Coles v. Eagle et al

Filing 434

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 419 . Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 05/27/2014. -- This Court therefore DENIES the City's Motio n, but this Court notes that the City may revisit its statute of limitations defense at trial if it presents evidence that, before Coles was "[i]mprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term le ss than [his] natural life," he knew or should have known that the City's actions and/or omissions were causes of his injury. If the City does not present evidence at trial regarding the accrual of Coles's claims against the City, this Court's rulings in the instant order will stand." (eps)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
HARRY J. COLES,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JOSHUA EAGLE, ET AL.,
)
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 09-00167 LEK-BMK

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Before the Court is Defendant City and County of
Honolulu’s (“the City”) Motion for Summary Judgment re Statute of
Limitations (“Motion”), filed on March 21, 2014.

[Dkt. no. 419.]

Plaintiff Harry J. Coles (“Coles”) filed his memorandum in
opposition on April 21, 2014, and the City filed its reply on
April 28, 2014.

[Dkt. nos. 427, 428.]

Defendant Joshua Eagle

(“Eagle”) and Elton Robertson (“Robertson”)1 filed a statement of
no position on May 1, 2014.2

[Dkt. no. 430.]

This matter came on for hearing on May 14, 2014.

After

1

Coles has sued Eagle and Robertson in their individual
capacities. During all relevant times, Eagle and Robertson were
police officers with the Honolulu Police Department (“HPD”).
[First Amended Complaint, filed 5/8/13 (dkt. no. 380), at ¶¶ 23.]
2

On May 2, 2014, Coles filed his “Surreply and Concise
Statement of Material Facts in Opposition” to the Motion
(“Surreply/CSOF”). [Dkt. no. 431.] This Court, however, has not
considered the Surreply/CSOF in ruling upon the Motion. See
infra Discussion Section I.

careful consideration of the Motion, supporting and opposing
memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, the City’s Motion is
HEREBY DENIED because, for purposes of the instant Motion, this
Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against the City accrued on
April 15, 2009, when he was imprisoned.

Thus, for purposes of

the instant Motion, this Court concludes that the statute of
limitations was tolled and Plaintiff timely filed his claims
against the City.
BACKGROUND
The instant case arises from the events that culminated
in Coles’s arrest on April 24, 2007 (“the Subject Incident”).

On

April 13, 2009, Coles, who was proceeding pro se at the time,
filed a Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint”).

The

Complaint alleged that, on April 24, 2007, Eagle directed Coles
to pull over while Coles was driving.
ordered him to get out of the car.

After Coles stopped, Eagle

According to the Complaint,

Coles could not get out because he could not open the car door.
Eagle then broke the car window and began hitting Coles with his
baton.

Eagle and Robertson pulled Coles out of the car through

the broken window, threw him to the ground, and repeatedly kicked
him.

Eagle also continued to hit Coles with his baton.

eventually handcuffed Coles.

[Complaint at pgs. 5-5A.]

Eagle
The only

claim the Complaint alleged against Eagle and Robertson was a 42

2

U.S.C. § 1983 claim,3 which alleged that they “violated the 4th,
5th and 14th Amendments [to the United States Constitution] by
use of excessive force.”

[Id. at pg. 5.]

The City was not a

defendant in the original complaint.
On November 12, 2010, United States District Judge
David Alan Ezra filed his Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (“11/12/10 Order”).4

[Dkt. no. 129.5]

Judge Ezra denied Eagle and Robertson’s motion for summary
judgment because he concluded that, based on the record at that
time, Eagle and Robertson were “not entitled to qualified
immunity on Coles’s claim that they used excessive force against
him once he was out of the car.”
at 1101.

11/12/10 Order, 753 F. Supp. 2d

Judge Ezra, however, ruled that, as a matter of law,

the force that Eagle and Robertson used when they broke the car
window and pulled Coles out of the car was reasonable.

Id.

