff contends that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether he
was a qualified individual under the ADA, (doc. 57, p. 5), and that a ruling on damages at the
summary judgment stage is inappropriate, (doc. 73, p. 11). For the reasons which follow, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. 50). 1
1
In light of its determination that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment disposing of the case in its
entirety, the Court declines to address Defendant’s request for summary judgment on the after-acquired
evidence defense, as it is not a dispositive issue but seeks merely to limit the damages recoverable by
BACKGROUND
The following facts are relevant to the disposition of Defendant’s Motion and, except
where specifically noted otherwise, are undisputed.
Defendant operates a raw chicken processing plant in Claxton, Evans County, Georgia.
(Doc. 5, p. 3; doc. 11, p. 2; doc. 58, p. 10.) At the plant, chickens are killed, eviscerated, cut up,
and processed in various ways. (Doc. 58, p. 27.) The incident giving rise to this case took place
in June 2016, when Plaintiff applied to work for Defendant. 2 (Doc. 5, p. 4.) It is undisputed, for
purposes of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiff was legally blind at the time
of this application. 3 (See Doc. 50-2, p. 1; doc. 57-1, p. 1.) While Plaintiff had previously worked
for Defendant intermittently between 1998 and 2001, (doc. 63-1, pp. 24–28), the undisputed
evidence indicates that his vision had worsened by the time he applied for re-hire in 2016, (see id.
at pp. 11–14, 24–28). As described more fully below, Plaintiff was given a conditional offer for a
specific job, but Defendant ultimately refused to hire him after it received documentation from his
medical provider regarding the limitations resulting from his vision issues. In this lawsuit, Plaintiff
challenges Defendant’s refusal to hire him as well as its failure to engage in an “interactive
process” to attempt to determine and provide a reasonable accommodation so that he could perform
the job. (Doc. 5, pp. 14–15.)
Plaintiff if his claim were allowed to proceed. This ground for summary judgment is therefore DENIED
as moot.
2
While Plaintiff’s Response in opposition to summary judgment offers information regarding a previous
occasion—in 2015—when he applied with Defendant, his Amended Complaint does not feature any
allegations against Defendant with regard to that particular application and hiring process. (See Doc. 5.)
As a result, the Court focuses on the allegations and evidence surrounding the June 2016 application
process.
3
Plaintiff’s visual acuity is 20/600. (Doc. 50-2, p. 1; doc. 57-1, p. 1.) Under the Social Security Act, people
with a visual acuity of 20/200 or less are “legally blind.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) & 1382(c) (2016).
2
I.
The Application and Interview Process
Defendant’s application process has several different parts. (Doc. 50-1, p. 2.) First,
applicants must complete an employment application. (Doc. 50-5, pp. 4–6.) Here, Plaintiff
testified that a friend of his, who also drove him to the interview, helped him complete the
application, explaining, “[H]e would read the questions out and I would give him the answer and
he would fill it in[ because] he could write faster and see a lot better than I could.” (Doc. 63-1, p.
60.) Per Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in the application, he specifically requested a “seasonal”
job, which the Court construes from the context of the surrounding testimony as a reference to a
job involved with the “seasoning” process (as opposed to a job that is only available during certain
seasons or periods of the year). 4 (Doc. 63-1, pp. 61–62 see also doc. 73, p. 4 (where Plaintiff
states, in his Sur-reply, that he “wrote on the application for the Defendant[] that he was applying
for the position of seasoning meat . . .”).) Plaintiff’s application was given to Defendant’s human
resources representative, Mr. Prater, who reviewed it and also reviewed Defendant’s record from
his previous employment at the plant, in order to determine if Plaintiff had any disqualifying
factors related to his prior employment and severance. (Doc. 50-5, p. 45; doc. 50-1, pp. 2–3.)
After determining that nothing from Plaintiff’s previous employment with the company made him
ineligible, Plaintiff was called in for an interview with Mr. Prater, who, according to Plaintiff, “got
on his computer screen and . . . told [Plaintiff] that [the type of job he requested] was open.” (Doc.
4
In his Amended Complaint and also in his Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff alleges that, during his interview, he and Ken Prater, who worked in Defendant’s human resources
department, discussed positions involving not only “meat seasoning” (also referred to at times as “nugget
seasoning”) but also “nugget counting.” (Doc. 5, pp. 8–9; doc. 57, p. 2.) However, Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony indicates that any potential “nugget counting” job was only discussed at a job interview in 2015,
which is not at issue in this lawsuit and that he and Mr. Prater discussed a job “season[ing] chicken” in the
2016 interview. (Doc. 63-1, pp. 47–48, 61–62.) Furthermore, Defendant denies the existence of a position
called “nugget counting” at the plant. (Doc. 50-8, p. 1.) Thus, the Court finds that the undisputed evidence
indicates that the only job position at issue in this case was one involving seasoning, and not one involving
nugget counting.
