Crawford v. Japan Airlines, et al

Filing 538

ORDER: 1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANT HAWAII AVIATION CONTRACT SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND REJECTING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION; AND 2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANT JAPAN AIRLINES' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AN D RECOMMENDATION re 531 , re 532 .. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 03/28/2014. -- Crawford's Objections to the magistrate judge's Findings and Recommendation to Grant in Part and Deny in Part Defendant Ha waii Aviation Contract Services, Inc.'s Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees, filed February 4, 2014, are HEREBY GRANTED, and Crawford's Objections to the magistrate judge's Findings and Recommendation to Grant in Part and Deny in Part Defendant Japan Airlines' Motion for Attorney's Fees, filed February 5, 2014, are HEREBY DENIED. This Court therefore REJECTS the magistrate judge's HACS F&R and ADOPTS the magistrate judge's JAL F&R as the order of this Cour t.This Court ORDERS Crawford's counsel to arrange the transmission of the total award to JAL, through JAL's counsel, by May 27, 2014. (eps )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered t o receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JAPAN AIRLINES; JALWAYS CO., )
LTD., a subsidiary of Japan
)
)
Airlines; HAWAII AVIATION
CONTRACT SERVICES, INC.; and )
)
DOES 1-10,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
JACK CRAWFORD,

CIVIL NO. 03-00451 LEK-KSC

ORDER: 1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN
PART DEFENDANT HAWAII AVIATION CONTRACT SERVICES, INC.’S MOTION
FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND REJECTING THE FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION; AND 2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART
AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANT JAPAN AIRLINES’ MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
On January 21, 2014, the magistrate judge filed the
Findings and Recommendation to Grant in Part and Deny in Part
Defendant Hawaii Aviation Contract Services, Inc.’s Motion for
Award of Attorney’s Fees (“HACS F&R”) and the Findings and
Recommendation to Grant in Part and Deny in Part Defendant Japan
Airlines’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees (“JAL F&R”).
531, 532.]

[Dkt. nos.

Before the Court are Plaintiff Jack Crawford’s

(“Crawford”) objections to the HACS F&R (“HACS Objections”),
filed on February 4, 2014, and Crawford’s objections to the JAL
F&R (“JAL Objections”), filed on February 5, 2014.

[Dkt. nos.

533, 534.]

HACS and JAL (collectively “Defendants’) each filed

its response on February 18, 2014.

[Dkt. nos. 536, 535.]

The

Court finds these matters suitable for disposition without a
hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(e) of the Local Rules of Practice
of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i
(“Local Rules”).

After careful consideration of the objections,

responses, and the relevant legal authority, this Court HEREBY
GRANTS the HACS Objections and REJECTS the HACS F&R, and HEREBY
DENIES the JAL Objections and ADOPTS the JAL F&R, for the reasons
set forth below.
BACKGROUND
In December 2002, Crawford and then-co-plaintiff
Martin Ventress (“Ventress”) filed their Complaint for Damages
(“Complaint”) against JAL, its subsidiary, JALways, Co., Ltd.
(“JALways”),1 and HACS in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.2

[Dkt. no. 23.]

Complaint alleged diversity jurisdiction.

The

[Id. at ¶ 8.]

1

Where appropriate, this Court will refer to JAL and
JALways collectively as “the JAL Defendants.” On
December 3, 2010, the JAL Defendants filed a Supplemental
Corporate Disclosure Statement stating that, “[a]s of
December 1, 2010, JAL and JALways merged into a single Japan
corporation, with JAL the surviving corporation.” [Dkt. no.
394.] Thus, JALways is not an active Defendant in this case.
2

On November 14, 2007, the magistrate judge approved the
parties’ Stipulation for Complete Severance under Fed. R. Civ. P.
21 of Plaintiffs’ Cases for All Purposes. [Dkt. no. 267.]
Ventress’s claims were adjudicated in CV 07-00581 LEK-RLP.
2

According to the Complaint, at the time of filing, Crawford, who
was a pilot for JAL and HACS, was a United States citizen
domiciled in California.

