Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Horizons, Inc. et al
Filing
683
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT MAUI PINEAPPLE COMPANY, LTD.'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES RELATING TO EEOC'S CONDITIONS PRECEDENT, ETC. (AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE NO.;S 8, 22, 29, 30) AND GRANTING IN PAR T AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT MAUI PINEAPPLE COMPANY, LTD.S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31 & 32 - 586 ; 589 . Signed by JUDGE LESLI E E. KOBAYASHI on 02/28/2014. -- the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant Maui Pineapple Company, Ltd.'s Affirmative Defenses Relating to EEOC's Conditions Precedent, etc. (Affirmative Defen se No.'s 8, 22, 29, 30), filed November 1, 2013, is HEREBY GRANTED, and the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant Maui Pineapple Company, Ltd.'s Affirmative Defenses: 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31 & 32, also filed November 1, 2013, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. (eps )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
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)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
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GLOBAL HORIZONS, INC., DBA
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GLOBAL HORIZONS MANPOWER,
)
INC.; CAPTAIN COOK COFFEE
COMPANY LTD.; DEL MONTE FRESH )
PRODUCE (HAWAII), INC.; KAUAI )
COFFEE COMPANY, INC.; KELENA )
)
FARMS, INC.,; MAC FARMS OF
)
HAWAII, LLC NKA MF NUT CO.,
LLC; MAUI PINEAPPLE COMPANY, )
)
LTD. AKA MAUI PINEAPPLE
)
FARMS; ALEXANDER & BALDWIN,
)
INC.; MASSIMO ZANETTI
BEVERAGE USA, INC.; AND DOES )
)
1-15, INCLUSIVE,
)
)
Defendants.
____________________________ )
UNITED STATES EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
CIVIL 11-00257 LEK
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON DEFENDANT MAUI PINEAPPLE COMPANY, LTD.’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
RELATING TO EEOC’S CONDITIONS PRECEDENT, ETC. (AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE NO.’S 8, 22, 29, 30) AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT
MAUI PINEAPPLE COMPANY, LTD.’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: 1, 4, 6, 7,
9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31 & 32
Before the Court is Plaintiff Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (“the EEOC” or “Plaintiff”): Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant Maui Pineapple Company,
Ltd.’s Affirmative Defenses Relating to EEOC’s Conditions
Precedent, etc. (Affirmative Defense No.’s 8, 22, 29, 30)
(“Conditions Precedent Motion”), filed on November 1, 2013; and
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant Maui Pineapple
Company, Ltd.’s Affirmative Defenses: 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14,
17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31 & 32 (“Post-Suit
Defenses Motion”), also filed on November 1, 2013.
586-87, 589-90.]
[Dkt. nos.
Defendant Maui Pineapple Company, Ltd. (“Maui
Pineapple”) filed a memorandum in opposition to each motion on
November 18, 2013,1 [dkt. nos. 646, 647,] and the EEOC filed a
consolidated reply as to both motions on November 22, 2013 [dkt.
no. 650].
The Court finds these matters suitable for disposition
without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of
Practice of the United States District Court for the District of
Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).
After careful consideration of the
motions, supporting and opposing memoranda, and the relevant
legal authority, the EEOC’s Conditions Precedent Motion is HEREBY
GRANTED, and the EEOC’s Post-Suit Defenses Motion is HEREBY
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, for the reasons set forth
below.
BACKGROUND
On April 19, 2011, the EEOC filed this action pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and
1
Defendant Kelena Farms, Inc. filed a statement of no
position as to each motion on November 18, 2013. [Dkt. nos. 644,
645.]
2
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The EEOC filed its
First Amended Complaint on July 15, 2011, its Second Amended
Complaint on December 16, 2011, and its Third Amended Complaint
on June 4, 2012.
[Dkt. nos. 12, 128, 263.]
The Third Amended
Complaint alleges that the defendants discriminated against a
class of Thai agricultural workers (collectively “the Class
members”) on the basis of their national origin, and/or race
and/or in retaliation for their participation in protected
activities.
