Williams v. United States of America
Filing
89
AMENDED ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONFIRM TRIAL DATE re 83 . Signed by JUDGE ALAN C KAY on 2/8/12. (eps)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticip ants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
TARSHIA WILLIAMS, individually
and as the Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Talia Williams, a Deceased
Minor,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant.
) Civ. No. 08-00437 ACK-BMK
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AMENDED ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CONFIRM TRIAL DATE
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1/
This case arises out of the death of minor Talia
Williams (“Talia”) on July 16, 2005.
Compl. ¶ 2.
At the time of
her death, Talia was living with her father, U.S. Army soldier
Naeem Williams (“Williams”), and stepmother, Delilah Williams
(“Delilah”), on a U.S. Army Base on Oahu, Hawaii.
Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
Talia allegedly, after suffering seven months of physical abuse
by Williams and Delilah, was fatally beaten by Williams.
¶ 6.
Id.
Williams has been charged with first degree murder and is
currently incarcerated awaiting trial.
1/
Id.
Delilah has pled
The facts as recited in this Order are for the purpose of
disposing of the current motion and are not to be construed as
findings of fact that the parties may rely on in future
proceedings.
guilty to first degree murder.
Id.
Talia’s mother, Plaintiff Tarshia Williams
(“Plaintiff”), brought the instant action against the United
States (referred to herein as “Defendant,” the “United States,”
or the “Government”) in her individual capacity and her capacity
as Personal Representative of Talia.
Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff
alleges that the United States is liable under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for, inter alia, negligence and wrongful death because
it failed to notice and take appropriate action regarding the
abuse of Talia.
Id. ¶¶ 16-24.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
The Related Criminal Cases
On July 18 and August 8, 2005, Defendant filed criminal
complaints against Delilah and Naeem Williams, respectively.
United States v. Williams, Cr. No. 06-00079 DAE-KSC-1 (D. Haw.
Aug. 8, 2005), Doc. No. 1; United States v. Williams, Cr. No. 0600079 DAE-2 (D. Haw. July 18, 2005), Doc. No. 1.
Williams faces two counts of first degree felony murder
and one count of obstruction of justice.
On September 8, 2006,
Defendant filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
against Williams.
Williams, Cr. No. 06-00079 DAE, Doc. No. 122.
His trial date has been continued multiple times the past six
2
years.2/
Most recently, upon stipulation by the Government and
Williams, the Court continued the trial date from January 2012
until September 4, 2012.
Id. Doc. No. 1665.
Meanwhile, in December 2006, Delilah pled guilty to one
count of first degree felony murder.
Id. Doc. No. 200.
The
Court sealed portions of Delilah’s plea agreement that described
the cause of Talia’s death to protect Williams’s right to a fair
2/
There has been extensive pretrial litigation in Williams’s
criminal case, which has involved over 1,600 filings. As a
federal death penalty case, the prosecution was required to
request and gain approval from the United State’s Attorney
General to seek the death penalty. See United States Attorneys’
Manual § 9-10.040; United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487, 488
(2d Cir. 2007). Additionally, in this case, Williams moved to
dismiss or strike the death penalty allegations, asserting that
the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 is
unconstitutional. Doc. No. 309. Furthermore, Williams has
consented to continuances and waived his right to Speedy Trial.
See e.g., Williams, Cr. No. 06-00079 DAE, Doc. Nos. 287, 481,
711, 759, 875, 1597, 1665. Reasons that the parties have
requested, and the Court has granted, continuances include that a
number of issues relating to expert witnesses had yet to be
resolved, see id. Doc. No. 481; to allow for a judicial
determination that any conflict between Williams and his own
attorneys is not of constitutional dimension, see id. Doc. No.