[Id. at ¶¶ 5, 11.]

Crawford later

repudiated that assertion and claimed that his domicile at the
time he filed the Complaint was Alabama.

[Pltf.’s Decl. of

Domicile, filed 8/7/13 (dkt. no. 500), at ¶ 1.]
On September 13, 2013, JAL filed its Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Jack Crawford’s Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction (“Motion to Dismiss”).

[Dkt. no. 510.]

JAL argued

that there was no diversity of citizenship in this case because,
at the time Crawford filed the Complaint, he was an expatriate
residing in Thailand, and therefore he was “stateless” for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

On December 31, 2013, this

Court issued an order granting the Motion to Dismiss (“Dismissal
Order”).

[Dkt. no. 528.]

Although this Court found that it was

not necessary to determine exactly where Crawford was domiciled
at the time he filed the Complaint, this Court found that
Crawford failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact as
to the issue of whether Alabama was his domicile.

This Court

therefore concluded that there was no federal diversity
jurisdiction over this case from the outset.
On January 18, 2013, well before this Court ruled that
it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Crawford’s case,
Crawford filed his “Motion for Sanctions Against JAL Defendants,

3

HACS, Carlsmith Ball, Certain Carlsmith Ball Attorneys, and
Carl Osaki” (“Sanctions Motion”).3

[Dkt. no. 405]

Crawford

asked this Court to “impose appropriately severe sanctions under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and the Court’s inherent authority to sanction bad faith
litigation, and also refer the responsible attorneys to the
Hawai`i State Bar and the Bar of this Court for appropriate
disciplinary action.”

[Mem. in Supp. of Sanctions Motion at 4.]

This Court denied the Sanctions Motion in a May 31, 2013 order
(“Sanctions Order”).

[Dkt. no. 453.4]

This Court found that, to

the extent that the Sanctions Motion was based on Crawford’s
qualification to fly, that issue had not been fully litigated,
and Crawford’s argument that Defendants’ position was frivolous
was premature.

This Court also found that his “request for Rule

11 sanctions [was] both procedurally defective and substantively
specious” and denied the request.
2420715, at *7.

Sanctions Order, 2013 WL

Further, this Court concluded that Crawford

failed to meet “the more stringent subjective bad faith standard”
of § 1927 and that

sanctions pursuant to this Court’s inherent

power were not warranted.

Id. at *8-9.

3

The Carlsmith Ball firm represents JAL, and Mr. Osaki
represents HACS.
4

The Sanctions Order is also available at 2013 WL 2420715.
4

Based on its findings that Crawford failed to comply
with Rule 11’s procedural requirements and that the Sanctions
Motion was “substantively without merit,” this Court concluded
that “Defendants, and any additional sanctions targets, are the
prevailing parties” and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2),
“these responding parties and counsel are entitled to their
reasonable attorneys’ fees resulting directly from Plaintiff’s
filing, in an amount sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct.”

Id. at *9.

Pursuant to the Sanctions Order, JAL and

HACS each filed a motion for attorneys’ fees (“JAL Fee Motion”
and “HACS Fee Motion”) on June 24, 2013.

[Dkt. nos. 469, 470.]

The magistrate judge deferred ruling on the motions for
attorneys’ fees pending the disposition of the Motion to Dismiss.
[EO, filed 9/12/13 (dkt. no. 512).]

Thus, the magistrate judge

issued the HACS F&R and the JAL F&R after the Dismissal Order.
In the HACS F&R, the magistrate judge recommended
granting the HACS Fee Motion in part and denying it in part.

The

magistrate judge recommended reducing the requested award of
$12,796.79 to $7,972.61.

In the JAL F&R, the magistrate judge

recommended reducing the requested award of $74,441.48 in
attorneys’ fees and $4,947.12 in costs to $52,511.02 in
attorneys’ fees and $4,580.87 in costs.
The instant objections followed.

