Pascual et al v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC et al
Filing
65
ORDER Granting Defendant Aurora Loan Services, LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment (Which The Court Construes As A Motion To Dismiss) re 42 . Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 6/18/12. (gls, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE< /center>Participants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
LESTER PASCUAL, an individual, and )
OFELIA PASCUAL, an individual,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC and )
DOES 1-100 inclusive,
)
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 10-00759 JMS-KSC
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
AURORA LOAN SERVICES,
LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (WHICH THE COURT
CONSTRUES AS A MOTION TO
DISMISS)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (WHICH THE COURT
CONSTRUES AS A MOTION TO DISMISS)
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises from a February 12, 2007 mortgage transaction in
which Plaintiffs Lester and Ofelia Pascual (“Plaintiffs”) borrowed $630,000 from
Lehman Brothers Bank, F.S.B. (“Lehman Brothers”), secured by a promissory note
and mortgage on real property located at 468 South Oahu Street, Kahului, Hawaii
96732 (the “subject property”). On September 20, 2009, the Hawaii Bureau of
Conveyances recorded an assignment of the mortgage to Defendant Aurora Loan
Services, LLC (“Defendant”), who subsequently foreclosed on the subject
property. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts that Defendant
violated Hawaii’s non-judicial foreclosure statute, Hawaii Revised Statutes
(“HRS”) § 667-5, by foreclosing on the subject property because the transfer of the
mortgage to Defendant was improper.
Currently before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a genuine issue of
material fact that the mortgage was improperly assigned to Defendant. Based on
Plaintiffs’ request and because the court can determine Defendant’s Motion based
on judicially-noticed evidence only, the court treats Defendant’s Motion as a
Motion to Dismiss. Based on the following, the court finds that the FAC fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss. Because granting leave to amend would be futile, this dismissal is
without leave to amend.
II. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
On February 12, 2007, Plaintiffs borrowed $630,000 from Lehman
Brothers, secured via a mortgage on the subject property. Doc. Nos. 43-2, 43-3,
Def.’s Exs. 1-2. The mortgage identifies Lehman Brothers as the lender, and states
that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) “is a separate
corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors
2
and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this Security Instrument.” Doc. No.
43-3, Def.’s Ex. 2 at 2. The mortgage further provides:
Borrower does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to
MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s
successors and assigns) and to the successors and assigns
of MERS, with power of sale [the subject property]. . . .
Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only
legal title to the interests granted by Borrowers in this
Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with the
law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and
Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to
exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not
limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and
to take and action required of the Lender.
Id. at 3. Finally, the mortgage notifies Plaintiffs that “[t]he Note or a partial
interest in the Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or
more times without prior notice to Borrower.” Id. at 12.
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for voluntary Chapter
11 bankruptcy. See Doc. No. 55-3, Pls.’ Ex. 8. On October 1, 2009, the State of
Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances recorded an April 15, 2009 Assignment of
Mortgage from MERS, solely as nominee for Lehman Brothers, to Defendant. See
Doc. No. 43-4, Def.’s Ex. 3.
In early 2009, Plaintiffs defaulted on their loan, which resulted in
Defendant filing a Notice of Mortgagee’s Intention to Foreclose Under Power of
Sale, recorded with the Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances on October 8, 2009. See
3
Doc. No. 55-3, Pls.’ Ex. 4. A public auction was held on October 1, 2010, with
Defendant being the high bidder with a credit bid of $304,000. Doc. No. 43-5,
Def.’s Ex. 4. On October 28, 2010, Defendant recorded a Mortgagee’s Affidavit of
Foreclosure Sale Under Power of Sale. Id.
B.
Procedural Background
On December 21, 2010, Plaintiffs initiated this action, asserting a
panoply of claims against Defendant, Nestor E. Segundo (Plaintiffs’ mortgage
broker), and MERS. After Defendant and MERS filed a motion for summary
judgment, the parties stipulated to dismissal of most of the claims and to the filing
of an amended complaint.