3

The Complaint also alleged a § 1983 claim against other
defendants who Coles alleged were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs from the injuries he suffered at the hands of Eagle
and Robertson. [Complaint at pgs. 6-6A.] That claim, however,
is not relevant to the proceedings currently before this Court.
4

The term “Defendants” in the 11/12/10 Order refers to
Eagle and Robertson. As previously noted, Coles’s original
Complaint did not name the City as a defendant. With respect to
the instant Motion, the term “Defendants” refers collectively to
the City, Eagle, and Robertson.
5

The 11/12/10 Order is also available at 753 F. Supp. 2d

1092.
3

On January 28, 2011, the instant case was reassigned to
this Court.

[Dkt. no. 145.]

This Court held a jury trial in

this matter from May 3, 2011 to May 6, 2011, and on May 9, 2011.
[Dkt. nos. 280, 283, 285, 287, 288 (Minutes).]

In light of the

11/12/10 Order, this Court instructed the jury that:
This Court has already found as a matter of law,
that the arrest was lawful, and that defendants’
acts of breaking the vehicle window and pulling
plaintiff from the vehicle was reasonable under
the circumstances. Thus, in order to prove an
unreasonable seizure in this case, the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the officers used excessive force when they used
physical force to arrest plaintiff after he was
removed from the vehicle.
[Jury Instructions, filed 5/9/11 (dkt. no. 289), at Court’s
Instruction No. 17.]
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Eagle and
Robertson, finding that Coles failed to prove that Eagle and
Robertson violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using
unreasonable force upon him after they removed him from the car.
[Special Verdict Form, filed 5/9/11 (dkt. no. 291), at 2.]
Pursuant to the jury verdict, judgment was entered in favor of
Eagle and Robertson on May 9, 2011.

[Dkt. no. 292.]

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed both the judgment
and the 11/12/10 Order.
Cir. 2012).

Coles v. Eagle, 704 F.3d 624, 631 (9th

The Ninth Circuit held that it was reversible error

to essentially grant partial summary judgment in favor of Eagle
and Robertson by ruling that the force that Eagle and Robertson
4

used when they broke the car window and removed Coles from the
car was reasonable.

The Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable

jury could conclude that the force Eagle and Robertson used was
not justified under the circumstances.

Id. at 630.

The Ninth

Circuit further held that giving Jury Instruction No. 17 was
reversible error because it “enforced an erroneous partial grant
of summary judgment in favor of” Eagle and Robertson.

Id.

The

Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.

Id. at 631.

After the remand, Coles filed his First Amended
Complaint on May 8, 2013.

[Dkt. no. 380.]

The First Amended

Complaint added the City, which was the employer of both Eagle
and Robertson during the relevant period, as a defendant.
Amended Complaint at ¶ 4.]

[First

The factual allegations of the First

Amended Complaint are essentially the same as the facts alleged
in the original Complaint’s § 1983 claim against Eagle and
Robertson.
The First Amended Complaint alleges the following
claims: 1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Eagle and Robertson
for the unreasonable use of force, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment (“Count I”); 2) a claim under § 1983 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 against the City, based on policies, practices, and/or
customs that violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
(“Count II”); 3) an assault and battery claim against Eagle and

5

Robertson (“Count III”); 4) a negligent training, supervision,
and retention claim against the City (“Count IV”); 5) an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Eagle
and Robertson (“Count V”); and 6) a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim against Eagle and Robertson (“Count
VI”).

The First Amended Complaint seeks the following relief:

compensatory damages, including general and special damages;
interest on the compensatory damages; punitive damages against
Eagle and Robertson; reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and any other appropriate relief.
DISCUSSION
I.

Procedural Rulings
At the outset, this Court notes that, although the City

filed a concise statement of facts in support of the Motion
(“City’s CSOF”), [filed 3/21/14 (dkt. no. 420),] Coles failed to
file a concise statement of facts with his memorandum in
opposition.

In addition, he did not seek leave of court to file

his Surreply/CSOF.
Local Rule 7.4 sets forth the deadlines for a
memorandum in opposition to, and a reply in support of, a motion
set for hearing.