3
50-6, pp. 2–3.) Plaintiff claims that Mr. Prater told him that the available position would involve
“seasoning chicken,” including “put[ting] it in the tub.” (Doc. 63-1, p. 62.) He also claims that at
this point he discussed the fact that he was legally blind with Mr. Prater. (Id. at pp. 61–62.)
According to Plaintiff, Mr. Prater told him that he would “be able to do this,” that “it was a pretty
easy job,” and was “something [Plaintiff] can do.” (Id. at p. 62.) At this time, Mr. Prater gave
Plaintiff a “conditional offer of employment” for the job. (Doc. 50-2, p. 6; doc. 57-1, p. 7; see also
doc. 50-6, pp. 3, 6.) Plaintiff, however, would still need to be cleared for the employment by the
plant nurse. (Do. 62-1, pp. 17, 21.)
A.
Plaintiff was Offered a Job as a “Marination Mixer”
It is undisputed that the at-issue position was “on the seasoning line” at the plant. (See
Doc. 50-2, p. 6; doc. 57-1, p. 7.) Plaintiff refers to it only as “meat seasoning” or “nugget
seasoning,” (doc. 5, pp. 8–9; doc. 57, p. 2), but there are multiple jobs on the seasoning line.
Plaintiff’s testimony that he was being considered for a job involving the use of a “tub” to “season
chicken” matches most closely the specific position on the plant’s seasoning line known as
“marination mixer.” (Doc. 50-8, pp. 2–3; doc. 63-1, p. 62.) In an effort to refute this as the specific
job that was offered to him, Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment repeatedly
asserts that the term “marination” was never used in Plaintiff’s interview and therefore this cannot
be the position he was being offered. (Doc. 57, p. 2 (citing doc. 63-1, p. 50).) In support of his
claim that the word “marination” was never used, Plaintiff cites to his own deposition transcript.
However, the specific page to which he cites does not include any testimony on this point and is
actually a portion of his testimony in which was discussing his 2015 interview for re-hire, not the
at-issue 2016 interview. (See id.; see also id. at p. 10 (citing to “Monroe Depo Pg. 26, 1. 16–24,”
which also does not support this assertion).) Additionally, Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence
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to support a determination that the at-issue position was not the “marination mixer” job or to
support a finding that Plaintiff’s description instead matches up with some other position at the
plant.
B.
Overview of the Seasoning Line and the “Marination Mixer” Position
Employees holding a marination mixer position at the plant are responsible for applying
spices and seasoning to the chicken. (Doc. 50-8, p. 2.) The job requires the employee to operate
and interact with multiple large machines: a “tumbler,” a “hopper,” and a “marination tank.” (Id.;
see also doc. 50-9, p. 2.) Specifically, employees in this position must “lift[] and measure[] 30
pound bags of spices into a massive hopper to be mixed with . . . [raw] chicken pieces [that have
already been placed in a] large tumbler,” which is described as being “like a concrete mixer.”
(Doc. 50-8, p. 2.) Employees must weigh and mix the seasoning exactly according to the specific
instructions of each of Defendant’s customers. (Id.) The employees in this position also must
“visually monitor the equipment” during the process, “to ensure that the chicken is tumbled and
marinated for the correct amount of time.” (Id.) During the process, employees are also required
to climb stairs, to use hand trucks to transport items, and to “unload” the batch from the tumbler
at the end of the tumbling cycle. (Doc. 50-9, p. 2.) The area where the job is performed includes
a conveyor belt that moves the marinated chicken pieces from the marination tank to an area where
they are scooped and prepared for shipment. (Doc. 50-5, pp. 17–18; doc. 50–8, p. 2.)
The other positions on the seasoning line are scooper/scale operator, packer, and floorman.
(Doc. 50-8, p. 1.) All employees on the seasoning line are cross-trained to perform all of the jobs
on the line to ensure that all jobs are covered in the event of employee absences or restroom breaks.
(Id. at p. 2.) All of the positions on the seasoning line, however, involve interaction with or the
operation of equipment and machinery. (Id.; see also docs. 50-10, 50-11, 50-12.)
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The plant environment in general presents varying hazards, including standing water,
chicken fat and chicken pieces on the floor, water hoses “strewn about,” moving conveyor belts,
moving motorized pallet jacks and forklifts, and sharp cutting wheels.
(Doc. 50-8, p. 3.)
Defendant presented evidence that “[o]ne must often duck under machinery in order to move from
one place to another,” and, “in order to get to the seasoning lines from the entrance of the facility,
one must walk through a very complicated maze of machinery and also avoid the hazards [already
listed].” (Id.)
II.
The Medical Screening Process
After conditionally offering Plaintiff the marination mixer position, Mr. Prater directed
Plaintiff to the plant nurse’s office for the preemployment medical screening portion of the process,
during which Plaintiff was required to fill out a medical questionnaire. (Doc. 50-6, p. 4; doc. 505, p. 9; see also doc. 61-1, pp. 15–16.) The questionnaire was designed to help Defendant
determine whether an applicant can safely perform the at-issue job or whether there are any
medical issues that could impact the applicant’s job performance. (Doc. 50-5, p. 9; doc. 50-7, p.
