P.-K. et al v. Department of Education, State of Hawai'i
Filing
53
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 44 . Signed by JUDGE DAVID ALAN EZRA on 7/12/2011. [Order follows hearing held 7/11/2011 on M/PI. Minutes of hearing: docket entry no. 52 ] (afc) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). All participants are registered to receive electronic notifications.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
R.P.-K., through his parent C.K.,
R.T.D., through his parents R.D. and
M.D., and the HAWAII
DISABILITY RIGHTS CENTER, in
a representative capacity on behalf of
its clients and all other similarly
situated,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, )
STATE OF HAWAII,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_____________________________ )
Civ. No. 10-00436 DAE/KSC
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On July 11, 2011, the Court heard Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction (“Motion”). Jason H. Kim, Esq., appeared at the hearing on behalf of
Plaintiffs, Deputy Attorney General Carter K. Siu appeared at the hearing on behalf
of Defendant Department of Education (“Defendant” or “DOE”). After reviewing
the motion as well as the supporting and opposing memoranda, the Court DENIES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (Doc.
# 44.)
BACKGROUND
The named Plaintiffs in this case—excluding Plaintiff Hawaii
Disability Rights Center (“HDRC”)—are disabled individuals who are or had been
eligible for special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”). In this litigation Plaintiffs are challenging the validity of Act 163 of the
Session Laws of Hawaii for 2010 (“Act 163”) arguing it is an invalid attempt at
circumventing this Court’s holdings in B.T. v. Dep’t of Educ., 637 F. Supp. 2d 856
(D. Haw. 2009) (hereinafter “B.T. I”), B.T. v. Dep’t of Educ., Cv. Nos. 08-00356
DAE-BMK, 09-00059 DAE-BMK, 2009 WL 4884447 (D. Haw. Dec. 17, 2009)
(hereinafter “B.T. II”), and B.T. v. Dep’t of Educ., Cv. No. 08-00356 DAE-BMK,
2008 WL 3891867 (D. Haw. Aug. 21, 2008) (hereinafter “B.T. III”). Plaintiffs
here seek an injunction “requiring the DOE to continue to provide until the
conclusion of this litigation educational and related services to K.K., M.W.,
A.C.K., K.C., and M.L. and to all other members of the Plaintiff class who have
qualified for Extended School Year services” notwithstanding Act 163. (“Mot.,”
Doc. # 44, at 25.)
I.
B.T. and Act 163
The IDEA requires each state to provide a free appropriate public
education (“FAPE”) to “all children with disabilities . . . between the ages of 3 and
2
21, inclusive . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). This Court determined that federal
eligibility for special education and related services therefore ends on a student’s
twenty-second birthday. B.T. I, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 863–64 n.9. States, however,
may impose different age restrictions provided those same limitations are applied
to general education students as well. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (“The obligation
to make [FAPE] available to all children with disabilities does not apply with
respect to children . . . aged 3 through 5 and 18 through 21 in a State to the extent
that its application to those children would be inconsistent with State law or
practice . . . .”); see also B.T. I, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (“The State is only allowed
to deviate from the requirements of the IDEA if there is a clear State law that says
otherwise.”).
In B.T., Plaintiff B.T. was a severely autistic twenty-year-old. B.T. I,
637 F. Supp. 2d at 859. He argued that extending a FAPE to the age of twenty-two
was consistent with Hawaii law and that the DOE’s policy of terminating special
education services at the age of twenty was invalid given the terms of the IDEA.
See id. at 862–65. The Court agreed. Specifically the Court focused on the
“nature of the practice of Hawaii’s schools toward students 20 years or older” and
found that “Defendant has approved every single overage general education
student and barred almost every single overage special education student.” Id. at
3
865. Accordingly, “Hawaii [had denied] these students a meaningful education.”
Id. at 865–66. Hawaii therefore was “enjoined from implementing a per se rule
denying special education services based solely on [the students] attaining the age
of 20.” Id. at 866. The Court subsequently granted summary judgment, in part, for
Plaintiff B.T. B.T. II, 2009 WL 4884447, at *9. The State of Hawaii did not
appeal this Court’s ruling.
Since then, however, the State of Hawaii has passed Act 163 which
amended Haw. Rev. Stat § 302A-1134(c) to impose a twenty year age limit on all
admissions to public high school. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-1134(c).
Specifically, the statute states:
No person who is twenty years of age or over on the first instructional
day of the school year shall be eligible to attend a public school. If a
person reaches twenty years of age after the first instructional day of
the school year, the person shall be eligible to attend public school for
the full school year.