On September 12, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their FAC asserting a single
claim that Defendant violated HRS § 667-5 by foreclosing on the subject property
without a valid assignment of the mortgage. The FAC seeks a declaratory
judgment that the assignment from Lehman Brothers (via MERS) to Defendant is
invalid such that the non-judicial foreclosure is void.
Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss on February 29, 2012.
Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on May 25, 2012, and Defendant filed its Reply on
June 4, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Response on June 14, 2012. A
hearing was held on June 18, 2012.
4
C.
Construing the Motion for Summary Judgment as a Motion to Dismiss
Although Defendant styled its Motion as a Motion for Summary
Judgment, it relies largely on documents that were attached to the FAC and/or
recorded in the Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances, and makes a legal argument that
Plaintiffs’ claim fails as a matter of law.1 As a result, Plaintiffs argue in their
Opposition that the court should view the Motion for Summary Judgment as a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. The court agrees that Defendant could have made the same
arguments in a motion to dismiss as opposed to a motion for summary judgment
such that Defendant’s Motion should be treated as a Motion to Dismiss. See
Schwartz v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1968)
(“A motion for summary judgment may be made solely on the pleadings, when it is
so made it is functionally the same as a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment
on the pleadings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 10A Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Practice & Procedure
§ 2713 (3d ed. 1998) (“[A] summary-judgment motion may be made on the basis
of the pleadings alone, and if this is done it functionally is the same as a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim or for a judgment on the pleadings.”) (footnotes
1
Although Defendant also submits the Declaration of Kristen Trompisz, see Doc. No.
25-2, Def.’s Ex. 6, the court need not consider it to address the arguments presented by the
parties.
5
collecting cases omitted); see, e.g., Sutor v. FEMA, 2009 WL 2004375, at *3 n.4
(E.D. Pa. July 9, 2009) (treating motion for summary judgment as motion to
dismiss because the motion did not require the court to considering documents
outside the pleadings).
At the June 18, 2012 hearing, the court explained that it would treat
Defendant’s Motion as a Motion to Dismiss. The court further explained that by
converting the Motion to one brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must consider
whether Plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend if the Motion is otherwise
granted. In fact, Plaintiffs had already offered new theories of relief in their
Opposition (that is, claims in addition to the single claim in the FAC) and they
represented at the June 18, 2012 hearing that their briefing included all theories
that they wished to include in an amended pleading. And because Defendant had
responded to these new arguments in its Reply, Plaintiffs and Defendant concurred
at the hearing that the briefing was complete as to the claims Plaintiff would seek
to include in a second amended complaint and on the issue of whether it would be
futile to make these specific allegations. The court therefore construes the Motion
as a Motion to Dismiss and, finding that the FAC fails to state a cognizable claim,
determines whether it would be futile to allow amendment.
6
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss
a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet -- that the court must accept as
true all of the allegations contained in the complaint -- “is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not
simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient
allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party
to defend itself effectively.”).
Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
7
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, “the factual allegations that are taken
as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to
require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and
continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Factual allegations that only permit
the court to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct” do not show that the pleader
is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
IV. DISCUSSION
The court first addresses whether the FAC asserts a cognizable claim
for violation of HRS § 667-5, and finding that it does not, then addresses whether
Plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend.
A.
Claim for Violation of HRS § 667-5
HRS § 667-5(a) provides:
When a power of sale is contained in a mortgage, and
where the mortgagee, the mortgagee’s successor in
interest, or any person authorized by the power to act in
the premises, desires to foreclose under power of sale
upon breach of a condition of the mortgage, the
mortgagee, successor, or person shall be represented by
an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the State
and is physically located in the State.
The FAC asserts that Defendant violated HRS § 667-5 when it
foreclosed on the subject property because it is not “the mortgagee, the
mortgagee’s successor in interest, or any person authorized by the power to act.”
