H., et al v. Lemahieu, et al
Filing
560
ORDER (1) DENYING 549 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR FOR CLARIFICATION RE: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING ORDER DENYING PL AINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by District JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on March 29, 2012. (bbb, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MARK H. and RIE H.
Individually and as Guardians
Ad Litem of MICHELLE H. and
NATALIE H., minors,
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
PATRICIA HAMAMOTO, in her
)
official capacity of
Superintendent of the Hawaii )
Department o Education, State )
)
of Hawaii,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
CIVIL 00-00282 LEK-RLP
ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND/OR FOR CLARIFICATION RE: ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND
(2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court are (1) Plaintiffs Mark H. and
Rie H.’s, individually and as guardians ad litem of Michelle H.
and Natalie H. (collectively “Plaintiffs”), Motion for
Reconsideration and/or for Clarification Re: Order Denying
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’
Motion”), filed February 14, 2012, and (2) Defendants
Patricia Hamamoto, in her official capacity as Superintendent of
the Department of Education, and the State of Hawai`i Department
of Education’s (collectively “Defendants” or “the DOE”) Request
for Clarification Regarding Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Motion”), filed on
February 16, 2012.
Plaintiffs filed their memorandum in
opposition on March 1, 2012, and Defendants filed their
memorandum in opposition on March 2, 2012.
The parties filed
their respective replies on March 19, 2012.
The Court finds
these matters suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant
to Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United
States District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local
Rules”).
After careful consideration of the motions, the
supporting and opposing memoranda, and the relevant legal
authority, this Court HEREBY DENIES both motions.
BACKGROUND
The parties and the Court are familiar with the
extensive factual and procedural background of this case.
The
Court therefore will only discuss the background that is relevant
to the instant motions.
Following the most recent remand from the Ninth
Circuit, Mark H. v. Hamamoto (“Mark H. #2”), 620 F.3d 1090 (9th
Cir. 2010), Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (“summary judgment motion”) regarding liability for
their claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794.
Plaintiffs argued in their summary judgment motion
that eight factual findings effectively resolved in Plaintiffs’
2
favor all issues of liability,1 including deliberate indifference
under the standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Mark H.
#2.
In its January 31, 2012 Order (“Order”), the Court
1
In a July 14, 2011 Order, Magistrate Judge Richard Puglisi
ruled that the following eight facts are established under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel (“factual findings”):
1.
From 1994 to 1998, the Hawaii DOE did
not provide autism-specific services to the girls,
although such services were available.
2.
The Hawaii DOE did not include autismspecific services in the girls’ IEPs before 1999.
3.
Prior to the Administrative hearing,
Michelle and Natalie had not received “such
services as are necessary to permit the child[ren]
to benefit” from their education.
4.
It was four years (1998) before the
parents were given information about available
mental health services.
5.
Services that were required were not
made available nor included in the IEP.
6.
The unique needs of the girls were not
included in the IEPs.
7.
Functional analyses were not done for
Michelle and Natalie prior to the Administrative
Hearing.
8.
During the relevant years of 1994-1998,
the Hawaii DOE failed to provide Natalie or
Michelle a reasonable accommodation that they
needed to enjoy meaningful access to the benefits
of a public education.
[Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Preclude Relitigation of
Factual Issues Adjudicated in Administrative Hearing, filed
7/12/11 (dkt. no. 520), at 2-3 (citations omitted).]
3
denied Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, concluding that:
Although the question is a close one, the Court
cannot say, drawing all justifiable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party for purposes of
summary judgment, that Plaintiffs have met their
burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine
issue of material fact that the DOE deliberately
failed to act. That is, the Court cannot
determine, on the current record, whether the
DOE’s failure to act was merely negligent, or
contained the required element of deliberateness.
A reasonable jury, weighing the evidence at trial,
could possibly find that the DOE was not
deliberately indifferent. See Button v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. & Cmty Coll. Sys. of Nev., No.