2.) If more information was needed, the plant nurse would tell the applicant to have his or her
medical care provider fill out a Pre-employment Medical Screening Form. (Doc. 50-4, p. 38; doc.
50–5, p. 10; doc. 50-7, pp. 2–3.)
On his medical questionnaire, Plaintiff wrote, inter alia, that he had a “little vision issue”
and that he had previously hurt his wrist. (Doc. 50-2, p. 6; doc. 57-1, p. 7; see also doc. 50-4, pp.
36–37.) Annette Monroe, the plant nurse, reviewed the document and, in light of these two
disclosures regarding potential physical limitations, she directed him to have both his general
physician and his eye doctor complete Pre-employment Medical Screening forms (which she
provided to him). (Doc. 61-1, pp. 17–18; doc. 63-1, p. 64; doc. 50-5, p. 12.) These forms list a
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variety of functions (i.e., “May carry up to 80 pounds,” “Able to walk w/o restrictions,” “Able to
work near machinery,” “Able to bend/turn/twist wrist,” etc.) and has a space for the medical
providers to circle “yes” or “no” regarding whether the patient is capable of performing the given
function. (See Doc. 60-3, p. 2.) The form also has an area where it provides “[c]omments” or
makes specific requests to the provider. (Id.) In her deposition, Ms. Monroe explained that these
forms are used “[a]ny time that someone has a condition . . . that could cause them to be harmed
if [Defendant] put them in [one of its] jobs,” and that she uses these forms so that the applicant’s
physician can tell her “what they can and can’t do.” (Doc. 61-1, p. 19.)
The comments section of the form provided to Plaintiff’s general physician stated, in bold
letters, “Please evaluate left wrist.” (Id.) It also provided some information about what the job
could entail. (Id. (“May be lifting 40+ pounds, may be walking or standing, bending or stooping,
may be pulling skins, cutting with a knife or scissors . . . . May be doing 8+ hours of repetitive
work that involves hands, wrists, elbows, and shoulders.”).) The general physician circled “yes”
in response to all of the items on the form, wrote “No medical limit” next to “Max push/pull
weight,” and signed the form at the bottom. (Id.)
Plaintiff also provided a form to Dr. Robert King at the Georgia Eye Institute. (Doc. 50-4,
p. 38.) According to Plaintiff, he told Dr. King that this job would involve “seasoning the chicken
and putting it in the tubs.” (Doc. 66-1, pp. 3–6.) Plaintiff did not inform Dr. King that any
machinery would be involved in the job. (Id.) The comments section of the form provided to Dr.
King stated, in bold letters, “Please evaluate vision vs[.] work environment.” (Id.) It also provided
the same information as the general physician’s form (described above) regarding what the job
could entail. (Id.) While Dr. King’s responses on the form affirmed that Plaintiff could perform
most of the listed functions, he answered “no” regarding whether Plaintiff was “[a]ble to operat[e]
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equipment,” and added a handwritten note stating: “not able to see well enough to operate
equipment[;] can work in environment that does not require good vision.” (Doc. 50-4, p. 38.)
Although he answered “yes” to the query “[a]ble to climb w/o restrictions,” Dr. King wrote “not
high levels” in the comment area next to it. (Id.) In the comments section where he was asked to
“evaluate vision vs[.] work environment” (with the information about what the job could entail
stated thereunder), he wrote: “Patient is visually impaired and is able to do job that does not require
good vision.” (Id.) An additional note written by Dr. King in the bottom margin states: “Can use
scissors only. No sharp knives, saws, or machinery. Can work in job applied for.” (Id.)
Plaintiff returned the Pre-employment Medical Screening Forms to Defendant. (Doc. 631, p. 65.) Based on the form completed by Dr. King, Defendant determined that Plaintiff could
not perform any of the jobs on the seasoning line, including “marination mixer,” either “with or
without reasonable accommodation or without posing a direct threat to himself or others.” (Doc.
50-8, p. 3; doc. 61-1, pp. 26–27.) According to Plaintiff, Ms. Monroe told him that he could not
work at Claxton Poultry until he got his “eyes fixed.” (Doc. 63-1, pp. 65, 69.) According to
Plaintiff, he then asked Monroe if he could bring his vocational resource counselor to the plant and
“let him walk through the plant and see the departments that were available for [him] to work,”
but Ms. Monroe told him no. (Doc. 63-1, p. 70; doc. 65-1, pp. 3–5.)
III.