8
Specifically, the FAC asserts that MERS “never had the authority to validly
transfer such an interest in the subject property to [Defendant],” Doc. No. 36, FAC
¶ 15, because its authority is limited to administrative functions and Lehman
Brothers did not grant MERS authority to assign the mortgage to Defendant. Id. ¶¶
16-26. Defendant argues that this claim should be dismissed because, among other
reasons, MERS had authority to assign to Defendant all beneficial interest in the
mortgage, including the right to exercise the power of sale. Based on the
following, the court agrees with Defendant.
The role of MERS was recently explained by the Ninth Circuit in
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011), as follows:
MERS is a private electronic database, operated by
MERSCORP, Inc., that tracks the transfer of the
“beneficial interest” in home loans, as well as any
changes in loan servicers. After a borrower takes out a
home loan, the original lender may sell all or a portion of
its beneficial interest in the loan and change loan
servicers. The owner of the beneficial interest is entitled
to repayment of the loan. For simplicity, we will refer to
the owner of the beneficial interest as the “lender.” . . .
At the origination of the loan, MERS is designated
in the deed of trust as a nominee for the lender and the
lender’s “successors and assigns,” and as the deed’s
“beneficiary” which holds legal title to the security
interest conveyed. If the lender sells or assigns the
beneficial interest in the loan to another MERS member,
the change is recorded only in the MERS database, not in
county records, because MERS continues to hold the
deed on the new lender’s behalf. If the beneficial interest
9
in the loan is sold to a non-MERS member, the transfer
of the deed from MERS to the new lender is recorded in
county records and the loan is no longer tracked in the
MERS system.
Id. at 1038-39. Cervantes held that claims attacking the MERS recording system
as a fraud fail, given that mortgages generally disclose MERS’s role as acting
“solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns,” and that
MERS has the right to foreclose and sell the property. Id. at 1042.
Just like in Cervantes, the mortgage expressly notifies Plaintiffs of
MERS’s role as the nominee for the “Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.”
The mortgage clearly outlines MERS’s role by providing that: (1) MERS ‘is a
separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s
successors and assigns,” Doc. No. 43-3, Def.’s Ex. 2 at 2; (2) Plaintiffs “mortgage,
grant and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors
and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS, with power of sale [the
subject property],” id. at 3; (3) “Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds
only legal title to the interests granted by Borrowers in this Security Instrument,”
id.; and (4) “[t]he Note or a partial interest in the Note (together with this Security
Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower.” Id.
at 12. Further, MERS exercised this authority granted to it by Lehman Brothers by
assigning the mortgage to Defendant. See Doc. No. 43-4, Def.’s Ex. 3.
10
In light of the express disclosures in the mortgage giving MERS the
authority act on behalf of Lehman Brother and the transfer of the mortgage to
Defendant, Plaintiffs have no basis to assert that Lehman Brothers did not
authorize MERS to transfer the mortgage. Indeed, this court has already rejected
numerous borrowers’ claims challenging MERS’s authority to assign, on behalf of
a lender, the mortgage. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Kamakau, 2012 WL
622169, at *4 & *5 n.5 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2012) (explaining that a borrower cannot
challenge an assignment that he was not a party to, and that plaintiff may not assert
claims based on the argument that MERS lacked authority to assign its right to
foreclose); Lindsey v. Meridias Cap., Inc., 2012 WL 488282, at *3 n.6 (D. Haw.
Feb. 14, 2012) (“‘[A]ny argument that MERS lacked the authority to assign its
right to foreclose and sell the property based on its status as ‘nominee’ cannot
stand in light of [Cervantes.]” (quoting Velasco v. Sec. Nat’l Mortg. Co., 2011 WL
4899935, at *11 (D. Haw. Oct. 14, 2011)); Teaupa v. U.S. Nat’l Bank N.A., --- F.
Supp. 2d ----, 2011 WL 6749813, at *16 (D. Haw. Dec. 22, 2011) (dismissing
without leave to amend claim asserting that MERS lacks standing to foreclose);
Abubo v. Bank of New York Mellon, 2011 WL 6011787, at *8 (D. Haw. Nov. 30,
2011) (dismissing claim challenging MERS’s authority to assign the mortgage on
the basis that “the involvement of MERS in the assignment cannot be a basis for
11
voiding the assignment, much less for a claim of fraud”).