It also states: “No further or supplemental

briefing shall be submitted without leave of court.”

Insofar as

Coles neither obtained leave of court prior to filing the
Surreply/CSOF nor established any reason that would excuse his
6

failure to obtain leave of court, this Court STRIKES Coles’s
Surreply/CSOF.
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b), Plaintiff was required
to file and serve with his memorandum in opposition “a separate
document containing a single concise statement that admits or
disputes the facts set forth in the [City’s] concise statement,
as well as sets forth all material facts as to which it is
contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be
litigated.”

Because Plaintiff failed to do so, this Court DEEMS

ADMITTED all of the statements of fact set forth in the City’s
CSOF.

See Local Rule LR56.1(g) (“For purposes of a motion for

summary judgment, material facts set forth in the moving party’s
concise statement will be deemed admitted unless controverted by
a separate concise statement of the opposing party.”).
Finally, this Court notes that Coles’s memorandum in
opposition cites extensively to “the Excerpts of Record that were
filed with the Ninth Circuit because those are the documents that
Coles received before filing his First Amended Complaint.”
in Opp. at 5 n.2.]

[Mem.

The Excerpts of Record that Coles filed in

his Ninth Circuit appeal are not a part of the record in the
district court case.

Even though the Excerpts of Record

represent a compilation of documents filed in this district
court, this Court cannot determine from the district court record
which document is, for example “ER 122” or “ER 126.”

7

See, e.g.,

id. at 5-6.

Moreover, Local Rule 56.1(f) states:

When resolving motions for summary judgment, the
court shall have no independent duty to search and
consider any part of the court record not
otherwise referenced in the separate concise
statements of the parties. Further, the court
shall have no independent duty to review exhibits
in their entirety, but rather will review only
those portions of the exhibits specifically
identified in the concise statements.
(Emphasis added.)

Thus, this Court has no obligation to consider

the documents that Coles should have identified as exhibits to a
timely filed concise statement of facts.
This Court now turns to the merits of the City’s
Motion.
II.

Statute of Limitations and Tolling
Coles brings two claims against the City: 1) a claim

pursuant to § 1983 and § 1981 alleging that the City’s policies,
practices, and/or customs of tolerating HPD officers’ use of
excessive force violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and
2) a state law negligent training, supervision, and retention
claim.

The City argues that it is entitled to summary judgment

as to both claims because both are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.

Coles responds that he timely filed his

claims against the City because, when those claims accrued, he
was either detained or incarcerated, and therefore the applicable
statute of limitations was tolled.
The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[s]tate law governs
8

the statute of limitations period for § 1983 suits and closely
related questions of tolling.”

Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103,

1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

It is well settled that

the two-year statute of limitations in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-76
applies to § 1983 claims.

See, e.g., Butler v. Cnty. of Maui,

Civil No. 13–00163 SOM/KSC, 2013 WL 2295462, at *2 (D. Hawai`i
May 24, 2013) (citing Beckstrand v. Read, 2012 WL 4490727 (D.
Haw. Sept. 26, 2012) (applying two-year limitations period to
§ 1983 claim);7 Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 595, 837
P.2d 1247, 1259 (1992) (“We hold that the two-year statute of
limitations set forth in HRS § 657–7 governs § 1983 actions.”)).
Further, as a general rule, § 657-7 also applies to § 1981
claims.

See, e.g., Kaulia v. Cnty. of Maui, No. CIV 05–00290

JMS/LEK, 2006 WL 4660130, at *5 (D. Hawai`i May 24, 2006) (“The
two-year limitations period set forth in HRS § 657–7 applies to
the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, just as it applies to the
Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim.” (some citations omitted) (citing
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987)).8

6

Section 657-7 states: “Actions for the recovery of
compensation for damage or injury to persons or property shall be
instituted within two years after the cause of action accrued,
and not after, except as provided in section 657-13.”
7

The Ninth Circuit reversed Beckstrand in part on other
grounds. No. 12–17318, 2014 WL 983836 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2014).
8

The United States Supreme Court has noted that “[t]hree
years after [its] decision in Goodman, Congress enacted a
(continued...)
9

Coles’s negligent training, supervision, and retention
claim is also subject to the two-year statute of limitations in
§ 657-7.