06–16231, 289 Fed. Appx. 964 (9th Cir. Aug. 14,
2008) (“It is not enough that the Board took some
action—in Duvall the court made some effort to
accommodate, but we held that a jury could find
this effort both insufficient and deliberate.
This inquiry is nuanced and fact-intensive —
precisely the province of the jury.”); Roe v.
Nev., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1060 (D. Nev. 2007)
(“Whether a local government entity has displayed
a policy of deliberate indifference is generally a
question for the jury.” (quoting Oviatt By &
Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1478 (9th
Cir. 1992))).
Mark H. v. Hamamoto, Civil No. 00–00282 LEK–RLP, 2012 WL 299679,
at *15 (D. Hawai‘i Jan. 31, 2012).
I.
Plaintiffs’ Motion
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment because the DOE is liable for deliberate indifference as
a public entity based on its constructive knowledge.
Supp. of Plaintiffs’ Motion at 7.]
[Mem. in
They argue that City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), Duvall v. County of
Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001), Lovell v. Chandler, 303
4
F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002), and Mark H. #2 support holding a
public entity liable for damages under the circumstances
presented here.
They also argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment because the DOE is liable on a respondeat superior basis
for the deliberate indifference of relevant DOE employees based
on knowledge imputed to those employees.
[Id. at 13.]
Plaintiffs state that:
The DOE employees responsible for providing
services to Michelle and Natalie had a duty to
investigate, and they would have discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diligence that
Michelle and Natalie needed autism specific
services, that those services were available as a
reasonable accommodation, and that a failure to
provide those services would violate their
federally protected rights and subject them to the
risk of serious harm.
[Id.]
Next, Plaintiffs assert that clarification of eight
issues is necessary in order to narrow and define the issues for
trial.
The requests for clarification relate to the substance of
how the Court will instruct the jury, and whether specific
evidence and testimony will be admissible at trial.
[Id. at 16-
25.]
A.
Defendants’ Opposition
In their memorandum in opposition, Defendants argue
first that Plaintiffs have not met the standard for
reconsideration where their motion reiterates arguments
5
originally made in support of their summary judgment motion, and
second, that Plaintiffs improperly seek rulings by the Court in
the guise of “clarification,” which are more appropriately
addressed in Motions in Limine, settling of jury instructions,
and formal briefing and argument to this Court.
[Mem. in Opp. to
Plaintiffs’ Motion at 1.]
As to their first argument, Defendants assert that
Plaintiffs have merely reiterated arguments fully briefed and
considered by this Court, and therefore, their motion fails to
present any valid basis for reconsideration of the Order.
They
argue that, to the extent Plaintiffs have argued that this Court
did not expressly rule on portions of their arguments in support
of the motion for summary judgment, “such argument is without
merit, as this Court’s findings and ruling in denying Summary
Judgment subsumed all of Plaintiffs’ arguments as presented in
the [summary judgment motion] itself and the additional argument
presented in the Reply.”
[Id. at 6.]
Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ Motion
presents new legal theories that they failed to raise with
respect to the underlying summary judgment motion.
Specifically,
that deliberate indifference can be found with respect to whether
the DOE or its employees adequately investigated whether autismspecific services could be provided to Michelle and Natalie.
They note that Mark H. #2 does not define the deliberate
6
indifference standard as being satisfied by way of constructive
knowledge of what autism-specific services were a reasonable
accommodation, or by imputing that constructive knowledge to all
DOE employees.
[Id. at 7-9.]
As to Plaintiffs’ eight requests for clarification,
Defendants disagree that any additional clarification is
necessary.
Further, they argue that such requests attempt to
solicit separate rulings on issues that have not been properly
presented and are more appropriately reserved for pre-trial
motions and the settling of jury instructions.
B.
[Id. at 10-12.]
Plaintiffs’ Reply
In their reply, Plaintiffs maintain that their motion
was brought to correct what they believe to be a clear error of
law in order to prevent manifest injustice.
