Parks et al v. Watkins et al
Filing
99
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR THE FEDERAL COURT TO RETAIN JURISDICTION (DOC. 88 ) AND VACATING THE JUDGMENTS ON THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCS. 44 and 72 ) IN THE COURTS ORDER ISSUED ON AUGUST 31, 2012 (DOC. 84 ) . S igned by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 1/31/2013. ~ The Court must dismiss the state law claims because the Court did not have original jurisdiction over any claims in the action. There is no authority for the Court to exercise supplementa l jurisdiction. The rulings on PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 44) and DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, set forth in the Order issued on August 31, 2012, are VACATED . PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR THE FEDERAL COURT TO RETAIN JURISDICTION (Doc. 88) is DENIED. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry Modified to create links on 1/31/2013 (ecs, ). Modified on 1/31/2013 (ecs, ).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
BOGART MUMFORD PARKS,
individually and as the
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF WILLIAM J. PARKS,
deceased; and CHIYA NICHOLE
PARKS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT R. WATKINS, M.D.,
HAMAKUA HEALTH CENTER, INC.,
dba KOHALA FAMILY HEALTH
CENTER, and UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Defendants.
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Civ. No. 11-00594 HG-RLP
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR THE FEDERAL COURT TO RETAIN
JURISDICTION (DOC. 88)
AND
VACATING THE JUDGMENTS ON THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCS.
44 and 72) IN THE COURT’S ORDER ISSUED ON AUGUST 31, 2012
(DOC. 84)
The action arises out of a medical malpractice dispute.
Plaintiffs, representing the estate of the decedent, filed suit
against Defendants Robert R. Watkins, M.D., the United States of
America, and Hamakua Health Center, Inc., a federally-funded
health center. The Complaint claims that Defendant Watkins
committed medical negligence when he failed to diagnose and treat
1
the decedent’s cancer, which caused his death. The suit against
the Federal Government and the Hamakua Health Center was based on
a theory of respondeat superior liability, as Defendant Watkins’s
alleged employers.
The claims against the Federal Government and the Hamakua
Health Center provided the asserted basis for the Federal
District Court’s original jurisdiction.
In the Order issued on August 31, 2012, the Court dismissed
the Federal Government and the Hamakua Health Center from the
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. There was no proof
that the alleged medical negligence occurred while Defendant
Watkins was employed by the Federal Government and the Hamakua
Health Center.
Dismissal of the Federal Government and the Hamakua Health
Center eliminated the only possible basis for the Court’s
original jurisdiction over the action. The remaining claims,
state-law medical negligence claims against Defendant Watkins, do
not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs move for the Court to retain jurisdiction,
pursuant to the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, which grants federal jurisdiction over all claims that
form part of the same case or controversy as federal claims.
The Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction because
2
it did not possess original jurisdiction over any claims in the
action. The action must be dismissed.
The Motion for the Federal Court to Retain Jurisdiction
(Doc. 88) is DENIED. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
After dismissing the Federal Government and the Hamakua
Health Center from the action, the Court erroneously issued
rulings on two Motions for Summary Judgment. Such rulings were
improper because the Court did not have jurisdiction over the
matter.
The Court’s rulings on the Motions for Summary Judgment, set
forth in the Order issued on August 31, 2012 (Doc. 84), are
VACATED.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 29, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in
Federal Court. (Doc. 1.)
On March 28, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended
Complaint in Federal Court. (Doc. 30.)
On April 9, 2012, Defendants Hamakua Health Center, Inc. and
the United States of America filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 32).
On August 31, 2012, the Court granted the Federal Government
and the Hamakua Health Center Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Failing to recognize that it
3
lacked the authority to retain the action, the Court erroneously
denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Defendant Watkins’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc.
84.)
On September 10, 2012, the Court received a letter from
Defendant Watkins’s Counsel. It was unclear from the letter
whether the parties agreed that the action should proceed in
Hawaii State Court, as opposed to Federal Court. (Doc. 85.)
On September 27, 2012, the Court held a status conference
about whether the action would proceed in Federal Court. Counsel
was permitted to file a motion to dismiss or to retain federal
jurisdiction. The Court informed Counsel that it would dismiss
the action if no motion was filed. (Minute Order, September 27,
2012 (Doc. 87).)
On October 26, 2012, Plaintiffs filed PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
THE FEDERAL COURT TO RETAIN JURISDICTION. (Doc. 88.)
On November 1, 2012, Defendant filed an Opposition. (Doc.
89.)
On November 28, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their Reply. (Doc.
93.)
On December 10, 2012, the Court held a hearing on the Motion
for the Federal Court to Retain Jurisdiction. The issue arose as
to whether the Court has the power to exercise supplemental
4
jurisdiction. The parties were allowed to file supplemental
briefing on the issue.