Specifically, the Third Amended Complaint alleges
the following claims: pattern or practice of discriminatory
treatment based on national origin, retaliation, and/or
constructive discharge, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),
2000e-3(a) (“Count I”); hostile work environment/harassment, in
violation of § 2000e-2(a) (“Count II”); discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment, in violation of § 2000e-2(a) (“Count
III”); and retaliation, in violation of § 2000e-3 (“Count IV”).
[Third Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 622-96.]
Relevant to the instant
motions, the Third Amended Complaint prays for: permanent
injunctive relief against Maui Pineapple prohibiting it from
engaging in discrimination based on the Class members’ national
origin and/or race, prohibiting it from engaging in retaliation,
and requiring it to provide equal employment opportunities for
persons of Thai national origin and/or Asian race and to
eradicate the effects of past and present illegal employment
3
practices; an order requiring Maui Pineapple to make whole Itthi
Oa-Sot, and similarly situated individuals, through backpay with
prejudgment interest, reinstatement, and any other necessary
affirmative relief; an order requiring Maui Pineapple to make
whole Itthi Oa-Sot, and similarly situated individuals, through
damages for pecuniary losses and non-pecuniary losses suffered as
a result of Maui Pineapple’s illegal employment practices; an
award of punitive damages to Itthi Oa-Sot, and similarly situated
individuals; any other appropriate relief; and an award to the
EEOC of the costs of this action.
[Id., Prayer for Relief at
¶¶ Q-R, AA, JJ, TT, BBB, KKK-MMM.]
Maui Pineapple filed its answer to the Third Amended
Complaint (“Answer”), with a Cross-claim against Global Horizons,
on November 9, 2012.
two defenses.
[Dkt. no. 407.]
The Answer alleges thirty-
The Conditions Precedent Motion relates to
Affirmative Defense No. 3,2 No. 8, No. 22, No. 29, and No. 30.
The Post-Suit Defenses Motion relates to Affirmative Defenses
No. 1, No. 4, No. 6, Nos. 9 through 11, No. 14, No. 17, No. 18,
No. 20, No. 21, Nos. 23 through 28, No. 31, and No. 32.
The EEOC
seeks a summary judgment ruling that all of these defenses fail
as a matter of law.
2
Although Affirmative Defense No. 3 is not included in the
EEOC’s title of the Conditions Precedent Motion, the EEOC
addressed it in the text of the motion. See, e.g., Mem. in Supp.
of Conditions Precedent Motion at 3.
4
DISCUSSION
I.
Admission of Material Facts
At the outset, this Court notes that Maui Pineapple
failed to respond to the EEOC’s “Concise Statement of Concise
Undisputed Facts in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Defendant Maui Pineapple Company, Ltd.’s Affirmative
Defenses” (“EEOC CSOF”), filed November 1, 2013.3
588.]
[Dkt. no.
Local Rule 56.1(g) states: “For purposes of a motion for
summary judgment, material facts set forth in the moving party’s
concise statement will be deemed admitted unless controverted by
a separate concise statement of the opposing party.”
Thus, this
Court HEREBY DEEMS ADMITTED all of the statements of fact set
forth in the EEOC CSOF.
II.
Conditions Precedent Motion
A.
Conditions Precedent to Filing Suit
In the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant
Global Horizons, Inc. d/b/a Global Horizons Manpower Inc.’s
Affirmative Defenses and Denying Global Horizons’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed February 28, 2014 (“Global Horizons
Summary Judgment Order”), [dkt. no. 682,] this Court set forth
3
Both the Conditions Precedent Motion and the Post-Suit
Defenses Motion rely upon the EEOC CSOF. See, e.g., Mem. in
Supp. of Conditions Precedent Motion at 4 & n.2; Mem. in Supp. of
Post-Suit Defenses Motion at 1 & n.1.
5
the applicable legal authority regarding the EEOC’s conditions
precedent to filing suit.
[Id. at 20-23.]
The discussion of the
applicable legal authority is incorporated herein by reference.