Plaintiffs’ Motion at 1.]
[Reply to
In response to Defendants’ argument
that they have raised new issues for the first time in their
motion, Plaintiffs state that the issue of constructive knowledge
imputed to individual DOE employees was raised during the
briefing on the summary judgment motion.
[Id. at 4-8.]
As to their eight requests for clarification,
Plaintiffs maintain that they leave room for motions in limine
and will not determine the precise language of any jury
instruction.
II.
[Id. at 9-11.]
Defendants’ Motion
7
Defendants’ Motion states that the Court’s statement in
the Order that “[t]he DOE acknowledges, that it utterly failed to
provide for Michelle and Natalie’s educational needs, to their
and their parents’ tragic detriment[,]” is “obiter dictum,
unnecessary to the ruling set forth in the Order, yet potentially
confusing to at least two issues still hotly disputed by the
parties.”
[Mem. in Supp. of Defendants’ Motion at 3 (footnote
omitted).]
Defendants state that they “seek clarification of the
Court’s dicta, as it could be misinterpreted as recognition of a
judicial admission which Defendants have not made; a conclusion
of the Court with respect to causation and damages which were
not at issue in the underlying Motion; or both.”
[Id.]
With respect to causation and damages, Defendant argues
that the Court’s statement “could be misinterpreted as
establishing, as a matter of law, that any failure by the Hawai‘i
DOE to provide autism-specific services to Michelle and Natalie
was a proximate and legal cause of damages to Plaintiffs: legal
issues that were neither briefed, nor argued before this Court.”
[Id. at 6.]
A.
Plaintiffs’ Opposition
In their opposition, Plaintiffs characterize
Defendants’ request for clarification as more akin to a request
for reconsideration.
They argue that the Court’s statement is
supported by the record before the Court, including the eight
8
factual findings.
[Mem. in Opp. to Defendants’ Motion at 2-3.]
Plaintiffs note that Defendants did not oppose Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Preclude Relitigation of Factual Issues Adjudicated in
Administrative Hearing, which was granted by the magistrate judge
and not appealed, and led to the entry of the eight factual
findings.
[Id. at 3-4.]
With respect to causation and damages, Plaintiffs
assert that there is no question that Michelle and Natalie were
harmed by the failure to provide them with educational benefits,
and further, there is “no way that the Court’s statement
reasonably can be interpreted to have decided more than that
Michelle and Natalie did, in fact, suffer detriment as a result
of Hawaii DOE’s failure to provide for their educational
needs[.]”
[Id. at 8.]
They note that the Court has not ruled on
the extent of the harm, which is more appropriately an issue for
trial, if liability is established.
B.
[Id.]
Defendants’ Reply
In their reply, Defendants maintain that the Court’s
statement in the Order is unnecessary to the substantive rulings,
and that they have never admitted that Defendants “did not
provide the girls with any educational services or to attend to
any of their educational needs.”
3.]
[Reply to Defendants’ Motion at
They argue that the Court’s use of the term “utterly” might
“be misunderstood as referring to a judicial admission by the
9
Defendants that there was a complete, absolute, and total failure
to provide any educational services to Michelle and Natalie.”
[Id. at 4.]
DISCUSSION
To the extent the parties ask the Court to reconsider
its Order, the Court treats both motions as brought pursuant to
Local Rule 60.1.2
“[A] successful motion for reconsideration
must accomplish two goals.
First, a motion for reconsideration
must demonstrate reasons why the court should reconsider its
prior decision.
Second, a motion for reconsideration must set
forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the
court to reverse its prior decision.”
Donaldson v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D. Hawai`i 1996); accord Tom v.
GMAC Mortg., LLC, CIV. NO. 10–00653 SOM/BMK, 2011 WL 2712958, at
*1 (D. Hawai`i July 12, 2011) (citations omitted).
2
Although Plaintiffs move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
and Local Rule 60.1, Rule 59(e) applies to final judgments. See
Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 466-67 (9th Cir.
