Dowkin et al v. Honolulu Police Department et al

Filing 480

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU'S MOTION TO STAY PENDING RESOLUTION OF 9TH CIRCUIT APPEAL IN RELATED CASE re 463 Motion to Stay. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 09/30/2014. (eps)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SERGEANT SHERMON DEAN DOWKIN,
OFFICER FEDERICO DELGADILLO
MARTINEZ, JR., and OFFICER
CASSANDRA BENNETT-BAGORIO,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF
)
HONOLULU, FORMER CHIEF OF
)
POLICE BOISSE CORREA,
)
CURRENT CHIEF OF POLICE
)
LOUIS KEALOHA, ASSISTANT
)
CHIEF MICHAEL TAMASHIRO,
)
MAJOR KENNETH SIMMONS,
)
MAJOR JOHN MCENTIRE,
)
CAPTAIN NYLE DOLERA,
)
LIEUTENANT MICHAEL SERRAO,
)
LIEUTENANT DAN KWON,
)
LIEUTENANT WILLIAM AXT,
)
SERGEANT WAYNE FERNANDEZ,
)
SERGEANT RALSTAN TANAKA,
)
OFFICER COLBY KASHIMOTO,
)
PAT AH LOO,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL 10-00087 LEK-RLP

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION
TO STAY PENDING RESOLUTION OF 9TH CIRCUIT APPEAL IN RELATED CASE
Before the Court is Defendant City and County of
Honolulu’s (“the City”) “Motion to Stay Pending Resolution of 9th
Circuit Appeal in Related Case” (“Motion”), filed on May 29,
2014.

[Dkt. no. 463.]

Defendants Lieutenant Dan Kwon (“Kwon”)

and Sergeant Wayne Fernandez (“Fernandez”) filed a joinder in the
Motion on August 26, 2014.

[Dkt. no. 472.]

Plaintiffs Sergeant

Shermon Dean Dowkin (“Dowkin”), Officer Federico Delgadillo

Martinez, Jr. (“Delgadillo”), and Officer Cassandra BennettBagorio (“Bennett-Bagorio,” all collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed
their memorandum in opposition on August 28, 2014, and the City
filed its reply on September 8, 2014.

[Dkt. nos. 474, 476.]

This matter came on for hearing on September 22, 2014.

After

careful consideration of the Motion, supporting and opposing
memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, the City’s Motion is
HEREBY DENIED for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs originally filed this action on February 22,
2010.

They filed an amended complaint on March 30, 2010, and the

Second Amended Complaint for Compensatory, Statutory and Punitive
Damages and for Injunctive Relief Prohibiting Illegal and LifeThreatening Racial and Gender Discrimination and Retaliation
(“Second Amended Complaint”) on June 24, 2011.
139.]

[Dkt. nos. 5,

On January 17, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended

Complaint for Compensatory, Statutory and Punitive Damages
(“Third Amended Complaint”).

[Dkt. no. 221.]

The Defendants

named in the Third Amended Complaint are: the City, Former Chief
of Police Boisse Correa (“Correa”), Current Chief of Police
Louis Kealoha (“Kealoha”), Assistant Chief Michael Tamashiro
(“Tamashiro”), Major Kenneth Simmons (“Simmons”), Major
John McEntire (“McEntire”), Captain Nyle Dolera (“Dolera”),
Lieutenant Michael Serrao (“Serrao”), Kwon, Lieutenant

2

William Axt (“Axt”), Fernandez, Sergeant Ralstan Tanaka
(“Tanaka”), Officer Colby Kashimoto (“Kashimoto”), and Pat Ah Loo
(“Ah Loo,”1 and all collectively “Defendants”).

The Third

Amended Complaint states:
This is an action to recover compensatory and
punitive damages brought by three Honolulu Police
Officers against their employers, The Honolulu
Police Department and The City and County of
Honolulu (hereinafter “HPD” and the “City”
respectively, and “HPD” collectively), and against
numerous complicit supervising officers, for
systemic racial and gender discrimination and
retaliation.
[Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 3.]

Plaintiffs allege that the

named supervisors and officers “put Plaintiffs at risk of bodily
harm and even death solely because of invidious racial and gender
prejudice.”

[Id. at ¶ 4.]

According to the Third Amended Complaint, Dowkin is a
forty-seven-year-old, African-American male, who has been
employed with HPD since 1988.

He is a Field Sergeant on the

First Watch in HPD District 4, and he “was the only AfricanAmerican supervisor in HPD District 4 for most of the relevant
time period.”

[Id. at ¶ 5.]

Delgadillo is a forty-four-year-

old, Mexican-American male, who has been employed with HPD since
1998.