The first two conditions precedent - the EEOC’s receipt
of a charge of discrimination and notice to the employer of the
charge - are not in dispute.
The EEOC received charges of
discrimination from Itthi Oa-Sot, and forty other claimants
(collectively “the Claimants”), against Maui Pineapple, and Maui
Pineapple received notice of the charges.
[EEOC CSOF at ¶¶ 1-4.]
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 3 alleges that the EEOC
failed to conciliate in good faith, and Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defense No. 22 alleges that the EEOC did not conduct
an adequate investigation.
By failing to respond to the EEOC CSOF, Maui Pineapple
has admitted that: “Shortly after receiving the Claimants’
Charges of Discrimination, the EEOC investigated by, among other
things, requesting evidence from [Maui Pineapple], interviewing
witnesses, including [Maui Pineapple] witnesses through visits to
the [Maui Pineapple] worksite, and obtaining position
statements.”
[Id. at ¶ 5.]
For the reasons stated in the Global
Horizons Summary Judgment Order, only some investigation of an
EEOC charge is required for purposes of the conditions precedent
analysis.
Based on Maui Pineapple’s admission, there is no
genuine dispute of material fact as to the issue of whether the
6
EEOC investigated the charges of discrimination against Maui
Pineapple.
Based on the undisputed facts, this Court concludes
that, as a matter of law, the EEOC satisfied the condition
precedent of investigating the charges against Maui Pineapple.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
This Court therefore GRANTS the
Conditions Precedent Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative
Defense No. 22.
As to the requirement that the EEOC conciliate in good
faith, by failing to respond to the EEOC CSOF, Maui Pineapple has
admitted that: “[o]n or about August 31, 2010, EEOC sent [Maui
Pineapple] a conciliation proposal.
The parties thereafter,
continued conciliation efforts through late October 2010[;]” and
“[o]n or about December 17, 2010, the EEOC issued letters to
[Maui Pineapple] and Claimants stating that conciliation efforts
had failed.”
[EEOC CSOF at ¶¶ 10-11.]
The EEOC submitted
correspondence that Maui Pineapple and the EEOC exchanged during
the conciliation process.
[Decl. of Sue Noh in Supp. of
Conditions Precedent Motion & Post-Suit Defenses Motion (“Noh
Decl.”), filed 11/1/13 (dkt. no. 591), Exh. 11.]
Maui Pineapple
has not presented any evidence suggesting that the EEOC acted in
bad faith during the conciliation process.
Even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Maui Pineapple,
see Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th
Cir. 2006), this Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of
7
material fact as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 3.
This Court also concludes that, under either the deferential
approach or the three-part test discussed in the Global Horizons
Summary Judgment Order, the EEOC complied with the requirement to
conciliate in good faith.
This Court GRANTS the Conditions
Precedent Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense
No. 3.
B.
Administrative Remedies
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 8 is that the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies bars the EEOC’s
claims.
This defense fails as a matter of law because the
“exhaustion of administrative remedies is an issue when the suit
is brought by a private party but not when the Commission is the
plaintiff.”
EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th
Cir. 2005).
Further, to the extent that Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defense No. 8 asserts that the EEOC cannot assert
claims on behalf of a Claimant unless he or she exhausted his or
her administrative remedies, that argument also fails.
With respect to exhaustion, “[i]n a Title VII
representative suit, unnamed class members need
not individually bring a charge with the EEOC as a
prerequisite to joining the litigation.” Bean v.
Crocker Nat’l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir.
1979). This is so because “the EEOC is not merely
a proxy for the victims of discrimination”;
instead, “[w]hen the EEOC acts, albeit at the
behest of and for the benefit of specific
individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public
8
interest in preventing employment discrimination.”
Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw., Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S.
318, 326, 100 S. Ct. 1698, 64 L. Ed. 2d 319
(1980). The EEOC may thus seek relief for . . .
employees who may have been affected by
Defendant’s discriminatory policy even though they
have not complied with the requirements necessary
to bring private actions on their own. . . .
EEOC v. Catholic Healthcare W., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107 (C.D.
Cal. 2008).