711; to allow for the resolution of a then-pending complicated
Daubert hearing, jury selection issues, and other pre-trial
motions that both sides anticipated filing, see id. Doc. No. 759;
scheduling conflicts by counsel for the Government and Williams,
which necessitated a continuance to allow Williams’s attorney
time for adequate preparation, see id. Doc. No. 875; over the
Government’s objection, to allow Williams’s counsel adequate time
to prepare motions relating to two new counts of the Second
Superseding Indictment, the Second Amended Death Notice, and
upcoming mental health evaluations, and to allow for the
location, and transportation to Hawaii, of important witnesses
that are in the Army and were serving abroad, see id. Doc. No.
1068; and a number of important issues had yet to be resolved
(i.e., mental health issues) or even briefed (e.g., diabetes and
dependent personalty disorder issues), see id. Doc. No. 1394.
3
trial.
Id. Doc. No. 224.
II.
The Instant Civil Case
On October 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant
complaint.
Doc. No. 1.
After a scheduling conference, the Court
set the bench trial for March 2, 2010.
Doc. No. 11.
On December
2, 2009, Defendant moved to continue trial until the conclusion
of Williams’s criminal trial.
the continuance.
Doc. No. 32.
Doc. No. 28.
Plaintiff opposed
On January 22, 2010, Magistrate
Judge Kurren issued an order granting Defendant’s motion to
continue trial because holding the civil trial before the
criminal trial might impact Williams’s right to a fair trial.
2010 WL 290542 (Doc. No. 41).
Magistrate Judge Kurren noted that
the criminal trial was a death penalty case, that Plaintiff “does
not deny that she will seek to introduce details about the nature
and causes of Talia’s death,” and that the release of such
details before the criminal trial posed a danger to Williams’s
right to a fair trial.
Id. at *3.
1, 2011.
After a status conference, the trial date
Doc. No. 47.
was continued to January 18, 2012.
A new trial was set for March
Doc. No. 69.
Plaintiff did
not file an objection to this continuance.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2009, Plaintiff moved for a
pretrial determination as to the admissibility of twenty-five
statements attached to an investigation report of Talia’s death
prepared by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division.
4
2010
WL 290542 (Doc. No. 41).
Two of these statements were those of
Delilah and Williams, which Plaintiff asserted were admissible as
statements against interest pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3).
Id. at *1-2.
Because Rule 804(b)(3) is only
applicable when the declarant is unavailable as a witness, the
Court deferred ruling on the admissibility of the statements
“until it is clear that the witnesses are indeed unavailable.”
Id. at *2.
On April 7, 2010, after briefing by the parties and a
hearing, the Court granted in part, and denied in part, a motion
for summary judgment filed by Defendant.
(Doc. No. 63).
711 F. Supp. 2d 1195
The Court granted Defendant’s Motion as it
applied to any alleged negligence by child care workers who had
custody and control of Talia in relation to an incident that
occurred in February 2005, but denied the remainder of
Defendant’s motion, which principally focused on arguing that the
United States had no duty in this case.
Id. at 1201, 1215.
On September 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion to
Confirm Trial Date, which was accompanied by a supporting
memorandum (“Pl.’s Mot. Mem.”).
Doc. No. 73.
On September 28,
2011, Defendant filed an opposition (“Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s
Mot.”).
reply.
Doc. No. 74.
Doc. No. 75.
On November 4, 2011, Plaintiff filed a
Magistrate Judge Kurren denied Plaintiff’s
Motion on November 30, 2011.
Doc. No. 78.
5
Magistrate Judge
Kurren concluded that “[b]ecause the civil trial is a bench
trial, evidence will be admitted in the civil trial that the
criminal court may exclude,” and thus a danger of releasing
inadmissible evidence prior to the death penalty trial existed.
Id. at 4.
He concluded that the pretrial publicity generated
from the civil trial would significantly impair Williams’s right
to a fair trial.
Id. at 4-5.
He summarized as follows:
[I]f the civil trial were held before the
criminal trial, the court could not guarantee
Naeem would have a fair trial in a death
penalty case because of the media coverage
that would likely occur. Therefore, good
cause exists to modify the schedule in this
case to continue the civil trial until after
the criminal trial.
Id. at 5.
