Lara et al v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Company
Filing
92
ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT. Signed by District JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on November 29, 2011. (bbb, )CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
TIMOTHY LARA and DARYL DEAN
DAVIS,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
RENAISSANCE HOTEL OPERATING
)
)
COMPANY,
)
)
Defendant.
_____________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 08-00560 LEK-RLP
ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
On October 3, 2011, Plaintiffs Timothy Lara and
Daryl Dean Davis (“Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated (all collectively “the Class”), filed
the instant Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
(“Motion”).
[Dkt. no. 83.]
On October 17, 2011, Defendant
Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., doing business as Renaissance
Wailea Beach Resort (“Defendant”), filed a statement of no
opposition to the Motion.
[Dkt. no. 85.]
Plaintiffs filed two
supplemental statements in support of the Motion, one on
October 24, 2011 (“10/24/11 Supplement”), and one on October 31,
2011 (“10/31/11 Supplement”).
[Dkt. nos. 87, 88.]
On November 7, 2011, this matter came before the Court
for a final fairness hearing for the proposed settlement1 and a
hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion.
[Minutes (dkt. no. 91).]
Lori Aquino, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, and Shannon
Liss-Riordan also appeared by telephone on behalf of Plaintiffs.
Richard Rand, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendant.
For the
reasons set forth below, and after due consideration of the
evidence and arguments presented by the parties and the record in
this case, the Court CONCLUDES that good cause exists to GRANT
final approval of the settlement agreement in this action
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(e) and to
GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
This action is one of seven similar cases that
Plaintiffs’ counsel initiated from November 2008 to January 2009
relating to the distribution of hotel services charges pursuant
to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 481B-14.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
imposed service charges in its resort that were subject to §
481B-14 and that Defendant used a portion of the service charges
“to pay for costs or expenses other than wages and tips of
employees.”
See id.
Defendant, however, allegedly did not
clearly disclose its practice to its customers.
1
Plaintiffs
This Court issued its Order: (1) Preliminarily Approving
Class Action Settlement Agreement, (2) Approving Form of Notice,
(3) Establishing Objection Deadline, (4) Directing Dissemination
of Notice, and (5) Scheduling “Final Fairness Hearing” on August
16, 2011 (“Preliminary Approval Order”). [Dkt. no. 82.]
2
allege that Defendant’s failure to make clear disclosures
required Defendant to distribute all of the service charges
directly to its food and beverage service employees as tip
income, but Defendant failed to do so.
Plaintiffs contend that
this failure constitutes: violations of Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 481B14, 481B-4, and 480-2; intentional interference with contractual
and/or advantageous relations; breach of implied contract; unjust
enrichment; and violations of Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 388-6, 388-10,
and 388-11.
The Amended Class Action Complaint (“Amended
Complaint”), [filed 6/28/10 (dkt. no. 57),] seeks: certification
of the class action; damages compensating the Class for the lost
income from the service charges they were entitled to; treble
damages and liquidated damages; attorneys’ fees; interest; and
any other relief that they are entitled to receive.
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT
On August 12, 2011, the parties filed their Stipulation
Regarding Entry of Order: (1) Preliminarily Approving Class
Action Settlement Agreement, (2) Approving Form of Notice, (3)
Establishing Objection Deadline, (4) Directing Dissemination of
Notice, and (5) Scheduling “Final Fairness Hearing” (“Preliminary
Approval Stipulation”).
[Dkt. no. 80.]
The parties’ Settlement
Agreement and Release Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) is
attached to the Preliminary Approval Stipulation as Exhibit 1.
The parties agreed to the following definition of the settlement
3
class: “All individuals who worked as banquet or room service
food and beverage service employees at the Renaissance Wailea
Beach Resort between December 10, 2004, and the hotel’s closing
on September 6, 2007.”
[Settlement Agreement at 2.]
The key terms of the settlement are as follows:
•Defendant agrees to pay $90,000.00 as the total settlement
amount;
•Plaintiffs agree that Class counsel will petition the Court for
an award of attorneys’ fees and costs of no more than
$30,000.00 to be paid from the total settlement amount; and
•the two Plaintiffs would request incentive payments of $5,000.00
each to be paid from the total settlement amount.
[Id. at 3-4.]
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT
AND NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT TO THE CLASS
This Court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement, finding that it was “sufficiently fair and reasonable
to warrant providing notice to the Class of its terms” as
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(e).
at 3.]
[Prelim. Approval Order
The Court scheduled the final fairness hearing for
November 7, 2011.