5

STANDARD
This district court reviews a magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations regarding an award of attorneys’
fees under the following standard:
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations, the district court
must review de novo those portions to which the
objections are made and “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980); United States
v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (“[T]he district judge must review
the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations de novo if objection is made, but
not otherwise.”).
Under a de novo standard, this Court reviews
“the matter anew, the same as if it had not been
heard before, and as if no decision previously had
been rendered.” Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457
F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). The
district court need not hold a de novo hearing;
however, it is the court’s obligation to arrive at
its own independent conclusion about those
portions of the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendation to which a party objects. United
States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.
1989).
Valencia v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, Civil No. 10–00558
LEK–RLP, 2013 WL 3223628, at *5 (D. Hawai`i June 25, 2013).
DISCUSSION
I.

Whether Crawford Sought Sanctions Against HACS
At the outset, the HACS Objections argue that the

magistrate judge should not have considered the HACS Fee Motion
6

because Crawford never sought Rule 11 sanctions against HACS or
HACS’s counsel.

In the Sanctions Order, this Court denied

Crawford’s request for Rule 11 sanctions in its entirety, 2013 WL
2420715, at *7, and awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule
11(c)(2) to, inter alia, HACS and HACS’s counsel:
The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to
comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 11
and that the Plaintiff’s Motion is substantively
without merit. The Court therefore concludes that
Defendants, and any additional sanctions targets,
are the prevailing parties. Accordingly, these
responding parties and counsel are entitled to
their reasonable attorneys’ fees resulting
directly from Plaintiff’s filing, in an amount
sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct. . . .
Id. at *9.

Thus, Crawford’s first objection to the HACS F&R is

essentially an untimely objection to the Sanctions Order, which
this Court filed on May 31, 2013.

See Local Rule LR60.1 (stating

that motions asserting “[m]anifest error of law or fact” pursuant
to subsection (c) “must be filed not more than fourteen (14) days
after the court’s written order is filed.”).

Although Crawford

filed the HACS Objections on February 4, 2014, this Court, in its
discretion, will still consider Crawford’s argument.
According to the pertinent section headings in the
Sanctions Motion, Crawford asked this Court to impose: Rule 11
sanctions “JOINTLY ON THE JAL DEFENDANTS, CARLSMITH BALL AND
ANNA M. ELENTO-SNEED;” [Mem. in Supp. of Sanctions Motion at 18
(emphasis in original);] sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

7

against “CARLSMITH BALL AND CARLSMITH BALL PARTNERS
ANDREW PEPPER, STEVEN EGESDAL AND MATTHEW MATSUNAGA, AND UPON
HACS ATTORNEY CARL OSASKI [sic];” [id. at 30;] and sanctions
pursuant to this Court’s inherent authority against “DEFENDANTS
AND THEIR COUNSEL” [id. at 34].

These indicate that Crawford

only sought § 1927 and inherent authority sanctions against HACS
and HACS’s counsel.
In its Response to the HACS Objections, HACS argues
that the Sanctions Motion did seek Rule 11 sanctions against it
and its counsel.

[Response to HACS Objections at 3-4 (quoting

Mem. in Supp. of Sanctions Motion at 4, 30, 37).]

The first

passage that HACS relies on stated:
“Given (a) the severity of the collusive
misconduct by Defendants and their counsel,
(b) that the attorneys involved are all
experienced, senior attorneys, and (c) the
evidence of calculated, deliberate bad faith and
utter lack of concern for the consequences of
their misconduct, the Court should impose
appropriately severe sanctions under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority to
sanction bad faith litigation . . . .
[Mem. in Supp. of Sanctions Motion at 4.]

