Fowlers v. U.S. Department of Justice et al
Filing
42
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION re 33 , 36 . Signed by JUDGE ALAN C KAY on 4/5/13. (gls, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
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)
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Plaintiff, )
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vs.
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
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JUSTICE; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE; FLORENCE T. NAKAKUNI; )
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LESLIE E. OSBORNE, AND RYLAN
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OSHIRO,
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Defendants. )
)
ALEXIS-KELVIN: FOWLERS,
Civ. No. 11-00178 ACK-RLP
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 18, 2011, pro se Plaintiff Alexis-Kelvin
Fowlers (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against
the U.S. Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service,
Florence T. Nakakuni, Leslie E. Osborne, and Rylon Oshiro
(collectively, “Defendants”).
(ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on
July 1, 2011 (ECF No. 13), and on October 6, 2011 Defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with
prejudice (“Motion to Dismiss”) (ECF No. 21).
On February 2, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a document
entitled, “Judicial Notice for A[n] Amendment In Jurisdiction And
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Request For Transfer For Want Of Jurisdiction” (“Request for
Transfer”).
(ECF No. 23.)
The document alleged, inter alia,
that this Court did not have jurisdiction because “[the name of
the Court] was spelled in all capital letters.”
at 3.
See ECF No. 23
Plaintiff argued that his case needed to be transferred
“from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT to the district court of
the United States, district of Hawaii.”
Id at 6.
Defendants
responded to this statement on February 3, 2012 in a reply
memorandum, urging the Court to disregard Plaintiff’s Opposition
as “totally frivolous and irrelevant.”
(ECF No. 24.)
On February 15, 2012, this Court issued an Order
Granting, As Modified, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (“Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss”), which
dismissed Plaintiff’s Count I1/ without prejudice and dismissed
the rest of the counts with prejudice.
(ECF No. 27.)
The Court
gave Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint no later
than March 27, 2012, and Plaintiff was notified on February 21,
2012 that failure to file the second amended complaint by that
date would result in the dismissal of the case.
(ECF No. 28.)
On March 21, 2012, rather than filing an amended
complaint, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Order Granting, As
Modified, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint
1/
Count I alleged that Defendants owed Plaintiff a refund
for tax returns in 2008 and 2009. See Amended Complaint at 3-4,
ECF No. 13.
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(“Objection”).
(ECF No. 29.)
Although not entirely clear,
Plaintiff’s chief complaint appears to be that this Court
allegedly “lacks authority to rule on Plaintiff’s complaint due
to lack of jurisdiction” because “The United States District
Court is not a true United States Court . . . .”
Id at 1-2.
On
March 23, 2012, Defendants filed a Response to the Objection,
asserting that it was frivolous and should be disregarded, and
requesting that this Court dismiss the entire case with prejudice
based upon Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely Second Amended
Complaint.
(ECF No. 30.)
On March 29, 2012, this Court issued an “Order
Dismissing the Case” that dismissed Plaintiff’s Count I without
prejudice and dismissed Plaintiff’s other claims with prejudice.
(ECF No. 31).
On February 22, 2013, Plaintiff faxed a “Notice of
Motion and Motion to Void the March 29, 2012 “Order Dismissing
the Case” and Void the March 29, 2012 Judg[]ment Entered
P[u]rsuant to the “Order Granting, As Modified, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint” Filed On February 15,
2012" (Motion for Reconsideration).
(ECF No. 33.)
Plaintiff
subsequently filed paper copies of his Motion for Reconsideration
with the Court on February 25, 2013.
(ECF No. 36.)
filed a Memorandum in Opposition on March 18, 2013.
39).
Defendants
(ECF No.
Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ Opposition on
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April 3, 2013.2/
(ECF No. 40).
Under Local Rule 7.2(e), the
Court did not hold a hearing regarding this matter because
motions for reconsideration are non-hearing motions.
STANDARD
I. Motion for Reconsideration
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) provides that
a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order if
“the judgment is void.”
The Supreme Court has held that a void
judgment is “one so affected by a fundamental infirmity that the
infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final.”
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 130 S.
Ct. 1367, 1379 (2010).
A judgment is not considered void “simply
because it is or may have been erroneous.”
Id.
Instead, FRCP
60(b)(4) only applies “in the rare instance where a judgment is
premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a
violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the
opportunity to be heard.”
Id.
2/
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not serve a copy of
their Opposition to Plaintiff. Plntf.’s Response at 1, ECF No.
