Sartin v. Statesboro Police Department et al

Filing 8

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS that the re 1 Complaint filed by Annie-Delester: Sartin should be dismissed and closed. Objections to R&R due by 9/16/2024. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 8/29/24. (wwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
ANNIE-DELESTER:SARTIN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
CV 624-041
)
STATESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT;
)
BULLOCH COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; )
and LAKEVIEW IN MARKET DISTRICT/
)
THE GRAND,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_________________________________________________________
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
_________________________________________________________
Plaintiff commenced the above-captioned case pro se and is proceeding in forma

pauperis (“IFP”). Because she is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff’s complaint must be screened to
protect potential Defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984).
I.

Screening the Complaint
A.

Background

In her complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants (1) Statesboro Police Department; (2)
Bulloch County Sheriff’s Office; and (3) Lakeview in Market District/The Grand. (See doc.
no. 1, pp. 1-3.) Taking all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must for purposes of
the present screening, the facts are as follows.
On November 14, 2023, Plaintiff was “was stopped by a debt collector who works for
Statesboro Police.” (Id. at 14.) As Plaintiff is not a United States citizen, she produced a

passport and international license to the police officer in support of her “right to travel,” but
the officer told her that if she did not exit the car, he would pull her out. (Id.) The officer then
handcuffed Plaintiff, kidnapped her, and took her to the Bulloch County Jail. (Id.) Plaintiff
was released the same day and then “recission the cit[a]tion on 11-15-2023 to return to sender
as [her] rights.” (Id.) At a court proceeding on January 17, 2024, the judge did not accept
Plaintiff’s “special appearance,” refused to dismiss the citation, and issued a bench warrant for
Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. at 14-15.)
On June 21, 2024, the Statesboro Police were banging on her door, and the maintenance
man allowed officers to “enter [her] private space without [her] consent,” resulting in her arrest
on a failure to appear warrant. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff later discovered a “1013 law” related to
her “mental awareness” was done without her permission or that of her family. 1 (Id.) Plaintiff
entered a not guilty plea at Bulloch County Jail Court but was detained for twenty-eight days.
(Id.) According to publicly available records, Plaintiff was found guilty of the traffic violations
of (1) speeding and (2) driving without a valid license and sentenced to twenty-eight days of
confinement. See State v. Sartin, STCR2023002148 (Bulloch Cnty. State Ct. Dec. 8, 2023),
available at https://peachcourt.com/ (use “Case Search” by “Party Name” in Bulloch Cnty.

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According to Peachtree Wellness Solutions:

A 1013 mental health is an involuntary commitment form used in the state of
Georgia as a legal procedure that allows the temporary detainment [of] individuals
in a mental health crisis who pose a danger to themselves. A 1013 is usually
initiated when someone presents an immediate risk from severe mental health
disorder symptoms or suicidal ideation.
Available at https://peachtreewellnessmh.com/1013-mental-health/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2024).

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State Ct.; then search for “Sartin, Annie”; last visited Aug. 29, 2024). 2 While detained in
Bulloch County Jail, Plaintiff encountered mold, unclean vents and mats, rude staff, and
unsatisfactory food that did not include any fruit. (Doc. no. 1, p. 15.) Plaintiff seeks over four
million dollars in damages. (Id. at 6.)
It is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff was detained when she commenced this case.
The disposition date of the traffic citations is listed in court records as July 18, 2024, (State v.
Sartin, STCR2023002148, doc. no. 22), and she signed her Prisoner Complaint form on July
19, 2024, (doc. no. 1, p. 13). Plaintiff did not comply with the Court’s order directing her to
clarify her status as an incarcerated or nonincarcerated litigant. (See doc. nos. 5, 6.)
B.

Discussion
1.

Legal Standard for Screening

The complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous
if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc.,
366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.
1997)).

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The Court may take judicial notice of state court dockets available online. See Paez v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 947 F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); United States v.
Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting court may take judicial notice of another court’s
records to establish the existence of ongoing litigation and related filings).
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To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
allegations in the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed
factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” or if it “tenders ‘naked
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w]
that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
The court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant’s pleadings, holding them to a
more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal construction does not
mean that the court has a duty to re-write the complaint. See Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d
903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020); Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
2.