He is a Motorized Metropolitan Police Officer.

At all

relevant times, he was the only Mexican-American HPD officer in

1

According to the Third Amended Complaint, Ah Loo is “the
civilian Labor-Relations Advisor for HPD.” [Third Amended
Complaint at ¶ 21.]
3

District 4.

Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of his

mistreatment, Delgadillo was forced to resign from HPD, i.e.,
Plaintiffs allege he was constructively discharged, in the summer
of 2011.

[Id. at ¶ 7.]

Bennett-Bagorio is a forty-four-year-

old, Caucasian female, who has been employed with HPD since 1997.
She is also a Motorized Metropolitan Police Officer.

[Id. at

¶ 8.]
Plaintiffs assert that HPD requires that, “when a
motorized patrol officer makes a traffic stop, fellow officers
must immediately proceed to the scene to cover and protect the
officer making the stop” and, “on all police calls involving any
potential for violence, backup officers are immediately assigned
to cover the officer initially arriving at the scene.”
¶ 25.]

[Id. at

Plaintiffs allege that, “[a]lthough officially condemned,

there is an unspoken practice employed by law enforcement
officers to isolate and ostracize a fellow officer whom they
dislike.”

[Id. at ¶ 26.]

Plaintiffs allege that one of the

reasons officers may not provide backup for another officer is in
retaliation for the officer’s opposition to racism or sexism
within HPD.

According to Plaintiffs, this practice is dangerous

and can ultimately force the ostracized officer to resign.

[Id.

at ¶¶ 27-28.]
Plaintiffs allege that Dowkin and members of his team,
including Delgadillo, were deprived of backup from other patrol

4

officers.

Plaintiffs allege that this was: in retaliation for an

internal complaint that Dowkin made about a racially derogatory
remark that his supervisor made; and because of Dowkin’s and
Delgadillo’s race.

Dowkin made verbal and written complaints to

his commanding officers.

On July 9, 2008, on behalf of himself

and Delgadillo, Dowkin submitted a written complaint to Correa,
who was Chief of Police at that time.

[Id. at ¶¶ 32-42, 68.]

According to the Third Amended Complaint, Fernandez with Kwon’s approval - ordered the First Watch officers not to
provide backup for Dowkin and Delgadillo.

From that time through

the filing of the Third Amended Complaint, no one in the chain of
command - including Serrao, Dolera, McEntire, Simmons, Tamashiro,
Correa, and Kealoha - ever countermanded the order or disciplined
Fernandez or Kwon for giving it.

Plaintiffs also allege that

some of the individual Defendants retaliated against Dowkin and
Delgadillo for making a race discrimination complaint by: failing
to stop the problem regarding lack of backup; failing to
investigate their complaint and to punish offending officers; and
providing tacit approval of the discriminatory failure to provide
backup.

Plaintiffs allege that the conduct of those Defendants

violated both federal and state law.

[Id. at ¶¶ 43-45.]

Plaintiffs also allege that Bennett-Bagorio, another
member of the First Watch patrol, verified Dowkin’s and
Delgadillo’s allegations.

Bennett-Bagorio was then discriminated

5

against because she is female and/or retaliated against for
opposing unlawful discrimination.

After Bennett-Bagorio filed a

formal complaint about the retaliation and discrimination, she
suffered further retaliation, including an incident on
October 18, 2010 when she suffered serious injury.

According to

Plaintiffs, Tanaka intentionally allowed Bennett-Bagorio to enter
a bar without backup, and a suspect physically assaulted her.
[Id. at ¶¶ 46-47.]
Plaintiffs further argue that Dowkin (since 2003),
Delgadillo (since 2007), and Bennett-Bagorio (since 2008) have
been subjected to other forms of race discrimination and
retaliation, including racial comments and being reprimanded for
failing to comply with standards that were not enforced on other
officers.

[Id. at ¶¶ 50-52.]

Plaintiffs also allege that

Defendants and other City employees conspired to violate
Plaintiffs’ constitutional, statutory, and common law rights or
to otherwise cause Plaintiffs harm.

The conspiracy includes,

inter alia: the failure to provide backup; the failure to
properly supervise officers in Plaintiffs’ chain of command;
filing false personnel complaints against Plaintiffs; filing
false performance evaluations that inhibited Plaintiffs’
professional advancement; and denying Plaintiffs overtime.
at ¶ 54.]

6

[Id.

In November 2011, the City, through HPD, informed
Dowkin that none of his complaints of race discrimination were
sustained.

Plaintiffs argue that this confirms the existence of

a conspiracy between Defendants to discriminate and retaliate
against Dowkin.