On December 14, 2011, Plaintiff appealed the Magistrate
Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Confirm Trial Date
(“Pl.’s Appeal”) and requested oral argument.
Doc. No. 79.
Defendant filed an opposition on December 22, 2011 (“Def.’s
Opp’n”).
Doc. No. 80.
On January 5, 2012, the Court held a hearing on
Plaintiff’s appeal.
STANDARD
I.
Reconsideration of 2010 Order
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s “Motion to Confirm
was effectively a motion to reconsider the Magistrate’s January
21, 2010 Order (which plaintiff did not appeal) finding that
6
‘good cause exists to modify the Scheduling Order in the instant
case and continue trial to after the criminal trial concludes.’”
Def.’s Opp’n 4 (citing Doc. No. 41).
Defendant contends,
therefore, the standard of review for reconsidering a prior
interlocutory order, which requires showing new facts, a change
in the law, or manifest error of law or fact, applies.
Id.; see
L.R. 60.1.
The Court concludes that this standard is met here due
to new facts since the 2010 Order.
The criminal complaint
against Williams was filed back in 2005, and the court did not
anticipate that the trial would not have commenced by January
2012.
On January 19, 2011, the court set the trial in the civil
case for January 18, 2012, to which Plaintiff raised no
objection.
See Doc. No. 69.
However, almost a year has elapsed
since setting that date and almost two years since Magistrate
Judge Kurren continued the trial date over Plaintiff’s objection.
The Court finds that under these circumstances, there have been
new facts with respect to allowing reconsideration of the January
21, 2010 Order.
Thus to the extent reviewing the Magistrate
Judge’s Order to Confirm Trial Date constitutes a reconsideration
of the 2010 Order, the Court will exercise its discretion to
reconsider the 2010 order.
See Navajo Nation v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046
(9th Cir. 2003) (“Whether or not to grant reconsideration is
7
committed to the sound discretion of the court.”).
II.
Review of Magistrate Judge’s Interlocutory Order
Pursuant to Local Rule 74.1, any party may appeal from
a magistrate judge’s order determining a non-dispositive pretrial
matter or, if a reconsideration order has issued, the magistrate
judge’s reconsideration order on such a matter.
The district
judge shall consider the appeal and shall set aside any portion
of the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.
See L.R. 74.1; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 626(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
The district judge may
also reconsider sua sponte any matter determined by a magistrate
judge.
See L.R. 74.1.
“The clearly erroneous standard applies to the
magistrate judge’s factual findings while the contrary to law
standard applies to the magistrate judge’s legal conclusions,
which are reviewed de novo.”
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell,
245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
“[ A] magistrate judge’s
ruling on discovery issues, including relevancy, is clearly
erroneous only when the district court is left with a ‘definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”
JJCO,
Inc. v. Isuzu Motors Am., Inc., Civ. No. 08–00419 SOM-LEK, 2009
WL 3569600, at *2 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2009).
The district judge
may not simply substitute his or her judgment for that of the
magistrate judge.
See Grimes v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,
8
951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991).
“A decision is contrary to
law if it applies an incorrect legal standard or fails to
consider an element of the applicable standard.”
Na Pali Haweo
Cmty. Ass’n v. Grande, 252 F.R.D. 672, 674 (D. Haw. 2008)
(internal quotations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Framework
Although a district court may delay a civil proceeding
pending the outcome of parallel criminal proceedings, “such
action is not required by the Constitution.”
Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1989).
Absent substantial prejudice to the parties, simultaneous
parallel civil and criminal actions are unobjectionable.
Keating
v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir.
1995).
Nevertheless, a court may decide in its discretion to
schedule civil proceedings after a related criminal trial “when
the interests of justice seem[] to require such action.”
Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
In determining whether to reschedule a civil proceeding
in the face of a parallel criminal proceeding, a court should
consider “the particular circumstances and competing interests
involved in the case.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
In
Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322 (9th Cir.
1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth factors for a
9
court to consider when deciding whether to reschedule a civil
trial after parallel criminal proceedings.