Similarly, the

conclusion of the Sanctions Motion argued:
Plaintiff’s motion for an order levying
sanctions, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the
Court’s inherent authority, against the JAL
Defendants, HACS, Carlsmith Ball,
Anna M. Elento-Sneed, Andrew Pepper,
Steven Egesdal, Matthew M. Matsunaga and

8

Carl Osaki, should be granted in its
entirety . . . .
[Id. at 37.]

These passages do not indicate that Crawford sought

Rule 11 sanctions against HACS and HACS’s counsel.

They are

merely summaries of his arguments for sanctions in general, and
Rule 11 was only one basis of his request for sanctions.
HACS also relies upon the section of the Sanctions
Motion discussing the “Appropriate Rule 11 Sanctions.”

Crawford

stated, “Defendants and their counsel have unwaveringly insisted
that their reason and basis for terminating Crawford was
precisely that . . . , as Carlsmith Ball attorney Matsunaga put
it, Crawford had ‘lost his license to fly.’”
Sanctions Motion at 30 (emphasis added).]

[Mem. in Supp. of

Although in portions

of the Sanctions Motion, Crawford used the term “Defendants” to
refer to JAL, JALways, and HACS and the term “JAL Defendants” to
refer to JAL and JALways, see, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of Sanctions
Motion at 2, the quotation that HACS relies upon in its Response
to the HACS Objections appeared in section III.C., which was
titled “Appropriate Rule 11 Sanctions,” id. at 28.

The previous

two sections were III.A., “THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE RULE 11
SANCTIONS JOINTLY ON THE JAL DEFENDANTS, CARLSMITH BALL AND ANNA
M. ELENTO-SNEED,” and III.B., “The JAL Defendants and their
Attorneys Violated Rule 11.”
original).]

[Id. at 18, 24 (emphasis in

Thus, while not the model of clarity, it appears

9

that Crawford used the term “Defendants” in III.C. to refer to
JAL and JALways.
Based on further review of the Sanctions Motion, this
Court concludes that Crawford did not seek Rule 11 sanctions
against HACS and HACS’s counsel, and this Court erroneously
awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) to HACS and
HACS’s counsel.

This Court therefore WITHDRAWS the award of

attorneys’ fees to HACS and HACS’s counsel.

In light of the

withdrawal, this Court GRANTS the HACS Objections and REJECTS the
HACS F&R.
II.

Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter in the JAL Objections, Crawford

argues that this Court does not have the authority to award
“statutory prevailing party attorneys’ fees” because this Court
has ruled that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
Crawford’s Complaint.

[JAL Objections at 2.]

In finding that he could address the JAL Fee Motion,
the magistrate judge stated:
The Supreme Court has held that although a
final determination of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction precludes all further adjudication of
a case in federal court, “such a determination
does not automatically wipe out all proceedings
had in the district court at a time when the
district court operated under the misapprehension
that it had jurisdiction.” Willy v. Coastal
Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992); In re Exxon
Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 431 (9th Cir. 1996).
Because the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is a
collateral matter that does not involve judgment
10

on the merits of an action, a district court does
not adjudicate the merits of a “case or
controversy” over which it lacks jurisdiction by
imposing sanctions. Willy, 503 U.S. at 138.
District courts have the authority to determine
whether an attorney abused the judicial process
and assess appropriate sanctions. Id.
[JAL F&R at 4-5.]

In the JAL Objections, Crawford argues that

Willy is inapplicable to the instant case because the instant
case “involves only a prevailing party fee award under Rule
11(c)(2) and does not involve a Rule 11(b) sanction.”
Objections at 3 (emphasis omitted).]

[JAL

Crawford, however, cites no

case law supporting such a narrow interpretation of Willy.
Crawford argues that:
Other cases finding that district courts properly
exercise jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees
where subject matter jurisdiction is found to have
been lacking are generally limited to instances
involving statutory provisions specifically
authorizing an award of attorneys’ fees where
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, i.e.
improvident removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c).
[JAL Objections at 3-4 (citing Moore v. Permanente Medical Group,
Inc., 981 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1992); Mints v. Education Testing
Service, 99 F.3d 1253 (3d Cir. 1996)).]

