Beckstrand v. Read et al
Filing
44
ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS THOMAS READ AND NETTIE SIMMON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 35 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 9/26/12. "The court GRANTS the Motion in part. The Court gran ts summary judgment on Counts I and II to Defendants on limitations grounds. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED. This order leaves Count III for further adjudication." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MATTHEW BECKSTRAND,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS READ; NETTIE SIMMONS; )
DOES 1-10,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
CIVIL. NO. 11-00597 SOM/BMK
ORDER GRANTING IN PART,
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS
THOMAS READ AND NETTIE
SIMMONS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS THOMAS READ
AND NETTIE SIMMONS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiff Matthew Beckstrand brings suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Thomas Read and Nettie Simmons
(collectively, “Defendants”) for constitutional violations in
connection with an alleged miscalculation of his state-court
sentence.
Beckstrand claims that the miscalculation caused him
to spend seventy-three days in prison for an alleged parole
violation that occurred after the date he says his parole term
should have ended.
Defendants now move for summary judgment on all counts
on the grounds that (1) Defendants have qualified immunity with
respect to all claims because they were allegedly following the
law governing the calculation of his sentence, and (2)
Beckstrand’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
See Defs. Thomas Read and Nettie Simmons’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF
No. 35 (“Motion”).
The court grants the Motion in part on
limitations grounds, leaving the Fourth Amendment claim for
further judgment.
II.
BACKGROUND.
On November 6, 2006, Beckstrand was sentenced by Judge
Elizabeth Strance of the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit,
State of Hawaii, to a five-year indeterminate term for seconddegree burglary in Criminal Case No. 99-248K.
Judgment for CR.
No. 99-248K (“Judgment”), attached as Exhibit “A” to Pl.
Separate Concise Statement of Facts, ECF No. 40 (“Pl. CSOF”).
In the state system, a five-year “indeterminate”
sentence sets five years as the maximum prison term.
The Hawaii
Paroling Authority may order an individual released after less
than five years.
In that event, the Hawaii Paroling Authority
may require the individual to obey parole conditions for the
remainder of the five-year period.
Hawaii v. Kamana`o, 118 Haw.
210, 219, 188 P.3d 724, 733 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 706-669,
706-670 (2007).
At the time he was sentenced in that state case,
Beckstrand was already serving his prison sentence in a federal
bank robbery case, as ordered by this court in Criminal Case No.
04-00273 SOM.
Defs. Thomas Read and Nettie Simmons’ Concise
2
Statement of Material Facts in of Supp. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF
No. 36 (“Defs. CSOF”) 2 ¶ 2; Pl. CSOF ¶ 25.
The Judgment
entered by Judge Strance provided, “This sentence shall run
concurrently with the sentence imposed in” the federal bank
robbery case.
Judge Strance subsequently entered a Stipulation
Regarding Pre-Sentence Credits and Order (“Stipulated Order”),
stating that Beckstrand was to “receive credit from October 31,
2004,” toward his state sentence.
Stipulated Order, attached as
Exhibit “B” to Pl. CSOF.
After serving his federal prison term, Beckstrand was
transferred to state prison to complete his state incarceration.
Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).1
He was not required to spend
five years in prison on his state sentence.
released on state parole on March 6, 2008.
Instead, he was
Defs. CSOF ¶ 4; Pl.
CSOF ¶ 4; Order of Parole, attached as Exhibit “A” to Defs.
Thomas Read and Nettie Simmons’ First Req. Admiss. to Pl.
Matthew Beckstrand, attached as Exhibit “E” to Defs. CSOF
(“Parole Order”).
1
Many of the facts on which Beckstrand relies are not
before the court in the form of admissible evidence. Instead,
Beckstrand cites his Complaint as if it is a sworn statement,
instead of merely a set of allegations. Unless directly
contested by Defendants, however, this court considers even
assertions not made under penalty of perjury if it appears to
the court that Beckstrand could present the material in issue in
admissible form at trial. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032,
1036 (9th Cir. 2003).
3
Shortly before he was released from state custody,
Beckstrand signed his Parole Order, which stated that his parole
term would expire on October 1, 2011.
Parole Order; Defs. CSOF
¶ 20; Pl. CSOF ¶ 20.
This expiration date is at the heart of
the present dispute.
After his release, Beckstrand’s state
parole officer informed him that he “had him until 2012,” and
that Beckstrand was not entitled to credit for his federal
sentence.
Defs. CSOF ¶ 5; Pl. CSOF ¶ 5.
Beckstrand contacted
the State of Hawaii’s Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) and
spoke with Simmons, a legal assistant in the department, about
his parole expiration date.
10.
Defs. CSOF ¶¶ 6, 10; Pl. CSOF ¶¶ 6,
On or around October 14, 2008, Beckstrand allegedly
provided Simmons with a copy of the Judgment and Stipulated
Order in an apparent attempt to obtain a more favorable
determination of his parole expiration date.