A court should
consider (1) the extent to which a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
rights are implicated, (2) the plaintiff’s interest in proceeding
expeditiously, (3) the burden the proceedings may impose on the
defendant(s), (4) the convenience of the court and the efficient
use of judicial resources, (5) the interests of persons not
parties to the civil litigation, and (6) the interest of the
public in the pending civil and criminal litigation.
Id. at 324-
35.
II.
The Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Magistrate Judge accepted
the Government’s general concern about pretrial publicity, and
made its ruling without a factual record to support the claim.”
Pl.’s Appeal 3.
Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge’s
concern of pretrial publicity is not factually supported because
“virtually all of the facts since 2005 have been subject to
extensive media publicity.”
Id. at 6.
Plaintiff also argues
that the Magistrate Judge erred by failing to apply the factors
set forth in Keating, and such an application renders
rescheduling the civil trial after the criminal trial
unwarranted.
Id. at 4.
In its opposition, Defendant argues that avoiding the
possibility of prejudicing Williams’s rights constitutes good
10
cause for holding the criminal trial prior to the civil trial.
Def.’s Opp’n 6.
Defendant asserts that Keating is
distinguishable because in this case, “the key issue is pretrial
publicity, and the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial,
matters Keating does not address.”
Id. at 5.
Defendant asserts
therefore the Court should apply the standard set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), which allows a schedule
to be modified for good cause, rather than the Keating factors.
Id.
Defendant asserts that even if the Court applies the Keating
factors, the Magistrate Judge did not err.
Id. at 12.
Defendant noted that in Williams’s criminal trial, the
Court, over objections of the media, had sealed portions of
Delilah’s plea agreement that describe the events leading to
Talia’s death.
Id. at 6.
Defendant states that “[t]rial of the
civil matter will inevitably raise the same dangers of publicity
and prejudice that the criminal court has tried to prevent.”
at 9.
Id.
Defendant further avers that “[t]he fact that the civil
trial is a bench trial under civil rules, and the criminal trial
is a death penalty jury trial under criminal rules, makes it
almost inevitable that the civil court will admit evidence that
the criminal court will exclude.”
Id. at 9-10.
Defendant
asserts that such action will result in exposing the jury pool to
inadmissible evidence that the Court has attempted to prevent in
the criminal case.
Id. at 10.
11
III. Application of the Keating Factors
Although this case is distinguishable from Keating in
several respects, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s assertion
that Keating is inapplicable to these circumstances.
Opp’n 5-6.
See Def.’s
Keating, as here, involved the propriety of holding a
civil trial before a related criminal trial when such action
would affect the parties’ rights, including the Constitutional
rights of a criminal defendant.
See Keating, 45 F.3d at 324-26
(considering Defendant’s argument that holding the civil trial
before his criminal trial violated his due process rights by
“forc[ing] him to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege”).
Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider the factors set forth
in Keating.
The Court nonetheless notes that this is different from
the typical case involving related civil and criminal cases in
several respects.
First, William’s involvement in Talia’s abuse
and death will inevitably be at issue in the civil trial;
Williams, the criminal defendant, however, is not a party to the
civil trial.
Second, Williams has more at stake than the
ordinary criminal defendant.
“The Court is not dealing with a
civil trial or even a criminal trial with less devastating
consequences.
Rather, it is dealing with a death penalty case,
and one of the few that pass through this Court.”
United States
v. Williams, Cr. No. 06-00079 DAE, Doc. No. 299, at 7-8.
12
Although the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s
position regarding the extended delay of the criminal trial,
applying the Keating factors here, the scales tip in favor of
upholding the Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion
to Confirm Trial Date.3/
The Court further notes that
Plaintiff’s counsel admitted at the hearing that he was unable to
find a case where a court proceeded with a civil trial before a
related criminal death penalty trial.
A.
Williams’s Fifth Amendment Rights
It is permissible to hold a civil trial at the same
time as a related criminal proceeding, even if it necessitates
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
F.3d at 326.