On January 4, 2012, both parties filed a supplemental
memorandum on the issue. (Docs. 96 and 97.)
BACKGROUND
The action stems from the death of William J. Parks (“the
Decedent”). Plaintiffs Bogart Mumford Parks and Chiya Nichole
Parks, representing the Estate of the Decedent, filed a medical
malpractice suit against Defendants Robert R. Watkins, M.D., and
his employers, the federally-funded Hamakua Health Center d/b/a
Kohala Family Health Center, and the United States of America.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Watkins committed medical
negligence when he failed to treat and diagnose the Decedent’s
cancer, which caused the Decedent’s death. The claims against the
Federal Government and the Hamakua Health Center are based on
their respondeat superior liability, as Watkins’s alleged
employers.
The claims against the Federal Government and the Hamakua
Health Center provided the possible basis for the Federal
District Court’s jurisdiction over the action. The claims against
Defendant Watkins do not provide an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction.
The Court dismissed the claims against the Federal
Government and the Hamakua Health Center for lack of subject
5
matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). There was no proof that the alleged medical negligence
occurred while Defendant Watkins was employed by the Federal
Government and the Hamakua Health Center.
Only state-law claims against Defendant Watkins remain. The
Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that form part
of the same case or controversy as a federal claim, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides the only possible basis for federal
jurisdiction.
The parties dispute whether the Court has the power to
retain jurisdiction over the action, and if so, whether the Court
should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
claims.
ANALYSIS
I.
FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The district courts of the United States are courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005).
Federal district courts have no
jurisdiction without specific constitutional or statutory
authorization.
Id.
Pursuant to federal statutes, federal district courts
generally have original jurisdiction over claims that arise under
6
federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and claims between citizens of
different states involving claims greater than $75,000, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Federal district courts also generally have original
jurisdiction over claims against the United States, including
claims for money damages that fall within the requirements
established by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
When a federal court has original subject matter
jurisdiction the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, grants it jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to the claims within the federal court’s original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III. Section 1367(a) of the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute provides:
[I]n any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States
Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder
or intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Supplemental jurisdiction requires that the
Court have original jurisdiction.
A district court with original jurisdiction has the
discretion to refuse supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims that meet the requirements of § 1367(a) when certain
7
conditions are present. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Foster v. Wilson,
504 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). One such condition is when
the district court dismisses all claims over which it had
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When one of the
conditions in § 1367(c) is met, the Court’s decision to exercise
or decline supplemental jurisdiction is informed by “the values
of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988);
Acri v. Varian
Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 supplemented by, 121 F.3d 714
(9th Cir. 1997).
Although judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity
usually point toward declining jurisdiction over state-law claims
that remain after the dismissal of all federal-law claims before
trial, dismissal is purely discretionary. Carnegie-Mellon, 484
U.S. at 350 n.7; Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S.
635, 639 (2009).
A federal court does not have authority to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when
the federal-law claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction may only be invoked when
the district court has “a hook of original jurisdiction on which
to hang it.” Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254
F.3d 802, 805-806 (9th Cir. 2001). Distinguishing a dismissal on
8
jurisdictional grounds from a dismissal on the merits, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held:
If the district court dismisses all federal
claims on the merits, it has discretion under
§ 1367 to adjudicate the remaining claims; if
the court dismisses for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, it has no discretion and
must dismiss all claims.
Id.
When a district court dismisses a claim over which it has
jurisdiction for failure to state a claim, the pendent claims
still meet the requirements for supplemental jurisdiction, set
forth in title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). They form part of the same
case or controversy as a claim in the action within the court’s
original jurisdiction. A district court may exercise or deny
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims, pursuant to §
1367(c), based on the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity. Acri, 114 F.3d at 1000.
II.
PENDENT CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE COURT LACKED
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS
A.
Federal Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs filed the action in Federal District Court
alleging the Court had original jurisdiction over the claims
against the Federal Government and the Hamakua Health Center,
which were brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act
9
(“FTCA”) and the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance
Act of 1992 (“FSHCAA”).
The FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity and
grants federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against the United States for loss of property, personal
injury, or death “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his . . . employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The
FSHCAA extends FTCA coverage to certain federally-funded
healthcare centers, such as the Hamakua Health Center. Pub. L.
No. 102-501, 106 Stat. 3268 (1992).
The Court dismissed the Federal Government and the Hamakua
Health Center, without prejudice, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court held that sovereign immunity was not
waived because there was no evidence that Defendant Watkins was a
federal employee acting within the scope of his employment.
(Order, Aug. 31, 2012 at pg. 32 (Doc. 84).)
The remaining state-law claims against Defendant Watkins do
not have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Defendant
Watkins and Plaintiffs are all citizens of Hawaii and the claims
do not arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
Supplemental jurisdiction provided the only possible
jurisdictional basis for the remaining claims. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a).
