Andrews et al v. Hawai'i, County of et al

Filing 45

ORDER (1) Granting Defendants County of Hawaii, Gregory Esteban, Corey Hasegawa And Casey Cabral's Motion to Dismiss, Or In The Alternative, To Stay Pending Judgment In Case No. 09-1-00296 In The Circuit Court Of The Third Circuit, State Of Hawa ii; And (2) Administratively Closing Case Pending A Decision In Case Number CR. NO. 09-1-00296 In The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, State of Hawaii re 29 , 37 . Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 12/23/11. (gls, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SCOTT L. ANDREWS; and CLAUDIA )
J. ROHR,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
HAWAII COUNTY; GREGORY
)
ESTEBAN; JOHN P. STEWART;
)
COREY HASEGAWA; CASEY
)
CABRAL; and DOE DEFENDANTS )
1-25,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
________________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 11-00512 JMS/BMK
ORDER (1) GRANTING
DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF
HAWAII, GREGORY ESTEBAN,
COREY HASEGAWA AND CASEY
CABRAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO
STAY PENDING JUDGMENT IN
CASE NUMBER CR. NO. 09-100296 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE THIRD CIRCUIT, STATE OF
HAWAII; AND
(2) ADMINISTRATIVELY
CLOSING CASE PENDING A
DECISION IN CASE NUMBER CR.
NO. 09-1-00296 IN THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
STATE OF HAWAII

ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF HAWAII,
GREGORY ESTEBAN, COREY HASEGAWA AND CASEY CABRAL’S
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO STAY PENDING
JUDGMENT IN CASE NUMBER CR. NO. 09-1-00296 IN THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAII; AND
(2) ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING CASE PENDING A DECISION IN
CASE NUMBER CR. NO. 09-1-00296 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAII
BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2011, pro se Plaintiffs Scott L. Andrews (“Andrews”)
and his wife Claudia J. Rohr (“Rohr”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action

asserting federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims
against Defendants Hawaii County (the “County”) and Hawaii County Police
Department officers Gregory Esteban (“Esteban”), John P. Stewart, Corey
Hasegawa (“Hasegawa”), and Casey Cabral (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs
assert that Defendants violated Andrews’ constitutional rights in investigating,
arresting, and prosecuting Andrews for one count of terroristic threatening and four
counts of reckless endangerment arising from an altercation Andrews had with a
tow truck driver and individuals at the Hilo green waste facility on August 30,
2007. Based on this incident, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint asserts claims
titled: (1) False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution; (2) Selective Police
Enforcement/Prosecution; (3) Interference with Access to the Courts;
(4) Malicious Abuse of Process; (5) Speedy Trial Rights; (6) Punitive Damages;
and (7) County Negligence. Plaintiffs seek general, special, and punitive damages.

The criminal action against Andrews is currently pending in the Third
Circuit Court of the State of Hawaii, Cr. No. 09-1-0296 (the “State criminal
action”). In light of this fact, on November 29, 2011, the County, Esteban, and
Hasegawa (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, to Stay Pending Judgment in the State criminal action (“Motion to
2

Stay”), arguing that this action should be stayed because Plaintiffs will not be
entitled to damages if Andrews is convicted in the State criminal action.1 On
December 21, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition, agreeing that the court should
grant a stay of this action. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the court determines
Moving Defendants’ Motion to Stay without a hearing and GRANTS the Motion
to Stay.
ANALYSIS
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme
Court held:
[T]o recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by
a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus[.]
(footnote omitted). Heck extends beyond claims challenging convictions to bar a
prisoner’s claims for wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and speedy trial

1

Also pending before the court is Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the FAC, filed
on November 18, 2011. Doc. No. 27. Because this Order stays this action pending a judgment
in the State criminal action, the court DEEMS MOOT Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
the FAC, without prejudice to Defendants raising such arguments when the stay in this action is
lifted.
3

violations -- i.e., the precise claims presented by Plaintiffs in this action. See, e.g.,
Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Heck bars
plaintiff’s civil rights claims alleging wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution and
conspiracy among police officers to bring false charges against him); Cabrera v.
City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that Heck
bars plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims until conviction is
invalidated); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (Heck bars
plaintiff’s civil rights claims alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to
arrest and brought unfounded criminal charges); Gibbs v. Contra Costa Cnty.,
2011 WL 1899406, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2011) (dismissing speedy trial
violation claim because such claim “necessarily implies” the invalidity of
plaintiff’s conviction and such conviction has not been reversed or invalidated).
Heck does not, however, bar a plaintiff from bringing an action
asserting these claims during the pendency of the criminal action. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007), explains that such action should instead be stayed:
[i]f a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he [or she]
has been convicted (or files any other claim related to
rulings that likely will be made in a pending or
anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the
district court, and in accord with common practice, to
stay the civil action until the criminal case or the
likelihood of a criminal case is ended.

4

Later, “[i]f the plaintiff is then convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn
that conviction, Heck requires dismissal; otherwise, the case may proceed.” Yuan
v. City of Los Angeles, 2010 WL 3632810, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2010) (citing
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393); Peyton v. Burdick, 358 Fed. Appx. 961 (9th Cir. 2009)
(vacating judgment in § 1983 case where claims implicated rulings likely to be
made in pending state court criminal proceeding and remanding for district court to
stay action until pending state court proceedings concluded); Harrell v. Lemos, 292
Fed. Appx. 614 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Sturgis v. Brady, 2009 WL 1227908, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2009) (“Although a plaintiff’s damages claims will not be
barred under Heck if the plaintiff has not yet been convicted, the claims should not
go forward if such plaintiff’s criminal proceedings are still pending.”) (citation
omitted)).
The court finds that a stay pursuant to Wallace is appropriate.2
Plaintiffs seek damages and their claims essentially boil down to claims for false
arrest, malicious prosecution, and violation of Andrews’ right to a speedy trial, and
such claims relate to rulings that likely will be made in the State criminal action.
In other words, success in this action would necessarily implicate the validity of
any conviction, if found, in the State criminal action. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487
2

To the extent Moving Defendants ask the court to dismiss this action, the court rejects
such request as contrary to Wallace.
5

(“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”). Plaintiffs offer no argument to the
contrary, and indeed agree that a stay is in the interest of justice.3 The court
therefore GRANTS Moving Defendants’ Motion to Stay, pending a final resolution
of the State criminal action.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the court GRANTS Moving Defendants’ Motion
to Stay and administratively closes this action pending a final resolution of the
State criminal action.
In light of this stay, the court further ORDERS that the case be
administratively closed. The case shall be administratively reopened after the final
resolution of the State criminal action. The administrative closing of this case is
solely an administrative matter and does not impact, in any manner, any party’s
rights or obligations, has no impact on any limitation period applicable to this case,
does not alter in any manner any previous rulings by the court, and does not
require a filing fee to reopen the case. Moving Defendants are directed to provide
the court every three months beginning April 1, 2012 with a written update

3

Plaintiffs do, however, request that “limited discovery” continue in this action. The
court rejects this request -- discovery in this civil action is not necessary while the case is stayed.
6

explaining the status of the State criminal action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 23, 2011.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge

Andrews et al. v. Hawaii County et al., Civ. No. 11-00512 JMS/BMK, Order (1) Granting
Defendants County of Hawaii, Gregory Esteban, Corey Hasegawa and Casey Cabral’s Motion to
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Stay Pending Judgment in Case Number Cr. No. 09-1-00296 in
the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, State of Hawaii; and (2) Administratively Closing Case
Pending a Decision in Case Number Cr. No. 09-1-00296 in the Circuit Court of the Third
Circuit, State of Hawaii

7