This Court therefore finds that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative
Defense No. 8, and this Court concludes that the EEOC is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
This Court GRANTS the Conditions
Precedent Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense
No. 8.
C.
Hawaii’s Workers’ Compensation Statute
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 29 alleges
that, assuming arguendo that any Claimant was a Maui Pineapple
employee, the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries is
within the Hawai`i workers’ compensation statutory scheme.
Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this
issue, several district courts within the Ninth Circuit have
rejected the argument that the workers’ compensation exclusivity
rule preempts claims under federal civil rights statutes.
See,
e.g., EEOC v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115
(D. Or. 2013) (citing Von Heeder v. Safeway, Inc., No. 00–25–HA,
2001 WL 1703092, at *9 (D. Or. Nov. 11, 2001) (citing Rose v.
9
Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 211, 215 n.1 (D. Mass.
1997); Karcher v. Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1210, 117 S. Ct. 1692, 1693, 137 L. Ed. 2d
820 (1996); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1190 (2nd
Cir. 1987))).
This Court agrees.
This Court therefore finds
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Maui
Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 29, and this Court concludes
that the EEOC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This
Court GRANTS the Conditions Precedent Motion as to Maui
Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 29.
D.
The Labor Management Relations Act
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 30 alleges
that, assuming arguendo that any Claimant was a Maui Pineapple
employee, Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”) preempts the EEOC’s claims as to that Claimant.
The Ninth Circuit has stated that:
LMRA § 301 preempts state-law claims that are
“substantially dependent upon analysis of the
terms of an agreement made between the parties in
a labor contract[.]” Allis–Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 206 (1985). More specifically, LMRA § 301
will operate to preempt a state-law claim whose
resolution depends upon the meaning of a
[collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)]. Lingle
v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
405–406, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988)
(“If the resolution of a state-law claim depends
upon the meaning of a [CBA], the application of
state law . . . is pre-empted and federal
labor-law principles—necessarily uniform
throughout the Nation—must be employed to resolve
10
the dispute.”) LMRA § 301 extends not only to
“claims founded directly on rights created by
collective bargaining agreements, [but] also [to]
claims which are substantially dependent on
analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.”
Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213, 1215–16 (9th Cir.
1988) (internal citations omitted). . . .
Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 2008) (some
alterations in Adkins).
In the Conditions Precedent Motion, the
EEOC argues that the LMRA does not apply under the facts of this
case and, even assuming arguendo that it does apply, Title VII
rights are independent of employees’ rights under their CBA, and
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., does
not preempt federal anti-discrimination laws.
Maui Pineapple has not identified any evidence that
there was a CBA between Maui Pineapple and the Claimants who are
alleged to have been employees of Maui Pineapple.
Thus, even
viewing the record in the light most favorable to Maui Pineapple,
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Affirmative
Defense No. 30, and the defense fails as a matter of law because
the LMRA is inapplicable under the facts of this case.
Insofar
as the LMRA does not apply in this case, this Court need not
reach the EEOC’s preemption arguments.
This Court GRANTS the
Conditions Precedent Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative
Defense No. 30.
Insofar as the EEOC is entitled to summary judgment as
to all of the affirmative defenses at issue in the Conditions
11
Precedent Motion, this Court GRANTS the Conditions Precedent
Motion.
III. Post-Suit Defenses Motion
A.
Defenses Regarding Sufficiency of the Pleadings
Affirmative Defense No. 1 asserts that the Third
Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and Affirmative Defense No. 9 asserts the similar
defense of failure to state a claim that supports damages,
equitable relief, or any other relief.
First, as noted in the
Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order, a defense asserting that
the complaint fails to state a claim is not an affirmative
defense.
[Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order at 18-19.]
Even if this Court considers defenses No. 1 and No. 9
as affirmative defenses, this Court notes that, on August 1,
2012, Maui Pineapple filed a motion to dismiss the Third Amended
Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but it only
[Dkt. no. 288.]
The district court4 denied
Maui Pineapple’s motion to dismiss.5
Thus, Affirmative Defenses
No. 1 and No. 9 fail as to Count IV.