10
B.
The Court’s Finding with Respect to Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction was Proper
Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in dismissing the
Federal Government and the Hamakua Health Center for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. They claim that the Court treated
the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment by relying on a factual record outside the pleadings and
making an evidentiary determination, and thus asserted
jurisdiction in the matter. (Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memo at pg.
2 (Doc. 97).)
1.
Standards for Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. V. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594
F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). An attack on subject matter
jurisdiction may be facial or factual. A facial attack is based
on the allegations on the face of the complaint together with any
undisputed facts on the record. A factual attack allows the court
to look beyond the complaint, hear evidence regarding
jurisdiction, and rule on the issue prior to trial, resolving
factual disputes where necessary. Id. Although the nature of the
burden varies depending on whether a motion to dismiss is a
facial or factual attack, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Stock West, Inc. v.
11
Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). In a
facial attack, the court must consider the allegations of the
complaint to be true. In a factual attack, the court need not
presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations. White v.
Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).
The traditional 12(b)(1) standards are not appropriate when
issues of jurisdiction and substance are intertwined. Roberts v.
Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). When the
jurisdictional question is dependent on the resolution of factual
issues going to the merits, the court should employ the standard
applicable to a motion for summary judgment, because a resolution
of the jurisdictional facts is akin to a decision on the merits.
Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).
Applying the summary judgment standard, the moving party should
prevail only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in
dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter
of law. Id. Dismissal in such a case is appropriate if it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which
would entitle him to relief.
Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1177.
Applying the summary judgment standard to determine whether
federal jurisdiction exists does not create federal jurisdiction
where none exists.
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2.
Application of Factual Attack Standard was Proper
The Court held that the merits were not intertwined with the
jurisdictional issue and applied the standard for a factual
attack pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). (Order, Aug. 31, 2012 at pgs.
22-23). The Court applied the standard for a factual attack, not
that of summary judgment. The Court placed the burden of proving
subject matter jurisdiction on Plaintiffs and did not allow a
presumption of truth to attach to Plaintiffs’ allegations. (Id.
at pgs. 30-31.)
Plaintiffs contend that the Court should have applied the
summary judgment standard to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, as
the Ninth Circuit Court Appeals did in the case of Augustine, 704
F.2d 1074, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 1983).
In Augustine, the question of subject matter jurisdiction
depended on the resolution of factual issues going to the heart
of the plaintiff’s negligence action. The determination of
whether the negligence claim met the FTCA’s jurisdictional
prerequisite depended on whether the defendants’ conduct was
negligent. The Court of Appeals remanded the action for the
district court to resolve the merits of the claim to the extent
necessary to allow it to properly determine its own jurisdiction.
Id.
Here, unlike in Augustine, the jurisdictional facts are not
intertwined with the merits of the alleged negligence claim. The
13
jurisdictional issue depends on when Defendant Watkins was
employed by the Federal Government and the Hamakua Health Center.
The alleged negligent conduct in this case did not occur until
approximately ten months after Defendant Watkins’s employment
with the Federal Government and the Hamakua Health Center
terminated. The Court’s jurisdictional determination did not
depend on whether Defendant Watkins acted negligently.
The Court applied the proper standard in deciding the
federal defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See CNA v. United States,
535 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2008)(scope-of-employment issues under
the FTCA is jurisdictional and 12(b)(1) standard applies because
jurisdictional issue is not overly intertwined with merits of
plaintiff’s claims); Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003
(10th Cir. 1995)(not intertwined because immunity issue does not
arise under the FTCA).
3.
Summary Judgment Standard Mandates Same Result
The effects of applying the summary judgment standard to the
facts of the case would not result in a different outcome. Under
either the summary judgment standard or the factual attack
standard, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss would be granted for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The same result would occur
because no material issues of fact exist as to (1) the period of
Defendant Watkins’s employment with the Federal Government and
the Hamakua Health Center and (2) whether a negligent act
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occurred during that period of employment. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at
733 (“Since the material facts are not in dispute, we need not
decide whether the trial court was required to apply summary
judgment standards in ruling on appellees’ motion or whether the
court could properly have considered this a purely jurisdictional
issue and therefore could have treated the motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).”)
The Court conducted a hearing on the issue of the scope of
Defendant Watkins’ employment with the Federal Government and the
Hamakua Health Center and reviewed evidence outside the pleading,
attached to the parties’ filings. The material facts relating to
jurisdiction are not in dispute. Defendant was employed by the
United States from August 10, 2006 through November 2, 2006.
(Order, Aug. 31 2012 at pg. 28 (Doc. 84).) There is no evidence
supporting an allegation that Defendant Watkins breached a duty
of care during that period of employment, nor do Plaintiffs
allege that a breach occurred between August 10, 2006 and
November 2, 2006.
