Dowkin et al v. Honolulu Police Department et al
Filing
153
ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER DENYING CITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRIFURCATE CASE 140 ; 149 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 7/22/11. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants regis tered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SERGEANT SHERMON DEAN DOWKIN,
OFFICER FEDERICO DELGADILLO
MARTINEZ, JR., AND
OFFICER CASSANDRA BENNETTBAGORIO,
Plaintiffs,
V.
HONOLULU POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
FORMER CHIEF OF POLICE BOISSE
CORREA,
CURRENT CHIEF OF POLICE LOUIS
KEALOHA,
ASSISTANT CHIEF MICHAEL
TAMASHIRO,
MAJOR KENNETH SIMMONS,
MAJOR JOHN MCENTIRE,
CAPTAIN NYLE DOLERA,
LIEUTENANT MICHAEL SERRAO,
LIEUTENANT DAN KWON,
LIEUTENANT WILLIAM AXT,
LIEUTENANT WAYNE FERNANDEZ,
SERGEANT RALSTON TANAKA,
OFFICER COLBY KASHIMOTORO,
PAT AH LOO, AND
Does 1-100,
Defendants.
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CIVIL NO. 10-00087 SOM/RLP
ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S ORDER DENYING CITY
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
TRIFURCATE CASE
ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER
DENYING CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRIFURCATE CASE
I.
INTRODUCTION.
On May 19, 2011, Defendant City and County of Honolulu
moved to trifurcate Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
On June 30, 2011, after
a hearing on the matter, Magistrate Judge Richard L. Puglisi
denied the motion, concluding that Defendants had not
demonstrated the need to trifurcate as required by Rules 20(b)
and 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant City and County of Honolulu (“City”) now
objects to that order, arguing that Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s
order was clearly erroneous.
The City argues that fairness and
equity require that the three Plaintiffs’ cases be separated.
This court is unpersuaded and affirms Magistrate Judge Puglisi.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), this court finds this matter
suitable for disposition without a hearing.
II.
BACKGROUND FACTS.
Sergeant Shermon Dean Dowkin (“Dowkin”) and Officer
Federico Delgadillo Martinez, Jr. (“Delgadillo”) of the Honolulu
Police Department (“HPD”) allege that, between 2003 and 2008,
their supervisors and fellow officers gave direct orders and
conspired not to provide them protective “cover” or “backup” when
they arrested persons in the field.
27, ECF No. 5.
See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24,
Dowkin is allegedly the only African-American
supervisor, and Delgadillo is allegedly the only Mexican-American
officer in the First Watch of District 4.
Id. ¶ 28.
Dowkin and Delgadillo’s ongoing requests for assistance
were allegedly “routinely ignored” by Defendants who were
purportedly “motivated by racial prejudice.”
Id. ¶ 29.
Dowkin
and Delgadillo claim that this was designed or accomplished with
a reckless disregard for their physical safety and that, when
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they complained about race discrimination, retaliation also
motivated Defendants.
Id.
Dowkin and Delgadillo further allege
that, after they filed formal written complaints with HPD,
retaliation immediately commenced.
Id.
Officer Cassandra Bennett-Bagorio (“Bennett-Bagorio”)
provided testimony allegedly supporting Dowkin and Delgadillo’s
claims of race discrimination and of purported failure to provide
cover on traffic stops.
Id. ¶ 32.
Bennett-Bagorio alleges that,
as a result of her testimony and her gender, Defendants
retaliated against her.
Defendants allegedly failed to provide
her with backup on traffic stops, denied her critical training,
humiliated her in front of her peers, and isolated her from
normal workplace social contact.
III.
Id.
LEGAL STANDARD.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 74.1,
a party may appeal to a district judge any pretrial
nondispositive matter determined by a magistrate judge.
Under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a magistrate judge’s order may be reversed
by the district court only if it is “clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.”
is high.
The threshold of the “clearly erroneous” test
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
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mistake has been committed.”); Thorp v. Kepoo, 100 F. Supp. 2d
1258, 1260 (D. Haw. 2000) (the clearly erroneous standard is
“significantly deferential, requiring a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”).
IV.
ANALYSIS.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides, in
pertinent part:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or
to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
will be conducive to expedition and economy,
may order a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party
claim, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
. . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
The decision whether to try matters
separately is within a court’s sound discretion.
See Hangarter
v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir.
2004).
Separate trials, however, are the exception rather than
the rule of normal trial procedure; Rule 42(b) allows, but does
not require, separate trials to further convenience or avoid
prejudice.
See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 advisory
committee’s note (1966 Amendment) (“[S]eparation of issues for
trial is not to be routinely ordered[.]”).
Moreover, a court’s
decision to sever claims or trifurcate the case will not be
overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.
See M2 Software,
Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Based on his review and consideration of the pleadings
and oral arguments of the parties, Magistrate Judge Puglisi ruled
that Defendants had failed to meet their burden of proving that
trifurcation would promote judicial economy and avoid
inconvenience or prejudice to the parties.
See Spectra-Physics
Lasers, Inc. v. Uniphase Corp., 144 F.R.D. 99, 101 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
As Magistrate Judge Puglisi recognized, “the facts and
legal issues involved in Plaintiffs’ cases are sufficiently
intertwined such that it is appropriate to keep them together as
one action.”
Order at 6, ECF No. 140.
All three officers’
discrimination claims are connected in a way that would cause the
evidence at trial to overlap substantially.
The alleged
discrimination and retaliation against Bennett-Bagorio, for
instance, allegedly resulted directly from her testimony in
support of Dowkin and Delgadillo’s joint racial discrimination
claims.
This court agrees with Magistrate Judge Puglisi.
Trifurcation would cause plaintiffs to have to present the same
evidence at three trials.
This would create excess work and
expense for the parties, witnesses, counsel, and the court.
In their pending Objections, Defendants have raised the
same arguments they presented to Magistrate Judge Puglisi (i.e.,
trifurcation is necessary to promote judicial economy, to avoid
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prejudice to the City, and to prevent jury confusion).
at 8-13, ECF No. 149.
See Obj.
The court is persuaded by Magistrate Judge
Puglisi’s conclusion that trifurcation is unwarranted, and that
Defendants will not be unduly prejudiced.
Overall, the factors
of substantially overlapping evidence, judicial economy, and
convenience to the parties, witnesses, and counsel weigh in favor
of Plaintiffs.
This court agrees with and adopts the rationale
and conclusions espoused by Magistrate Judge Puglisi in his
Order.
A district judge should only reverse a magistrate
judge’s ruling on a nondispositive matter such as a motion to
trifurcate if the ruling is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
See Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A
district judge may reconsider a magistrate’s order in a pretrial
matter if that order is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to
law.’”); Lovell v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 1096,
1100 (D. Haw. 2010) (“Under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard, the
magistrate judge’s ruling must be accepted unless, after
reviewing the entire record, this Court is ‘left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’”) (citations omitted).
Defendants do not establish
that a mistake has clearly been committed.
See Boskoff v. Yano,
217 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083 (D. Haw. 2001).
Accordingly,
Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s ruling is affirmed.
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V.
CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the
Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying City Defendants’ Motion to
Trifurcate Case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, July 22, 2011
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
Dowkin v. Honolulu Police Department, Civ. No. 10-00087 SOM/RLP; ORDER
AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER DENYING CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
TRIFURCATE CASE.
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