See Keating, 45
It is, however, a significant factor in deciding
whether to proceed with the civil trial, which should be
considered and weighed against the other relevant factors.
Id.
Plaintiff contends that Williams’s Fifth Amendment
rights will not be implicated by the civil trial because his
post-arrest statements in the investigation report are admissible
under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2), 803(8), and 804(b)(3).
The Court disagrees with this statement.
Rule 801(d)(2), which provides that an opposing party’s
statement is not hearsay, appears to be inapplicable to
3/
The Court notes that there is some overlap in considering
the Keating factors.
13
Williams’s statements because Williams is not the opposing party
in this case.
Rule 803(8) excludes a record or statement of a
public office the hearsay rule in certain situations, but does
not appear to apply to Williams’s post-arrest statements
contained in an investigation report.
See 2010 WL 290542, at *2
(Doc. No. 41) (“Pursuant to the terms of Rule 803(8)(C), only
factual findings resulting from an investigation are excluded
from the hearsay rule . . . .
Thus, Rule 803(8)(C) does not
exclude from the category of hearsay any underlying witness
statements contained in [a] [report] because those statements are
not factual findings resulting from an investigation.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted); San Francisco Baykeeper v. West
Bay Sanitary Dist., 791 F. Supp. 2d 719, 744 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(“Rule 803(8) deems a public report admissible based on the
notion that its official author knows what he is talking about
and will state the facts accurately.
That presumption does not
attach to the statements of third parties who themselves bear no
public duty to report what they observe.”).
Rule 804(b)(3) provides that statements against
interest are excepted from the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.
Plaintiff has not established that
Williams will be unavailable as a witness at trial.
If Williams
invokes his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, however, he
will be unavailable within the meaning of Rule 804(b).
14
See
United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009).
Although the statements might be able to come in at that time, it
will require Williams to invoke his Fifth Amendment right.
The Court nonetheless does not think concern for
Williams’s Fifth Amendment rights is significant in these
circumstances.
Williams is not a party to the civil case and the
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right will not prejudice him,
i.e., he will not have to invoke his Fifth Amendment right at the
expense of his civil defense.
See e.g., S.E.C. v. Alexander, No.
10-CV-04535-LHK, 2010 WL 5388000, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010)
(“[A]llowing the civil case to proceed in parallel with the
criminal prosecution would effectively force [the defendant] to
choose between defending himself in the civil case and preserving
his Fifth Amendment rights.”).
B.
Plaintiff’s Interest in Proceeding Expeditiously
Plaintiff asserts that she is prepared to proceed to
trial and that delays make her case more difficult to prove as
time goes by and memories fade.
Pl.’s Appeal 13.
Plaintiff
filed her complaint in October 2008, over three years ago.
The
Court agrees that Plaintiff has an interest in proceeding
expeditiously to trial.
The Court also notes that Plaintiff
presumably has an interest in closure of the criminal trial.
Consequently, she has an interest in ensuring that Williams is
properly prosecuted, rather than risking a conviction and
15
reversal on appeal due to the lack of a fair trial.
Such action
would further delay resolution of the criminal case that has been
pending for many years now.
Because Plaintiff seeks to proceed
to trial, however, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of
not continuing the civil trial and reversing the Magistrate
Judge’s Order.
C.
The Burden the Proceedings May Impose on Defendant
The Government has an obvious interest in the proper
prosecution of Williams, including ensuring that he receives a
fair trial.
See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1037 (2d
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he United States ha[s] a strong national interest
in safeguarding the integrity of its criminal process.”); United
States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1967) (recognizing
“[t]he interest of the government in the integrity of the
criminal process”).
The Ninth Circuit has recognized: “‘In
essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’
jurors.
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates
even the minimal standards of due process.’”
Woodford, 428 F.3d
at 1210 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)).
Prejudicial pretrial publicity that affects the impartiality of
jurors implicates this right.
See id.
Plaintiff repeatedly refers to the danger from
prejudicial pretrial publicity as lacking factual support and
16
“speculative.”