[Id. at ¶ 142.]

The Third Amended Complaint alleges the following
claims:
•a race and gender discrimination claim by Plaintiffs against the
City for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq. (“Count I”);
•a race, color, or national origin discrimination claim by Dowkin
and Delgadillo against the City for violation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d, et seq. (“Count II”);
•a claim for violations of the Hawai`i State Constitution and a
claim under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 by Dowkin and Delgadillo
against the City, and a claim under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 3782(3) against Tanaka, Kashimoto, Fernandez, and Kwon
(“Count III);
•a negligent training claim by Plaintiffs against Tanaka, Kwon,
Fernandez, and the City, and negligent retention, failure to
report and investigate against Kashimoto, Tanaka, Kwon,
Fernandez, and the City (“Count IV”);
•an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim
by Plaintiffs against Tanaka and Kashimoto, an IIED claim by
Dowkin and Delgadillo against Axt, and an IIED claim by
Bennett-Bagorio against Fernandez (“Count V”);
•a negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claim by
Dowkin against the City, Kwon, and Fernandez, and an NIED
claim by Bennett-Bagorio against the City and Tanaka
(“Count VI”);
•a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy claim by Plaintiffs against
Defendants (“Count VII”); and

7

•a civil conspiracy claim by Plaintiffs against Defendants
(“Count VIII”).
As to damages, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are
jointly and severally liable for: actual and compensatory
damages, including Plaintiffs’ past and future economic losses;
extreme emotional and psychological pain and suffering; punitive
damages; statutory damages; pre-judgment interest and postjudgment interest; reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and any
other appropriate statutory or equitable relief.
On September 2, 2011, Chief United States District
Judge Susan Oki Mollway issued an order granting in part and
denying in part the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint that Defendants filed July 8, 2011 (“9/2/11 Dismissal
Order”).2

[Dkt. nos. 145, 167.3]

Chief Judge Mollway, inter

alia, dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims in the Second Amended
Complaint against the individual Defendants for employment
discrimination in violation of § 378-2(1) and (2) on the ground
that there is no individual liability under those subsections.
9/2/11 Dismissal Order, 2011 WL 3882844, at *7.
On May 10, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for
Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint (“Motion to Amend”).

2

Chief Judge Mollway recused herself from this case on
March 27, 2013, and the case was reassigned to this Court. [Dkt.
no. 448.]
3

The 9/2/11 Dismissal Order is available at 2011 WL
3882844.
8

[Dkt. no. 283.]

Plaintiffs sought to add: two new defendants -

Denise Tsukayama, the City’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
Officer (“Tsukayama”), and Dave Kajihiro, HPD Deputy Chief
(“Kajihiro”); new factual allegations that Plaintiffs argued were
based on discovery obtained from Defendants after Plaintiffs
requested leave to file the Third Amended Complaint; new causes
of action, including additional conspiracy claims; and thirtyseven exhibits in support of the conspiracy claims.

The

magistrate judge denied the Motion to Amend in an order filed on
July 3, 2012 (“7/3/12 Order”).

[Dkt. no. 338.4]

On July 20,

2012, Plaintiffs filed an appeal from the 7/3/12 Order.
no. 379.]

[Dkt.

On August 27, 2012, Chief Judge Mollway denied the

appeal and affirmed the denial of the Motion to Amend.

[Dkt. no.

393.]
In addition, on July 23, 2012, Chief Judge Mollway
filed the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal
of Third Amended Complaint (“7/23/12 Dismissal Order”).
no. 382.5]

[Dkt.

She dismissed Count IV as to all Defendants except

the City, 2012 WL 3012643, at *5, dismissed Count VII in its
entirety, id. at *6, and dismissed Count VIII in its entirety,

4

The 7/3/12 Order is available at 2012 WL 2577572. It also
addresses other motions that are not at relevant to the Motion
currently before this Court.
5

The 7/23/12 Dismissal Order is available at 2012 WL
3012643.
9

id. at *8.
On October 30, 2012, Chief Judge Mollway issued an
entering order finding that the case should be stayed pending the
disposition of the appeal before the Hawai`i Supreme Court in
Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co. (“10/30/12 EO”).6

[Dkt. no. 430.]

The stay was to take effect after she ruled on a pending appeal
of one of the magistrate judge’s orders.

On January 17, 2013,

after she resolved the magistrate appeal, Chief Judge Mollway
issued an EO noting that the stay ordered in the 10/30/12 EO was
in full effect.

[Dkt. no. 444.]

The Hawai`i Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lales
on February 13, 2014.