See Aana v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 965 F. Supp.

2d 1157, 1179 (D. Hawai`i 2013) (“Negligence claims in Hawai`i
are subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657–7.” (citing Ass’n of Apartment Owners of
Newtown Meadows ex rel. its Bd. of Dirs. v. Venture 15, Inc., 115
Hawai`i 232, 276–77, 167 P.3d 225, 269–70 (2007))).
Coles agrees that a two-year statute of limitations
applies to each of his claims against the City, but he argues
that his claims against the City are timely because the statute
of limitations has been tolled by his continuous
detention/incarceration since the Subject Incident.

Haw. Rev.

Stat. § 657-13 states, in pertinent part:
If any person entitled to bring any action
specified in this part (excepting actions against
the sheriff, chief of police, or other officers)
is, at the time the cause of action accrued,
either:
. . . .

8

(...continued)
catchall 4–year statute of limitations for actions arising under
federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990.” Jones v. R.R.
Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658). The Supreme Court also held that “a cause of action
‘aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted’ after December 1,
1990 – and therefore is governed by § 1658’s 4–year statute of
limitations – if the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was
made possible by a post–1990 enactment.” Id. at 382 (alteration
in Jones). The parties do not contend that the four-year statute
of limitations applies to Coles’s § 1981 claim.
10

(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in
execution under the sentence of a criminal
court for a term less than the person’s
natural life;
such person shall be at liberty to bring such
actions within the respective times limited in
this part, after the disability is removed or at
any time while the disability exists.
First, this Court notes that § 657-13 tolling does not
apply to claims “against the sheriff, chief of police, or other
officers.”

This district court has ruled that, pursuant to the

“sheriff” exception, § 657-13 tolling does not apply to the State
of Hawai`i Department of Public Safety or its employees.

See,

e.g., Rodenhurst v. Hawaii, CIV. No. 08-00396 SOM-LEK, 2010 WL
1783568, at *3 (D. Hawai`i Apr. 29, 2010) (citing Samonte v.
Sandin, Civ. No. 05–00353, 2007 WL 461311, at *4 (D. Haw., Feb.
07, 2007) (noting that “[t]he statute creating the department of
public safety specifically states that the ‘functions, authority,
and obligations, . . . and the privileges and immunities
conferred thereby, exercised by a “sheriff” . . . shall be
exercised to the same extent by the department of public
safety’”) (alterations in Rodenhurst)).9

This district court,

however, has refused to extend Samonte and similar cases to the
counties (where the county is sued based on the actions of its
police department) pursuant to § 657-13’s “chief of police”

9

The language that this district court relied upon in
Samonte comes from Haw. Rev. Stat. § 26-14.6(f).
11

exception.

See Dusenberry v. Cnty. of Kauai, Civil. No. 07-00180

JMS/LEK, 2007 WL 3022243, at *4 (D. Hawai`i Oct. 12, 2007)
(stating that § 657-13 “does not exempt counties, leaving no
doubt or uncertainty as to its limited reach”); id. (“The Hawaii
State legislature has exempted the Department of Public Safety
(through [Haw. Rev. Stat. §] 26–14.6(f)) from the tolling
provision; no similar statute exempts the County of Kauai.”).
This Court acknowledges that the decisions of other
district judges in this district are not binding on this Court.
See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (“A
decision of a federal district court judge is not binding
precedent in either a different judicial district, the same
judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different
case.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

This Court,

however, agrees that nothing in § 657-13 expressly exempts the
counties, and there is no comparable statute to § 26-14.6(f)
regarding either the counties or the county police departments.
Further, the City has not presented any reason distinguishing the
Dusenberry analysis.