Plaintiff’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed for Failing to Follow a
Court Order

Because Plaintiff submitted her complaint on a form entitled “Complaint for Violation
of Civil Rights (Prisoner Complaint),” detailed her dissatisfaction with her treatment in the
Bulloch County Jail, and provided a prisoner ID number, (see doc. no. 1), it appeared to the

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Court Plaintiff was incarcerated. However, Plaintiff’s first IFP motion only provided answers
to the questions on page one of the two-page IFP motion, and the limited information was
provided under the heading for non-incarcerated litigants. (See doc. no. 2.) As Plaintiff had
not completed the entire IFP form, the Court did not have sufficient information to determine
whether she should be allowed to proceed IFP and directed her to submit a new, fully
completed motion to proceed IFP. (Doc. no. 3.) At the Court’s direction, the Clerk of Court
provided Plaintiff with Form AO 240, Application to Proceed in District Court Without
Prepaying Fees or Costs (Short Form). (Doc. no. 3-1.) In the order directing Plaintiff to file a
completed IFP motion, the Court cautioned “Plaintiff that any attempt to utilize frivolous
sovereign citizen litigation tactics will be flatly rejected.” (Doc. no. 3, pp. 2-3 (collecting cases
rejecting frivolous sovereign citizen legal theories).)
The Form AO 240 IFP motion Plaintiff returned was again filled out under the section
for non-incarcerated litigants and suggested she had no income from any source, no assets, no
money in a savings or checking account, and no monthly obligations or other debts. (Doc. no.
4, pp. 1-2.) Yet Plaintiff also listed a Post Office Box for an address, two telephone numbers,
and an email address on her pleadings. (Doc. no. 1, p. 12.) The numbers did not add up, as
there is no explanation how Plaintiff pays for living expenses such as housing or food, let alone
a telephone(s), if she is not incarcerated.
Thus, the Court afforded Plaintiff a second opportunity to submit a proper IFP motion
and specifically instructed Plaintiff that she “must clarify her status as an incarcerated on nonincarcerated litigant, and she must provide the IFP information that matches her current litigant
status.” (Doc. no. 5, p. 2.) Despite receiving detailed instructions concerning the financial

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information that must be disclosed, (id. at 3), Plaintiff again submitted an IFP motion – under
penalty of perjury – suggesting she has no income from any source, no assets, no money in a
savings or checking account, and no monthly obligations or other debts. (See doc. no. 6.)
Moreover, in contravention of the Court’s prior warning about frivolous sovereign citizen
jargon, Plaintiff again signed her name with a colon, declared she was a “[l]iving woman of
god who has dominion on this land,” and challenged the Court to “prove to [her] there is lawful
money.” (Id. at 5.) She concluded with the declaration, “This application is an extension of
credit and a promissory note for exchange of tender of payment, bill of exchange as security.”
(Id.)
A district court has authority to manage its docket to expeditiously resolve cases, and
this authority includes the power to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to comply
with a court order. Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556
F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)); see also Eades v. Ala. Dep’t
of Human Res., 298 F. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“District courts possess
the ability to dismiss a case . . . for want of prosecution based on two possible sources of
authority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) or their inherent authority to manage their dockets.”).
Moreover, the Local Rules of the Southern District of Georgia dictate that an “assigned Judge
may, after notice to counsel of record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of
prosecution, with or without prejudice . . . [for] [w]illful disobedience or neglect of any order
of the Court; or [a]ny other failure to prosecute a civil action with reasonable promptness.”
Loc. R. 41.1 (b) & (c). Finally, dismissal without prejudice is generally appropriate pursuant
to Rule 41(b) where a plaintiff has failed to comply with a court order, “especially where the
litigant has been forewarned.” Owens v. Pinellas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 331 F. App’x 654,

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655 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.
1989)).
Here, Plaintiff’s failure to clarify her status as an incarcerated or non-incarcerated litigant,
along with her failure to submit an IFP motion with current, accurate, and complete financial
information and her reliance on nonsensical sovereign citizen jargon, 3 evidences her willful
disobedience of the Court’s prior orders. The Court cautioned Plaintiff that failing to comply
with the terms of the Court’s orders would result in a recommendation for dismissal. (Doc.
no. 3, p. 2; doc. no. 5, p. 3.) Thus, dismissal of this case without prejudice is appropriate.
3.

Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

Even if the case were not due to be dismissed for failure to comply with prior court
orders, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
a.

Plaintiff Does Not Connect Lakeview in Market District/The
Grand to Any Alleged Wrongful Conduct

The Eleventh Circuit has held that a district court properly dismisses a defendant where
a prisoner, other than naming the defendant in the caption of the complaint, fails to state any
allegations that associate the defendant with the purported constitutional violation. Douglas
v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we do not require technical niceties
in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how
3

As has previously been explained to Plaintiff, (doc. no. 3, pp. 2-3), courts routinely reject
such patently frivolous attempts to avoid the statutes, rules, and regulations applicable to all federal
litigants. See, e.g., Jackson v. Inch, 816 F. App’x 309, 311 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing
United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 223 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) for proposition that “courts have
repeatedly and ‘summarily rejected [sovereign-citizen legal theories] as frivolous’”); see also
Roach v. Arrisi, No. 8:15-cv-2547-T-33AEP, 2016 WL 8943290, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2016)
(recognizing “sovereign citizen theories have been found to be ‘utterly frivolous’ and patently
ludicrous,’ using ‘tactics’ that are a waste of their time as well as the court’s time, which is being
paid for by hard-earned tax dollars”).
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overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”). Thus, Plaintiff must describe how each
individual participated in any alleged constitutional violation or other acts and omissions she
claims to have caused her injury. Here, Plaintiff lists Lakeview in Market District/The Grand
as a Defendant in the caption of the complaint and the portion of the form reserved for
identifying Defendants, (doc. no. 1, pp. 1-3), but she does not mention this entity anywhere in
her statement of claim, or even explain what it is. As Plaintiff does not substantively mention
this Defendant and does not make any allegations associating it with a purported constitutional
violation, let alone explain how it qualifies as a person acting under color of state law, dismissal is
appropriate. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (requiring in § 1983 case allegation of
violation of right secured by Constitution or laws of United States by person acting under color
of state law).
b.

Sheriff and Police Departments Are Not Subject to Suit

The Bulloch County Sheriff’s Office is not a proper party because sheriff’s departments
are not legal entities capable of being sued. See Wilkerson v. Brown, CV 616-066, 2016 WL
4472972, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2016) (“[T]he Bulloch County Sheriff’s Department is not
an entity subject to suit under Section 1983.”), adopted by 2016 WL 6272395 (S.D. Ga. Oct.
25, 2016); Herrington v. Effingham Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, CV 411-099, 2011 WL 2550464,
at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr, 21, 2011) (“However, [Plaintiff] cannot sue the sheriff’s department
because it is not capable of being sued.” (citing Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.
1992) and collected cases)), adopted by 2011 WL 2550459 (S.D. Ga. June 27, 2011); Smith v.
Dekalb Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-2820-TWT, 2010 WL 308984, at *2
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2010) (same). Likewise, the Statesboro Police Department is not a viable

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Defendant. Lovelace v. DeKalb Cent. Probation, 144 F. App’x 793, 795 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (affirming dismissal of county police department because it is not legal entity subject to
suit); Green v. Cunningham, CV 418-210, 2018 WL 6310269, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 3, 2018)
(explaining “the police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”), adopted by
2019 WL 136991 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2019). Further, appropriate parties for suit under § 1983
include “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (subjecting
only “persons” to liability); Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502
(Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a
corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue”)
(quotations omitted). Thus, neither Defendant Bulloch County Sheriff’s Office nor Statesboro
Police Department are not capable of being sued and are subject to dismissal.
II.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s

case be DISMISSED and CLOSED.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of August, 2024, at Augusta,
Georgia.

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