The Motion states that eighteen out of sixty-one Class
members returned claim forms.
No Class member filed an
objection, and no Class member opted out.
[Motion at 3.]
Eight
notices and claim forms were returned to Plaintiffs’ counsel as
undeliverable, and counsel obtained updated addresses and
reissued the notices and claim forms for seven of those
individuals.
[Id. at 5.]
4
The Motion also states that Defendant was working to
provide Plaintiffs’ counsel with the records necessary to
determine the service charge earnings during the period in
question.
The Class members’ respective settlement distributions
will be determined, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement,
based on these records.
Each Class member will receive a
distribution in proportion to the number of hours that he or she
worked as banquet or room service employees during the period in
question.
[Id. at 5-6.]
By the date of the 10/24/11 Supplement, forty-three
Class members submitted claims “accounting for approximately 90%
of the class settlement funds.”
[10/24/11 Supplement at 3.]
The
10/24/11 Supplement also states that no Class member filed an
objection, and no Class member opted out.
[Id.]
Attached to the
10/24/11 Supplement as Exhibit 1 is a spreadsheet showing the
estimated distribution of the Class members’ portion of the
settlement amount.
Based on those estimates, “just over $45,000
has been claimed out of a $50,000 class settlement fund (assuming
court approval of the attorneys’ fees and lead plaintiff
incentive payments requested in Plaintiffs’ motion), which
accounts for 90% of the class settlement fund.”
[Id. at 4.]
At the hearing on the Motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel
represented that, since the filing of the 10/24/11 Supplement,
they may have received one or two more claims.
5
Plaintiffs’
counsel noted that there was still additional time for Class
members to submit claims and be included in the distribution.
Plaintiffs’ counsel did not report receiving any objections or
any opt out notices since the filing of the 10/24/11 Supplement.
The Court therefore FINDS that, as required by Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(e)(1), notice of the settlement
was directed in a reasonable manner to all Class members who
would be bound by the settlement.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
Insofar as the parties have allocated a portion of the
settlement amount for Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses,
this Court must examine the reasonableness of the award before it
can grant final approval of the settlement.
I.
Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses
The Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and
Defendant provides that a portion of the settlement amount be
allocated for an award of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and
expenses.
Plaintiffs also rely upon the “common fund” doctrine.
[Motion at 14-19.]
Further, they contend that the award is
reasonable based on a lodestar cross-check.
[Id. at 19-26.]
At the outset, the Court notes that the “common fund”
doctrine does not apply because the parties did not follow
regular common fund procedure in this case.
See Staton v. Boeing
Co., 327 F.3d 938, 969 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted)
6
(“Under regular common fund procedure, the parties settle for the
total amount of the common fund and shift the fund to the court’s
supervision.
The plaintiffs’ lawyers then apply to the court for
a fee award from the fund.”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), however, states:
“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law
or by the parties’ agreement.”
Thus, pursuant to Rule 23(h), the
parties’ Settlement Agreement alone is a sufficient basis for an
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs.
The Court,
however, emphasizes that it has only relied upon the parties’
agreement as the basis for the entitlement to award; the Court
has not relied upon the parties’ representation that the
requested award is reasonable.
The Court will independently
review the requested award for reasonableness.
II.
Amount of the Award
Under federal law, reasonable attorneys’ fees are
generally based on the traditional “lodestar” calculation set
forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000).
Fischer
The
court must determine a reasonable fee by multiplying “the number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation” by “a reasonable
hourly rate.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
Second, the court must
decide whether to adjust the lodestar amount based on an
7
evaluation of the factors articulated in Kerr v. Screen Extras
Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), which have not been
subsumed in the lodestar calculation.
Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119
(citation omitted).
The factors the Ninth Circuit articulated in Kerr are:
(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment
by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5)
the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances, (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained, (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case,
(11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client, and (12) awards in
similar cases.
Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70.
Factors one through five have been
subsumed in the lodestar calculation.
Morales v. City of San
Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996).
Further, the Ninth
Circuit, extending City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567
(1992), held that the sixth factor, whether the fee is fixed or
contingent, may not be considered in the lodestar calculation.
Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th
Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th
Cir. 1993).
Once calculated, the “lodestar” is presumptively
reasonable.
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for
Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 728 (1987); see also Fischer, 214 F.3d
at 1119 n.4 (stating that the lodestar figure should only be
8
adjusted in rare and exceptional cases).
Although Plaintiffs do not request a lodestar award of
attorneys’ fees in this case, this Court uses the fees that it
could have awarded Plaintiffs under the lodestar analysis as a
gauge of the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees provided for
in the Settlement Agreement.