1989) (“Rule 59(e) clearly contemplates entry of judgment as a
predicate to any motion.”). The Court therefore proceeds only
under Local Rule 60.1 with respect to reconsideration. As to the
requests for clarification, a district court has plenary power to
revise, modify, or rescind an interlocutory order prior to the
entry of final judgment. “The Ninth Circuit has recognized the
rule that, ‘as long as a district court has jurisdiction over the
case, then it possesses the inherent procedural power to
reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause
seen by it to be sufficient.’” White v. Sabatino, Civ. Nos.
04-00500 ACK/LEK, 05-00025 ACK/LEK, 2007 WL 2462634, at *3 (D.
Hawai‘i Aug. 24, 2007) (quoting City of Los Angeles, Harbor
Division v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir.
2001)).
10
This district court recognizes three grounds for
granting reconsideration of an order: “(1) an intervening change
in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3)
the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
White v. Sabatino, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1274 (D. Hawai`i 2006)
(citing Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169,
1178–79 (9th Cir. 1998)).
“Mere disagreement with a previous
order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration.”
Id.
“Whether or not to grant reconsideration[,]” however, “is
committed to the sound discretion of the court.”
Navajo Nation
v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331
F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kona Enter., Inc. v.
Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2000)).
I.
Plaintiffs’ Motion
A.
Reconsideration
To the extent Plaintiffs seek a ruling on their
arguments that the DOE is liable (1) as a public entity based on
its constructive knowledge, or (2) on a respondeat superior basis
for the deliberate indifference of relevant DOE employees based
on knowledge imputed to those employees, it appears that at least
portions of these arguments are subsumed within the Court’s
ruling that:
To the extent Plaintiffs argue that they have
established deliberate indifference under a theory
of respondeat superior or City of Canton, the
Court finds that those alternative theories do not
11
provide an adequate basis for the entry of summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
Order, 2012 WL 299679, at *12.
The Court, however, takes this opportunity to clarify
that Plaintiffs have not met their burden on summary judgment
with respect to these specific arguments, as raised in
Plaintiffs’ Motion.
That is, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiffs have not
established that they are entitled to summary judgment on the
issue of whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
See
Wereb v. Maui Cnty., 727 F. Supp. 2d 898, 922 (D. Hawai‘i 2010)
(“Whether a local government has displayed a policy of deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens is
generally a jury question.” (citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
Again, Plaintiffs have not established as a matter of
law, under any of their alternative theories of liability, the
requirements set forth in Mark H. #2:
Hawaii DOE had knowledge that a harm to a
federally protected right was substantially likely
if Hawaii DOE knew that Michelle and Natalie
needed accommodation of autism-specific services.
See [Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2002)]. Hawaii DOE failed to act upon that
likelihood if it failed to adequately investigate
whether those autism-specific services were a
reasonable accommodation. See id.; Duvall, 260
F.3d at 1139-40. Thus, Hawaii DOE acted with
deliberate indifference if it knew that Michelle
and Natalie needed autism-specific services in
order to enjoy meaningful access to the benefits
of a public education and failed to investigate
whether those services were available as a
12
reasonable accommodation.
Mark H. #2, 620 F.3d at 1099.
As to the first issue, the Court does not agree with
Plaintiffs that they have conclusively established that the DOE
can be held liable here for deliberate indifference as a public
entity based on its constructive knowledge.
The Court does not
read Mark H. #2 as providing for the imposition of liability here
based on the DOE’s constructive knowledge, “based on the sheer
‘obviousness’ of the systemic inadequacies in the face of actual
knowledge by ‘relevant DOE employees’. . . .”
[Mem. in Supp. of
Plaintiffs’ Motion at 8 (emphasis in original).]
Plaintiffs’
theory does not alter the Court’s conclusion that whether
Defendants adequately investigated whether autism-specific
services were available presented a question of fact on the
current record.
