Williams v. Rickard et al
Filing
153
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ENJOIN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS AND CLARIFYING STATUTE APPLICABLE TO THIS COURT'S EARLIER REMAND ORDER 145 ; 152 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 1/25/12. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVI CEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
LEIGAFOALII TAFUE WILLIAMS,
fka LEIGAFOALII TAFUE
KOEHNEN,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
DAWN RICKARD; HOME 123
CORPORATION, a California
)
)
corporation, its successors
)
and assigns, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
CIV. NO. 09-00535 SOM/KSC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
ENJOIN STATE COURT
PROCEEDINGS AND CLARIFYING
STATUTE APPLICABLE TO THIS
COURT’S EARLIER REMAND ORDER
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ENJOIN STATE
COURT PROCEEDINGS AND CLARIFYING STATUTE
APPLICABLE TO THIS COURT’S EARLIER REMAND ORDER
Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(“Deutsche Bank”), joined by Defendant Real Time Resolution, Inc.
(“Real Time”), seeks an order from this court enjoining ongoing
state court proceedings.
injunction.
This court denies the request for an
However, this court does here provide clarification
concerning the statutory authority under which this court
remanded what remained before it of this lawsuit.
This action began in state court.
It was removed to
this court, where it stayed for about a year and a half.
During
that time, this court issued several orders, culminating in the
remand of the remaining claims to the state court after all
federal claims had been disposed of.
Those remaining claims were
brought under state law against only Defendants Dawn Rickard and
Home 123 Corporation.
To the court’s surprise, federal
proceedings in this case have been revived.
What brings the matter back to this court is the dismay
that parties that had prevailed before this court felt upon
finding that Plaintiff Leigafoalii Tafue Williams was arguing in
state court that she should be allowed to proceed against them.
Those prevailing parties, forced to incur legal fees to argue to
the state court that this court had already ruled on the claims
against them, have returned here seeking assistance from this
court in stopping Williams from proceeding against them in state
court.
While understanding the moving parties’ frustration,
this court does not agree with them that this court should enjoin
state court proceedings.
Deutsche Bank and Real Time point this court to 28
U.S.C. § 2283, which provides:
A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.
The issue before this court is whether an injunction would fall
under the exceptions to the bar on orders enjoining state court
proceedings.
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The movants’ primary focus is on the purported need for
this court to protect or effectuate its judgments.
This is the
third exception, sometimes called the “relitigation exception,”
listed in the Anti-Injunction Act.
As the Ninth Circuit says,
“The relitigation exception was designed to permit a federal
court to prevent state court litigation of an issue that was
previously presented to and decided by a federal court. . . .
A
district court may properly issue an injunction under the
relitigation exception if ‘there could be an actual conflict
between the subsequent state court judgment and the prior federal
judgment.’” G.C. & K.B. Investments, Inc. V. Wilson, 326 F.3d
1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
This court agrees
with Deutsche Bank and Real Time that there could be an actual
conflict between a state court judgment on claims against them
and this court’s prior ruling in their favor.
Thus, this court
concludes that an order enjoining state court proceedings against
them would be permitted under the relitigation exception.
However, neither Wilson nor any other authority requires a
federal court to enjoin a state court just because an injunction
is permissible.
The state court, while deciding that it could review
this court’s orders, ultimately did not nullify any part of this
court’s rulings.
As the state court, like this court, has ruled
in favor of Deutsche Bank and Real Time, this court fails to see
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why an injunction is necessary to protect or effectuate its
judgments.
The movants’ true concern appears to lie in avoiding
attorneys’ fees that they feel they are being unjustifiably
forced to incur.
That is an understandable concern, but it is
not equivalent to a need by this court to protect its judgment.
Deutsche Bank and Real Time also vaguely argue that the
state court should be enjoined to aid this court’s jurisdiction.
This court has remanded state law claims against Rickard and Home
123, over which it earlier had supplemental jurisdiction.
As
this court’s intent was that it no longer exercise jurisdiction
over any part of this case, this court has difficulty agreeing
with the moving parties that it must aid its own jurisdiction
through an injunction.
This court turns now to the request by Deutsche Bank
and Real Time that it clarify the statutory basis for the remand
order.
Deutsche Bank and Real Time seek this clarification from
this court in light of the following statement in the state
court’s minute order of July 26, 2011:
The court having reviewed the subject
motion and memoranda submitted, and being
duly advised of the record and file herein
and for good cause appearing therefore,
finds that it has jurisdiction as the
United States District Court for the
District of Hawai’i remanded this case
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and not 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c). By doing so, the United
States District Court for the District of
Hawai’i divested itself of jurisdiction
upon mailing of the certified copy of the
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order of remand to the Clerk of the First
Circuit Court.