Plaintiff Seeks Legal Recourse
After filing a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), (doc. 50-4, p. 39; doc. 66-1, p. 12), Plaintiff requested a Notice of Right
to Sue from the EEOC, (doc. 5, p. 5). In December 2017, he filed a Verified Complaint initiating
this lawsuit, (doc. 1), and subsequently filed the Amended Complaint, (doc. 5), alleging that
Defendant violated his rights under the ADA. Specifically, he alleges that Defendant refused to
8
hire him because of his disability and “refused to engage in the interactive process regarding any
accommodation necessary for the Plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the job.” (Id. at p.
6). Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 4, 2019, (doc. 50), and Plaintiff
filed a Response, (doc. 57). Defendant filed a Reply, (doc. 71), and Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply,
(doc. 73).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment “shall” be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is “genuine” if the
“evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact. See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir.
2003). Specifically, the moving party must identify the portions of the record which establish that
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a)). When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may
discharge his burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial. See id. (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)). If the moving party discharges this burden, the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to
show that a genuine issue of fact does not exist. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
9
In determining whether a summary judgment motion should be granted, a court must view
the record and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County,
630 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611,
616 (11th Cir. 2007)). However, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citation and emphasis
omitted).
DISCUSSION
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff purports to bring claims against Defendant for
violating the ADA by “fail[ing] to hire and fail[ing] to engage in the interactive process with
Plaintiff.” (Doc. 5, p. 1.) The Amended Complaint focuses on Defendant’s failure to hire him in
June 2016 and failure to “engage in the interactive process regarding any accommodation
necessary for the Plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the job.” (Id. at pp. 4, 6.) In Count
One of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is a “qualified individual” pursuant to the
ADA because, “according to [his] doctors,” he, with or without reasonable accommodations, “can
perform the essential functions of the job for which [he] applied,” which he alleges “did not require
the use of machines.” (Id. at pp. 13–14.) Plaintiff then asserts, within Count I, that Defendant
violated the ADA “by denying [him] a job that he was qualified to perform,” by “failing to hire
him,” and by “failing to engage in an interactive process regarding a reasonable accommodation.”
(Id. at pp. 14–15.)
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“The ADA was enacted ‘to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of American life.’” Harrison v. Benchmarks Elecs. Huntsville,
Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted.) In relevant part, the ADA provides
that no covered entity (i.e., employer or prospective employer) “shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring . .
. or discharge of employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Title VII’s employment discrimination burden-shifting framework applies to ADA claims.
Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff must prove three elements
to make the necessary prima facie case of disability discrimination: “(1) he is disabled; (2) he is a
qualified individual; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his disability.”
Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2007).
I.
Whether Plaintiff Had or Was Perceived to Have a Disability
Defendant does not dispute, at least for purposes of summary judgment, that Plaintiff had
or was perceived to have a disability when he applied for a job in June of 2016. (Doc. 50-1, p.
10.) (Defendant also does not dispute that it is a covered entity subject to the requirements of the
ADA.) Instead, Defendant focuses its Motion for Summary Judgment on the theory that Plaintiff
cannot show that he was a “qualified individual” as contemplated by the ADA in satisfaction of
the second prong. (Doc. 50-1, p. 10.)
II.
Whether Plaintiff Was a “Qualified Individual” Under the ADA
Under the ADA, “a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ is an ‘individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
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employment position that such individual holds or desires.’” Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs.,
100 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). Thus, a person who is not
able to perform the essential functions of a job even with a reasonable accommodation is not a
qualified individual and, therefore, not covered by the ADA. See Davis v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of
the employment position” but do not include “the marginal functions of the employment position.”
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Thus, in order to assess whether Plaintiff was a “qualified individual,”
the Court first must determine the essential functions of the job he applied for, and then the Court
will turn to whether he could perform those functions.
A.
Defendant Has Established the Essential Functions of the Marination Mixer
Position.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant states that the essential functions of the
position are set forth in the Job Safety Analysis form for the position, and they specifically include
accurately weighing, measuring, and mixing the ingredients, operating machinery, and monitoring
the operation of the machinery to ensure the marination process is properly completed. (Doc. 501, pp. 11–13.) Plaintiff’s dispute on this topic focuses on challenging Defendant’s right to rely on
the Job Safety Analysis form as evidence of the essential functions. (Doc. 57, p. 11.)
Whether a certain job function is essential is “evaluated on a case-by-case basis by
examining a number of factors,” D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1230 (11th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305), and not just a written job description (such as the
Job Safety Analysis form). ADA regulations provide a number of considerations including but
not limited to:
(1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, (2) written job
descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, (3)
the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (4) the consequences
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of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, (5) the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, (6) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and
(7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).