As to the other claims
addressed Count IV.
4
This case was originally assigned to United States
District Judge David Alan Ezra, but was reassigned to this Court
on November 15, 2012. [Dkt. no. 418.] Judge Ezra ruled on Maui
Pineapple’s motion to dismiss.
5
See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss and the Substantive Joinders Thereto, filed
10/9/12 (dkt. no. 389).
12
against Maui Pineapple, this Court concludes that the Third
Amended Complaint states claims that are plausible on their face.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 555 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007).
This Court therefore
GRANTS the Post-Suit Defenses Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defense No. 1, and Affirmative Defense No. 9.
B.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Affirmative Defense No. 4 alleges the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
The EEOC argues that Maui Pineapple has
conceded the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
[Mem. in
Supp. of Post-Suit Defenses Motion at 7 (citing Answer at ¶ 2).]
As noted in the Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order,
parties cannot waive the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and
this Court has an obligation to consider subject matter
jurisdiction requirements sua sponte.
Judgment Order at 24.]
[Global Horizons Summary
This Court concludes that, as a general
matter, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
EEOC’s claims against Maui Pineapple, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1345.
This Court therefore GRANTS the Post-Suit
Defenses Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 4.
This Court, however, emphasizes that the ruling regarding subject
matter jurisdiction over this action in general does not
constitute a ruling on the specific issues raised in the
remainder of Maui Pineapple’s affirmative defenses.
13
C.
Mitigation of Damages
Affirmative Defense No. 6 asserts that the failure to
mitigate damages bars the EEOC’s claims.
“A plaintiff seeking back pay under Title VII has ‘a
duty to mitigate damages by seeking alternative employment with
“reasonable diligence.”’”
Machado v. Real Estate Res., LLC,
Civil No. 12–00544 RLP, 2013 WL 3944511, at *10 (D. Hawai`i
July 30, 2013) (quoting Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., Inc., 224
F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–5(g)(1))).
frontpay.
The requirement also applies to claims for
See, e.g., Cervantes v. Emerald Cascade Rest. Sys.,
Inc., No. 3:11–cv–00242–RCJ–VPC, 2012 WL 1681654, at *7 (D. Nev.
May 11, 2012) (citing Caudle, 224 F.3d at 1020).
The EEOC has abandoned the request in the Third Amended
Complaint for backpay from Maui Pineapple, and has confirmed that
it is not seeking frontpay.
[EEOC CSOF at ¶ 25; Order Granting
in Part & Denying in Part Pltf.’s Motion for Protective Order Re:
Immigration Status, & Information Related to Immigration Status,
filed 12/21/12 (dkt. no. 479), at 13.]
The requirement to
mitigate damages does not apply to claims seeking compensatory
damages.
See, e.g., Fred Meyer Stores, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the
mitigation of damages issue, and the EEOC is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
This Court therefore GRANTS the Post-Suit
14
Defenses Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 6.
D.
Defenses Relating to Timeliness
Affirmative Defense No. 7 asserts that the EEOC’s
claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and one of the
defenses asserted in Affirmative Defense No. 17 is laches.
Affirmative Defense No. 21 asserts that the charges were
untimely.
Global Horizons raised the same timeliness defenses,
and this Court set forth the applicable legal authority in the
Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order.
[Global Horizons Summary
Judgment Order at 12-16 (laches); id. at 25-27 (other defenses
related to timeliness).]
by reference.
This Court incorporates that discussion
The Post-Suit Defenses Motion does not address the
300-day filing-limitation.
In fact, the EEOC’s assertions in the
Post-Suit Defenses Motion indicate that the Charges may refer to
allegations beyond the 300-day period before the filing of the
charges.
See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of Post-Suit Defenses Motion
at 9 (“on April 18, 2006, Itthi Oa-Sot timely filed a charge of
discrimination against [Maui Pineapple] pertaining to his
employment at [Maui Pineapple] from 2004 through 2005.” (citation
omitted)).
This Court therefore finds that the EEOC has not
carried its burden on summary judgment as to Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defenses No. 7 and No. 21.