See Order, 2012 WL 299679, at *12 (“In
opposition to the Motion, the DOE has set forth evidence that
relevant employees considered Michelle and Natalie’s individual
needs, but there remains a question of fact regarding whether
these employees sufficiently investigated what accommodations
were reasonable.”).
That is, Plaintiffs have not conclusively
established the “actual knowledge” of “relevant DOE employees”
sufficient to impute such knowledge to the DOE as a public
entity, and have not established whether those same employees
adequately investigated available accommodations.
13
The Court
declines to “reconsider its Order and grant partial summary
judgment based on a determination that Hawaii DOE is liable for
deliberate indifference because it had constructive knowledge
attributable to it as a collective entity.”
[Mem. in Supp. of
Plaintiffs’ Motion at 12-13 (emphasis in original).]
Second, the Court previously rejected Plaintiffs’
argument that they are entitled to summary judgment because the
DOE is liable on a respondeat superior basis for the deliberate
indifference of relevant DOE employees based on knowledge imputed
to those employees.
In the Order, the Court stated as follows:
The Court agrees with the DOE that the “knowledge”
of the DOE is not imputed to the individual DOE
employees who actually provided Michelle and
Natalie with services. Plaintiffs’ allegations
against the DOE itself are premised upon the acts
and omissions of individual DOE employees,
however, Plaintiffs’ argument relies upon the
knowledge of the “Hawai`i DOE” as a collective,
rather than on the specific knowledge of
individual DOE employees. The DOE states that
Plaintiffs’ argument that the “Hawai`i DOE” as an
entity “knew” that certain services were available
as a reasonable accommodation ignores the basic
fact that whatever the “Hawai`i DOE” - as employer
may have known [–] no evidence has been submitted
to establish that relevant DOE employees had this
same knowledge. [Mem. in Opp. at 5-6.] The DOE
notes that the knowledge of an individual employee
may be imputed to the employer, [however] a public
employer’s knowledge is not imputed to its
employees. [Id. at 6 (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v.
State of Hawai`i DOE, 351 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1013
n.31 (D. Hawai`i 2004)).]
Order, 2012 WL 299679, at *12.
Further, Plaintiffs’ argument that the “DOE employees
14
responsible for providing services to Michelle and Natalie had a
duty to investigate, and they would have discovered through the
exercise of reasonable diligence that Michelle and Natalie needed
autism services, [and] that those services were available as a
reasonable accommodation,” [Mem. in Supp. of Plaintiffs’ Motion
at 13,] does not establish, as a matter of fact or law, that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
Rather, borrowing
Plaintiffs’ terms, what “they would have discovered through the
exercise of reasonable diligence” and what constitutes
“reasonable diligence” under the circumstances and based on the
current record, appear to be questions of fact for the factfinder to decide.
See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.
v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1430 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that “whether the government’s actions are ‘reasonable’ is often
a jury issue”).
The Court declines to “reconsider its Order and
grant partial summary judgment based on a determination that
Hawaii DOE is liable for the deliberate indifference of ‘relevant
DOE employees’ who are charged with constructive notice that harm
to Michelle and Natalie’s federally protected rights was
substantially likely.”
[Mem. in Supp. of Plaintiffs’ Motion at
16.]
The Court CONCLUDES that Plaintiffs have not met their
burden of demonstrating manifest errors of law or fact in the
Order.
Plaintiffs’ sincere disagreement with the Order is an
15
insufficient basis for reconsideration.
Accordingly, the Court
finds no error in its denial of Plaintiffs’ summary judgment
motion.
B.
Requests for Clarification
To the extent Plaintiffs seek “clarification” of
various evidentiary and legal issues that are more appropriately
raised during pretrial motions or the settling of jury
instructions, the Court declines to provide more definite
statements of clarification at this time.
These matters have not
been properly or fully briefed by the parties, and are not
appropriate for a Court ruling at this time.
The Court agrees
that these important issues remain to be settled before trial,
and the Court will set an appropriate briefing schedule
accordingly.
The Court declines Plaintiffs’ requests for
reconsideration and clarification, and Plaintiffs’ Motion is
HEREBY DENIED.
II.
Defendants’ Motion
Defendants take issue with the Court’s statement in the
Order that “[t]he record is clear, and the DOE acknowledges, that
it utterly failed to provide for Michelle and Natalie’s
educational needs, to their and their parents’ tragic detriment.”
Order, 2012 WL 299679, at *12.
As a preliminary matter, the
Court observes that the record supports the crux of the Court’s
16
statement in the Order.3
Next, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ assertion
that this statement “could be interpreted as referring to an
admission by the Defendants that the Hawai`i DOE or its employees
failed to provide the girls with any educational services or
attend to any of their educational needs.”
[Mem. in Supp. of
3
At the hearing on Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion,
Defendants’ counsel acknowledged that Michelle and Natalie did
not receive the appropriate services from the DOE.
So under 504, we typically and customarily
look to what’s going on in the trenches. Some
children were receiving appropriate services.
Obviously the plaintiffs acknowledge that, and we
also acknowledge that Michelle and Natalie did
not. There is, I don’t think, any question at all
about that, and I am not going to stand before you
or a jury and say that they did receive the
appropriate services, because they did not.
[12/20/11 Hrg. Trans., filed 12/29/11 (dkt. no. 544), at 12-13.]
Moreover, portions of the uncontested factual findings
establish that:
. . . .
3.
Prior to the Administrative hearing,
Michelle and Natalie had not received “such
services as are necessary to permit the child[ren]
to benefit” from their education.
. . . .
8.
During the relevant years of 1994-1998,
the Hawaii DOE failed to provide Natalie or
Michelle a reasonable accommodation that they
needed to enjoy meaningful access to the benefits
of a public education.
[Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Preclude Relitigation of
Factual Issues Adjudicated in Administrative Hearing, filed
7/14/11 (dkt. no. 520), at 2-3 (citations omitted).]
17
Defendants’ Motion at 4 (emphases in original).]
Such a broad
reading of the Court’s statement does not appear to be warranted
under the circumstances.
Notably, the issue presented by Mark H.
#2 is not whether the girls received any educational services.
See Mark H. #2, 620 F.3d at 1099 (“Thus, Hawaii DOE acted with
deliberate indifference if it knew that Michelle and Natalie
needed autism-specific services in order to enjoy meaningful
access to the benefits of a public education and failed to
investigate whether those services were available as a reasonable
accommodation.”).
To the extent Defendants argue that the Court’s
statement “could be misunderstood as documenting a judicial
admission on the part of the Defendants which the Hawai‘i DOE has
not made,” [id. at 5,] the Court is not persuaded that
clarification is necessary.
In any event, any outstanding
evidentiary issues raised by the Order, including judicial
admissions, will be addressed at trial.
Finally, to the extent Defendants urge the Court to
clarify the statement because it could be read as implying that
causation and/or damages have been established, the Court
declines to do so.
There is no doubt that Plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment as to liability – causation and damages were not
before the Court in Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion.
The
Court’s statement can not be reasonably misunderstood as stating
18
a “legal conclusion that Defendants have admitted either or both
causation and damages.”
17.]
[Mem. in Supp. of Defendants’ Motion at
Accordingly, the Court declines Defendants’ request for
clarification, and Defendants’ Motion is HEREBY DENIED.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration and/or for Clarification Re: Order Denying
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed
February 14, 2012, is HEREBY DENIED.
Defendants’ Request for
Clarification Regarding Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, filed on February 16, 2012, is HEREBY
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, March 29, 2012.
/S/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
MARK H., ET AL. V. PATRICIA HAMAMOTO, ET AL; CIVIL NO. 00-00282
LEK-RLP; ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND/OR FOR CLARIFICATION RE: ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND
(2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?