See, e.g., Almodova v. City & Cnty.
of Honolulu, Civil No. 07–00378 LEK–RLP, 2011 WL 4625692, at *5
(D. Hawai`i Sept. 30, 2011) (stating that the Court will use the
lodestar method as a guide to review the agreed upon attorneys’
fees in a Fair Labor Standards Act settlement for
reasonableness); Shea v. Kahuku Hous. Found., Inc., Civil No.
09–00480 LEK–RLP, 2011 WL 1261150, at *6 (D. Hawai`i Mar. 31,
2011) (citation omitted) (using the lodestar analysis as a guide
to evaluate the reasonableness of the agreed upon attorneys’ fees
in a settlement of action pursuant to Rule 23(h)).
If Plaintiffs’ counsel calculated their attorneys’ fees
according to the lodestar analysis, the fees would be as follows
for work attributable to the instant case in particular:
Attorney/Staff
Shannon Liss-Riordan
Harold L. Lichten
Ian Russell
Brant Casavant
Paralegals (primarily
Alisha Ripley)
Ashley Ikeda & Lori Aquino
Rate
$350
$350
$150
$150
$ 75
Hours
19.0
3.3
3.5
2.0
8.0
Subtotal
$ 6,650.00
$ 1,155.00
$
525.00
$
300.00
$
600.00
$350
5.0
Total
$ 1,750.00
$10,980.00
[Motion, Exh. B (Decl. of Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq. (“Liss-
9
Riordan Decl.”)), at ¶¶ 16-17 & spreadsheet attached thereto;
10/31/11 Suppl., Exh. 1.]
In addition, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Lichten & LissRiordan, P.C., incurred the following fees working on all of the
related cases as a whole:
Attorney/Staff
Shannon Liss-Riordan
Harold L. Lichten
Ian Russell
Brant Casavant
Sara Smolik
Alex Sugarman-Brozan
Sarah Getchell
Steven Young
Rate
$350
$350
$150
$150
$150
$150
$150
$150
Hours
400.0
367.5
298.53
19.2
19.35
2.7
22.5
12.1
Total
Subtotal
$140,000.00
$128,625.00
$ 44,780.00
$ 2,880.00
$ 2,903.00
$
405.00
$ 3,375.00
$ 1,815.00
$324,783.00
[10/31/11 Suppl., Exh. 2, Exh. 3 (Decl. of Shannon Liss-Riordan,
Esq. (“10/31/11 Liss-Riordan Decl.”)) at ¶¶ 4-8.]
Plaintiffs’ counsel, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld,
incurred the following fees working on all of the related cases
as a whole:
Attorney/Staff
Ashley Ikeda
Lori K. Aquino
David A. Rosenfeld
Judy Castillo (paralegal)
Eleanor Natwick (paralegal)
TRO (unidentified paralegal)
Rate
$275
$275
$275
$125
$125
$125
Hours
15.64
19.79
1.51
1.0
1.0
0.3
Total
Subtotal
$ 4,301.00
$ 5,442.25
$
415.25
$
125.00
$
125.00
$
37.50
$10,446.00
[10/31/11 Suppl., Exh. 4 (Decl. of Ashley K. Ikeda in Supp. of
Pltfs.’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
(“10/31/11 Ikeda Decl.”)) at ¶¶ 4-6, Exh. A thereto.]
Ms. Liss-Riordan graduated from law school in 1996 and
10
has “achieved significant successes developing the law protecting
tipped employees.”
[Liss-Riordan Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 4.]
graduated law school in 1977.
[Id. at ¶ 10.]
Mr. Lichten
Mr. Russell,
Mr. Casavant, and Ms. Getchell graduated from law school in 2008.
[10/31/11 Liss-Riordan Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4, 7.]
Ms. Smolik and
Mr. Young both graduated from law school in 2004, and Mr.
Sugarman-Brozan graduated from law school in 2001.
[Id. at ¶¶ 5-
6, 8.]
Mr. Ikeda and Ms. Aquino have been practicing law in
this district since 1981 and 1985, respectively, and Mr.
Rosenfeld has been practicing law for more than thirty years.
[10/31/11 Ikeda Decl. at ¶¶ 4-5.]
Ms. Castillo and Ms. Natwick
are paralegals in Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld’s Alameda,
California office.
[Id. at ¶ 6.]
Based on the hourly rate, the
identified person “TRO” is presumably also a paralegal in the
Alameda office.