The EEOC’s Post-Suit
Defenses Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Maui
15
Pineapple’s Affirmative Defenses No. 7 and No. 21.
As to Maui Pineapple’s laches defense, this Court first
notes that Maui Pineapple has not identified any prejudice that
is has suffered as a result of the EEOC’s delay in bringing this
civil action.
Further, insofar as Maui Pineapple did not file a
substantive response to the Post-Suit Defenses Motion,6 Maui
Pineapple has not identified specific arguments why the EEOC’s
delay in bringing this action was unreasonable or unexcusable.
Thus, Maui Pineapple presumably relies on the fact that five
years elapsed between the start of the EEOC’s investigation and
the filing of this action.
As this Court ruled in the Global
Horizons Summary Judgment Order, the five year lapse of time, by
itself, is not enough to establish that the EEOC’s delay in
bringing the civil action was unreasonable or unexcusable.
[Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order at 16-17.]
This Court
finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Maui
Pineapple’s laches defense.
For the reasons set forth in the
Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order, this Court concludes that
the EEOC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Maui
Pineapple’s laches defense.
This Court therefore GRANTS the
6
Maui Pineapple’s memorandum in opposition to the Post-Suit
Defenses Motion states that “it has raised meritorious
affirmative defenses. However, given the circumstances including
its financial situation and the fact that it is no longer in
operation, Maui Pineapple is unable to fund a substantive
opposition to the EEOC’s motion . . . .” [Dkt. no. 647.]
16
Post-Suit Defenses Motion as to the portion of Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defense No. 17 asserting laches.
E.
Elements of the EEOC’s Prima Facie Case
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 10 asserts
that, if discrimination occurred, Maui Pineapple did not know,
nor should it have known, about the discrimination.
Maui
Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 11 asserts that the adverse
employment actions would have been taken regardless of the
Claimants’ protected status.
To the extent that these defenses may be available
under the facts of this case, they are not affirmative defenses
because they merely attack an element of the EEOC’s prima facie
case for the counts to which these defenses may apply.
For the
reasons stated in the Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order,
[Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order at 19,] the EEOC is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defenses No. 10 and No. 11.
This Court therefore
GRANTS the Post-Suit Defenses Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defenses No. 10 and No. 11.
F.
After-Acquired Evidence
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 14 asserts a
defense based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
The Ninth
Circuit has stated that:
The “after-acquired evidence” doctrine precludes
or limits an employee from receiving remedies for
17
wrongful discharge if the employer later
“discovers” evidence of wrongdoing that would have
led to the employee’s termination had the employer
known of the misconduct. McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360–63, 115
S. Ct. 879, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1995). As we have
explained, “[a]n employer can avoid backpay and
other remedies by coming forward with
after-acquired evidence of an employee’s
misconduct, but only if it can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have
fired the employee for that misconduct.” O’Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761
(9th Cir. 1996).
Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004).
The instant case does not include wrongful discharge claims, and
Maui Pineapple has not identified any evidence which would
suggest that the after-acquired evidence doctrine may apply in
this case.
Even viewing the record in the light most favorable
to Maui Pineapple, this Court finds that there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to the after-acquired evidence defense,
and this Court concludes that the EEOC is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
This Court therefore GRANTS the Post-Suit
Defenses Motion as to Affirmative Defense No. 14.
G.
Equitable Defenses
In addition to Maui Pineapple’s laches defense,
discussed supra, Affirmative Defense No. 17 asserts equitable
defenses, including waiver, estoppel, and/or unclean hands.
These are fact-specific defenses, and Maui Pineapple has not
identified any evidence which indicates that these defenses may
be applicable under the facts of this case.
18
Thus, even viewing
the record in the light most favorable to Maui Pineapple, this
Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
the unsubstantiated assertion of waiver, estoppel, and unclean
hands.
This Court concludes that the EEOC is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law as to these defenses.
To the extent that Affirmative Defense No. 17 attempts
to assert unspecified affirmative defenses, this Court notes that
Maui Pineapple never amended its Answer to identify additional
defenses.