133 Hawai`i 332, 328 P.3d 341.

It held

that “[i]ndividual employees are . . . not personally liable as
‘employers’ for harassment and retaliation claims under HRS
§§ 378–2(1)(A) and 378–2(2).”

Id. at 334, 328 P.3d at 353.

It

did not reach the issue of individual liability under § 378-2(3),
noting that Lales did not raise such a claim in his amended
complaint and did not raise the issue of whether such a claim was
cognizable in either his responses to the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment or in the appeal before the ICA.

Id. at 333

n.9, 328 P.3d at 352 n.9.

6

The Hawai`i Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) issued
its opinion in Lales on May 9, 2012. 2012 WL 1624013. On
October 9, 2012, the Hawai`i Supreme Court accepted the
defendants’ application for a writ of certiorari. 2012 WL
4801373.
10

On May 14, 2014, this Court lifted the stay ordered in
the 10/30/12 EO.

[Dkt. no. 455.]

In the instant Motion, the City asks this Court to stay
the instant case pending the resolution of the appeal in BennettBagorio, et al. v. City & County of Honolulu, et al., CV 13-00071
DKW-KSC (“Bennett-Bagorio”).

The City argues that Plaintiffs

filed Bennett-Bagorio to circumvent the denial of the Motion to
Amend in the instant case.7

According to the City, the First

Amended Complaint for Compensatory, Statutory and Punitive
Damages in Bennett-Bagorio (“the Bennett-Bagorio Complaint”),
[Bennett-Bagorio, filed 2/20/13 (dkt. no. 5),8] asserts the same
claims that Plaintiffs sought to add in the instant case through
the Motion to Amend.

[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 2.]

In Bennett-Bagorio, United States District Judge
Derrick K. Watson dismissed the case with prejudice, finding the
Bennett-Bagorio Complaint to be duplicative of the instant case.
[Bennett-Bagorio, Order Granting Defendant City and County of
Honolulu’s Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss First Amended

7

Plaintiffs are the only plaintiffs in Bennett-Bagorio, and
they are represented by the same attorneys who are representing
them in the instant case. The defendants in Bennett-Bagorio are:
the City; D. Scott Dodd, Defendants’ former counsel in the
instant case; Carrie K.S. Okinaga and Robert C. Godbey Mr. Dodd’s supervisors; Kealoha; Correa; Kajihiro; Major
Kerry Inouye; Lieutenant Carolyn Onaga; Lieutenant Yvonne Bolton;
HPD Detective Randall Gratz; and Tsukayama.
8

Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in Bennett-Bagorio
on February 11, 2013.
11

Complaint and Denying the Motion for Sanctions, filed 1/28/14
(dkt. no. 66) (“Bennett-Bagorio Dismissal Order”).9]

The Clerk’s

Office entered final judgment on January 29, 2014, and Plaintiffs
filed a Notice of Appeal on February 27, 2014.
67, 68).]

[Id., (dkt. nos.

The City filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal on

March 11, 2014, appealing the denial of sanctions.

[Id. (dkt.

no. 73).]
In the instant Motion, the City represents that the
Bennett-Bagorio appeals remain pending before the Ninth Circuit,
and it asks this Court to stay the instant case until the
resolution of the Bennett-Bagorio appeal.

[Mem. in Supp. of

Motion at 2-3.]
DISCUSSION
In an analogous situation involving the defendant’s and
third-party-defendant’s request to stay the case pending the
resolution of a related state court case, this district court
stated:
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is
incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its
docket with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am.
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed.
153 (1936). See Leyva v. Certified Grocers of
Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“[T]he court may order a stay of [an] action
pursuant to its power to control its docket and

9

The Bennett-Bagorio Dismissal Order is available at 2014
WL 296860.
12

calendar and to provide for a just determination
of the cases pending before it.”). . . .
Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Nordic PCL Constr., Inc., Civil No.
11–00515 SOM/KSC, 2012 WL 1492399, at *20 (D. Hawai`i Apr. 26,
2012) (some alterations in Nordic PCL).
Similarly, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California has stated:
For the sake of judicial economy, such a stay may
be granted pending the outcome of other legal
proceedings related to the case. Leyva v.
Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857,
863–64 (9th Cir. 1979). Such discretion is
appropriately used when the resolution of another
matter will have a direct impact on the issues
before the court, substantially simplifying issues
presented. Mediterranean Enters. v. Ssangyong
Corp., 708 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. Cal. 1983); San
Diego Padres Baseball P’ship v. United States,
2001 WL 710601, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2001).
The district court’s determination of whether
a stay is appropriate, “must weigh competing
interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis,
299 U.S. at 254–55. The Ninth Circuit has noted
that these competing interests include:
the possible damage which may result from the
granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity
which a party may suffer in being required to
go forward, and the orderly course of justice
mea-sured [sic] in terms of the simplifying
or complicating of issues, proof, and
questions of law which could-be expected to
result from a stay.
CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir.
1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55). . . .
Karoun Dairies, Inc. v. Karlacti, Inc., Civil No. 08cv1521 AJB
(WVG), 2013 WL 4716202, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013).