Notably, the first factor—the employer’s judgment—is “‘entitled to substantial weight in
the calculus,” though “[it] alone is not conclusive.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169,
1182 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Holly, 492 F.3d at 1285). Here, the judgment of Defendant is that
accurately measuring and mixing chicken seasoning and operating and monitoring machinery are
essential functions of the Marination Mixer position. (Doc. 50-8, p. 2.) Specifically, Mark Bland,
the head of Defendant’s human resources department, stated in an affidavit that “[w]eighing,
mixing, measuring, and monitoring with accuracy are, in the judgment of [Defendant], essential
functions of the Marination Mixer position” and the “Marination Mixer must operate the Hopper,
Tumbler, Marination Tank, and hand trucks.” (Id.) This factor thus weighs heavily in favor of
finding that these tasks were essential functions of the position.
As to the second factor, Defendant offers its Job Safety Analysis form as evidence of the
company’s written job description. (Doc. 50-1, p 11.) Plaintiff argues that these forms should not
be used as evidence here because the forms are not specifically titled as job descriptions. (Doc.
57, p. 10). However, in D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit considered a Job Safety Analysis form, along with other even less formal
documents such as a handwritten note, as evidence on the issue of whether working on a conveyor
belt was an essential function of a given job. 422 F.3d at 1231. As such, this Court will consider
Defendant’s forms in analyzing the second factor.
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The form for the “marination mixer” position lists the following “[e]quipment [o]perated”
on the job: hopper, tumbler, hand truck, and marination tank. (Doc. 50-9, p. 2.) In addition, the
form’s “Procedure-step by step” section states:
1. Obtain seasoning ingredients
2. Weigh & mix marination by recipe
3. Load batch into tumbler and tumble required time
4. Unload batch at end of cycle
5. Reload and repeat
6. Communicate with supervisor and scoopers to get product scooped into bags.
(Id.) (emphases added). Thus, the second factor also supports a finding that weighing, measuring
and mixing seasoning and ingredients, operating machinery, and monitoring the operation of the
machinery are essential functions of the position.
The next factor specifically addressed by the parties involves the consequences of not
requiring the employee to perform the at-issue functions. The evidence shows that products on
the seasoning line must be seasoned “exactly to customer specifications,” which vary from
customer to customer. (Doc. 50-8, p. 2.) One of these customers was Chick-Fil-A, whose business
was worth approximately 50 million dollars to Defendant. (Doc. 50-5, p. 16.) Plaintiff offers no
evidence of his own to show that there would be no adverse consequence if he were not required
to accurately measure or mix seasoning or to load, operate and monitor the machinery that does
the mixing. Even drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the evidence indicates
that not requiring an employee to measure ingredients to a customer’s specifications, to operate
the machinery to mix those ingredients and marinate the chicken, and to monitor that machinery
could significantly disrupt the facility’s operations and cost Defendant significant business.
While neither party submitted specific evidence about the amount of time spent measuring
and mixing seasoning or operating and monitoring machinery, the Court notes that the Job Safety
Analysis form’s step-by-step description of the job, along with Mr. Bland’s affidavit testimony,
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indicates that the majority of a marination mixer’s active working time is spent
measuring/weighing the ingredients, loading mass quantities of the ingredients into large machines
and monitoring those machines, and unloading the mixed batches of the ingredients from the
machines. (See Doc. 50-9, p. 2; doc. 50-8, p. 2.)
The remaining factors in the essential function analysis are inapplicable here, as the record
contains no evidence of a collective bargaining agreement, nor any evidence concerning the work
experience of either past marination mixers or employees currently holding that position.
The Court emphasizes that Plaintiff has not offered any evidence tending to raise a question
of fact as to whether these were indeed essential functions of the job, or even as to whether different
types of tasks are actually the essential functions of the job. Instead he argues that “a jury would
be justified in concluding that having 20/20 vision is not an essential function of the job,” and that
“being able to perform each and every job on the [seasoning] line is not an essential function of
the job for which [he] applied.” (Doc. 57, p. 11.) These cursory arguments do not speak to any of
the factors and do not provide a basis for calling into question whether the job functions delineated
by Defendant are indeed essential to the job. Thus, after analyzing the factors for which
evidentiary support has been offered, the Court finds as a matter of law that weighing, measuring
and mixing seasoning and ingredients, operating machinery, and monitoring the operation of the
machinery were essential functions of the marination mixer position.
B.
Plaintiff Has Not Made a Prima Facie Showing that He Could Perform the Job
With or Without Reasonable Accommodations.
Having determined that accurately weighing, measuring, and mixing the ingredients,
operating the machinery and equipment, and monitoring the operation of the machinery are
essential functions of the at-issue job, the Court turns to the next step in the inquiry, which is to
15
determine whether Plaintiff could have performed these essential functions with or without
reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2016).
1. Plaintiff Has Not Made a Showing that He Could Perform the Job Without
Accommodations.
In his Sur-reply, Plaintiff appears to argue, for the first time, that there is sufficient evidence
upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that he was able to perform the essential duties of
the job without any accommodations. (Doc. 73, pp. 4–5.) In support, Plaintiff points to the two
Pre-employment Medical Screening Forms, which he claims indicate that both physicians
determined he would be able to handle the job even without an accommodation. (Doc. 60-2, p. 2;
doc. 60-3, p. 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff emphasizes that his general physician answered “yes”
regarding his ability to handle all of the listed duties and responsibilities. (Doc. 60-3, p. 2.)
