Daker v. Dozier et al

Filing 20

ORDER denying 3 Motion for Recusal; denying 5 Motion for Recusal. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 3/15/2019. (pts)

COURT
tE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

uiV.

2019 HAR |5 AM 9 53

STATESBORO DIVISION

WASEEM DAKER,

SO.DiSLiiroI"^Plaintiff,
•k

*

V.

CV 618-032

*

COMMISSIONER GREGORY DOZIER,

5

et al.,

k

k

Defendants.

*
k

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiff's pro se motions to recuse.

{Docs. 3, 5.)

Plaintiff requests that both the undersigned and

United States Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker recuse themselves
"from this case and any further cases involving" Plaintiff.
to Recuse, Doc. 3, at 1.)

(Mot.

These two motions are identical to each

other and to the motions for recusal Plaintiff filed in at least

three other cases before this Court.^
case's

factual

and

procedural

A short history of this

background

is

available

in

the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation entered on March 7,
2019. (See Doc. 19.)

1 See Dakar v. Allen, Case No. 6:17-CV-023, Doc. 95 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018)
("Allen I"); Daker v. Allen, Case No. 6:17-CV-079, Doc. 52 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 5,

2018) ("Allen II"); Daker v. Dozier, Case No. 6:17-CV-110, Doc. 18 (S.D. Ga.
Mar. 5, 2018) ("Dozier").

In each of these cases the Court denied Plaintiff's

motion to recuse. (See Allen I, Doc. 98; Allen II, Doc. 55; Dozier, Doc. 21.)

Plaintiff asserts that recusal is required of the undersigned

and Magistrate Judge Baker pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because
''[t]his Court's history of orders shows a pattern by both Judge

Hall and Magistrate Baker of treating Mr. Daker disparately and
discriminatorily as compared to other cases, and saying anything
it can to rubberstamp-dismiss any and every case he files." (Mot.
to Recuse, at 4.)

Plaintiff further contends that the undersigned

and Magistrate Judge Baker have acted as ^^surrogate prosecutor[s]
"
and have ''flipflopped" by issuing inconsistent rulings across
Plaintiff's multiple pending cases.

(Id. at 16-22.)

Recusal is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.

Jones v.

Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 459 F. App'x 808, 810-11 (11th

Cir. 2012).

a

Under Section 144, a judge must recuse himself when

party to a

district court proceeding "files a timely and

sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is

pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in
favor of any adverse party." 28 U.S.C. § 144. "To warrant recusal
under § 144, the moving party must allege facts that would convince
a

reasonable

person

that

bias

actually exists."

Christo

v.

Padgett, 223 F.Sd 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Jones, 459

F. App'x at 811 ("The facts alleged in the affidavit must show
that the bias was personal, not judicial in nature." (citing United
States V. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 682 (5th Cir. 1977))).

Section

455(a)

requires

recusal

where

"an

objective,

disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying
the

grounds

on

which

recusal

was

sought

would

entertain

significant doubt about the judge's impartiality."

Parker v.

Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988).
doubts must be resolved in favor of recusal.

a

Any

United States v.

Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989).

Generally, judicial rulings "cannot serve as the basis for
recusal or cast doubts on impartiality unless [the moving party]

establishes pervasive bias and prejudice." Jones, 459 F. App'x at

811 (citing Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d at 682); see also Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) ("[J]udicial rulings
alone

almost

never

constitute

a

valid

partiality motion." (citation omitted)).

basis

for

a

bias

or

"Neither a trial judge's

comments on lack of evidence, rulings adverse to a party, nor

friction between the court and counsel constitute pervasive bias."
Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647,

651 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted); see also Liteky, 510
U.S. at 555 ("[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced

or events

occurring

in

the

course

of the

current

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis
for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism

or

antagonism

that

impossible." (emphasis added)).

would

make

fair

judgment

Here, Plaintiff's bias allegations are based on comparisons
between his cases and the cases of other inmates before this Court
and

for

inconsistencies

between

the

Court's

rulings.^

These

allegations, however, are insufficient to warrant recusal of the
assigned judges in this case.

First, Magistrate Judge Baker, having been confirmed as a

District Judge in this District, is no longer serving on this case.
(See In re Magistrate Judge Case Assignments, Case No. 1:18-MC012, Doc. 1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 5, 2018).)

Accordingly, Plaintiff's

motion for recusal of Judge Baker is denied as moot.

Second, Plaintiff did not satisfy the relevant procedural

requirements of Section 144.

See 28 U.S.C. § 144.

motions do

affidavits,

not

include

any

much

less

Plaintiff's
a

legally

sufficient one.

Further, even ignoring the procedural defects, the majority
of Plaintiff's arguments stem from his disagreement with the
Court's rulings in his cases.

Plaintiff cites case law that

purportedly shows why the Court's rulings are incorrect.

Such

2 For example, 'Plaintiff argues the Court ^^flipflopped" in its treatment of
Allen I and Daker v. Allen, Case No. 4:17-CV-106 (S.D. Ga. filed June 19, 2017)
("Allen III"). Both cases concerned whether a habeas corpus petition was an
appropriate avenue to challenge placement in segregation. The Court, however,

granted Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and vacated its Order in Allen
III to bring it in line with the prior ruling in Allen I. (See Allen III, Doc.
28.)
Because the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and
harmonized its rulings in Allen I and Allen III, Plaintiff's bias argument holds
no weight.

disagreements with judicial rulings are not ^'a valid basis for a

bias or partiality motion."

See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556.

Finally, Plaintiff s quibbles with the amount of time he was

granted for an extension as compared to other pro se litigants.
However, this is not the type of decision that demonstrates bias
or partiality.

See id. (''A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom

administration . . . remain

immune".)

Again,

allegations are judicial, not personal, in nature.

Plaintiff's

In total.

Plaintiff failed to present evidence that shows a ^Meep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible"
or otherwise raise an objective doubt about the assigned judges'

impartiality. See id. at 555. Therefore, recusal of the assigned
judges is not required, and Plaintiff's motions for recusal (Docs.
3, 5) are DENIED.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this /^dav of March,
2019.

J. TONmL HALL/ CHIEF JUDGE

UNIT^JXSTATES DISTRICT COURT
ITHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA