Davis v. Guam et al

Filing 179

Decision and Order Re Attorneys' Fees and Costs (related document: 162 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs). The court GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES themotion in part. The total award on Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs is $947,717.39. Signed by Chief Judge Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood on 4/8/2019. (fad, )

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FILED

DISTRICT COURT OF GU^M

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<^>A?R08Zo,j»y^

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JEANNE G. QUINATA
CLERK OF COURT

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THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM
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ARNOLD DAVIS, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated,

CIVIL CASE NO. 11-00035

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Plaintiff,
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DECISION AND ORDER

vs.

RE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

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GUAM, GUAM ELECTION COMMISSION,
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ALICE M. TAIJERON, MARTHA C. RUTH,
JOSEPH F. MESA, JOHNNY P. TAITANO,
JOSHUA F. RENORIO, DONALD I.
WEAKLEY, and LEONARDO M.
RAPADAS,
Defendants.

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Before the court is Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. See PL's Mot., ECF

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No. 162. For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES the

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motion in part. The total award on Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs is $947,717.39.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background have been thoroughly recounted in the court's
order dated March 8, 2017. See Order, ECF No. 149. Accordingly, the court finds no reason to

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rehash this information herein.
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DISCUSSION

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a.

Entitlement to Attorney Fees

This is a civil rights action that deals with the topic of self-determination of the political

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status of the island and who should have the right to vote on a referendum concerning such.

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Plaintiff—a white, non-Chamorro, male and resident of Guam—was prohibited from registering

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to vote on the referendum. This court determined the prohibition was a violation of the Fifteenth

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Amendment's prohibition of racial discrimination in voting and the Fourteenth Amendment's

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Equal Protection Clause. Because there was a clear violation of the Fifteenth and Fourteenth

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Amendments, the court found it unnecessary to address the statutory arguments presented by

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Plaintiff.

There are two federal statutes entitling Plaintiff to receive attorneys' fees: 52 U.S.C. §

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10310(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Voting Rights Act provides in part that, "[i]n any action

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or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the

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court, in its discretion, may allowthe prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable

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attorney's fee, reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the

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costs." 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e).

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Similarly, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (as amended) provides in

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part that, "[i]n any action orproceeding to enforce a provision ofsection[]... 1983 [civil action

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for deprivation ofrights]... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other

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than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

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Defendants are not contesting that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of

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Plaintiffs motionon attorneys' fees or that Plaintiffis entitled to attorneys' fees. What is at issue

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iswhether the attorneys' fees inthe amount claimed are reasonable. See Defs.' Opp'n. at 7-8,l

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1The page citations throughout thisOrder are based onthe page numbering provided by the CM/ECF system.
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ECF No. 172.
b. Standard

The Supreme Court has found that "[t]he most useful starting point for determining the

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amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

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multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983). This is

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known as the "lodestar figure," which is a "presumptively reasonable fee." Gonzalez v. City of

Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196,1202 (9th Cir. 2013). And as the Supreme Court has previously held,
the presumption is a "strong" one. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010).
The court may then adjust the lodestar figure upward or downward based on the factors set forth

in Kerr that are not subsumed in the lodestar calculation.2 Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202.

The party applying for fees "bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The

party opposing the fees "has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the
district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts

asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits." Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,
1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992).

TheNinthCircuit recognizes that because "awarding attorney's fees to prevailing parties

incivil rights cases is a tedious business," the trial court "should normally grant the award in
full" if the party opposing the fee request "cannot come upwith specific reasons for reducing the

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2The Kerr factors are as follows: (1) the time andlabor required; (2) the novelty anddifficulty ofthe questions; (3)

the skill requisite to perform thelegal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by theattorney due
to acceptance of thecase; (5) thecustomary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed orcontingent; (7)time limitations
imposed by theclient orthecircumstances; (8) theamount involved and theresults obtained; (9) theexperience,
reputation, and ability of theattorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of thecase; (11) thenature and length of the
professional relationship withtheclient; and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526
F.2d 67,70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976).

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fee request." Moreno v. CityofSacramento, 534 F.3d 1106,1116 (9th Cir. 2008). At the same

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time,'nothing compels a court to overlook ambiguities in a requesting party's supporting

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materials.

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c.

Reasonable Rates

An established standard for determining a reasonable hourly rate is the "rate prevailing in
the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and

reputation." Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). The general rule is that the relevant community is the forum in which the district court
sits. Id. However, rates from outside the forum may be used if local counsel was "unwilling or

unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization

required to handle properly the case." Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,1405 (9th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff seeks a local rate of $250.00 for his local counsel on Guam, Mun Su Park; and

Washington, D.C. rates for the following off island counsel: J. Christian Adams of Election Law
Center; Michael E. Rosman, Christopher J. Hajec, and Michelle A. Scott of Center for Individual

Rights; andDouglas R. Cox, Scott P. Martin, Marisa C. Maleck, Jason J. Mendro, Amir C.
Tayrani, and Russell B. Balikian of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. See Decl. of Adams at 9,
ECFNo. 162-1; Decl. of Park at 2, ECF No. 162-7; Decl. of Rosman at 3-4, ECF No. 162-9;and
Decl. of Cox at 9, ECF No. 162-20.

Defendants argue thatthe relevant community is Guam so Guam rates should be applied
for Plaintiffs Washington, D.C.-based attorneys. Defs.' Opp'n at 8-12, ECF No. 172.

Defendants dispute Plaintiffs claim thatthere are no qualified attorneys on Guam willing to
accept the case. Id. at 9. Defendants statethat they contacted six law firms on Guam, who are
"considered to be qualified to handle the Plebiscite litigation." Id.. Out of the six contacted, only

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one indicated that it wouldhave taken the case.3 See Decl. of Sablan at 1-2, ECF No. 172-2. In

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addition, Defendants argue that the "local community" also includes the Commonwealth of the

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Mariana Islands ("CNMI"), relying on a dissenting opinion in Guam Society ofObstetricians and

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Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 1996). See Opp'n at 10, ECF No. 172.

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The court finds Defendants' argument unpersuasive. Other than a dissenting opinion,

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Defendants did not provide any binding legal authority to support their contention that "local

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community"4 includes the neighboring islands of CNMI and that therefore, Plaintiffshould have

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also checked with the CNMI bar members.

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Moreover, Defendants rely on Paeste v. Government ofGuam, 2013 WL 6254669 (9th

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Cir. Dec. 3,2013), in support of their contention that Guam hourly rates should be used for

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Plaintiffs Washington, D.C.-based attorneys. That case is distinguishable. In Paeste, the Ninth

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Circuit found that the Guam rate was appropriate and rejected the application of San Francisco

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hourly rates, because there wasno evidence thatlocal counsel was either unwilling or

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unavailable. Paeste, 2013 WL 6254669, at *4. The only explanation for the requested San

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Francisco rates was a declaration statingthat "given the complexityof the issues... and to

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maximize the potential for success in bringing a case to Court and prevailing ... [,]" counsel

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determined to seek off-island counsel with experience in complex class action suits. Id. Counsel

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also made conclusory statements bytheorizing thatthereason why "no other attorneys stepped

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forward to represent the proposed class oftaxpayers ..." was because no one wanted to

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challenge the Governor of Guam. Id. The Ninth Circuit found these declarations to be

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insufficient and are not evidence to provethat local counsel was unwilling or unavailable. Id. at

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3An attorney from another firm appears to have contradictory statements, first indicating that his law firm could
have taken thecase only to later state that he"declined to speculate as to whether ornotthe firm would have taken it
in the first place."See Decl. of Sablan, at 2, ECFNo. 172-2.
4The courtwill construeDefendants' reference to a "local community" as"relevant community" for purposes ofthe
reasonable rate analysis.
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3-4.

Unlike Paeste, Plaintiff in this case provided evidence to justify using rates from outside

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the Guam forum, by showing that local counsel was unavailable either because they are

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unwilling or unable to perform. Plaintiff himself contacted at least ten Guam attorneys by phone.

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Decl. of Davis at 2, ECF No. 162-6. It soon became apparent to him that no one was willing to

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represent him. Id. Davis stated that more than one attorney whom he contacted told him that it

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would be unlikely for him to find representation on Guam. Id. At least one attorney told Davis

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that accepting the case would be detrimental to his business as it would affect his relationship

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with local judges. Id.

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Plaintiffs counsel, J. Christian Adams, contacted a total of 27 Guam attorneys in an

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effort to obtain local counsel. Decl. of Adams at 3, ECF No. 162-1. Adams spent several hours

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on long distance telephone calls to Guam bar members "attemptingto ascertainthe names of

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lawyers whomay be willing to participate in the case as local counsel." Id. Adams then made

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appointments and personally met with lawyers on Guam over the course of a week. Id. In his

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attempt to secure a local counsel for this case, Adams declares:

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In not one single instance of these meetings in their offices on
Guam with Guam Bar Association members with either significant

experience in contested civil litigation in the United States District
Court or with a measure of expertise in either elections or Guam

politics, wasthe attorney willing to work on the case. In fact, some
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of these conversations became quickly uncomfortable for both

myself and, from myperspective, from the Guam BarAssociation
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memberas I discussed plans to challenge the status plebiscite. For
example, some members defended the plebiscite in these
discussions and retaining these lawyers was not a realistic
possibility.

... [I]tbecame clearin these meetings that at leastone member of

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the Guam Bar Association was even afraid to take the case. These

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fears were expressly shared with me by one lawyer. One local
lawyer with offices in Hagatna told me, "I haveto live here. I have
an office buildinghere," inferring that damagemight inure to his

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person or property. The fears expressed to me by members of the
Guam Bar Association ranged from fear ofjudges or officials
viewing the attorney less favorably for their other clients, to
sincere concerns about their safety and property if they took the
case...

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Some lawyers I met who had significant litigation experience or a
measure of expertise in Guam elections or politics became so
visibly uncomfortable with the mention of a plebiscite challenge
that I terminated the meeting...

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Id. at 4. The unwillingness of Guam attorneys to take this case was also experienced by

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Defendants themselves when a local law firm they contacted informed them that "they would not

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have taken the case because of the political nature of the issues involved." See Decl. of Sablan at

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2, ECF No. 172-2.

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After speaking with Guam attorneys who rejected representation of Plaintiff, Adams did

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not stop there. Adams inquired from them if they knew anyone else on Guam who might be

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interested in taking the case. See Decl. of Adams at 3, ECF No. 175-1. Adams received

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"befuddled and uncomfortable looks" and most of them declined to recommend an attorney. Id.

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In addition to phone calls and in-person meetings, Adams also reached out to Guam attorneys by

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email. Id.

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While Defendants may have found one law firm on Guam willing to take the case, this

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wasall done in hindsight. It is unknown to this court what the law firm's response would have

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been hadthey been asked prior to the commencement of the case, not by Government, but by

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Plaintiff.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds thatPlaintiff made reasonable efforts to find local

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counsel but was faced withthe unwillingness of Guam attorneys to represent him. When Plaintiff

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was finally able to find local counsel willing totake the case, the local counsel lacked the degree

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ofexperience, expertise, orspecialization required to handle the case properly. See Decl. of Park

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at 2, ECF No. 162-7. Accordingly, because of the unavailability of local counsel eitherbecause

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they were unwilling or unable to perform, this court will depart from the forum-rate rule and

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apply Washington, D.C. rates to Plaintiffs non-local counsel.

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TheWashington, D.C. rates that Plaintiffis seeking for his non-local counsel are the
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hourly rates identified for the 2016-2017 rates in the U.S Attorneys' Office Matrix ("USAO

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Matrix"). PL's Mot. at 18, ECF No. 162-24. Defendants do not argue that the USAO Matrix

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hourly rates are unreasonable for the Washington, D.C. legal community. Rather, Defendants

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only argue that the rates are unreasonable because the relevant community is Guam. The

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declarations by Sheldon Bradshaw and Bradley J. Schlozman support finding that Plaintiffs

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requested hourly rates using the USAO Matrix are reasonable if D.C. were the relevant

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community.

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Bradshaw is a practicing attorney in Washington, D.C. He was formerly the Principal

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Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Department of Justice

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("DOJ"), wherein he had supervisory oversight of the Voting Section at DOJ. Decl. of Bradshaw

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at 3, ECF No. 162-3. Bradshaw stated that the use of the USAO Matrix in this case is an

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"extremely reasonable hourlyrate based on [his] firsthand experience with hourlyrates charged

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by attorneys in the [Washington, D.C] area, especially so considering the nature of this case."

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Id. at 3-4.

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Schlozman was a practicing attorney in Washington, D.C. He was formerly the Deputy

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Assistant Attorney General of theU.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division, wherein

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among his responsibilities was the enforcement ofelection and voting rights laws. Decl. of

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Schlozman at 2-3, ECFNo. 162-4. Schlozman stated that he considers the rates set forth in the

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USAO Matrix to "likely understate significantly the reasonable attorney fee hourly ratefor a

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lawsuit of this magnitude, particularly in light of [his] firsthand experience of the hourly rates

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routinely charged by experienced voting rights practitioners in Washington D.C." Id. at 3

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(emphasis omitted).

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The court has no reason to believe otherwise that the use of the USAO Matrix in the

Washington, D.C. area for a civil rights case such as this one is unreasonable. Accordingly, the
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court will apply the2016-20175 rates in the USAO Matrix. The Ninth Circuit has long

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"recognized that district courts have the discretion to compensate prevailing parties for any delay

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in the receipt of fees by awarding fees at current rather than historic rates in order to adjust for

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inflation and loss of the use of funds." Gates, 987 F.2d at 1406. However, the rates will be based

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on the experience level of the attorney at the time the work was performed. See e.g., South Yuba

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River Citizens League & Friends ofRiver v. Nat'I Marine Fisheries Serv., 2012 WL 1038131, at

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*6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27,2012).

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Attorney/Law Firm
Mun Su Park, Law Offices of Park and Associates

J. Christian Adams (Election Law Center, PLLC)

Hourly Rate
$250.00
$516.00

(June 2011-May 2014)
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Michael E. Rosman (Center for Individual Rights)

$543
(June 2014-May 2017)
$543.00

(through May 31, 2015)

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$581.00

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Christopher J. Hajec(Centerfor Individual Rights)

(from June 1,2015)
$465.00

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(through May 31,2015)

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$516.00

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(from June 1,2015)

Michelle A. Scott (Center for Individual Rights)

$516.00

Douglas R. Cox (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP)
Scott P. Martin (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP)

$543.00
(from June 1,2016)
$581
$465

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MarisaC. Maleck (Gibson, Dunn & CrutcherLLP)
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Jason J. Mendro (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP)
Amir C. Tayrani (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP)

Russell B. Balikian (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP)
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5 The case ended in 2017.

(through May 31,2016)

(2015-2016)
$395
(2013-2014)
$322
(2013-2014)
$465
$465
$332
(2013-2014)

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See Decl. of Adams at 9, ECF No. 162-1; Decl. of Park at 2, ECF No. 162-7; Decl. of Rosman at

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3-4, ECF No. 162-9; Decl. of Cox at 9, ECF No. 162-20; and Ex. 4 to Decl. of Rosman at 12,

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ECF No. 162-10.

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The Election Law Center utilized one paralegal with an hourly rate of $20, although it

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could have requested for the prescribed hourly rate under the USAO Matrix in Washington, D.C.

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See Decl. of Adams at 8-9, ECF No. 162-1. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP utilized three

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paralegals and two research librarians with an hourly rate of $157, which is the prescribed rate

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under the USAO Matrix in Washington, D.C, for paralegals and law clerks. See Decl. of Cox at

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4, ECF No. 162-20; and Ex. 4 to Decl. of Rosman at 12, ECF No. 162-10.

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d.

Reasonable Hours

Time is reasonably expended on the litigation when it is "useful and of a type ordinarily

necessary to securethe final result obtainedfrom the litigation." Webb v. Bd. OfEduc. ofDyer

County, 471 U.S. 234,242 (1985). Counsel hasthe burden to demonstrate that the number of

hours spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Further, counsel
bears the burden of submitting detailed time records justifyingthe hours claimedto have been

expended. Id. The court may reduce hours where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if the
case was overstaffed and hoursare duplicated; if the hours expended are deemedexcessive or

otherwise unnecessary. Id. at 433-34. The court may also reduce hours unreasonably spent, or
where excessive time is spent on a particular task, or where there is redundant and/or ambiguity
in the billing. Id.

i. J. CHRISTIAN ADAMS, ELECTION LAW CENTER, PLLC

J. Christian Adams ("Adams") is claiming a total of 719 hours and 34 minutes. PL's
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Mem. at 23, ECF No. 162-24.
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1. Block Billing and Lack of Detail
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Defendants objectto Adams' billable hours due to the lack of detail and block billing.
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Defs.' Opp'n, at 12, ECF No. 172. Defendants prepared a chart ("Exhibit A"), listing those

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entries that lack detail. See Ex. A to Decl. of Sablan at 5-7, ECF No. 172-2.

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Pursuant to CVLR 54(c)(2)(A), there must be adequate description of the services

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rendered, so that the court can evaluate the reasonableness of the requested fees. The court

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agrees that some of Adams' billable hours lack detail and some entries were billed in block

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format. However, the court, having reviewed the docket sheet and the filings contained therein,

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and as discussed infra, was able to surmise with sufficient detail most of the tasks performed.

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a.

Emails and Conversations

The court cross-referenced the email entries and telephone calls with co-counsel's
billable hours, and it was able to determine the tasks performed.

For example, for the entry dated December 20,2011, "email from cocounsel MR. Email
to cocounsel MR," Ex. A to Decl. of Sablan at 5, ECF No. 172-2, a review of Mr. Rosman's

entry reveals that the email conversation was in regard to Section 2 and foreign policy
exclusivity. See Ex. 8 to Decl. of Rosman at 4, ECF No. 162-12. The December 29,2011,
"Conversation with Michael Rosman," Ex. A to Decl. of Sablan at 5, ECF No. 172-2, shows

from Mr. Rosman's entry that thetopic was onthe opposition brief. See Ex. 8 to Decl. of
Rosman at 4, ECF No. 162-12. The entry dated September 4,2015, "Conversation withcounsel

MR," Ex. A to Decl. of Sablan at 6, ECF No. 172-2, pertains to status of class certification,

summary judgment motion and arguments to be made thereon. See Ex. 13 to Decl. ofRosman at
4, ECFNo. 162-17. The September 24,2015 entry, "Emailsfrom cocounsel...," Ex. A to
Decl. of Sablan at 6, ECF No. 172-2, pertains to the summary judgment motion. See Ex. 13 to
Decl. of Rosmanat 4, ECF No. 162-17. The December 4, 2015, "email to and from cocounsel,"
Ex. A to Decl. of Sablan at 6, ECF No. 172-2, pertainsto correctingtypos in the reply memo

reviewed by Mr. Rosman. See Ex. 13 to Decl. of Rosman at 7, ECF No. 162-17.
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There were other entries pertaining to emails and conversation with co-counsel which

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were not contained in Defendants' Exhibit A, but this court nonetheless reviewed and

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scrutinized. For example, emails on July 27,2012, see Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 5, ECF

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No. 162-2, pertain to discovery dispute and settlement. See Ex. 10 to Decl. of Rosman at 4, ECF

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No. 162-14. The entry dated November 5,2015, "Discussion with cocounsel MR about case,"

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Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 8, ECF No. 162-2, pertains to the response to defendants' motion

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for summary judgment. See Ex. 13 to Decl. of Rosman at 5, ECF No. 162-17.

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There were two entries of "email to and from client" without anything more (entries

dated November 3,2015, and November 23,2015). Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 8-9, ECF No.

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162-2. However, the total time for these two entries is only 23 minutes, with the November 23,

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2015, beingbilled forjust three minutes. The court is well aware that it is counsel's obligation to

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keep his client apprised on the case and therefore finds these entries, even though lacking

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specific details, to be reasonable.

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In Defendants' Exhibit A, Defendants list two entries, one billed for 20 minutes for an

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"[ejmail conversation with opposing counsel" onJune 12,2015, andthe other for 44 minutes for

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a "[conversation with opposing counsel and cocounsel MR" onJune 10,2015. Ex. A to Decl. of

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Sablan at 6, ECF No. 172-2. It is expected and, in fact, highly encouraged, for opposing counsel

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to communicate and confer with each other so as not to waste the court's time as well as to try to

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move the case along. Accordingly, an hour and 4 minutes of communicating withopposing

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counsel, though unknown to this court as to what the conversation pertains to, is reasonable as

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counsel's efforts to attempt to resolve differences.

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In another entry contained in Defendants' Exhibit A, Adams billed for 9 hours for

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"[telephone callsand emails to dozens of Guam contacts and potential witnesses. Telephone

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conversations with local lawyers. Gathering of documentary evidence and photographic
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evidence. Research of Guam Dept. of Chamorro affairs[,]" on September 13,2011. Ex. A to

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Decl. of Sablan at 5, ECF No. 172-2. While this entry was block billed and did not indicate the

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topic of the calls or emails, the court was able to surmise that these calls were in regard to trying

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to obtain local counsel. Adams stated that he spent "many hours on long distance telephone calls

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to members of the Guam Bar Association attempting to ascertain the names of lawyers who may

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be willing to participate in the case as local counsel." Decl. of Adams at 3, ECF No. 162-1. In

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total, Adams made 27 phone calls to Guam attorneys. Id. The court can easily see this task taking

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an entire day.
b. Pleadings Preparation

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As to the entries on preparation and/or legal research on the complaint, motion to dismiss,

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and motion for summary judgment, the court finds that while the entries lack the kind of

specificity the court prefers, the court is intimately familiar with these pleadings and the relevant
legal issues, and after a thorough review of the hours billedfor these pleadings, the court finds
the hours to be reasonable.

For example, in Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, Adams spent a total of 84.37

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hours6 in "preparation" for summary judgment motion. Eighty-four hours in preparation of a
summary judgment motion with 317 pages of exhibits is reasonable andnot excessive to this
court.

Adams spent a total of30hours and 52 minutes7 in legal research and preparation of

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response to defendants' motion to dismiss. Inaddition, Adams spent a total of 30hours and 24

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6See entries dated 08/17/2015,08/18/2015, 08/25/2015, 09/03/2015, 09/04/2015,09/08/2015, 09/09/2015,
09/14/2015,09/17/2015,09/22/2015,09/24/2015,09/29/2015, 10/01/2015, 10/02/2015, 10/04/2015,10/05/2015,
10/23/2015, 10/27/2015, 10/28/2015, 10/29/2015, and 10/30/2015. Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 8, ECF No. 162-

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2.

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7See entries dated 12/05/2011, 12/07/2011, 12/12/2011,12/14/2011, 12/15/2011,12/19/2011, 12/20/2011,
12/22/2011,12/28/2011, 01/02/2012. Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 3-4, ECF No. 162-2.
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minutes8 in hearing preparation. The motion is notoneto be treated lightly, considering that it is

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a dispositive motion, which, if granted (and it was in fact granted), would terminate Plaintiffs

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case. Spending approximately 61 hours to properly defend a motion that could end Plaintiffs

4

case is a very conservative number to this court.

5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17

18
19
20
21
22

The same reasoning and finding goes to the hours Adams spent on preparing a response
to defendants' motion for summary judgment.
c. Discovery and other work performed

Defendants object to other entries they claim lack detail. See Ex. A to Decl. of Sablan at
7, ECF No. 172-2. For example, they object to Adams' entry dated March 14,2016, for 2 hours
and 20 minutes, with the following description, "[preparation of discovery documents. Request

for admission. Requests for production. Interrogatories." Id. Another example was an entry

datedAugust 22,2016, for six hours and 28 minutes, with the following description:
"[preparation for summary judgment motion argument. Id.
These entries contain sufficient detail, and this court is able to determine that the hours

spent on the described work is reasonable. It is enough for Plaintiff to identify at leastthe

"general subject matter" of the entries and "plaintiffs counsel... is notrequired to record in

great detail how each minute ofhis time was expended." Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 989 (9th
Cir. 2004) (internal brackets and citations omitted).

Certainly, Adams could have done a better job recording his billable hours with more

specificity. However, the court does not find his billable hours to beunreasonable as discussed
above. In addition, the court notesthat Adams did not bill for at least 73 hours of work on this
case. See Decl. of Adams at 8, ECF No. 162-1.

23
24

8See entriesdated 10/17/2012, 10/19/2012, 10/29/2012,10/30/2012,11/01/2012, 11/02/2012, 11/08/2012,
11/12/2012,11/14/2012, and 11/15/2012. Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 6-7, ECF No. 162-2.
14

2.

1

2

Travel Time

Defendants object to Adams' travel hours and move the court to reduce the requested

3

hours by at least 50 percent. Defs.' Opp'n. at 19-20, ECF No. 172. The court denies said request.

4

The touchstone in determining whether hours have been properly claimed is reasonableness. The

5

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22

23
24

assessment of reasonableness is made by reference to standards established in dealings between

paying clients and the private bar. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 678 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1982). "When
a lawyer travels for one client he incurs an opportunity cost that is equal to the fee he would have

charged that or another client if he had not been traveling. That is why lawyers invariably charge
their clients for travel time, and usually at the same rate they charge for other time[.]" Henry v.
Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188,194 (7th Cir. 1984). District courts have long granted prevailing

partiestheir full hourly rate for travel time. E.g., United States v. The City and Cnty. ofSan
Francisco, 748 F.Supp. 1416 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F.Supp.2d 1068 (N.D.
Cal. 2010).

This court has first-hand experience in traveling from Guam to the East Coast, including
Washington, D.C. Flights are typically longer than 20 hours. Although Adams is entitled to his

full hourly rate for travel time, Adams discounted most of his travel time. For example, he only
charged 15 hours on September 26,2011, and September 15,2012; 12 hours on September22,
2012, November 13,2012, and November 16,2012; 8 hours on August 30,2016; and 14 hours

on September 2,2016. See Attach. A to Decl. of Adams, ECFNo. 162-2. The court also observes
that the majorityof his travel includedAdams workingon the case. Adams did not bill for the
time he slept on the plane. Decl. of Adams at 3, ECF No. 175-1.

As to Adams' Saipan travel on September 24, 2011, the court does not believe that
Adams double billed for this entry. There are two Saipan travel references on September 24,

2011. As there is no billed Saipan lodging expense and the airfare ticket shows the same date for
15

1

travel to and from Saipan, see Attach. D to Decl. of Adams at 2-3, ECF No. 162-5, the court

2

finds that the first reference was travel to Saipan from Guam, and the second reference was

3

travel back to Guam from Saipan that same day.

4

The court will not reduce Adams' travel time. The court is well-aware of the time it takes

5

to travel to Washington, D.C, from Guam, and the already-reduced travel hours billed by Adams

6

is reasonable.

3. Discovery

7

8
9
10
11

Defendants object to Plaintiffs approach in handling his case and questions whether his
actions were necessary.

For example, Defendants ask this court to cut the requested attorney fees to reflect the
excessive time spent on preparing and conducting depositions. In total, Defendants calculated

12

that Adams billed for approximately 120 hours for time spent preparing and taking depositions.9

13

See Defs.' Opp'n. at 23, ECF No. 172. The court reviewed the entries from August 28,201210

14

15

16

through September21,2012, and found that Adams spent a total of 90 hours and 24 minutes for

both deposition preparation and the actual taking ofdepositions.11 Subtracting 27 hours billed
during the days when the depositions weretaken (entries dated September 17,2012; September

17

18
19
20
21
22

23
24

9Defendants argue that it is impossible to determine exactly howmuch timewasspent on deposition preparation
dueto Adams' block billing. The courtis not so muchconcerned with the block billingbecause Adams grouped
these highly related tasks, e.g., entry dated 09/02/2012, "[deposition prep. Review of evidence and organization of
exhibits and deposition questions[,]" and this court does notbelieve Adams "padded" histime. In fact, hebilled in
real time(e.g. 3-minute phone call, instead of rounding it off and billing by everytenthor fifteenth of the hour),
which is rare for this court to see.

10 Defendants referto "entries for 8/26/12 through 9/21/12," Defs.' Opp'n. at 23, ECFNo. 172,but there is no
August 26,2012 entry so the court will be starting with the August 28, 2012 entry.
11 See entriesdated08/28/2012 (1:45); 08/29/2012 (1:26); 09/02/2012(8:00); 09/04/2012 (8:00); 09/07/2012 (5:40);
09/10/2012 (4:00); 09/11/2012 (2:23); 09/11/2012 (1:08); 09/12/2012 (8:00); 09/13/2012 (2:02); 09/17/2012
(10:00); 09/18/2012 (11:00); 09/19/2012 (10:00); 09/20/2012 (9:00); and09/21/2012 (8:00). See Attach. A to Decl.
of Adams, at 5-6, ECF No. 162-2. The court did not take into account the 15 hours in which Adams was traveling

(entry dated 09/15/2012) andin whichhe prepared en route for the depositions. The court hasalready takenthis 15
hours into account under the travel time.

16

1

20,2012; and September 21,2012), the preparation time is 63 hours and 24 minutes, which on

2

average is a little over 10 hours of preparation per person/witness (as Defendants have noted in

3

their opposition, there were six witnesses).12 Anaverage of 10hours per person to prepare for a

4

deposition is reasonable, particularly if it involved reviewing of evidence and exhibits, as is the

5

case here.

6

In addition, Defendants argue that the depositions were not necessary because Plaintiff

7

did not use any of the depositions taken (Ron McNinch, Ed Alvarez, and Robert Klitzke) in

8

support of his summary judgment motion.13 Defs.' Opp'n. at 22, ECF No. 172. Defendants also

9

question the necessity of Plaintiffs written discovery after the case was remanded from the

10

Ninth Circuit, also arguing that none of it was used in support of Plaintiffs summary judgment

11

motion. Id. at 24. Defendants believed that Plaintiff could have filed his motion for summary

12

judgment without further discovery Id. at 23-24.

13

The standard is not whether such discovery was used to support a particular motion.

14

Rather, it is whether the work "at the time rendered, would have been undertaken by a reasonable

15

and prudent lawyer to advance or protect [the] client's interest in the pursuit of a successful

16

recovery[.]" Moore v. Jas. H Matthews &Co., 682 F.2d830, 839 (9th Cir. 1982).

17

Here, Plaintiffconducted depositions and writtendiscoverynot necessarily for the

18

exclusive usein support of his summary judgment motion. When Plaintiff conducted the

19

discovery, both pre- and post-remand, thecase was setfor trial. See Scheduling Orders, ECF

20
21

12 Only three depositions occurred because discovery was subsequently stayed pursuant to this court's order dated
September 21,2012. ECF No. 69.

22

23
24

13 Defendants argue thatthe depositions of Michael Bevaqua, Jose Garrido, and Carl Gutierrez werealso
unnecessary. See Defs.' Opp'n. at22,ECF No. 172. The court notes that depositions of these three individuals did
not occur, andPlaintiffis not claiming for attorney fees on depositions thatdid not occur. SeeAttach. A to Decl. of
Adams at6, ECF No. 162-2 (entries dated 09/17/2012, 09/20/2012, and 09/21/2012, and cross-referenced with
Attach. D to Decl. of Adams at 17, ECF No. 162-5).
17

1

Nos. 37 and 95. And as Plaintiff pointed out in his Reply, there was no way of him knowing that

2

the trial would not proceed as scheduled. PL's Reply at 15, ECF No. 175. A reasonable and

3

prudent lawyer would take the necessary steps to prepare his case at every stage of the litigation.

4

Whether it was the deposition taking or the written discovery that Plaintiff undertook, this court

5

will not second guess Plaintiffs legal strategy. See Moreno v. CityofSacramento, 534 F.3d

6

1106,1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting post-hoc scrutiny of prevailing party's strategy). This court

7

will also not compare or expect Plaintiff to conduct zero depositions, simply because Defendants

8

felt they did notneed any.14 Additionally, Plaintiffs written discovery took a day's worth of

9

work—9 hours and 59 minutes15—which this court does not find to be excessive and is, in fact,

10
11

minimal.

Defendants also argue that the court should exclude the time spent preparing a motion to

12

compel that was never filed.16 Defs.' Opp'n. at25, ECF No. 172. Other than arguing that the

13

motionto compelwas unnecessary and that "the discovery upon which it was based was

14

unnecessary[,]" id. at 25, Defendants presented nothing else. Defendants failed to cite to any

15

legal authority that would support their assertion that time spenton a motion that was neverfiled

16

should be excluded. The court reviewed Exhibit A of Kenneth Orcutt's Declaration (pages 7-43,

17

ECF 172-1,Defendants' response to Plaintiffs second request for admissions, interrogatories

18

and production), and this court finds it reasonable for Plaintiffto explore the possibility of a

19
20

14 In theirattempt to make a pointthatPlaintiffs discovery was excessive, Defendants pointed out thatthey
conducted onlytwo separate document-production requests, six interrogatories, andzero depositions. See Defs.'
Opp'n. at 23, ECF No. 172.

21

22
23
24

15 See entries dated 01/29/2016 (1:50); 03/14/2016 (2:20); 03/16/2016 (0:03); 03/16/2016 (2:00); 03/17/2016 (0:45);
03/18/2016 (0:30); 03/21/2016 (2:01); and 03/21/2016 (0:30). Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 9-10, ECF No. 162-2.

16 Defendants cited to a total of approximately 11 hours. Defs.' Opp'n. at 25, ECF No. 172. However, four hours of
those were not spenton the motion preparation but rather, they were hoursworked on opposingDefendants' own
motion to compel. See Ex. 14 to Decl. of Rosman at 4, ECFNo. 162-18(entries dated 5/31/2016, "review
defendants' papersin support of motion to compel..."; and 6/6/2016, "review and edit C. Adams draft ofopp to
motion to compel...").
18

1

motion to compel. In addition, this court will not second guess Plaintiffs legal strategy on

2

whether to pursue a motion to compel or not. See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112.
4. Time Spent on reviewing Davis v. Commonwealth Election

3

Commission
4

Defendants object to the time spent by Adams in reviewing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
5

Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission, 844 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2016). In total, Adams
6
7

8

9
10
11
12

13
14
15

16

spent approximately 4 hours and 2 minutes17 in reviewing the case, communicating with his cocounsel about the case, discussing the case with his client, communicating with the plaintiffs
counsel in the Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission, reviewing materials from the lower

court {e.g., district court's opinion and the complaint filed), researching local rules on new
authority, drafting letter to the court about the Ninth Circuit's opinion, and reviewing the
summaryjudgment motion and discussing with co-counsel on whether amendments or

supplements should be made in lightof the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Seeentries datedDecember
29,2016, and January 3,2017, Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 11-12, ECF No. 162-2.

Reviewing an eight-page opinion not only requires just plain reading of the opinion, but it also

requires thoughtful and careful analysis of how this opinion would impact Plaintiffs case.
Accordingly, the court finds that approximately four hours spent on reviewing Davis andother

17

related tasks is reasonable.
18

19

5. Teleconferencing Entry

The court will reduce Adams' entry dated September 25, 2012, "Meeting with legal team

20

about case (MR)," in light of Rosman's identical entry in which Rosman is only billing for 1.00

21

hour for their conversation. See Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 6, ECF No. 162-2; Ex. 10 to

22

Decl. of Rosman at 6, ECF No. 162-14.

23
24

17 See Entries dated 12/29/2016 (3:10); 01/03/2017(0:05); and01/03/2017 (0:47). Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at
11-12, ECF No. 162-2.
19

1

2
Date

3

09/25/2012

Description

Attorney
Adams

Meeting with legal team about

Hours
Claimed
2:00

Approved

Hours

1.00

1.00

1:00

case (MR)
4

09/25/2012

Rosman

Mtg w/C. Adams, T. Pell, and
C. Coates

5

Based on the hour reduction, the court will reduce Adams' fee for September 25, 2012, as
6
follows:
7
Date

8

Description

Amount Claimed

09/25/2012

Meeting with legal team about

$516x2:00 = $1,032

Amount Approved
$516x1:00 = $516

case (MR)
9

6. Total Attorney Fees for Adams

10

Approved

Years
11

Approved Hours

Approved Amounts

Rates

June 2011-May 2014
12

$516

448 hours and 54 minutes

$231,632.40

June 2014-May 2017

$543

269 hours and 40 minutes
718 hours and 34 minutes

$146,429.00
$378,06L40

TOTAL
13

The total attorney fees awarded to Adams is $378,061.40.
14
15

ii.

16

1.

19

Discussion

Mun Su Park ("Park") is claiming a total of 113 hours. PL's Mem. at 23, ECF No. 162-

17
18

Mun Su Park, Law Offices of Park & Associates

24.

Defendantsobject to three entries by Park, arguing that those entries lack detail. See Ex.

20

A to Decl. of Sablan at 7, ECF No. 172-2. The entries at issue are "deposition

21

arrangement/preparation" and "depositions preparation/arrangement" dated September 16,18,

22

and 19, 2012, for a total of 3 hours and 30 minutes. Id. As discussed supra, it is sufficient for

23

Plaintiffto identify at least the general subject matter of the entries. See Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d at

24

989. Spending 3 hours and 30 minutes in deposition arrangements and preparation as the local
20

1
2

counsel for Plaintiff is reasonable to this court.

The court, however, will exclude the duplicative hours on deposition taking. Park is

3

billing a total of 24 hours for deposition taking on September 17, 20, and 21, 2012. See Attach. A

4

to Decl. of Park at 4, ECF No. 162-8. Adams conducted the depositions and had already billed

5

for these hours. Park, on the other hand, "did not examine any witnesses, make any objections, or

6

otherwise actively participate in the depositions." See Decl. of Weinberg at 2, ECF No. 172-4.

7

The court expects that the overall lead attorney for Plaintiff, Adams, would have been sufficient

8

to conduct the depositions on his own. See Farris v. Cox, 508 F.Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Cal. 1981)

9

(reduction of time where multiple attorneys attended depositions and hearings).

10
Date
11
12

09/17/2012
09/20/2012
09/21/2012
TOTAL

Entry Description

Hours
Claimed
8.0
8.0
8.0
24

Depositions

depositions held in office
depositions held in office

Revised
Hours
0
0
0
0

13

In addition, Defendants move the court to reduce Park's fee request by 50%. Defs.'
14

Opp'n. at 26, ECF No. 172. They argue that Park "never charges less than 15 minutes for any
15

task." Id. The court finds this to be an inaccurate statement. Park billed for less than 15 minutes
16

on certain tasks he performed. See Attach. A to Decl. of Park at 8, ECF No. 162-8 (entries dated
17

8/29/2016, 8/31/2016, 9/02/2016, 9/14/2016, and 10/31/2016 were all billed as "0.1").
18

The court, however, will reduce the following hours as unreasonable because the tasks
19

could have been easily performed in less than the time they were billed for. The court determined
20

this by reviewing the entry and cross referencing such entry with the relevant docket filing.18
21
22

23
24

18 Forexample, counsel has billed for reviewing a notice regarding the extension oftime forthefiling of an
opposition toDefendants' motion to compel {see ECF No. 132) onJune 2, 2016. The notice was two sentences long
and should not have taken counsel more than 0.10 hours to review.
21

1
2

Entry Description

3

12/08/2011

Revised
Hours
0.3

0.25

filed proposed order for extension of

Hours
Claimed
0.5

0.2

0.25

0.1

0.25
0.25
0.25

0.1
0.1
0.1

0.25

0.1

0.25

0.1

0.25

0.1

0.25
0.25
0.25

0.2
0.1
0.1

0.25

0.1

3.50

Date

1.70

time to respond with mailing addresses
4

01/05/2012

review of certificate of

service/scheduling notice
5

02/01/2012

6

02/17/2012
03/16/2012
04/06/2012

review of court order referring motion
to dismiss

7

8

review of order granting motion re
amicus

06/21/2013
07/06/2013

9
10

review of court order granting motion
review of scheduling order

08/28/2013

review of notice of ECF by 9th Circuit
re copies of amicus brief
review of notices of ECF, appeal
transcript re transcript filed before chief
and magistrate judge
review of notices of ECF, appeal
transcript

11
12

10/07/2015
06/02/2016
06/14/2016

review of orders on motions

review of notice re motion to compel
Review of notice from court re dates

for summary judgment hearing
08/26/2016

13

Review of notice from court re hearing
date and video recording

TOTAL
14

The court will also reduce the hourly rate for the non-legal work performed by Park on
15

May 5, 2016, for 0.25 hours ("mailed out to lead counsel CDs from opposing counsel"). See
16

Attach. A to Decl. of Park at 7, ECF No. 162-8. Non-legal work is not compensable at attorney
17

rates. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989).
18
19
20
21
22

Date

05/05/2016

Entry Description

Hours
Claimed
0.25

mailed out to lead counsel

Rate
Claimed

Rate Approved

$250.00

$20.00iy

CDs from opposing counsel

Based on the discussion above, the court finds that Park's reduced hours are reasonable.

Despite Defendants' argument that Park did "little other than 'review' documents[,]" Defs.'

23
24

19 This rate is based on the paralegal hourly rate by Election Law Center, PLLC, which this court finds reasonable.
See Decl. of Adams at 8, ECF No. 162-1.
22

1

Opp'n. at 26, ECF No. 172, the court finds that Park as the local counsel had a duty to

2

"meaningfully participate in the preparation and trial of the case with the authority and

3

responsibility to act as attorney of record for all purposes" at all times. Local Rule GNLR

4

17.1(e). Thus, reviewing filings and knowing both the procedural and substantive aspects of the

5

case is Park's responsibility as the local counsel for Plaintiff. The court will not reduce Park's

6

fee request by 50 percent.
In addition, the court notes that Park's billing is minimal. From 2011 to 2017

7
8

(approximately 5.5 years), Park has only billed for approximately a little over two weeks' worth

9

of work.

2. Total Attorney Fees for Park

10

Hours
86.95
0.25
87.20

Rate

11

$250.00
$20.00

12

TOTAL

13

Total

$21,737.50
$5.00

$21,742.50

The total attorney fees awarded to Park is $21,742.50.

14

iii. Center for Individual Rights

The Center for Individual Rights ("CIR") is claiming a total of 453.3 hours. PL's Mem. at

15
16

23, ECF No. 162-24. The CIR utilized three attorneys in this case: Michael E. Rosman

17

("Rosman"), Christopher J. Hajec, and Michelle A. Scott. See Decl. of Rosman at 3, ECF No.

18

162-9.

19
20
21
22
23
24

1.

Lack of Detail

Defendants object to a total of 19 entries by CIR for lack of detail. See Ex. A to Decl. of
Sablan at 7, ECF No. 172-2. The court reviewed these entries and found that four of these entries

were similar to Adams', wherein Adams did not specify the topic of conversation with co-

counsel Rosman. However, Defendants did not object to Adams' entries dated September 15,
2011; September 25, 2012; August 21, 2015; and January 29, 2016, for lack of detail. Compare

23

1

id. with Attach. A to Decl. of Adams, ECF No. 162-2. Presumably, Defendants found these

2

entries of Adams to be acceptable "as is." This court will do likewise.
That leaves 15 entries in question, four of which this court was able to clearly determine

3
4

based on cross referencing the entries between Rosman, Adams, and Cox. Rosman's entry dated

5

December 5,2011, "review of emails," pertains to the motion to dismiss. This entry was cross

6

referenced with Adams' entry of December 5,2011 ("... Email to litigation team about motion

7

to dismiss."). See Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 3, ECF No. 162-2. The November 1,2012

8

entry, "email exchange w/C. Adams," shows from Adams' entry that the work done was on the

9

preparation for the motion to dismiss argument. See id. at 6. The email exchange between

10

Rosman and Adams on October 21,2015, was on the topic of extension. See id. at 8. As to

11

Rosman's entry dated August 28,2014, "disc. w/M. Scott & C. Hajec; tel call w/D Cox," the

12

discussion was on the oral argument preparation. See Ex. 2 to Decl. of Cox at 21, ECF No. 162-

13

22.

14

As for the rest of the entries, the court is able to surmise the general topic of the

15

conversations based on the surrounding entries by counsel and his co-counsel Adams and Cox.

16

These entries were also cross-referenced with the docket entries. For example, Defendants filed

17

their motion to dismiss on December 2,2011. See ECF No. 17. For the month of December

18

2011,Adams' work was focused on responding to the motion to dismiss. See Attach. A to Decl.

19

of Adams at 3, ECF No. 162-2. Likewise, the CIR's work for the month of December 2011, was

20

focused on researching arguments pertaining to the motionto dismiss. See Ex. 12 to Decl. of

21

Rosman at 3-4, ECF No. 162-12, at 3-4. Thus, while Defendants object to the December 16,

22

2011 entry, "tel call w/C. Adam; review cases" for lack of detail, the record shows that the task

23

performed was on the topic of opposing the motionto dismiss. This is also supported by

24

Rosman's Reply Statement, wherein he indicated that based on the date of Defendants' motion to
24

1

dismiss and the date Plaintiff filed his opposition, it is reasonable to infer that Rosman was

2

reading cases related to the motion to dismiss. Reply Statement of Rosman at 2, ECF No. 175-2.
The purpose of requiring detail is to ensure that the court is able to review whether a

3
4

particular task is reasonable. The majority of the entries in question are billed at 0.10 or 0.20

5

hours, which are not exorbitant and which are reasonable time spent on communicating with co-

6

counsel (all entries were on communicating with co-counsel either by email, telephone call, or

7

meeting). The court recognizes the importance of conferring with co-counsel to ensure efficiency

8

and avoid duplicative work and, therefore, it does not find these entries to be unreasonable.

9

Certainly, Rosman could have recorded his billable hours with more specificity.

10

However, the court does not find that Rosman "padded" his billable hours. As the Ninth Circuit

11

stated in Moreno, "lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in

12

the hope of inflating their fees. The payoff is too uncertain, as to both the result and the amount

13

of the fees. It would therefore be the highly atypical civil rights case where plaintiffs lawyer

14

engages in churning."Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. Further, the court notes that the CIR did not

15

bill for approximately 210 hours of work on this case.See Decl. of Rosman at 6, ECF No. 162-9.
2. Teleconferencing Entries

16

The court will reduce two of Rosman's entries dated December 29,2011, and June 20,

17
18

2014, because when the entries were cross-referenced with entries from the co-counsel with

19

whom Rosman conversed, their billable hour was less than Rosman's.

20
Date

21

12/29/2011

Description

Attorney
Adams

Conversation with Michael

Hours

Hours
Claimed
0:20

Approved

0.70

0.40

0:20

Rosman

22

12/29/2011

Rosman

Tel call w/C. Adams

discussing opp brief
23

See Ex. 8 to Decl. of Rosman at 4, ECF No. 162-12; Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 4, ECF No.
24
162-2.
25

1
2

Description

Attorney

Date

6/20/2014

Rosman

6/20/2014

Cox

3

Email exchanges re possible
video appearance, oral
argument; tel call w/D Cox re

Hours
Claimed
0.70

Approved

0.25

0.25

Hours

0.25

same

4

Telephone conferences and
emails regarding oral
argument.

5

6
7
8

See Ex. 12 to Decl. of Rosman at 7, ECF No. 162-16; Ex. 2 to Decl. of Cox at 19, ECF No. 16222.

Based on the time reduction, the court will reduce Rosman's fee for December 29,2011,
and June 20,2014, as follows:

9
10

12/29/2011

Amount Claimed

Amount Approved

$543x0.70 = $380.10

$543x0.40 = $217.20

$543x0.70 = $380.10

$543 x 0.25 = $135.75

$543x1.4 = $760.20

$543 x 0.65 = $352.95

Description

Date

Tel call w/C. Adams

discussing opp brief
11

6/20/2014

12

Email exchanges re possible
video appearance, oral
argument; tel call w/D Cox re
same

TOTAL
13

3. Total Attorney Fees for the CIR

14

16
17

Attorney

Hours Claimed

Approved Hours

Approved Amounts

Rosman

324.50

323.75

$181,215.05

Scott

15

97.20
31.60
453.30

97.20
31.60
452.55

$51,005.70
$14,694.00
$246,914.75

Hajec
TOTAL

18
19

See ECF No. 162-10, at 18.

The total attorney fees awarded to the CIR is $246,914.75.

20

iv. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
21

The law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP ("Gibson Dunn") is claiming a total of
22

587.5 hours. PL's Mem. at 23, ECF No. 162-24. Gibson Dunn utilized three main attorneys in
23

this case: Douglas R. Cox ("Cox"), Scott P. Martin ("Martin"), and Marisa C. Maleck
24

("Maleck"). See Decl. of Cox at 3-4, ECF No. 162-20. Two additional attorneys assisted in
26

1

preparing for oral argument and one additional attorney assisted in preparing the documentation

2

necessary for the attorney fees motion. Id. at 4. Five legal staff members were also utilized: Mari

3

Ann Buckwalter (research librarian), Sheila Enright (research librarian), Janine A. Hanrahan

4

(paralegal), Kim L. Michael (paralegal), and Erica N. Oleszczuk (paralegal appellate specialist).

5

Mat 4.

1. Appellate Counsel and Reasonableness of Staffing

6

Defendants object to Plaintiff having hired a separate law firm—Gibson, Dunn &

7
8

9
10
11

Crutcher LLP ("Gibson Dunn")—for appellate work, stating that it was not necessary. Defs.'

Opp'n. at 17, ECF No. 172. They argue that using Gibson Dunn is an "overkill" and that the
Election Law Center and the CIR both possess specialized knowledge in the area of civil rights
and voting litigation. Id.

It is not unusual for litigants to hire an appellate counsel who has the necessary expertise

12
13

14
15

16
17

18
19

in the appellate level.20 Decl. of Cox at 9, ECF No. 162-20. After having lostin thetrial level,
Plaintiff sought the expertise of Gibson Dunn, who succeeded in similar cases, as it did in Rice v.

Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).21 Id. Caselaw does not prohibit payment of attorney fees in cases
where Plaintiffretained an appellate counsel. See e.g., Bishop v. Smith, 112F. Supp. 3d 1237,

1239 (N.D. Ok. 2015). Noris it unusual to utilize a team of attorneys for appellate work,

provided the work is not duplicative. See id. (three attorneys handled the appellate work, with
each attorneyhaving their own separateresponsibilities).

Here, while it may initially appear thatthere wasan "overstaffmg and overkill" of

20
21

attorneys at the appellate level, see Defs.' Opp'n. at 17, ECF No. 172, a thorough review of

22

20 Cox has 31+years of experience. Decl. of Cox at 9, ECFNo. 162-20.
23

24

21 Rice bears striking similarities to the instant case, asevidenced by this court's great reliance on the case in its
decision on the motion for summary judgment. Cox played a principal role in Rice. Decl. ofCox at 3, ECF No. 16220.

27

1

Gibson Dunn's billable hours shows otherwise. In analyzing the number of hours worked by

2

each of the six Gibson Dunn attorneys involved in this case, lead appellate counsel Cox billed for

3

approximately two weeks' worth of work only. ECF No. 9 at 162-20. Three others (Mendro,

4

Tayrani and Balikian) billed a total of less than 30 hours. Id. And while there may have been five

5

legal staff who worked on this case in the appellate level, which seems a lot, their combined

6

hours only added up to a little over 40 hours, which is one week's worth of work for one person.

7

Id. Thus, the court does not find the hours to be an "overkill."

8
9

Further, the court did not find inflated expenditure of time, unlike the court in Spell v.

McDaniel, 852 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1988), which Defendants relied on to make their argument that

10

Gibson Dunn's fees should be reduced. See Defs.' Opp'n. at 17, ECF No. 172. In fact, the hours

11

being billed are less than the number of hours actually worked by the firm. Decl. of Cox at 9,

12

ECF No. 162-20. Gibson Dunn is only seeking $215,489.7522 in attorney fees. Id. at 2. This

13

amount is deeply discounted by more than 50%, since the actual attorney fees incurred by

14

Plaintiff with Gibson Dunn is $468,368.23. Id. Clearly, there is neither overkill nor overinflated

15

expenditure of time billed.

16
17
18

19
20
21
22

2.

Lack of Detail

Defendants object to multiple entries by Cox, Maleck, and Martin, arguing that they lack
detail. Decl. of Saban at 8-10, ECF No. 172-2. While the court would have appreciated entries

that are greaterin detail, the court finds the currententries sufficient. The entries in question

were compared to the otherentries within the same timeframe as well as the appellate docket
sheet from the Ninth Circuit, Ex. 1 to Cox Reply Decl. at 5-7, ECF No. 175-5, and this court was

able to glean a sense of the tasks performed and assess the reasonableness of the hours billed. For

23
24

22 The correct amount is actually $215,490.00. Gibson Dunn miscalculated the total amount by 25 cents. See Chart,
ECF No. 162-20, at 9 (Cox's rate: $581 x 80.25 = $46,625.25, not $46,625.00).
28

1

example, the May 22,2014 entry by Cox, "[r]eview and respond to emails" billed at 0.50 hours

2

pertains to the "DNMI opinion and potential Rule 28(j)." See Ex. 2 to Decl. of Cox at 19, ECF

3

No. 162-22).

4

To the extent that the court did not line-by-line mention each billing entry that

5

Defendants have objected to, the court finds them reasonable. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1400 ("As

6

long as the district court supplies us with a sufficient understanding of the reasons for its decision

7

... we will presume that the district court implicitly rejected those specific challenges to

8

plaintiffs' billing judgment deductions that it did not expressly discuss in its order.").

9
10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22

23
24

3. Appellate work on standing issue and the underlying merits

Plaintiff appealed this court's dismissal of the case for lack of standing but also raised the
underlying merits of the case. In a two-to-one decision, the Ninth Circuit ruled on the standing
issue in favor of the Plaintiff but declined to rule on the underlying merits. As such, Defendants

argue that Plaintiff should not be compensated for the work performed on the underlying merits.
Defs.' Opp'n. at 18-19, ECF No. 172.

As Plaintiff pointed out, "[s]ince an appeal was going to be heard in any event, and the

marginal cost of raising the merits was fairly low (especially in comparison to the effort it
actually took to obtain summaryjudgment after remand, much less what a trial might have cost
in time and money), it was perfectly reasonable for Plaintiffs attorneys to make the effort." PL's
Reply at 13, ECF No. 175. This court agrees.

Further, in determining whether an unsuccessful claim is compensable, "[fjirst, the court

asks whether the claims upon which the plaintiff failed to prevail were related to the plaintiffs
successful claims... If the unsuccessful and successful claims are related, then the court must

apply the second part of the analysis, in which the court evaluates the 'significance of the overall
relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended.' If the plaintiff

29

1

obtained 'excellent results,' full compensation may be appropriate[.]" O'Neal v. City ofSeattle,

2

66 F.3d 1064,1068-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

Although the Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the underlying merits, the issues raised by

3
4

Plaintiff were not completely unrelated to Plaintiffs successful claim. Had Plaintiff not

5

succeeded in the standing issue, his underlying claims would have never been addressed by this

6

court.

4. Total Attorney Fees for Gibson Dunn

7
8

9
10

Attorney

Hourly Rate

Hours Claimed

Amounts

Cox

$581

80.25

$46,625.25

Martin

2015-2016: $465
2013-2014: $395
$322
$465
$465
$332
$157

2.5
154.75
275

$1,162.50
$61,126.25
$88,550.00
$2,557.50
$1,860.00
$6,308.00
$7,300.50

11

Maleck
Mendro

12

Balikian

Tayrani

paralegals & research
13

5.5
4.0
19
46.5

librarians
TOTAL

$215,490.00

14

See Decl. of Cox at 9, ECF No. 162-20.
15

16
17

The total attorney fees awarded to Gibson Dunn is $215,490.00.
v. Overstaffing

Defendants seek a reduced fee because they assert that the case is overstaffed. Defs.'

18

Opp'n. at 15, ECF No. 172. At first glance, it may appearthe case is overstaffed. There are four

19

law firms and multiple lawyers involved. However, closer scrutiny shows otherwise.

20

At the trial level, there were only two main attorneys handling the case: Adams and

21

Rosman. Adams is the lead attorney, while Rosman and his firm mainly focused on the drafting

22

and filing of the complaint, the motion for class certification, and the motion for attorney fees.

23

See Decl. of Rosman at 2, ECF No. 162-9. Two other attorneys assisted Rosman, but their

24

contribution was minimal. Hajec billed for approximately 30 hours. Scott billed for less than 100
30

1
2

hours. See Ex. 6 to Decl. of Rosman at 18, ECF No. 162-10.

At the appellate level, there were three main attorneys responsible for the appellate work

3

with the appellate lead counsel billing for approximately just 80 hours {see supra for detailed

4

staffing discussion on Gibson Dunn).

5

This can hardly be considered overstaffing, particularly when the court considers the

6

length of this litigation. The duration of the case lasted approximately 5.5 years, from the filing

7

of the complaint to the granting of summaryjudgment in favor of Plaintiff. Along the way, the

8

case was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction, appealed, and then remanded.

9

The case itself is complex, having touched on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,

10

the Voting Rights Act, Guam's Organic Act, and the long and unique history of the plebiscite

11

and the political sensitivity of the case.

12

Defendants complain of duplicative tasks but could only point to entries of telephone

13

conferences, emails and meetings among Plaintiffs attorneys as duplicative. See Defs.' Opp'n. at

14

16, ECF No. 172. The court does not find these to be duplicative tasks, but rather, they are tasks

15

that avoid duplication and inefficiencies and are therefore reasonable. Communicating with co-

16

counsel is expectedto ensure everyone is on the same page. The court's review of the billable

17

hours does not show excessive hours of calls and emails and meetings. Accordingly, the court

18

finds no merit to Defendants' arguments.

19
vi.
20
21
22

23
24

Motion for Class Certification

It is well-settled that "a plaintiff who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a

necessary step to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney's fees even for the unsuccessful
stage." Cabrales v. County ofLos Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).
Defendants argue that the motion was not necessary, because the injunctive and
declaratory relief sought by Plaintiff would benefit all proposed class members. Defs.' Opp'n. at
31

1

24, ECF No. 172. Moreover, Defendants argue that the class certification was not successful,

2

because this court never ruled on the motion. Id.

3

The court did not decide on the motion for class certification because it opted to address

4

the dispositive motion first. Assuming arguendo that the motion was unsuccessful, the court

5

must make a two-part inquiry whether to award fees for said motion.

6

"First, the court asks whether the claims upon which the plaintiff failed to prevail were

7

related to the plaintiffs successful claims. If unrelated, the final fee award may not include time

8

expended on the unsuccessful claims. If the unsuccessful and successful claims are related, then

9

the court must apply the second part of the analysis, in which the court evaluates the

10

'significance of the overall relief obtainedby the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably

11

expended.' If the plaintiffobtained 'excellent results,' full compensation may be appropriate, but

12

if only 'partial or limited success' was obtained, full compensation may be excessive." O'neal v.

13

City ofSeattle, 66 F.3d 1064,1068 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

14

"Claimsare relatedwhere they involve 'a common core of facts' or are 'based on related

15

legal theories.'... '[T]he test is whether relief sought onthe unsuccessful claim is intended to

16

remedy a course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from the course of conduct that gave

17

rise to theinjury upon which the reliefgranted is premised.'" Id. (citations omitted).

18

In the instant case, Plaintiffsought to certify the classto prevent the Government of

19

Guam from refusing otherwise qualified voters to register andvotein the political status

20

plebiscite. The motion itself was not a separate claim, but rather a method ofpursuing Plaintiffs

21

ultimately successful claims. See O'Neal, 66 F.3d at 1069 (unsuccessful motion for class

22

certification, which was not considered a "claim," but a method of pursuing relief). Thus, the

23

class certification motion was related to Plaintiffs claims and therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to

24

attorney fees for the work performed on this motion.
32

1

e.

2
3

Costs
i.

Adams' Business Class Airfare

Adams seeks reimbursement of four roundtrip airfare tickets from Washington, D.C. to

4

Guam, in the amount of $23,372.14. See Attach. D to Decl. of Adams at 2, ECF No. 162-5.

5

Defendants object to the business class airfare,23 arguing that luxurious travel should notbe

6

reimbursable. Defs.' Opp'n. at 20, ECF No. 172. Although this court agrees that luxurious travel

7

generally should not be reimbursable, the court recognizesthe unique situation of traveling to

8

Guam from the East Coast, with travel time of approximately 20 hours or more, and with limited

9

flight schedule availability. In Adams' case, business travel saved time and money. For example,

10

for the summaryjudgment hearing, Adams arrived less than 11 hours before the hearing and left

11

Guam late in the afternoon that same day of the hearing. Decl. of Adams at 3, ECF No. 175-1.

12

Traveling in business class allowed him to sleep on the plane just before the hearing. Id. For the

13

other three workingtrips to Guam,the alternative for Adams was to arrive earlier on Guam than

14

necessary and incur even more billable hours. Id. Such additional expenses would have also

15

included lodging, meals, and transportation costs. Accordingly, based on Guam's location and its

16

distance from Washington, D.C, the court will approve the full amount of $23,372.14 for his

17

airfare tickets.

18
19
20
21
22

ii. Expert Fees

Plaintiff seeks reimbursement in the amount of $3,525 for fees paid to his expert, Tom
Brunell, PhD. See Attach. D to Decl. of Adams at 16, ECF No. 162-5. Defendants argue such

fees are not compensable. Defs.' Opp'n. at 27, ECF No. 172. Defendants' argument has no merit.
Section 10310(e) of Title 52, United States Code (Voting Rights Act), allows for reasonable

23
24

23 Adams did not fly business class throughout. His airfare from Tokyo to Guam was in coach. Reply Decl. of
Adams at 3, ECF No. 175-1.
33

1

expert fees. The fees requested herein are reasonable24 and therefore, the courtawards $3,525 in

2

expert fees.
iii.

3
4
5

6
7

Non-taxable costs

Plaintiff seeks recovery of litigation expenses such as postage and shipping fees, meals,
travel costs, and legal research. An award of expenses should be limited to typical out-of-pocket
expenses that are charged to a fee-paying client and should be reasonable and necessary. Harris
v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16,19 (9th Cir. 1994).
1. Election Law Center, PLLC

8

The Election Law Center seeks reimbursement of non-taxable costs in the amount of
9

$25,764.87. PL's Mem. at 23, ECF No. 162-24. This amount includes $600 expense for paralegal
10

work. Id. at 23 n.7; see also Attach. A to Decl. of Adams at 12, ECF No. 162-2.
11

Defendants object to the amount of non-taxable costs and argues that the non-taxable
12

costs recoverable should only be approximately $11,764. Defs.' Opp'n. at 30, ECF No. 172.
13

Defendants based this amount by reducing the roundtrip airfares from over $23,000 to $9,600,
14

and by eliminating the expert fees of $3,525 as non recoverable. Id. This amount, however,does
15

not amount to approximately $11,764.
16

Regardless, the court has ruled on the issues ofbusiness travel and expert fees,25 as
17

discussed above. Accordingly, the court grantsthe full amount of $25,764.87 as non-taxable
18

costs for the Election Law Center, PLLC. See Attach. D to Decl. of Adams at 2, ECF No. 162-5
19

for the breakdown.
20
21
22

23
24

24 Dr. Brunell's hourly rate is $300, and he billed for 11.75hours. See Attach. D to Decl. of Adams at 16, ECF No.
162-5.The court also reviewed the expert report he prepared, which was used by Plaintiff in support ofhis summary
judgment motion. See Ex. Dl to Statement, ECF No. 105-5.

25 The expert fees in the amount of $3,525 is separately awarded from the rest ofthe Election Law Center's non
taxable costs.

34

2.

1

The Law Offices of Park and Associates seeks reimbursement of non-taxable costs in the

2

3
4

5

6

amount of $246.65. PL's Mem. at 24, ECF No. 162-24. This amount consists of $240 for "Park's

messenger" billed at $40 per hour for 6 hours; and $6.65 in mailing expenses for sending

discovery materials to co-counsel.26 Decl. of Park at 3, ECF No. 162-7. Defendants object to this

amount and argue that Park should bepaid $0in non-taxable costs.27
The court agrees, in part, with Defendants. Park has not provided any explanation that

7

8
9
10
11
12

13

would justify payment of $240 for a messenger. There is no information provided as to what
work was performed by the messenger for 6 hours. It is counsel's burden to provide the court
with adequate description of costs. In re Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm. Sales Practice Litig, 148
F.3d 283,333-34 (3d Cir. 1998) (an attorney submitting an application for attorney fees and

expenses has the burden of establishing entitlement to such monies). Accordingly, the amountof
$240 is denied.

The court, however, grants the amount of $6.65 as non-taxable costs for the Law Offices

14
15

Law Offices of Park and Associates

of Park and Associates.

3. Center for Individual Rights

16

The CIR seeks reimbursement of non-taxable costs in the amount of $250.00. PL's Mem.
17

at 24, ECF No. 162-24. This amount represents the fee paid for Rosman's admission pro hac
18

vice. Decl. of Rosman at 7, ECFC No. 162-9. Defendants do not object to this amount. Defs.'
19

Opp'n. at 31, ECF No. 172. Accordingly, the court grants $250.00 of non-taxable costs for the
20

CIR.
21
22
23

26 Parkalso included in his request the amount of $120 for fees for service of summons and subpoena. See Decl. of
Parkat 3, ECF No. 162-7. This amount will not be paid as a non-taxable cost, but rather as taxable cost under a
separate order.

24

27 Defendants have included the $6.65 postage fee as taxable cost. See Defs.' Opp'n. at 28, ECF No. 172 ("Mr. Park
should be awarded taxable costs of $126.65 ...").
35

1

4. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
2

3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17

Gibson Dunn seeks reimbursement of non-taxable costs in the amount of $24,802.43.

PL's Mem. at 23, ECF No. 162-24. Defendants object to this amount, arguing that Gibson

Dunn's computer legal research is excessive, the "in house" duplication is unjustified, and the
$472 shipping costs do not identify the shipped items. Defs.' Opp'n. at 29, ECF No. 172.
The court finds all these expenses to be reasonable. The computer legal research

performed by Maleck were all on issues relevant to the appeal. See Reply Statement of Cox at 5,
ECF No. 175-4. The "in house" duplication charges were from Gibson Dunn's on-site copy

center, which prepares copies of the briefs for court filing, prepare binders for moots and oral
arguments, and other similar projects. Id. These are typical costs incurred by a paying client.
As for the unidentified materials that were shipped, Gibson Dunn provided a copy of

three shipping labels, which describes the contents as "DOCUMENTS" sent by Martin from
Guam to an Angelina Walker at the Gibson Dunn office in Washington, D.C. See Ex. 2 to Reply
Statement of Cox at 2-9, ECF No. 175-6. The shipping labels were dated in August 2014. Id.
Thus, it can be inferred that these documents were related to the oral argument before the Ninth
Circuit, which was held on Guam in August 2014.
f.

Attorneys' Fees and Costs incurred after April 4,2017

18

Plaintiff seeks an additional $30,884.30 of attorney fees that were incurred after April 4,
19

2017. PL's Reply at 16, ECF No. 175. The breakdown of this amount is as follows:
20
21

Attorney

22

Rosman
Cox

Balikian

Hourly Rate
$581.00

Hours

Amount

23.80
14.50
26.00

$13,827.80
$8,424.50
$8,632.00

$581.00
$332.00

23

Id; Reply Statement of Rosman at 5, ECF No. 175-2; Reply Statement of Cox at 7, ECF No.
24

36

1

175-4. In addition, Plaintiff seeks an additional non-taxable cost in the amount of $275.49 for

2

legal research. PL's Reply at 16, ECF No. 175; Reply Statement of Cox at 8, ECF No. 175-4, Ex.

3

3 to Reply Statement of Cox at 8, ECF No. 175-7.

4

Reasonable fees and costs associated with the pursuit of attorneys' fees are generally

5

recoverable. McGrath v. County ofNevada, 67 F.3d 248,253 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

6

This court reviewed the additional billable hours submitted by Rosman and Cox. The hours

7

billed reflect the work performed on the original fee application that were not included in the

8

original request and additional work as a result of Defendants' opposition to the motion for

9

attorneys' fees and costs. See Ex. A to Reply Statement of Rosman at 3-5, ECF No. 175-3; Ex. 3

10

to Reply Statement of Cox at 2-7, ECF No. 175-7. The court notes that Rosman also did not bill

11

for 15.10 hours. See Ex. A to Reply Statement of Rosman at 5, ECF No. 175-3.

12

After having reviewed the additional request and supporting documentation, the court

13

finds the requested attorneys' fees and costs to be reasonable and therefore grants the request.
g. Lodestar Adjustment

14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23

After the determination of the lodestar figure, the court may then adjust the figure upward
or downward based on the factors set forth in Kerr that are not subsumed in the lodestar

calculation. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202.

The court has already considered several of the Kerr factors in calculating the lodestar

figure, such as the undesirability as well as the complexity of the case; the experience, reputation
and ability of the attorneys and their fees; the results obtained; and the time and labor required.
As such, the court finds no reason to depart or adjust the lodestar figure. The court also notes that
Plaintiff does not seek an upward adjustment to the lodestar figure. PL's Mem. at 15, ECF No.
162-24.

24

37

1
2

IIL

CONCLUSION

Prior to Plaintiff suing the Government of Guam on his own, he made every effort to

3

avoid costs by first filing a complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), in the hope

4

that DOJ would take action on his behalf. See Decl. of Davis at 2, ECF No. 162-6. However,

5

whenit became clear that no action will be taken,28 Plaintiffwas compelled to seek private

6

representation. Id. Ironically, however, in DOJ's filing of the amicus curiae, DOJ stated that it

7

"has substantial responsibility for the enforcement of the CRA and Section 2 of the VRA, which

8

prohibit racial discrimination in voting. See 52 U.S.C. 10101(c), 10308(d). Because these

9

statutes ban conduct that may also violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the United

10

States similarly has an interest in ensuring the proper interpretation of these amendments." See

11

Docket No. 21, Case No. 17-15719 (9th Circuit). Had DOJ taken on this "substantial

12

responsibility" in 2009, when Plaintiff first filed a complaint with DOJ, the attorneys' fees and

13

costs in the instant case would likely not have been incurred.

14

This case has not been an easy one for counsel to represent. Due to the highly political

15

nature of the case, it was almost impossible for Plaintiff to find local counsel. This was

16

demonstrated by Plaintiff when he and Adams contacted a total of 37 attorneys, all of whom

17

declined representation for various reasons—some defended the plebiscite; others feared for their

18

safety and property if they took on the case; and many were afraid that public officials and

19

judges would view them less favorable if they were associated in preventing the plebiscite. This

20

court itself witnessed firsthand the emotions running high in its courtroom and outside of the

21

courthouse as members of the public demonstrated their constitutionally protected right to

22

protest. For local counsel Mun Su Park to take on the case when no one else would is

23
24

28 The courtnotes that DOJ decided to intervene at the appellate level when it filed an amicuscuriae on November
28,2017, supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and urging the Ninth Circuit to affirm this court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiff. See Docket No. 21, Case No. 17-15719 (9th Circuit).
38

1
2

commendable.

With a few exceptions as noted above, the courtfinds that the requested fees are

3

reasonable and certainly, there is no "padding" of billable hours by counsel. Counselthemselves

4

did not bill for all the work performedin this case. For example, J. Christian Adams of the

5

Election Law Center did not bill for at least 73 hours of work. In addition, Adams billed in real

6

time, insteadof billing by every tenth or fifteenth of the hour, which is rare for this court to see.

7

Michael E. Rosman and his team from the Center for Individual Rights did not bill for

8

approximately 210 hours. Douglas R. Cox and his team from the law firm of Gibson, Dunn and

9

Crutcher billed for only $215,489.75, a more than 50% discount from the full billable amount of

10

$468,368.23. Park himself billed for a little over two weeks' worth of work for a case that lasted

11

for over five years. Reasonable billing judgments were exercised by all of Plaintiffs counsel.

12

The court also notes that counsel could have asked for a lodestar upward adjustment but declined

13

to do so.

14

In sum, in this sensitive and highly political-in-nature case, Plaintiff's billing judgment—

15

both for attorneys' fees and costs—demonstrates an extra ordinary dedication to containment of

16

cost and renews this court's faith in conscientious billing practices.

17
18

19

With the limited exceptions described above, the court finds that the remaining costs and
fees requested by Plaintiff reasonable and shall be awarded as follows:
Attorney Fees

Law Firm

$21,742.50
$378,061.40
$260,742.552y
$232,546.503U
$893,092.95

Law Offices of Park and Associates
20
21
22

Election Law Center, PLLC
Center for Individual Rights
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
TOTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES
Law Firm

Non-taxable Costs

23

29 The sum of $246,914.75 and $13,827.80.
24

30 The sum of $215,490.00, $8,632.00 and $8,424.50.
39

$6.65

Law Offices of Park and Associates

$25,764.87

Election Law Center, PLLC
Center for Individual Rights
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

$250

$25,077.92jl
$51,099.44

TOTAL NON-TAXABLE COSTS

Other Expenses
4

Amount Awarded

$3,525

Expert Fees for Tom Brunei 1, PhD

5

The total award on Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs is $947,717.39.
6

SO ORDERED this 8th day of April, 2019.

7

8

FRANCES M. TYDrNGOO-GXlEWOOD
Chief Judge

9

10

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12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

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The sum of $24,802.43 and 275.49.
40