Plaintiff also emphasizes that Dr. King, his eye doctor, wrote at the bottom of his Pre-employment
Medical Screening Form that he could “work in job applied for.” (Doc. 60-2, p. 2.) Plaintiff also
points to his interview with Mr. Prater, during which he claims he told Mr. Prater about his eye
condition and that Mr. Prater told him that the position “was a pretty easy job” and “was something
[he could] do.” (Doc. 63-1, p. 62.) He repeatedly states that, based on these comments, he
“believed” he was a qualified individual for the at-issue position. (Doc. 73, p. 4.)
The Court finds that neither doctor’s screening form provides evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job without
any accommodations. First, in completing the screening form regarding Plaintiff’s abilities, the
general physician was told specifically to evaluate Plaintiff’s left wrist. Thus, there is no indication
that the physician was providing any opinion regarding the effect Plaintiff’s vision impairment
would have on his ability to perform the job. As to Dr. King, the undisputed facts establish that
he was not provided a specific description of the tasks involved in the job. Thus his opinion that
16
Plaintiff could work the job has de minis probative value, if any, due to its lack of relevancy and
foundation. While the screening form provided some general information about skills and abilities
that the job “may” require, it did not provide a description of what the performance of the job
would entail or what kind of equipment and machinery Plaintiff would be operating (or working
in the vicinity of). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s own description of the job as involving simply
“seasoning” chicken and putting it in a “tub” did not provide Dr. King with a meaningful
understanding of the true nature of the job (and it instead downplayed the extent to which Plaintiff
would have to work with and around large equipment and machinery). That Dr. King did not grasp
the true nature of the job is even more apparent in light of his specific note that Plaintiff “is not
able to see well enough to operate equipment” and his admonition of “no . . . machinery.” When
taken as a whole, Dr. King’s evaluation actually supports Defendant’s position that Plaintiff could
not perform the essential functions of the job without accommodation.
Finally, in the face of the undisputed evidence regarding the nature and risks of the essential
functions of the job (including, most importantly, the amount of interaction with heavy equipment
and machinery and the meticulousness required in measuring seasonings), Mr. Prater’s statements
to Plaintiff during the interview would not provide a reasonable jury with a basis for finding that
Plaintiff could perform the job without a reasonable accommodation. The alleged comments were
made during the application and interview process, and the parties agree that the tentative job offer
Mr. Prater made to Plaintiff at that time was conditioned upon the plant nurse clearing him for the
job after reviewing all necessary medical documentation. Even assuming Plaintiff told Mr. Prater
that he had vision problems and was legally blind, there is no evidence that Mr. Prater knew how
or the extent to which Plaintiff’s vision was limited and whether or how it would impact his ability
to perform the job. Indeed, that determination was prudently left for the next step of the process,
17
when Plaintiff was required to complete a medical questionnaire and to obtain completed Preemployment Medical Screening Forms as requested by the plant nurse.
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing that, even with
his vision limitations, he could perform the essential functions of the marination mixer job without
any accommodations.
2. Plaintiff Has Not Made a Showing that He Could Perform the Job With
Accommodations.
Plaintiff still may be deemed a “qualified individual” if he can show that he could perform
the essential functions of the job if certain reasonable accommodations were made for him. The
ADA requires an employer to make “reasonable accommodations” to an otherwise qualified
employee with a disability “unless doing so would impose [an] undue hardship.” Lucas v. W.W.
Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) and 29
C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)). An accommodation is only reasonable if it allows the disabled employee to
perform the essential functions of the job in question. Id.
“The employee has the burden of identifying an accommodation and demonstrating that it
is reasonable. Assuming [the employee] cannot do so, the employer has no affirmative duty to
show undue hardship. Moreover, an employer’s ‘duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is
not triggered unless a specific demand for an accommodation has been made.’” Frazier-White v.
Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied 137 S. Ct.
592 (2016).
The regulations implementing the ADA contemplate two types of “reasonable
accommodations” that could be applicable here:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified
applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant
desires; or
18
(ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or
circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed,
that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential
functions of that position[.]
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i–ii).
The parties’ briefs seem to focus on the latter type of reasonable accommodation—that is,
whether Plaintiff requested an accommodation to enable him to actually perform the essential
functions of the job. In his briefs, however, Plaintiff neglects to identify any sort of modification
or adjustment to the work environment or the way the marination mixer job is performed that
arguably would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of the job. The closest he
comes is emphasizing evidence that all of the employees who work on the seasoning line are crosstrained to be able to perform all of the jobs on the line (not just the one to which they are assigned).