Thus, for the reasons stated in the Global Horizons
Summary Judgment Order, Maui Pineapple’s attempt to assert
additional defenses in Affirmative Defense No. 17 does not
provide the EEOC with sufficient notice.
Summary Judgment Order at 34-35.]
[Global Horizons
Similarly, Affirmative
Defenses No. 31 and No. 32 also attempt to preserve unspecified
defenses.
Affirmative Defense No. 31 asserts “any and all
statutory, regulatory, and/or common law privileges and
immunities available[,]” [Answer at 32,] and Affirmative Defense
No. 32 asserts additional affirmative defenses revealed in
discovery.
For the reasons stated in the Global Horizons Summary
Judgment Order, these affirmative defenses do not provide the
EEOC with sufficient notice.
The Post-Suit Defenses Motion is GRANTED as to the
remainder of Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 17, and as
to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defenses No. 31 and No. 32.
19
H.
Scope of the Charges and the EEOC Investigation
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 18 asserts
that factual allegations and legal theories outside of the scope
of the Claimants’ charges are barred.
For the same reasons as
set forth in the Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order, this
defense fails as a matter of law because this Court must construe
the charges liberally, and this Court has jurisdiction over all
discrimination allegations that were in the charges or can be
reasonably expected to grow out of the EEOC’s investigation of
the charges.
[Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order at 29-30.]
The Post-Suit Defenses Motion is GRANTED as to Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defense No. 18.
I.
Standing
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 20 asserts
that the EEOC does not have standing to pursue claims on behalf
of persons who have not consented to the EEOC’s representation.
For the same reasons as set forth in the Global Horizons Summary
Judgment Order, this defense fails as a matter of law based on
the reasonable extension of the rule that the EEOC may pursue
claims on behalf of class members with whom it does not have an
attorney-client relationship, and the rule that the EEOC does not
have to be certified as the class representative pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23.
29.]
[Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order at 28-
The Post-Suit Defenses Motion is GRANTED as to Maui
20
Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 20.
Maui Pineapple also asserts in Affirmative Defense
No. 28 that the EEOC lacks standing to pursue claims outside of
Title VII.
This defense is inapplicable to the instant case
because the EEOC is only pursuing Title VII claims.
This Court
therefore GRANTS the Post-Suit Defenses Motion as to Maui
Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 28.
J.
Improper Joinder
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 23 alleges
improper joinder.
First, this Court notes that Fed. R. Civ. P.
21 states: “Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing
an action.
On motion or on its own, the court may at any time,
on just terms, add or drop a party.
claim against a party.”
The court may also sever any
In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)
provides that defendants may be joined in one action if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action.
In addition, in the context of the permissive joinder of
plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit has imposed the additional
requirement that “a district court must examine whether
permissive joinder would comport with the principles of
fundamental fairness or would result in prejudice to either
21
side.”
Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir.
2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
District courts
within the Ninth Circuit have also applied this rule when
considering the joinder of defendants.
See, e.g., Hard Drive
Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal.
2011); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Liberty Surplus Ins.
Corp., No. CV08-4066 CAS (OPx), 2008 WL 5210659, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 10, 2008).
Based on the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint
and the current record in this case, even viewed in the light
most favorable to Maui Pineapple, this Court finds that the
joinder of Maui Pineapple and Global Horizons meets the
requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), and the joinder is fundamentally
fair.
Maui Pineapple has not identified any evidence suggesting
that it has been prejudiced by the joinder.
Thus, there are no
genuine issues of material fact as to the joinder issue, and this
Court concludes that the EEOC is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
This Court therefore GRANTS the Post-Suit Defenses
Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense. No. 23.
K.
Causation
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defenses No. 24, No. 25,
and No. 26 assert defenses related to causation.
Affirmative
Defense No. 24 alleges that Maui Pineapple was not the actual or
proximate cause of the Claimants’ injuries; Affirmative Defense
22
No. 25 asserts that there were intervening and/or superseding
causes of the Claimants’ injuries; and Affirmative Defense No. 26
asserts that the Claimants had preexisting injuries caused by
other sources.