Although Willy involved

an action that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held was
improperly removed, 503 U.S. at 132-33, the United States Supreme
Court did not rely on § 1447(c) in holding that the district
court had the authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions.
the Supreme Court held that:

11

Ultimately,

The interest in having rules of procedure obeyed
. . . does not disappear upon a subsequent
determination that the court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction. . . . [T]here is no
constitutional infirmity under Article III in
requiring those practicing before the courts to
conduct themselves in compliance with the
applicable procedural rules in the interim, and to
allow the courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions in
the event of their failure to do so.
Id. at 139.

Thus, this Court had the authority to enforce the

rules of procedure during the pendency of this case even though
this Court ultimately ruled that it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.

This Court therefore DENIES

Crawford’s objection that this Court lacks jurisdiction to award
attorneys’ fees to JAL pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
III. Objections to the Calculation of the Total Award
Crawford argues that the magistrate judge failed to
evaluate the reasonableness of the work that JAL’s counsel
performed.

This objection is DENIED because the magistrate judge

clearly reviewed the reasonableness of the hours reflected in the
requested fee award within the lodestar analysis.
This Court next turns to Crawford’s objection that the
magistrate judge’s “award of $2,362.02 in tax and $4,580.87 in
costs, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), is unsupported and
without a basis in law.”

[JAL Objections at 7.]

Rule 11(c)(2)

states, in pertinent part: “If warranted, the court may award to
the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred for the motion.”
12

An award of

reasonable costs is clearly within the meaning of the term
“reasonable expenses.”

Further, it is common practice in this

district court to award the associated general excise tax with an
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees.

See, e.g., Hawaii Tapers

Health & Welfare Fund v. B & A Builders Inc., Civ. No. 13–00208
JMS–RLP, 2014 WL 957457, at *5 (D. Hawai`i Mar. 12, 2014); Hawaii
Glaziers Trust Funds v. Island Glazing, Inc., No. CV 13–00448
SOM–RLP, 2014 WL 819208, at *6 & n.4 (D. Hawai`i Mar. 3, 2014);
Au v. Republic State Mortg. Co., Civ. No. 11–00251 JMS–KSC, 2014
WL 770291, at *9 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 25, 2014).

This Court

therefore DENIES Crawford’s objection to the legal basis for the
recommended award of taxes and costs.
Crawford’s next objection is that the magistrate judge
should have excluded the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in
responding to: his request for § 1927 sanctions; his request for
sanctions pursuant to this Court’s inherent authority; his
request for sanctions against Carlsmith Ball; and his request for
sanctions against Elento-Sneed.

Crawford is correct that the

award of attorneys’ fees was limited to the fees incurred in
responding to the request for Rule 11 sanctions, as opposed to
responding to the § 1927 or inherent powers request.

Crawford,

however, has not identified any specific hours of the fee request
that were attributable solely to the § 1927 issue or the inherent
powers issue.

Further, this Court concludes that a percentage

13

apportionment of fees attributable only to the Rule 11 request is
not warranted in this case because Crawford’s requests for
sanctions, based on three different legal theories, shared the
same factual basis.

See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of Sanctions Motion

at 2 (arguing that JAL, JALways, HACS, and their respective
counsel, “have defended this wrongful termination action for
nearly ten years on the grounds - now exposed as utter fabricated
- that the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (the “JCAB”) revoked
Plaintiff Capt. Jack Crawford’s pilot credentials and that
Capt. Crawford was necessarily terminated as a consequence”).
As to Crawford’s argument that JAL is not entitled to
fees attributable to responding to his request for sanctions
against Carlsmith Ball and against Elento-Sneed, this Court notes
that, during the events at issue in the Sanctions Motion,
Elento-Sneed was an attorney with Carlsmith Ball, which
represented JAL.