Plaintiff avers, baldly, that “it would [therefore] seem a natural place where a reasonable
accommodation could easily be made, if needed,” (doc. 57, pp. 9–10), but Plaintiff does not
elaborate on what reasonable changes could be made to enable him to perform the essential
functions of the job simply by virtue of the fact that he and the other employees would be trained
to handle each other’s duties, if necessary. Moreover, a defendant is not required to reallocate
essential functions, such as the functions of measuring ingredients and operating machinery in this
case, to other employees, so Plaintiff would not be entitled to be relieved of those duties simply
because another employee might have been trained and able to cover them. See Holbrook v. City
of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1997); Webb v. Donley, 347 Fed. Appx. 443,
446 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n employer is not required to reallocate job duties to change the
functions of a job.”) (citing Earl, 207 F.3d at 1367). Moreover, there is no evidence that Plaintiff
made a specific demand for this particular type of accommodation (reallocation of some duties).
19
Plaintiff attempts to satisfy his burden by claiming that the “reasonable accommodation”
that he requested was to have his vocational counselor come visit the plant. (Doc. 57, pp. 7–9.)
However, having a third party come to the plant and observe the marination mixer job in action
does not comport with the second definition of a reasonable accommodation because a site visit
would not constitute a “modification[] or adjustment[] to the work environment, or to the manner
or circumstances under which the position . . . is customarily performed, that [would] enable
[Plaintiff] to perform the essential functions” of the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (emphases
added). A site visit by the vocational counselor would not, in and of itself, enable Plaintiff to
perform the essential functions of the job despite his vision issues.
Upon examination of the relevant law and Plaintiff’s briefs, Plaintiff’s “reasonable
accommodation” claim seems instead to be that he requested a reasonable accommodation in the
job application process, per 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i). That is, Plaintiff appears to be arguing
that Defendant wrongfully refused to make an “adjustment[] to [the] application process” (i.e.,
permitting an out-of-the-ordinary observational site visit by a vocational counselor) in order “[to]
enable [Plaintiff] to be considered for the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i).
Closely related to this claim is Plaintiff’s separate claim, explicitly alleged in the Amended
Complaint, that Defendant violated the ADA by failing to “engage in the interactive process
regarding any accommodation necessary for the Plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the
job.” (Doc. 5, p. 15.) This claim pertains to the following provision of the federal regulations
implementing the ADA:
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for
the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual
with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.
20
29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3) (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff claims that, upon his making the request
for the site visit “accommodation,” Defendant was required (but failed) to “engage in the
interactive process” with him.
The Court addresses the “failure to engage in the interactive process” claim first. First, the
Court notes that the ADA provides no cause of action for failure to investigate possible
accommodations. McKane v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 363 F. App’x 679, 681 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Willis, 108 F.3d at 285). Nonetheless, even assuming Plaintiff does have a valid cause of action
based on this claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff could not prevail on it because the undisputed
evidence indicates that, after learning from Plaintiff that he had a vision issue, Defendant did
indeed initiate and engage in an interactive process to “identify the precise limitations resulting
from that disability,” by requesting that his eye doctor, Dr. King, complete a Pre-employment
Medical Screening Form. Through this form, Dr. King identified precise limitations resulting from
Plaintiff’s vision issue: that he is “visually impaired,” that he is “not able to see well enough to
operate equipment,” that he is only able to do a job if it “does not require good vision,” and that
he should not use “sharp knives, saws or machinery.” While Dr. King did (confusingly) also state
that Plaintiff could perform “the job applied for,” he did not provide any suggestions on how
Plaintiff could perform the marination mixer job despite his repeated and explicit admonitions that
Plaintiff is not capable of operating equipment and machinery or doing jobs requiring good vision.
In the face of this clear first-hand information from Plaintiff’s treating eye doctor, and knowing
that the essential functions of the job require the use of machinery and equipment and the need for
good vision, Defendant reasonably concluded that there were no “potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” The Court is not aware of any authority
21
that required Defendant to permit a vocational specialist to visit the plant to offer a second opinion
(particularly one that would be secondary to that of the specializing and treating physician).
The “failure to engage in the interactive process” claim also fails because Plaintiff has not
pointed to a “modification[] or adjustment[] to the work environment, or to the manner or
circumstances under which the [marination mixer] job . . . is customarily performed,” 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(o)(1)(ii), that Defendant could have undertaken to enable him to perform the essential
functions of the job. Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant had an affirmative duty to engage
in the interactive process and failed to do so, “where a plaintiff cannot demonstrate [a] reasonable
accommodation, the employer’s lack of investigation into reasonable accommodation is
unimportant.” Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997); Lucas, 257 F.3d at
1256 n. 2; Earl, 207 F.3d at 1367; Webb, 347 Fed. Appx. at 446. As the Eleventh Circuit explained
in Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc.,
We are persuaded that [a defendant’s] failure to investigate [does] not relieve [the
plaintiff] of his burden of producing probative evidence that reasonable
accommodations were available. A contrary holding would mean that an employee
has an ADA cause even though there was no possible way for the employer to
accommodate the employee's disability. Stated differently: An employer would be
liable for not investigating even though an investigation would have been fruitless.