In sum, the court finds that the FAC fails to assert a claim for
violation of HRS § 667-5 based on MERS’s alleged limited authority to assign the
mortgage. The court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
B.
Leave to Amend
The court recognizes that leave to amend a pleading should be granted
where such amendment would not be futile. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs
proffered additional theories attacking Defendant’s ability to foreclose on the
subject property. Based on the following, the court finds that Plaintiffs fail to offer
any claim that is plausible on its face such that granting leave to amend would be
futile. See Cervantes, 665 F.3d at 1043 (“[L]eave to amend would be futile
because the plaintiffs cannot state a plausible basis for relief.”).
For example, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant violated HRS § 667-5 by
failing to affirmatively demonstrate that it is a proper mortgagee entitling it to
foreclose on the subject property. Doc. No. 54, Pls.’ Opp’n at 12. Plaintiffs assert
that pursuant to HRS § 502-82, they may contest all title documents recorded in the
Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances affecting title to the subject property. Id. at 10-11.
Plaintiffs’ argument is supported by neither fact nor law -- § 502-82 allows a party
to rebut, as opposed to merely challenge, a recorded instrument. In relevant part, §
12
502-82 provides:
The record of an instrument duly recorded, or a transcript
thereof, duly certified, may also be read in evidence, with
like force and effect as the original instrument. Neither
the certificate of acknowledgment, nor the proof of any
instrument, is conclusive, but may be rebutted, and the
force and effect thereof may be contested by any party
affected thereby.
(emphasis added). Nothing in the plain language of § 502-82 or § 667-5 requires
Defendant to come forward with affirmative evidence supporting that its
assignment is valid, and Plaintiffs fail to proffer any allegations that rebut MERS’s
assignment of the mortgage to Defendant. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
based on Defendant’s failure to affirmatively demonstrate that it is a proper
mortgagee entitling it to foreclose on the subject property that is plausible on its
face.
Plaintiffs also argue that foreclosure was not authorized by § 667-5
because Defendant failed to “provide any evidence whatsoever in its Mortgagee’s
Affidavit of Foreclosure Under Power of Sale that it was assigned the Mortgage.”
Doc. No. 54, Pls.’ Opp’n at 13. Yet nothing in § 667-5 requires a Mortgagee’s
Affidavit of Foreclosure Under Power of Sale to include evidence that Defendant
was assigned the mortgage. And in any event, a review of the documents recorded
in the Bureau of Conveyances establishes that Defendant was assigned the
13
mortgage -- the assignment from MERS, on behalf of Lehman Brothers, to
Defendant was recorded on October 1, 2009. Thus, in light of the judiciallynoticed facts of this case, Plaintiffs cannot state a plausible claim based on
Defendant’s alleged failure to affirmatively establish that it was assigned the
mortgage loan.
Plaintiffs further assert that Lehman Brothers could not have validly
assigned the mortgage to Defendant on April 1, 2009 because it was in Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings at the time. Doc. No. 54, Pls.’ Opp’n at 14. Assuming
that Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan was part of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy estate,2
Lehman Brothers’ filing of Chapter 11 bankruptcy permitted it to continue to
operate its business in the ordinary course. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108;
Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Evergreen Moneysource Mortg. Co., 793 F. Supp.
2d 1189, 1194 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (noting that “[p]ursuant to sections 1107(a)
and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code, [Lehman Brothers] is authorized to operate its
business and manage its properties as a debtor in possession for the benefit of its
creditors, and it is on this basis that LBHI is prosecuting the present action”); see
2
The court recognizes that Defendant submitted evidence in its Reply suggesting that
Lehman Brothers endorsed the Note in blank prior to its bankruptcy. See Doc. No. 59-1, Kristen
Trompisz Decl. ¶ 6; Doc. No. 59-2, Def.’s Ex. 7; see also HRS § 490:3-205 (explaining that a
blank indorsement makes the note payable to the bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of
possession alone until specially indorsed). The court ultimately need not consider this evidence
to determine that Plaintiffs cannot assert a plausible claim.