16.
See Pl.’s Appeal 3, 6; Pl.’s Mot. Mem. 2-3, 15-
Plaintiff also avers that “almost all of the facts that
would be admitted in the civil case have already been reported in
the media.”
Pl.’s Appeal 3.
First, Plaintiff ignores the
Government’s point that “a civil trial might revive public
knowledge of and interest in the case that have been dormant
since shortly after the death of Talia Williams in 2005.”
Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. 9.
Def.’s
Indeed, of the thirteen news articles
Plaintiff submitted to the Court, ten were published shortly
after Talia’s death in 2005, one was published in February 2006
after Williams was indicted, and two were published in December
2006 after Delilah pled guilty.
See Pl.’s Appeal Exs. A-M.
The
public has likely forgotten this case, or at the least much of
the inflammatory details involving Talia’s death and abuse, in
the six years since Talia’s death and five years since Delilah’s
plea.
The Court finds that a civil trial will reawaken the
public’s interest and knowledge of this case.
Second, the criminal court found that paragraphs in
Delilah’s plea agreement “contain significant, and sometimes
gruesome, details that have not been collectively released to the
media and the public with such detailed specificity.”
United
States v. Williams, Cr. No. 06-00079 DAE-LEK, Doc. No. 224, at
15.
Plaintiff’s assertion that virtually every fact involving
Williams has already been reported to the media is therefore
17
incorrect.
Third, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument
that the potential harm from pretrial publicity is without
factual support and purely speculative.
Although the Court
cannot predict exactly what effect pretrial publicity will have
on Williams’s Constitutional right to a fair trial, the criminal
court has recognized the danger of pretrial publicity, e.g., it
sealed portions of Delilah’s plea agreement over objections of
the media.
See id. Doc. No. 299, at 6-8.
Specifically, the
Court noted that it was necessary to seal portions of Delilah’s
plea agreement “because the pretrial publicity that would be
generated by its release would taint the jury, implicating . . .
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”
Id.
The public
interest in the instant case will likely be high, as this civil
case involves the alleged repeated abuse and torture of a child
by her father and stepmother, the alleged brutal murder of the
child by her father, and allegedly the Government’s failure to
respond appropriately to charges and signs of such abuse.
Compl. ¶¶ 2-7.
See
Moreover, because Hawaii does not have the death
penalty, and federal death penalty cases are rare in this
district, public interest in the criminal trial will be enhanced.
Plaintiff further asserts that “the civil trial will be
conducted as a bench trial, and accordingly this Court can
implement mechanisms to protect the dissemination of any new
18
prejudicial evidence.”
Pl.’s Appeal 6-7.
Again, this argument
ignores that proceeding with the case will revive the public
interest in this matter and expose potential jurors to
inflammatory media coverage regardless if new facts are brought
to light or not.
Furthermore, the press will likely contest the
sealing of such evidence, as it did with Delilah’s plea agreement
in the criminal case.
See Williams, Cr. No. 06-00079 DAE-LEK,
Doc. No. 204 (Gannet Pacific Corporation, dba The Honolulu
Advertiser’s Memorandum in Opposition to Government’s and
Defendants’ Motions to Seal Plea Agreements).
Moreover, although
the Court can seal portions of evidence, it will be required to
make findings of fact, and the Court is not convinced it can
adequately protect Williams’s right to a fair trial.
See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (“In an action tried on the facts without a jury
. . . the court must find the facts specially and state its
conclusions of law separately.”).
This factor therefore weighs strongly in favor of
holding the civil trial after Williams’s criminal trial.
D.
The Convenience of the Court and the Efficient Use
of Judicial Resources
Plaintiff asserts that “[a] further continuance would
disrupt the Court’s schedule.”
Pl.’s Mot. Mem. 13.
The Court
disagrees; a continuance will not burden the convenience of this
Court.
In fact, given the current timing of the instant appeal,
even if the Court were to reverse the Magistrate Judge’s order,
19
it would be unable to reset the trial for January 18, 2012.