At the core of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is that Defendant
Watkins committed medical negligence by failing to diagnose and
treat the Decedent’s cancer when he removed a lesion in July or
August 2007. (Id. at pg. 30); Takayama v. Kaiser Found. Hosp.,
923 P.2d 903, 915-16 (Haw. 1996)(breach of duty required for a
negligence action under Hawaii law). Such alleged negligence
15
occurred approximately ten months after the scope of Defendant’s
employment with the Federal Government and the Hamakua Health
Center ended. Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian Indep. Refinery Inc., 879
P.2d 538, 546 (Haw. 1994)(respondeat superior liability under
Hawaii law depends on whether conduct was related to employment
or if employer derived benefit from activity).
Plaintiffs present evidence that the tumor may have arisen
during the time Dr. Watkins was employed by the Federal
Government and the Hamakua Health Center. There is no evidence of
Dr. Watkins having any knowledge or taking any action regarding
the tumor prior to July or August 2007. Although the facts
regarding when the tumor arose are disputed, (Plaintiff’s
Supplemental Memo at pg. 2), such an inquiry is not relevant in
determining whether the Court has jurisdiction over the federal
claims in this case.
There is no evidence that any negligent act affecting
Decedent occurred while Dr. Watkins was employed by the Federal
Government or the Hamakua Health Center. The material facts with
respect to jurisdiction are not in dispute.
C.
The Court Cannot Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
The Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims against the
Federal Government and the Hamakua Health Center, which provided
the only potential basis for federal original jurisdiction.
16
When a federal district court dismisses all federal claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, there is no valid claim
within the court’s original jurisdiction to trigger 18 U.S.C. §
1367(a)’s grant of supplemental jurisdiction over pendent statelaw claims.
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006);
Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805806 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 106.66[1]).
The Court does not have authority to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction because there was no original claim to which the
remaining state-law claims may be supplemental. See Arbaugh, 546
U.S at 514 n.11 (determination that a court’s lack of subject
matter jurisdiction mandates the dismissal of pendent state-law
claims, even when the determination relates to the merits of a
case);
Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 664
(9th Cir. 2010)(no discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction
over state-law claims when federal district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over federal claims); Lowery v. Reinhardt,
No. CV. 07-0880, 2008 WL 550083 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2008).
The Court’s finding that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ FTCA claim, after applying either
the summary judgment standard or the traditional 12(b)(1)
standard, prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
See Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996).
17
In Lowery, 2008 WL 550083 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2008), the
United States moved to dismiss or for summary judgment for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because a physician’s alleged
tortious conduct did not fall within the scope the physician’s
federal employment. Id. at *2. The Federal District Court,
applying state principles of respondeat superior liability,
determined that the alleged injuries did not fall within the
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at *5. The District
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction “as a matter of law”
because the undisputed facts would not support an inference that
the physician was acting within the scope of his employment.
Having dismissed “all federal claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the merits,” the District Court determined that
it had no discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction to
adjudicate remaining state law claims.” Id. at *7.
The factors which would trigger the Court’s discretionary
authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to §
1367(c), are inapplicable.
The action must be dismissed in its
entirety. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; Scott, 306 F.3d at 664;
Rosenblatt v. St. John’s Episcopal Hosp., No. 11-CV-1106 (ERK),
2012 WL 294518 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012)(dismissal of United
States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in medical
malpractice action brought pursuant to the FTCA “divests this
18
Court of original federal jurisdiction over any claim and thus
precludes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction”).
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Retain Jurisdiction is DENIED.
III. RULINGS ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS MUST BE VACATED
In the Order issued on August 31, 2012, which granted the
Federal Government’s and the Hamakua Health Center’s Motion to
Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court also
denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 44)
and Defendant Watkins’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc.
72). (Doc. 84.)
The rulings were in error.
The Court lacked jurisdiction over the action, therefore the
Court did not have the authority to rule on the summary judgment
motions. The Court’s rulings on the summary judgment motions
(Docs. 44 and 72) are VACATED.
CONCLUSION
The Court must dismiss the state law claims because the
Court did not have original jurisdiction over any claims in the
action. There is no authority for the Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
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The rulings on PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (Doc. 44) and DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, set forth in
the Order issued on August 31, 2012, are VACATED.
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR THE FEDERAL COURT TO RETAIN
JURISDICTION (Doc. 88) is DENIED.
The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 31, 2013, Honolulu, Hawaii.
/S/ Helen Gillmor
Helen Gillmor
United States District Judge
Parks, et al v. Watkins, et al, CV 11-00594 HG-RLP, ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR THE FEDERAL COURT TO RETAIN JURISDICTION
(Doc. 88) AND VACATING THE JUDGMENTS ON THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (DOCS. 44 and 72) IN THE COURT’S ORDER ISSUED ON AUGUST
31, 2012 (DOC. 84)
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