14
also In re Alta+Cast, LLC, 2004 WL 484881, at *5 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 2, 2004)
(stating that a “chapter 11 debtor is automatically authorized to operate its
business”); In re Continental Air Lines, Inc., 61 B.R. 758, 762 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
(noting that “[d]ebtors-in-possession are automatically given leave to operate their
business after filing of a Chapter 11 petition . . . the interplay between sections
1106, 1107, and 1108 makes it clear that the debtor has all of the statutory rights
and duties of a trustee in bankruptcy, with a few limited exceptions”). Thus, the
fact that Lehman Brothers entered into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, on its own, does not
support a claim that Lehman Brothers could not have validly transferred the
mortgage to Defendant.
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant failed to demonstrate that it
was the proper holder of the note at the time of foreclosure. Specifically, Plaintiffs
argue that the note, as a negotiable instrument, requires an indorsement by the
holder and an actual transfer to Defendant. Like Plaintiffs’ previous arguments,
Plaintiff are effectively asking the court to add an affirmative requirement -- that
Defendant establish that it holds the note -- before Defendant can foreclose. The
court rejects Plaintiffs’ invitation as not supported in law.
As this court has explained previously, “courts have soundly rejected
borrowers’ claims based on a lender’s non-possession of and/or failure to produce
15
the [] note.” Lindsey, 2012 WL 488282, at *8; see also White v. IndyMac Bank,
FSB, 2012 WL 966638, at *8 (D. Haw. Mar. 20, 2012) (rejecting a “show me the
note” argument for a unfair and deceptive acts or practices claim); Del Piano v.
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys, Inc., 2012 WL 621975, at *10 (D. Haw. Feb. 24,
2012) (rejecting a “show me the note” claim as “baseless”); Krakauer v. IndyMac
Mort. Servs., 2010 WL 5174380, at *9 (D. Haw. Dec. 14, 2010) (citing Angel v.
BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2010 WL 4386775, at *9–10 (D. Haw. Oct. 26,
2010) (“[T]his Court and other district courts have rejected ‘show me the note’
arguments like Plaintiffs’.”); Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F.
Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009) (discussing why courts routinely reject “show
me the note” arguments to avoid foreclosure)). Plaintiffs offer no reason why the
court should diverge from this caselaw.
Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant has failed to establish that
the note was properly “negotiated” to it pursuant to HRS § 490:3-201, which
defines “negotiation” of a negotiable instrument under Hawaii’s Uniform
Commercial Code. Whether the note was actually negotiated pursuant to HRS
§ 490:3-201, however, is of no consequence -- HRS § 490:3-203(b) explains that
the “[t]ransfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in
the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument.” Thus,
16
Plaintiffs have offered no basis in law to support a requirement that Defendant
must affirmatively establish that it holds the note.
Nor have Plaintiffs offered any basis to question that Defendant does
not hold the note. Instead, Plaintiffs ask the court to draw the inference that
Defendant may not physically hold the note because Defendant asserts that it
obtained the note in 2007, yet the Assignment of Mortgage recorded in the Hawaii
Bureau of Conveyances states that the note and mortgage were assigned to
Defendant in 2009. See Doc. No. 62, at 2-3. This difference in dates, however,
fails to support the inference that Defendant does not hold the note. Rather, at
most, it suggests at most a confusion regarding when Defendant received the note.
Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim that is plausible on its face based on
Defendant’s failure to prove that it holds the note.
In sum, although Plaintiffs offer numerous new theories of relief, none
of them is cognizable in law. The court therefore finds that granting Plaintiffs
leave to amend the FAC would be futile.
///
///
///
17
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case
file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, June 18, 2012.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
Pascual et al. v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC., Civ. No. 10-00759 JMS-KSC, Order Granting
Defendant Aurora Loan Services, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Which the Court
Construes as a Motion to Dismiss)
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?