Instead, the Court would order a scheduling conference and set a
new trial date forthright.
Thus, the Court finds the convenience
of the Court neutral in these circumstances.
Moreover, the Court finds the trial of this case will
reawaken significant prejudicial pretrial publicity and result in
the major dissemination of evidence inadmissible in the criminal
trial; consequently, the criminal court might be required to
grant a motion to change venue.
See Daniels v. Woodford, 428
F.3d 1181, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] court must grant a motion
to change venue if prejudicial pretrial publicity makes it
impossible to seat an impartial jury.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
This would result in the inefficient use of judicial
resources, as the criminal court has presided over Williams’s
case, which has gone through extensive pretrial litigation, for
years.
This factor thus weighs in favor of rescheduling the
civil trial after the criminal trial.
E.
The Interests of Third Parties
Plaintiff asserts that the family and friends of Talia
want closure and thus this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.
Pl.’s Appeal 13.
The Court has already considered the interest
of Plaintiff, Talia’s Mother, and finds the interest in closure
from Talia’s family and friends is far outweighed by Williams’s
interest in receiving a fair trial.
20
Additionally, as with
Plaintiff, Talia’s other family and friends presumably have an
interest in closure of the criminal trial.
Williams, facing a death sentence, has a strong
interest in receiving a fair trial.4/
The Supreme Court has
stated that “[n]o right ranks higher than the right of the
accused to a fair trial.”
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
As discussed above, the Court
finds that it cannot ensure Williams will receive a fair trial
untainted from prejudicial publicity that would result from
holding the civil trial before the criminal trial.
Consequently,
the Court finds this factor weighs strongly in favor of
rescheduling the civil trial after the criminal trial.
F.
The Public Interest
“[T]he public has a clear interest in the speedy
resolution of [a] civil action.”
E.E.O.C. v. Global Horizons,
Inc., Civ. No. 11-00257 DAE-RLP, 2011 WL 5325747, at *7 (D. Haw.
Nov. 2, 2011).
On the other hand, the public also has a strong
interest in law enforcement and the proper prosecution of
Williams.
See id.; see also Richardson v. United States, 468
U.S. 317, 325 (1984) (recognizing the public has an interest in
“fair trials designed to end in just judgments”) (internal
quotations omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
4/
Because Williams is not a defendant, he is a third party
to this suit.
21
has counseled that “a trial judge should give substantial weight
to [the public interest in law enforcement] in balancing the
policy against the right of a civil litigant to a reasonably
prompt determination of his civil claims or liabilities.”
Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962).
The
Court therefore concludes this factor weighs in favor of
rescheduling the civil trial after the criminal trial.
In sum, the Court finds that the Government’s interest
in the proper prosecution of Williams, Williams’s interest in a
fair trial untainted by prejudicial pretrial publicity resulting
from a civil trial, and the public’s interest in fair trials,
outweighs the Plaintiff’s interest in proceeding expeditiously to
trial.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying
Plaintiff’s Motion to Confirm Trial Date and vacating the trial
date set for January 2012.
Upon Plaintiff’s request and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), the Court is of the opinion that its determination
that a continuance is needed in this case “involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.”5/
5/
The Court filed its original order denying Plaintiff’s
appeal on January 6, 2012. On January 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed
a motion requesting the Court amend the order to include a
22
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Appeal of the Magistrate
Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Confirm Trial Date.
The parties are directed to schedule a hearing with the
Magistrate Judge to set a trial date following the criminal trial
date of September 4, 2012.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 8, 2012.
________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Sr. United States District Judge
Tarshia Williams v. United States, Civ. No. 08-00437 ACK-BMK: Amended Order
Denying Plaintiff’s Appeal of Magistrate Judge’s Order
finding that the order is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Doc. No. 84. Defendant filed an opposition on February 2, 2012.
Doc. No. 87. The Court issued an order granting Plaintiff’s
motion and discusses the parties arguments therein. See Doc. No.
88.
23
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