13

I.

Prejudice if a Stay is Granted
In the instant case, this Court finds that there is

significant prejudice that may result if this Court grants a
stay.
ago.

Plaintiffs filed this action over four-and-a-half years
Trial is currently set for September 15, 2015.

Defendants

argue that a stay will not prejudice Plaintiffs, who are only
seeking monetary relief.

The fact that Plaintiffs are not

seeking injunctive relief does not negate Plaintiffs’ interest in
obtaining relief within a reasonable time.

For example,

Delgadillo seeks monetary damages for, inter alia, his
constructive discharge in 2011, and Bennett-Bagorio seeks
monetary damages for, inter alia, serious physical injuries that
she suffered in 2010.

The current trial date is more than five

years after Plaintiffs filed this case, and to ask Plaintiffs to
resolve their claims and potentially obtain redress for their
injuries is unreasonable.10

Further, if this case is delayed by

another stay, all parties may be prejudiced by potential loss of
witnesses and other evidence due to the passage of time.

This

Court therefore finds that the first CMAX factor weighs against a
stay.

10

This Court recognizes that the delay caused by the stay
related to the Lales appeal was beyond the parties’ control.
14

II.

Prejudice if a Stay is Denied
The City argues that it will be prejudiced if the Court

denies a stay because, if the Ninth Circuit reverses the BennettBagorio Dismissal Order and remands that case for further
proceedings, there will be two cases involving substantially the
same parties and related events, but the two cases will be
litigated on two completely different schedules.

The City argues

that this places the parties at risk of inconsistent and/or
duplicative rulings in the two cases.

The City also argues that

allowing the cases to proceed separately will result in the
duplicative use of the parties’ and the Court’s resources.
Instead, the City asserts that this Court should stay the instant
case so that, if the Ninth Circuit reverses the Bennett-Bagorio
Dismissal Order, the two cases can proceed together.
Trial in this case is not scheduled until approximately
a year from now, and the Ninth Circuit may resolve the BennettBagorio appeal well before then.

Thus, even without a stay in

the instant case, it may still be possible to consolidate the two
cases if the Ninth Circuit reverses the Bennett-Bagorio Dismissal
Order.

Even if consolidation is not possible, the City may be

able to avoid inconsistent and/or duplicative rulings by invoking
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

However,

this Court emphasizes that these arguments will be moot if the
Ninth Circuit affirms the Bennett-Bagorio Dismissal Order.

15

The City also points out that, before Plaintiffs
alleged in Bennett-Bagorio that certain attorneys from the
Corporation Counsel’s office were involved in the conspiracy to
discriminate and retaliate against Plaintiffs, the Corporation
Counsel’s office represented Defendants in this case.

In light

of the conspiracy allegations, the City has since retained
private counsel for various groups of Defendants.
significantly increased Defendants’ expenses.

This has

The Court,

however, does not find the City’s increase in litigation expenses
to be particularly persuasive.

This Court finds that the second

CMAX factor weighs only slightly in favor of a stay.
III. Orderly Course of Justice
The Bennett-Bagorio appeal does not present any factual
or legal issues that will control the result of the instant case.
The crux of the City’s argument for a stay is that the two cases
should be consolidated if Plaintiffs prevail in the BennettBagorio appeal.

As stated, supra, consolidation may be possible

even if this Court denies the City’s request for a stay.
Further, if the Ninth Circuit affirms the Bennett-Bagorio
Dismissal Order, that appeal will have no effect on the instant
case.

This Court therefore finds that the third CMAX factor

weighs against a stay.
Having considered all of the competing interests, this
Court FINDS that a stay of this case pending the resolution of

16

the Bennett-Bagorio appeal is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the City’s Motion to
Stay Pending Resolution of 9th Circuit Appeal in Related Case,
filed May 29, 2014, is HEREBY DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, September 30, 2014.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

SERGEANT SHERMON DEAN DOWKIN, ET AL. VS. THE CITY AND COUNTY OF
HONOLULU, ET AL; CIVIL 10-00087 LEK-RLP; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION TO STAY PENDING RESOLUTION
OF 9TH CIRCUIT APPEAL IN RELATED CASE

17