A.
Reasonable Hourly Rate
In determining whether an hourly rate is reasonable,
the Court considers the experience, skill, and reputation of the
attorney requesting fees.
n.6 (9th Cir. 2002).
Webb v. Ada Cnty., 285 F.3d 829, 840 &
Under the lodestar method, this Court must
generally award out-of-state counsel attorneys’ fees according to
the prevailing market rates in Hawai`i.
See id.; see also Gates
v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on
11
denial of reh’g, (1993) (noting that the rate awarded should
reflect “the rates of attorneys practicing in the forum
district”).
Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledge this principle and
have applied “the local rate of $350 per hour to top attorneys
and $150 for associates[.]”
1.
[Liss-Riordan Decl. at ¶ 14.]
Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.
This Court finds that the hourly rates for Mr. Lichten,
Mr. Russell, Mr. Casavant, Ms. Smolik, Mr. Sugarman-Brozan,
Ms. Getchell, Mr. Young, and the paralegals are manifestly
reasonable.
Ms. Liss-Riordan, however, has only been practicing law
since 1996 and therefore does not warrant the same hourly rate as
Mr. Lichten, who has almost twenty years more experience than she
has.
See, e.g., Shea, 2011 WL 1261150, at *6-7 (finding $350 per
hour to be manifestly reasonable for Paul Alston, Esq., who has
approximately forty years of litigation experience).
A
reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Liss-Riordan is $240, comparable
to that of Jason Kim, Esq., see id., who has been practicing law
since 1998.
2.
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld
The Court finds that the hourly rates for local
counsel, Mr. Ikeda, Ms. Aquino, and Mr. Rosenfeld are manifestly
12
reasonable.2
excessive.
The hourly rates for the paralegals, however, are
See Donkerbrook v. Title Guar. Escrow Servs., Inc.,
Civil No. 10–00616 LEK–RLP, 2011 WL 3649539, at *7 (D. Hawai`i
Aug. 18, 2011) (noting that $85 is “on the high end of the range
of hourly rates for paralegals in Hawai`i” (citing Shea, 2011 WL
1261150, at *6–7 (awarding $75 for paralegals); Ko Olina Dev.,
LLC v. Centex Homes, Civil No. 09–00272 DAE–LEK, 2010 WL 3853251,
at *2 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 27, 2010) (awarding $85 per hour for a
paralegal with over thirty years of litigation experience))).
Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that the Weinberg,
Roger & Rosenfeld paralegals have special qualifications that
would warrant a rate on the high end of paralegal rates in
Hawai`i.
The Court therefore finds that $75, or the same rate
noted for the Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. paralegals, is a
reasonable hourly rate for the Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld
paralegals.
B.
Hours Reasonably Expended
Beyond establishing a reasonable hourly rate, a party
seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden of proving that the fees
and costs taxed are associated with the relief requested and are
reasonably necessary to achieve the results obtained.
2
See Tirona
The Court notes that, to the extent that Ms. Liss-Riordan
represented that Mr. Ikeda’s and Ms. Aquino’s hourly rate was
$350, [Liss-Riordan Decl., spreadsheet attached thereto,] the
calculation of the fees incurred specifically in this action will
be adjusted.
13
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Haw.
1993) (citations omitted).
A court must guard against awarding
fees and costs which are excessive, and must determine which fees
and costs were self-imposed and avoidable.
See id. at 637
(citing INVST Fin. Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391, 404
(6th Cir. 1987)).
A court has “discretion to ‘trim fat’ from, or
otherwise reduce, the number of hours claimed to have been spent
on the case.”
Soler v. G & U, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1056, 1060
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citation omitted).
Time expended on work deemed
“excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” shall not be
compensated.
See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1399 (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 433-34).
Under the traditional lodestar analysis, this Court
would apply various deductions, such as for unnecessarily
duplicative tasks and clerical items.
Insofar as this Court is
only using the lodestar analysis as a guide in this case and this
Court has already applied reductions to some of counsel’s hourly
rates, this Court will not apply its standard deductions to the
number of counsel’s hours.
The Court finds that, for purposes of
the instant Motion, the hours that Plaintiffs’ counsel incurred
in this case would be compensable under the lodestar analysis.
C.