The state court’s focus on the distinction between
§ 1447(c) and § 1367(c) appears to have had its genesis in
arguments made by Williams concerning the effect of a remand
pursuant to § 1447(c).
See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s Motion To
Enjoin State Court Proceedings, ECF Doc. 148, at Exhibit A
(“Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction,” filed in
state court, at 4-5).
However, it does not appear to this court
that the effect of this court’s order turns on the distinction
between the statutes.
While Deutsche Bank and Real Time urge this court to
state that it remanded this case pursuant to § 1367(c), not
§ 1447(c), this court’s view is that the statutes are not
mutually exclusive.
Both apply to the remand order, one
providing the substantive reason for the remand, the other the
procedural requirements.
In the remand order filed on May 25, 2011, this court
said, “Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, the Clerk of Court is
directed to send a certified copy of this order to the Clerk of
the First Circuit Court, State of Hawaii.”
The reference to
§ 1447 was intended to point the Clerk of Court to the procedural
requirement of § 1447(c), which states, in part: “A certified
copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the
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clerk of the State court.
with such case.”
The State court may thereupon proceed
Clearly, that procedure applied to this court’s
remand order.
That does not mean, however, that the substantive
ground on which the court was ordering a remand was listed in
§ 1447(c).
That statute refers to the deadline for motions to
remand based on defects other than a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
That deadline simply did not come into play before
this court, as there was no motion based on a procedural defect.
Nor did it appear at any time that this court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, another circumstance expressly mentioned in
§ 1447(c).
As this court had before it claims alleging
violations of federal statutes, this court had subject matter
jurisdiction.
The substantive reason for the remand had nothing
to do with a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Instead, after
disposing of all federal claims, this court declined to continue
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claims against Rickard and Home 123.
The exercise or refusal
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction was a matter of this
court’s discretion.
Having had subject matter jurisdiction at
the time the case was removed from state court, this court could
have continued to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims
even after disposing of the claims on which its subject matter
jurisdiction was originally based.
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See United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Under § 1367(c), however, this
court did not have to continue to exercise jurisdiction.
What § 1367(c) does is codify the federal court’s right
to exercise or decide not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
It states, “The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if .
. . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.”
While the statute does not mention
remand, a decision to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction necessarily results in either dismissal or remand.
Thus, the statute could be said to provide one particular reason
for a remand.
It does not, however, set forth the procedure to
be followed on remand, for which one must turn to § 1447(c).
With § 1367(c) in mind, this court stated the reason
for the remand in both the beginning and end of its remand order.
At page 5 of the order filed on May 25, 2011, this court said,
“The only claims remaining in this action are state law claims
asserted against Rickard and Home 123, which the court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over.
remanded to state court.”
Those claims are
At page 23 of the remand order, this
court repeated: “Williams stated that, because the TILA claims
are no longer being adjudicated against any Defendant, only state
law claims remain.
The court now declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.”
7
This court noted
at page 24, “When the federal claims are dismissed before trial,
it is within the court’s discretion to exercise jurisdiction over
the remaining state law claims.”
The court then said in the next
paragraph, “The court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over those remaining claims and remands this case to
state court.”
The court repeated that position on page 25.
Although this court did not cite the statute, it cited cases that
did so.
All of the above-quoted statements by this court derive
from § 1367(c) and cases relating to that statute.
To summarize, § 1367(c) provides the basis for the
remand order, and § 1447(c) provides the procedure to be
followed.
The statutes are not inconsistent.
Because a remand
based on § 1367(c) divests a federal court of jurisdiction as
surely as compliance with the procedural remand requirements of
§ 1447(c) does, this court does not think the difference between
the statutes affected any jurisdictional issue.
In any event,
this court cited § 1447(c) only for its procedural provisions,
not for the substance of the court’s remand decision.
This court never envisioned that, given its rulings,
Williams could proceed against Deutsche Bank and Real Time in
state court.
It may be that the present clarification will put
an end to the troubles that Deutsche Bank and Real Time say
Williams is visiting on them in state court.
In any event, this
court does not see this as the extraordinary case in which the
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injunction that Deutsche Bank and Real Time seek should be
entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, January 25, 2012.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
LEIGAFOALII TAFUE WILLIAMS, fka LEIGAFOALII TAFUE KOEHNEN vs.
DAWN RICKARD; CIV. NO. 09-00535 SOM/KSC; ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
ENJOIN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS AND CLARIFYING STATUTE APPLICABLE
TO THIS COURT’S EARLIER REMAND ORDER
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