The EEOC first argues that Maui Pineapple “has no legal
or evidentiary support to suggest that it can reduce or modify
its liability for damages with any of these three purported
defenses given the clear statutory language of Title VII.”
in Supp. of Post-Suit at 23 (citation omitted).]
[Mem.
As noted in the
Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order, proximate cause is
relevant in employment discrimination cases premised upon the
subordinate bias theory or the “cat’s paw” theory of liability.
[Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order at 32 & n.12.]
Maui
Pineapple, however, has not identified any evidence suggesting
that either of these theories, or the other causation principles
pled in the Answer, may apply under the facts of this case.
Further, even if those theories of causation are at issue in this
case, causation will be an element of the EEOC’s prima facie case
for the claims based upon those theories, and defenses negating
an element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case are not affirmative
defenses.
[Global Horizons Summary Judgment Order at 19.]
This
Court therefore concludes that Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative
Defenses No. 24, No. 25, and No. 26 fail as a matter of law.
Post-Suit Defenses Motion is GRANTED as to Maui Pineapple’s
23
The
Affirmative Defenses No. 24, No. 25, and No. 26.
L.
Claimants’ Immigration Status
Finally, the EEOC challenges Maui Pineapple’s
Affirmative Defense No. 27, which asserts that “Claimants’
immigration/visa status or limitations on the time periods during
which they were legally authorized to work in the United States”
bars recovery.
[Answer at 31.]
The EEOC is correct that, pursuant to Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002), “an
undocumented alien who has never been legally authorized to work
in the United States” cannot be awarded backpay.
The Ninth
Circuit has recognized that Hoffman precludes awards of frontpay.
See, e.g., Rivera, 384 F.3d at 826.
As previously noted,
however, the EEOC is no longer seeking backpay or frontpay in
this case.
The EEOC argues that Hoffman does not preclude awards
of compensatory damages, and this Court has not found any binding
case law interpreting Hoffman to preclude compensatory damages.
This Court therefore concludes that Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative
Defense No. 27 fails as a matter of law.7
7
This Court GRANTS the
The EEOC also argues that Maui Pineapple “cannot contest
that the Claimants were legally authorized to work in the U.S.
under the H2-A visa program during their employment at” Maui
Pineapple. [Mem. in Supp. of Post-Suit Defenses Motion at 25.]
The EEOC CSOF, however, does not address this fact, but the
EEOC’s failure to identify evidence establishing this fact does
not preclude this Court from ruling on the Post-Suit Defenses
Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defense No. 27.
24
Post-Suit Defenses Motion as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative
Defense No. 27.
M.
Summary of Defenses
In sum, this Court DENIES the Post-Suit Defenses Motion
as to Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defenses No. 7 and No. 21.
The denial is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This Court GRANTS the Post-Suit Defenses Motion as to
Maui Pineapple’s Affirmative Defenses No. 1, No. 4, No. 6, No. 9,
No. 10, No. 11, No. 14, No. 17, No. 18, No. 20, No. 23, No. 24,
No. 25, No. 26, No. 27, No. 28, No. 31, and No. 32.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the EEOC’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant Maui Pineapple Company,
Ltd.’s Affirmative Defenses Relating to EEOC’s Conditions
Precedent, etc. (Affirmative Defense No.’s 8, 22, 29, 30), filed
November 1, 2013, is HEREBY GRANTED, and the EEOC’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant Maui Pineapple Company,
Ltd.’s Affirmative Defenses: 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18,
20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31 & 32, also filed November 1,
2013, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, February 28, 2014.
/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
EEOC VS. GLOBAL HORIZONS, INC., ET AL; CIVIL 13-00257 LEK-RLP;
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEFENDANT MAUI PINEAPPLE COMPANY, LTD.’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
RELATING TO EEOC’S CONDITIONS PRECEDENT, ETC. (AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE NO.’S 8, 22, 29, 30) AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT
MAUI PINEAPPLE COMPANY, LTD.’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: 1, 4, 6, 7,
9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31 & 32
26