40. The Court notes that Defendants attached a Certificate of
Service to their Opposition stating that they had served the
document via mail. ECF No. 39. In any event, Plaintiff
responded to the Opposition, which indicates that Plaintiff was
not prejudiced by any alleged lack of notice of the Opposition.
The Court also notes that, even if the Court declines to consider
the Opposition, the Court’s decision in this Order would not
change because Plaintiff’s arguments do not convince the Court
that the previous orders are void.
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For jurisdictional defects, federal courts have usually
granted relief under FRCP 60(b)(4) for “the exceptional case in
which the court that rendered judgment lacked even an “arguable
basis” for jurisdiction.”
Id (citing United States v. Boch
Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Total want
of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an error in the
exercise of jurisdiction, and . . . only rare instances of clear
usurpation of power will render a judgment void.”).
II. Special Considerations for Pro Se Litigants
Pro se pleadings and briefs are to be construed
liberally.
Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696
(9th Cir. 1990).
When a pro se plaintiff technically violates a
rule, the court should act with leniency toward the pro se
litigant.
Motoyama v. Haw. Dep’t of Transp., 864 F. Supp. 2d
965, 975 (D. Haw. 2012); Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th
Cir. 1986).
However, pro se litigants are “not excused from
knowing the most basic pleading requirements.”
Am. Ass’n of
Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th
Cir. 2000).
Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of
procedure that govern other litigants.
Motoyama, 864 F. Supp. 2d
at 975.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s sole contention in his Motion for
Reconsideration is that this Court lacked jurisdiction to issue
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the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the Order
Dismissing the Case.
See Plntf.’s Mtn. for Recon. at 3-8.
Plaintiff provides a list of cases defining the term “void
judgment,” but provides no argument as to how this Court lacks
jurisdiction.
See id.
Instead, Plaintiff relies upon his
February 2, 2012 Request for Transfer to provide the arguments
disputing this Court’s jurisdiction.
Id at 2.
In this Court’s
February 15, 2012 Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
the Court noted that Plaintiff’s arguments in the Request for
Transfer challenging jurisdiction were “irrelevant, frivolous,
and without merit.”
ECF No. 27 at 7.
Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration has not convinced the Court otherwise.
This Court does not lack jurisdiction merely because
the name of the Court is capitalized as opposed to written in
lower case letters.
See Plntf.’s Request for Transfer at 3.
Nor
does the Court lack jurisdiction merely because statutes or other
cases refer to this Court in different terms, e.g., the “district
court of the United States” as opposed to the “United States
District Court.”
See id at 1-3.
Such arguments by Plaintiff are
nonsensical and do not establish that this Court’s previous
orders are void.
Plaintiff’s arguments that this Court is a territorial
court as opposed to a court of the United States are likewise
without merit.
Congress established this Court as an Article III
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district court by passing 28 U.S.C. § 91.
See also, United
States v. Lee, 472 F.3d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly,
the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument challenging jurisdiction
on this basis.
Plaintiff’s next contention that the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) should have brought a claim in the “district
court of the United States, United States Tax Court” also fails
to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction.
ECF No. 23 at 4.
Plaintiff filed the claim in this action, not the IRS, so
Plaintiff’s argument regarding where the IRS should or should not
file has no effect on this Court’s jurisdiction to decide
Plaintiff’s allegations of constitutional rights violations.
See
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 13, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (establishing
federal question jurisdiction for district courts).
Plaintiff also asserts that the “void order was a clear
trespass and an attempt to deprive the Plaintiff of his rights.”
Plntf.’s Response at 3, ECF No. 40.
The Court rejects
Plaintiff’s argument because the Court has jurisdiction and
Plaintiff’s rights have not been violated.
This Court gave
Plaintiff more than two opportunities to amend his Complaint so
that Plaintiff could proceed with his action if he so desired.
See ECF Nos. 11, 27, 31.
This Court even issued a minute order
explaining to Plaintiff the due date for Plaintiff to file a
second amended complaint.
ECF No. 28.
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The Court’s actions
toward Plaintiff in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status do not
demonstrate any deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights.
In conclusion, the Court properly denied Plaintiff’s
previous Request to Transfer, and this Court’s previous orders
were not void because the Court properly concluded that
jurisdiction existed to enter the orders.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s
Notice of Motion and Motion to Void the March 29, 2012 “Order
Dismissing the Case” and Void the March 29, 2012 Judg[]ment
Entered P[u]rsuant to the “Order Granting, As Modified,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint” Filed On
February 15, 2012."
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
Honolulu, Hawai#i, April 5, 2013.
________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Sr. United States District Judge
Fowlers v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, et al., Civ. No. 11-00178 ACK-RLP: Order
Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
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