This Court therefore concludes that the

City is not exempt from § 657-13 tolling.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-14 requires that, in order for a
plaintiff to avail himself of § 657-13 tolling, “the disability
[must have] existed at the time the right of action accrued.”
Thus, in order to determine whether § 657-13 tolling applies to

12

Coles’s claims against the City, this Court must first determine
when those claims accrued.
III. Accrual
Federal law determines when Coles’s § 1983/§ 1981 claim
accrued.

See Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir.

2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S. Ct. 1091
(2007)), cert. denied, Beard v. Pouncil, 134 S. Ct. 76 (2013).
Under federal law, accrual occurs when the
plaintiff has a complete and present cause of
action and may file a suit to obtain relief.
[Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 127 S. Ct. 1091]; see
also Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir.
1996) (“Under federal law, ‘the limitations period
accrues when a party knows or has reason to know
of the injury’ which is the basis of the cause of
action.” (quoting Golden Gate Hotel Ass’n v. San
Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1994))).
An action ordinarily accrues on the date of the
injury. Ward v. Westinghouse Canada, Inc., 32
F.3d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994). A federal claim
accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know of the injury that is the basis of the
action. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d
758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Trotter v. Int’l
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 704 F.2d
1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 573-74.
The City relies upon the general rule that a claim
accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his
injury.

The City argues that Coles’s injury for purposes of his

claims against the City is the same as his injury for purposes of
his claims against Eagle and Robertson - the physical injuries
that he suffered during the Subject Incident.

13

Thus, the City

argues that Coles’s § 1983/§ 1981 claim against the City accrued
when the Subject Incident occurred, and § 657-13 tolling does not
apply because, at that the time of the Subject Incident, Coles
was not “[i]mprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under
the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than [his]
natural life.”
The City’s argument ignores case law stating that, in
considering when a plaintiff knew or had reason to know of his
injury, the Ninth Circuit interprets the term “injury” “with some
flexibility,” and the Ninth Circuit has “held that a claim
accrues not just when the plaintiff experiences the injury, but
when the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known of the injury and the cause of that
injury.”

Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577,

581 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Further, the following analysis applies regarding the
accrual of Coles’s claim for negligent supervision, training, and
retention.

Such a negligence claim
accrues “the moment plaintiff discovers or should
have discovered the negligent act, the damage, and
the causal connection between the former and the
latter.” Yamaguchi v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 65 Haw.
84, 90, 648 P.2d 689, 693–94 (1982) (citation
omitted); see also Hays [v. City & Cnty. of
Honolulu], 81 Hawai`i [391,] 396, 917 P.2d [718,]
723 [(1996)] (“[Haw. Rev. Stat.] § 657–7.3’s
two-year limitation commences to run when
plaintiff discovers, or through the use of
14

reasonable diligence should have discovered,
(1) the damage; (2) the violation of the duty; and
(3) the causal connection between the violation of
the duty and the damage.” (quoting Jacoby v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 1 Haw. App. 519, 525, 622
P.2d 613, 617 (1981))).
Aana, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (some alterations in Aana).

Thus,

as to both of Coles’s claims against the City, the knowledge of
his injury alone was not enough to trigger accrual.

Coles’s

claims against the City did not accrue until he knew or had
reason to know that the City’s actions and/or omissions, i.e. the
City’s failure to properly supervise, train, and monitor HPD
officers and the City’s negligent retention of HPD officers, were
causes of his injury.
In considering the City’s Motion, this Court must view
the current record in the light most favorable to Coles.

See

Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We
review a grant of summary judgment de novo and must determine,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
There is no evidence in the current record that supports the
City’s position that, at the time of the Subject Incident, Coles
knew or should have known that the City’s actions and/or
omissions were causes of his injury.

There is evidence in the

record that, on April 15, 2009, Coles filed a complaint in the
15

State of Hawai`i First Circuit Court against Eagle, Robertson,
the City, and others, arising from the Subject Incident (“the
State Complaint” and “the State Action”).10

[City’s CSOF, Aff.

of Archie T. Ikehara, Exh. C (State Complaint).]

