Pitts v. Department of Public Safety et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TRANSFERRING ACTION 4 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 4/14/11. ("This action is TRANSFERRED to the U.S. District Court for the Distr ict of Arizona. Pitts's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the file and send any pending motions or further documents received from Pitts to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona.") (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Joseph Pitts served by First Class Mail at the address of record on April 15, 2011.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JOSEPH PITTS #A0259019,
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)
Petitioner,
)
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vs.
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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, )
CCA MAINLAND BRANCH
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ADMINISTRATORS,
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Respondents.
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_____________________________ )
CIV. NO. 11-00250 SOM-RLP
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND TRANSFERRING ACTION
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TRANSFERRING ACTION
Petitioner Joseph Pitts, a Hawaii state prisoner
incarcerated at the Saguaro Correctional Center (“SCC”), located
in Eloy, Arizona, has filed a civil action and a motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
Pitts
names the Hawaii Department of Public Safety and its “CCA
Mainland Branch Administrators”1 as respondents to this suit.
Pitts has neither paid the filing fee for commencing this action
nor submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Pitts seeks injunctive relief to prevent Arizona prison
officials from retaliating against him for filing a suit
regarding a 2009 disciplinary charge and alleged assault against
Pitts by another inmate.
Pitts claims he was denied the right to
call witnesses or produce evidence when he was disciplined for
1
The Hawaii Department of Public Safety contracts for
correctional services with the Corrections Corporation of America
(“CCA”), which operates SCC.
threatening a prison official, and later attacked by another
inmate at unnamed prison officials’ prompting.
See Doc. 1-2,
Decl. in Support of Mot. at ¶ 4 (“This attack on me was
orchestrated by the [prison] staff.”).
Pitts states that he has
drafted a complaint regarding this incident, but alleges that, if
he files the complaint, he will be put in segregation and his
personal and legal materials will be taken from him.
The court finds that venue is improper in Hawaii and
that transfer of this action is in the interests of justice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Accordingly, this action is
TRANSFERRED to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona.
Insofar as Pitts seeks a temporary restraining order or
injunctive relief from this court, that request is DENIED without
prejudice to the reassertion of this request in the District of
Arizona.
I.
A.
LEGAL STANDARDS
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
When jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity,
such as in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, venue is
proper in the district in which: (1) any defendant resides, if
all of the defendants reside in the same state; (2) a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject
of the action is situated; or (3) any defendant may be found, if
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there is no district in which the action may otherwise be
brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also Ziegler v. Indian River
County, 64 F.3d 470 (9th Cir. 1995) (extensive discussion on
jurisdiction); Lee v. Corr. Corp. of America, 525 F. Supp. 2d
1238, 1241 (D. Haw. 2007).
B.
28 U.S.C. § 1406
“The district court of a district in which is filed a
case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall
dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such
case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.”
C.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Injunctive Relief
The purpose of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo if the
balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that
justice requires the court to intervene to secure the positions
until the merits of the action are ultimately determined.
of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
Univ.
To obtain a
temporary restraining order, a plaintiff must establish that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is
in the public interest.
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, --, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
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“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and
drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant,
by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Mazurek
v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
A party seeking a preliminary
injunction simply cannot prevail when that motion is unsupported
by evidence.
With respect to motions for preliminary injunctive
relief or a temporary restraining order, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that:
[i]n any civil action with respect to prison
conditions, to the extent otherwise authorized by law,
the court may enter a temporary restraining order or an
order for preliminary injunctive relief. Preliminary
injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no
further than necessary to correct the harm the court
finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least
intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
II.
DISCUSSION
As noted, a case may be brought in a district where any
defendant resides, if all of the defendants reside in the same
state, or in a district where a substantial part of the action
underlying the allegations occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
If
neither of these subsections can be satisfied, the action may be
brought in another district where any defendant can be found.
See Lee, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1241, n.1.
Venue here is determined by reference to § 1391(b)(2),
where a substantial part of the events alleged took place.
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Substantiality of events is measured by considering the nexus
between the events and the nature of the claims; for venue to be
proper under § 1391(b)(2), “significant events or omissions
material to the plaintiff’s claim must have occurred in the
district in question, even if other material events occurred
elsewhere.”
Ukai v. Fleurvil, Civ. No. 06-00237, 2006 WL
3246615, *3 (D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2006) (quoting Gulf Ins. Co. v.
Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing
propriety of venue under § 1391(a)(2)).
To determine
substantiality, the court looks to “the entire sequence of events
underlying the claim,”
Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244
F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2001), and focuses on the defendants’
(rather than the plaintiff’s) actions.
See Jenkins Brick Co. v.
Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (11th Cir. 2003); Woodke v. Dahm,
70 F.3d 983, 985 (8th Cir. 1995).
Pitts’s contemplated lawsuit and request for injunctive
relief arises from incidents that allegedly occurred or may occur
in Arizona.
The actions underlying the complaint that Pitts
wants to file and that allegedly deprived Pitts of his
constitutional rights occurred in Arizona.
Pitts seeks to enjoin reside in Arizona.
The individuals that
The only connection
this action has with Hawaii is Pitts’s status as a Hawaii inmate
who has been incarcerated in Arizona since at least April 13,
2009.
See Doc. 1-2, Decl. in Support of Mot. at ¶ 2.
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As such,
the court finds that a substantial part of the actions or
omissions alleged here occurred in Arizona, and venue is improper
in this district.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
The interests of justice favor transfer of this case to
the district where the significant events or omissions material
to Pitts’s claims occurred, witnesses may be found, there is
easier access to the necessary evidence, there is a local
interest, and the court is better able to determine whether
injunctive relief is required to preserve the status quo and
protect both parties rights.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also
King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992); Decker Coal
Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir.
1986).
Insofar as Pitts moves this court for a temporary
restraining order based on his allegations that, if he files a
complaint in Arizona, prison officials there will retaliate
against him by placing him in segregation and confiscating his
legal materials, his request is DENIED without prejudice.
Pitts
does not explain why he is able to file this action and this
request for relief in Hawaii without fear of reprisal, but cannot
do the same in Arizona.
In either venue, prison officials in
Arizona and Hawaii will become aware of his action once either
court takes action on Pitts’s request, and, if required, an
injunction can be issued in Arizona as easily as in Hawaii.
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Moreover, the District of Hawaii’s Local Rules impose
requirements for motions for temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction that Pitts has not met.
Local Rule
10.2(g) contemplates that a complaint will be filed
contemporaneously with any application for injunctive relief, and
requires that these documents be filed as separate documents.
See LR10.2(g).
While a party may file a request for injunctive
relief after a complaint is filed commencing an action, it should
not be filed before the complaint.
See Fed. R. Civ. P.5 (“A
civil action is commenced by filing complaint with the court.”).
Without a complaint that details Pitts’s allegations against
particular individuals, this court cannot determine Pitts’s
likelihood of success on the merits, judge the severity of
impending harm in the absence of preliminary relief, or balance
the equities between the parties.
Temporary restraining orders
are issued to preserve the status quo pending a more complete
hearing.
After this action is transferred to the District of
Arizona and Plaintiff files an actual complaint, that district
will be able to conduct a hearing to determine the issues and
decide the equities.
III.
CONCLUSION
This action is TRANSFERRED to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Arizona.
Pitts’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED without
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prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the file and
send any pending motions or further documents received from Pitts
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, April 14, 2011.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
Pitts v. Dep’t. of Public Safety, et al., Civ. No. 11-00250 SOM;
Transfer Order; psas/trsfr or venue/dmp/2011/ Pitts 11-250 SOM (tro)
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