Summary of Lodestar Comparison
Thus, if the Court was to award lodestar fees to
Plaintiffs’ counsel in the instant case, the fee for work
14
attributable specifically to this case would be:
Attorney/Staff
Shannon Liss-Riordan
Harold Lichten
Ian Russell
Brant Casavant
Paralegals (primarily
Alisha Ripley)
Ashley Ikeda & Lori Aquino
Rate
$240
$350
$150
$150
$ 75
Hours
19.0
3.3
3.5
2.0
8.0
Subtotal
$4,560.00
$1,155.00
$ 525.00
$ 300.00
$ 600.00
$275
5.0
Total
$1,375.00
$8,515.00
In addition, a portion of counsel’s fees attributable
to the work on all of the related cases as a whole would also be
compensable:
Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.
Attorney/Staff
Shannon Liss-Riordan
Harold L. Lichten
Ian Russell
Brant Casavant
Sara Smolik
Alex Sugarman-Brozan
Sarah Getchell
Steven Young
Rate
$240
$350
$150
$150
$150
$150
$150
$150
Hours
400.0
367.5
298.53
19.2
19.35
2.7
22.5
12.1
Total
Subtotal
$ 96,000.00
$128,625.00
$ 44,780.00
$ 2,880.00
$ 2,903.00
$
405.00
$ 3,375.00
$ 1,815.00
$280,783.00
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld
Attorney/Staff
Ashley Ikeda
Lori K. Aquino
David A. Rosenfeld
Judy Castillo (paralegal)
Eleanor Natwick (paralegal)
TRO (unidentified para.)
Rate
$275
$275
$275
$ 75
$ 75
$ 75
Hours
15.64
19.79
1.51
1.0
1.0
0.3
Total
Subtotal
$ 4,301.00
$ 5,442.25
$
415.25
$
75.00
$
75.00
$
22.50
$10,331.00
Plaintiffs’ counsel incurred a total of $291,114.00 in attorneys’
fees on work attributable to all of the related cases as a whole.
Insofar as counsel worked on seven related cases during the time
period in question, this Court attributes one-seventh of
15
counsel’s fees to this case, for a total of $41,587.74.
Based on the Court’s review of the amounts that it
would award Plaintiffs under a traditional lodestar analysis,
this Court FINDS that the proposed allocation of $30,000.00 of
the settlement amount for an award of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees
and expenses is reasonable.
FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) states, in
pertinent part:
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified
class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court’s approval. The
following procedures apply to a proposed
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise:
(1) The court must direct notice in a
reasonable manner to all class members who would
be bound by the proposal.
(2) If the proposal would bind class members,
the court may approve it only after a hearing and
on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a
statement identifying any agreement made in
connection with the proposal.
. . . .
(5) Any class member may object to the
proposal if it requires court approval under this
subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn
only with the court’s approval.
“The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect the unnamed members of
the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their
16
rights.”
In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
The Court must examine the parties’ settlement as a
whole for overall fairness.
The Court must approve or reject the
settlement in this case in its entirety; the Court cannot alter
certain provisions.
See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,
1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Court must balance the following
factors:
the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of
further litigation; the risk of maintaining class
action status throughout the trial; the amount
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery
completed and the stage of the proceedings; the
experience and views of counsel; the presence of a
governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Court has already evaluated the proposed settlement
and found it to be “fair and reasonable” as required by Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rule 23(e).
[Prelim. Approval Order at 3.]
The Court
reaffirms that finding here.
Despite being duly notified of the settlement, no Class
member has submitted objections to the settlement, and no Class
member appeared at the final fairness hearing to object to the
settlement.
Finally, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that no
Class member has requested exclusion from the Class.
The Court
therefore FINDS that no Class member objects to this settlement,
17
and that this is further support for the Court’s conclusion that
the settlement is fair and reasonable.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
The Court FINDS that the requirements of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(e) have been satisfied and that
the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
2.
The Court therefore GRANTS final approval of the
settlement and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement, filed on October 3, 2011.
3.
The Court ORDERS the parties to implement the
terms of the settlement.
4.
The Court DIRECTS Plaintiffs’ counsel to make
additional reasonable efforts to further contact any Class member
who did not submit a claim form in response to the Class notices,
and whose estimated claim under the Settlement Agreement exceeds
$200.
5.
Within sixty (60) days after the payment of the
Class members’ distribution payments, Plaintiffs’ counsel shall
file a report showing the distribution of the settlement amount.
6.
Upon receipt of such report and approval by the
Court and the settling parties, this Court will dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
18
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, November 29, 2011.
/S/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
TIMOTHY LARA, ET AL. V. RENAISSANCE HOTEL OPERATING CO.; CIVIL
NO. 08-00560 LEK-RLP; ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
19
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