The State

Complaint did not expressly allege either a § 1983 claim or a
§ 1981 claim against the City, nor did it expressly allege a
negligent training, supervision, and retention claim against the
City.

The State Complaint did allege that “due to the use of

excessive force the Defendants Eagle, Robertson, the Honolulu
Police Department and the City and County of Honolulu are liable
for the personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff.”

[Id. at

¶ 20.]
Hawai`i state courts, like this district court,
liberally construe pro se litigants’ pleadings.

Dupree v.

Hiraga, 121 Hawai`i 297, 314, 219 P.3d 1084, 1101 (2009)
(“Pleadings prepared by pro se litigants should be interpreted
liberally.” (citation omitted)).

At the hearing on the Motion,

Coles’s counsel argued that, even liberally construed, the State
Complaint does not allege either a § 1983 claim, a § 1981 claim,
or a negligent training, supervision, and retention claim against
the City.

Coles’s argument is misplaced.

The relevant inquiry

is not whether the State Complaint alleged identical claims to

10

Coles voluntarily dismissed the State Action on June 16,
2010. [City’s CSOF, Aff. of Archie T. Ikehara, Exh. D (Notice of
Dismissal).]
16

the claims against the City in the instant case.

The relevant

inquiry is whether the State Complaint, liberally construed,
proves that he knew or should have known that the City’s actions
and/or omissions were causes of his injury.

This Court finds

that, liberally construed, the State Complaint indicates that,
when Coles filed the State Complaint on April 15, 2009, he had,
or should have had, such knowledge.
Thus, by April 15, 2009, Coles knew or should have
known of the basis for both his § 1983/§ 1981 claim and his
negligent supervision, training, and retention claim against the
City.

Viewing the current record in the light most favorable to

Coles, there is no evidence that Coles had, or should have had,
this knowledge prior to the filing of the State Complaint.

For

purposes of the instant Motion, this Court FINDS that Coles’s
claims against the City accrued on April 15, 2009.
It is undisputed that, when Coles filed the State
Complaint on April 15, 2009, he was “[i]mprisoned on a criminal
charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court
for a term less than [his] natural life.”11

11

See Coles, 704 F.3d

The City argues that neither arrest nor detention
triggers § 657-13 tolling because neither being arrested nor
being detained constitutes being “[i]mprisoned on a criminal
charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court
for a term less than the person’s natural life.” This Court need
not address this argument in light of this Court’s finding that,
for purposes of the instant Motion, Coles’s claims against the
City accrued on April 15, 2009.
17

at 628-29 n.2 (“Coles had in fact stolen the Nissan he was
driving that night.” (citing State v. Coles, 120 Hawai`i 417, 209
P.3d 194 (unpublished table decision), 2009 WL 1280604 (Haw. App.
May 11, 2009) (affirming Coles’ conviction))).12

This Court

CONCLUDES, for purposes of the instant Motion, that the statute
of limitations for each of Coles’s claims against the City was
tolled pursuant to § 657-13(3) and, therefore, Coles timely filed
his claims against the City when he filed the First Amended
Complaint on May 8, 2013.
In light of this Court’s rulings, the City is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to its statute of
limitations defense.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).

This Court therefore

DENIES the City’s Motion, but this Court notes that the City may
revisit its statute of limitations defense at trial if it
presents evidence that, before Coles was “[i]mprisoned on a
criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal
court for a term less than [his] natural life,” he knew or should
have known that the City’s actions and/or omissions were causes
of his injury.

If the City does not present evidence at trial

12

According to State v. Coles, the Judgment of Conviction
and Sentence was filed on December 5, 2007. 2009 WL 2009 WL
1280604, at *1.
18

regarding the accrual of Coles’s claims against the City, this
Court’s rulings in the instant order will stand.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the City’s Motion for
Summary Judgment re Statute of Limitations, filed March 21, 2014,
is HEREBY DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, May 27, 2014.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

HARRY J. COLES VS. JOSHUA J. EAGLE, ET AL; CIVIL NO. 09-00167
LEK-BMK; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

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