97 F.3d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit has further elaborated that the ADA is
not intended “to punish employers for behaving callously if, in fact, no accommodation for the
employee’s disability could reasonably have been made.” Willis, 108 F.3d at 285. Here, Plaintiff
has not identified any proposed modification to the job that would enable him to perform its
essential functions (much less has he shown that any such accommodation would be reasonable).
As a result, his claim fails regardless of whether Defendant truly did fail to engage in the interactive
process.
22
Next, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s claim (to the extent he has intended to make one) that,
in requesting a site visit with his vocational counselor, he was seeking a modification or adjustment
to the job application process to accommodate his vision issues (pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(o)(1)(i)). While Plaintiff contends that he asked Defendant if his vocational counselor
could come “walk through the plant and see the departments that were available for [him] to work,”
this does not qualify as an accommodation that Defendant should have provided to him in order
for him to fully participate in Defendant’s application process or medical evaluation process.
Stated another way, this was not a request for an “accommodation to ameliorate the effect of his
disability in connection with the application process.” E.E.O.C. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 124 F. Supp.
3d 1136, 1158 (D. Kan. 2015) (approving of the employer’s refusal to provide the applicant a list
of the essential functions of the job and to permit him to “demonstrate” his abilities to perform
those duties) aff’d sub nom. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. BNSF Ry. Co., 853 F.3d 1150
(10th Cir. 2017). In fact, the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff’s vision limitation was
actually accommodated here, as he was permitted to have someone (his driver) assist him with
reading and completing the application paperwork. This individual also accompanied him when
he returned to submit the completed Pre-employment Medical Screening forms. There is no
evidence Plaintiff asked for (or needed) anything else to assist him with completing the application
process in order to be considered for the job. Furthermore, Plaintiff “points to no authority
suggesting that he is entitled to an accommodation [such as a site visit by a counselor] to assist
him in proving to [Defendant] that he could perform the essential functions of the position despite
the results of the medical evaluation process.” Id.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown—and, in light of the foregoing, cannot show, as he
must—that the requested “accommodation” (allowing a third party to come into the plant and
23
inspect employee activities) was a reasonable one, nor has he provided authority establishing that
Defendant’s duty to engage in an interactive process required it to permit the vocational counselor
to do a site visit. See Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 819 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“The duty to engage in an interactive process does not mandate a meeting with an employee’s . .
. vocational counselor. . . . The ADA envisions no more than ‘a flexible, interactive process by
which the employer and employee determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation.’”)
(quoting Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000)).
In closing, the Court emphasizes that, despite having had the benefit of discovery aids
throughout this case, Plaintiff has never identified an actual reasonable “modification[] or
adjustment[] to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position
. . . is customarily performed, that [would] enable [Plaintiff] to perform the essential functions” of
the marination mixer position despite his being legally blind, much less that such modification or
adjustment is a reasonable one. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).
The facts of this case are fairly straightforward and do not support recovery under the ADA.
Plaintiff successfully applied for, was interviewed for, and was conditionally offered a job as a
marination mixer in a chicken processing plant. The very purpose (i.e., essential functions) of that
job was to load, operate, and monitor very large pieces of machinery that mixed preciselymeasured spices, tumbled the chicken with the spices, and moved the marinated chicken out on a
conveyor belt in an environment featuring slip and trip hazards and a bevy of other moving
machines and equipment. After learning during the medical screening process that Plaintiff had a
vision issue, Defendant pursued additional information about his limitations and abilities. When
Plaintiff’s eye doctor specifically reported that Plaintiff could not work with machinery and
equipment and could not do tasks requiring “good vision,” Defendant reasonably concluded that
24
Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job. Plaintiff did not demand any specific
“modification[] or adjustment[] to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under
which the position . . . is customarily performed, that [would] enable [Plaintiff] to perform the
essential functions” of the marination mixer position despite his being legally blind, 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (emphasis added), and he still has never identified any such accommodation
during the pendency of this lawsuit. As a result, he has failed to make the necessary prima facie
showing that he is a “qualified individual” under the ADA, and he cannot succeed on his claims
that Defendant violated the ADA by failing to hire him or by failing to engage with him in the
“interactive process.” The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary judgment
as to Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claims. 5
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the “after-acquired evidence” defense, but GRANTS Defendant Norman
W. Fries, Inc. d/b/a Claxton Poultry Farms’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s
claims against it, (doc. 50). The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate
judgment of dismissal and to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED this 27th day of September, 2019.
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
5
Since Plaintiff’s substantive claims have failed, he is not entitled to any punitive damages, (doc. 5, p. 15).
See J. Kinson Cook of Ga., Inc. v. Heery/Mitchell, 644 S.E.2d 440, 449 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
25
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