JAL filed a single memorandum in opposition to

the Sanctions Motion, and the memorandum in opposition addressed
both the request for sanctions against JAL and the request for
sanctions against JAL’s counsel.

Assuming, arguendo, that some

of the award of attorneys’ fees is due to JAL as reimbursement of
attorneys’ fees it paid and some of the award is due directly to
JAL’s counsel, that distribution is JAL’s responsibility and is
not grounds for Crawford to object to the award itself.

14

This Court therefore DENIES Crawford’s objection that
the magistrate judge should have reduced the award of attorneys’
fees to JAL to reflect only work on the Rule 11 issue and should
have excluded work on the request for sanctions against JAL’s
counsel.
Finally, Crawford objects to the recommended fee award
to JAL on the ground that the award should only be a minimal
amount sufficient for deterrence.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)

states, in pertinent part:
A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited
to what suffices to deter repetition of the
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated. The sanction may include . . . , if
imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s
fees and other expenses directly resulting from
the violation.
Michael J. Green, Esq., James A. Frechter, Esq., and
Martin Sterenbuch, Esq., signed the Sanctions Motion.
Motion at 3.]

[Sanctions

Crawford’s pro hac vice counsel, Mr. Frechter and

Mr. Sterenbuch, apparently authored the Sanctions Motion, and
Crawford’s local counsel, Mr. Green, argued the motion at the
hearing before this Court.

[Trans. of 4/8/13 Hrg., filed 6/4/13

(dkt. no. 456), at 7 (Mr. Green states, “I agreed to argue this
motion for counsel.”).]

Crawford submitted an extensive

declaration in support of the Sanctions Motion.

15

Under the circumstances of this case, where the request
for Rule 11 sanctions was “procedurally defective,” as well as
“substantively specious” and “without merit,” Sanctions Order,
2013 WL 2420715, at *7, *9, this Court finds that the recommended
award of $52,511.02 in attorneys’ fees and $4,580.87 in costs,
for a total award of $57,091.89, is an appropriate amount to
deter Crawford, Crawford’s counsel, and other similarly situated
parties and their counsel, from filing similar motions.

This

Court therefore DENIES Crawford’s objection that the recommended
award is more than is necessary for deterrence.
IV.

Award in Favor of JAL
Having denied all of Crawford’s objections to the JAL

F&R, this Court ADOPTS the JAL F&R in its entirety.

Further,

this Court ORDERS Crawford to pay fifty percent of the $57,091.89
total award ($28,545.94) and ORDERS Crawford’s counsel to pay
fifty percent of the $57,091.89 total award ($28,545.95).
Michael Green, James Frechter, and Martin Sterenbuch shall be
jointly and severally liable for the portion of the total award
attributable to Crawford’s counsel.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Crawford’s Objections to
the magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendation to Grant in
Part and Deny in Part Defendant Hawaii Aviation Contract
Services, Inc.’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees, filed
16

February 4, 2014, are HEREBY GRANTED, and Crawford’s Objections
to the magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendation to Grant in
Part and Deny in Part Defendant Japan Airlines’ Motion for
Attorney’s Fees, filed February 5, 2014, are HEREBY DENIED.

This

Court therefore REJECTS the magistrate judge’s HACS F&R and
ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s JAL F&R as the order of this Court.
This Court ORDERS Crawford’s counsel to arrange the
transmission of the total award to JAL, through JAL’s counsel, by
May 27, 2014.
There being no other pending matters, this Court
directs the Clerk’s Office to enter judgment and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, March 28, 2014.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

JACK CRAWFORD VS. JAPAN AIRLINES, ET AL; CIVIL 03-00451 LEK-KSC;
ORDER: 1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN
PART DEFENDANT HAWAII AVIATION CONTRACT SERVICES, INC.’S MOTION
FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND REJECTING THE FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION; AND 2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART
AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANT JAPAN AIRLINES’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S
FEES AND ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
17