Id. Plaintiffs assert that while Act 163 imposes an age limit of 20 for attendance at
a public school, the DOE continues to provide a public education to students over
the age of 20 through the CB (competency-based) and GED (General Education
Development) high school equivalency programs (collectively “adult education
programs”). (See id. at 11.) A special education student, according to Plaintiffs,
4
cannot therefore be denied a FAPE on the grounds that he or she has “aged-out” of
IDEA eligibility per Act 163. (See id. at 12.)
II.
Movants
The Movants with respect to the instant Motion are not the named
Plaintiffs, but instead are class members—disabled individuals now or imminently
between the ages of 20 and 22 who have been receiving special education and
related services, including extended school year services (“ESY”), from the DOE
under the IDEA. (Mot. at 1.) Each has been told they will not receive services
beyond this school year on the basis of Act 163 alone.
III.
Procedural History
On July 17, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. (Doc. # 1.) On September 24, 2010, Plaintiffs
filed a Motion to Certify Class. (Doc. # 15.) On March 15, 2011, the Court issued
an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification.1 (Doc. # 31.) On June 23, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed the instant
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. # 44.) On July 1, 2011, Defendant filed
1
Specifically, the Court certified the class but determined that two of the
named plaintiffs were ineligible to be class members or representatives. (Doc. # 31
at 2.)
5
its Opposition. (“Opp’n,” Doc. # 48.) On July 5, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Reply.
(“Reply,” Doc. # 49.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[I]njunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008). To obtain a
preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate “that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 365 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct.
2207, 2218–19 (2008); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987);
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)); see also Stormans,
Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d. 1109, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying heightened
standard mandated by Winter). “‘[S]erious questions going to the merits’ and a
hardship balance that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can [also] support issuance
of an injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows a likelihood of irreparable
injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for Wild Rockies
v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010). A district court has great
discretion in determining whether to grant or to deny a temporary restraining order
6
or a preliminary injunction. See Wildwest Inst. v. Bull, 472 F.3d 587, 589–90 (9th
Cir. 2006); see also Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983) (“At
one end of the continuum, the moving party is required to show both a probability
of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury. At the other end
of the continuum, the moving party must demonstrate that serious legal questions
are raised and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.”) (internal
citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs advance multiple theories challenging Act 163. The theories
include: (1) Violation of the IDEA (Compl. ¶¶ 31–36); (2) Violation of Title II (Id.
¶¶ 37–41); (3) Violation of Section 504 (Id. ¶¶ 42–46); and (4) Estoppel (Id.
¶¶ 47–50). To prevail on these claims, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the DOE
uses Act 163 as a means of denying special education students a FAPE beyond the
age of twenty while simultaneously ushering general education students of the
same age into adult education programs to complete their secondary education.2
2
It is worthy of note that the term “adult education” appears in the IDEA.
Specifically, the IDEA requires that every IEP created after the child becomes
sixteen years of age must also include a statement of “appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition assessments related to
training, education, employment and, where appropriate, independent living skills”
as well as the “transition services . . . needed to assist the child in reaching those
(continued...)
7
See B.T. II, 2009WL 4884447, at *8 (granting summary judgment in part because
the DOE, in practice, allowed “a [general education] student to attend school after
20 years of age” while uniformly prohibiting special education students the same
opportunity).
The Court finds that the instant Motion is premature. While Plaintiffs
have demonstrated that Act 163 is used to deny special education students a FAPE
beyond the age of twenty, there is no evidence yet on the record to suggest that the
DOE has adopted a practice whereby general education students of the same age
are allowed to continue their secondary education in adult education programs with
regularity. See B.T. I, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 865–66 (focusing on the “nature of the
practice of Hawaii’s schools towards students 20 years or older” and finding that
“Defendant has approved every single overage general education student and
barred almost every single overage special education student”). Without this
evidence, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have satisfied their heavy
2
(...continued)
goals.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa),(bb). Transition services “means a
coordinated set of activities for a student with a disability that . . . is designed with
an out-come oriented process, which promotes movement from school to postschool activities, including . . . continuing and adult education . . . .” Id.
§ 1401(34) (emphasis added).
8
burden with respect to their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Specifically,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.
At the Hearing, the parties represented to the Court that depositions
will be conducted by the end of the month which should reveal the number of
general education students enrolled in adult education between the ages of twenty
and twenty-two. Once concluded, Plaintiffs are invited to refile the instant Motion
if their theories of liability are supported by evidence. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court the Court DENIES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. # 44.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, July 12, 2011.
_____________________________
David Alan Ezra
United States District Judge
R.P.-K, et al.. v. Department of Education, Civ. No. 10-00436 DAE/KSC; ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?