Pl. CSOF ¶¶ 30-34.
Simmons had audited Beckstrand’s file in July 2008 to
verify his presentence credit and release date of September 30,
2011.
Defs. CSOF ¶¶ 11-12; Pl. CSOF ¶¶ 11-12.
The file was
initially prepared by DPS staff member Raynette Ruiz in August
2007.
Defs. Thomas Read and Nettie Simmons’ Reply Mem. in Supp.
Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 41 (“Defs. Reply Mem.”).
After
Beckstrand’s inquiry, Simmons allegedly informed Beckstrand over
the telephone that, by law, Beckstrand was not entitled to
4
credit against his state sentence for time served on his federal
sentence.
Defs. CSOF ¶ 13; Pl. CSOF ¶ 13.
Beckstrand asked to speak with Simmons’s supervisor,
Defendant Read, DPS’s Offender Management Administrator.
CSOF ¶ 7; Pl. CSOF ¶ 7.
Defs.
Read informed Beckstrand by telephone
that, after meeting with Simmons and discussing Beckstrand’s
sentence, he concurred with his staff’s computation of
Beckstrand’s parole expiration date, and that Beckstrand was not
entitled to the credit he claimed.
Defs. CSOF ¶¶ 7, 15; Pl.
CSOF ¶¶ 7, 15.
Beckstrand alleges that his state parole term should
have ended no later than October 30, 2009,2 five years from the
date on which the stipulated credit began.
He says he complied
with all of the terms of his state parole through that date.
Pl. Mem. Opp’n to Defs. Mot. Summ. J., at 11, ECF No. 39 (“Pl.
Mem. Opp’n”).
In or around January 2010, Beckstrand’s parole officer
reported to the Hawaii Paroling Authority that Beckstrand had
violated his parole by failing to notify the parole officer of a
2
Beckstrand’s Memorandum in Opposition states that he
“sincerely believed that he was entitled to rely on the State
Sentence handed down by the Hawaii Circuit Court which ordered
that Plaintiff receive such credit.” Pl. Mem. Opp’n, at 11.
Beckstrand, however, does not claim to have actually relied on
the Judgment or Stipulated Order.
5
change of address in November 2009.
Opp’n, at 4.
Defs. CSOF ¶ 8; Pl. Mem.
Beckstrand alleges that the parole violation
occurred after the date the state parole term ended.
Compl.
¶ 33.
The Hawaii Paroling Authority issued a warrant for
Beckstrand’s arrest on January 12, 2010.
4.
Defs. Reply Mem., at
He was arrested eleven months later, on December 19, 2010,
and returned to state custody.
Pl. Mem. Opp’n, at 4.
Beckstrand alleges that he immediately notified prison
authorities that he was being held unlawfully.
Compl. ¶ 36.
At the initial hearing on Beckstrand’s parole
violation on February 2, 2011, Beckstrand was represented by
Taryn Tomasa of the State of Hawaii’s Office of the Public
Defender.
Id. ¶¶ 37-38.
After that hearing was continued,
Tomasa allegedly informed Max Otani, then-Acting Parole Board
Chairman at the Hawaii Paroling Authority, on numerous occasions
that Beckstrand was being held unlawfully, because by the terms
of the state Judgment and Stipulated Order, the state sentence
had ended before the alleged parole violation.
Beckstrand continued to be held in custody.
Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 42.
Thereafter, at the continued parole hearing on March 2, 2011,
Tomasa allegedly argued that Beckstrand was being held
unlawfully and represented that she was prepared to file a
6
motion in state court seeking Beckstrand’s release.
Id. ¶ 44.
According to Beckstrand, the Hawaii Paroling Authority then
ordered his release without explanation.
Id. ¶ 45.
Beckstrand
alleges that he was unlawfully incarcerated for 73 days (from
December 19, 2010, until March 2, 2011).
Id. ¶ 46.
In his Complaint, filed on September 30, 2011,
Beckstrand alleges that Simmons and Read violated his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Beckstrand
asserts a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a denial of due
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
III.
Compl. ¶¶ 47-63.
STANDARD.
Summary judgment shall be granted when “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010).
See Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,
198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
The movants must support
their position that a material fact is or is not genuinely
disputed by either “citing to particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for the purposes of the motion only),
7
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”; or
“showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence
or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”
R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Fed.
One of the principal purposes of summary
judgment is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported
claims and defenses.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323-24 (1986).
Summary judgment must be granted against a party that
fails to demonstrate facts to establish what will be an
essential element at trial.
See id. at 323.
A moving party
without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial--usually, but
not always, the defendant--has both the initial burden of
production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for
summary judgment.
Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz
Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).
The burden initially falls on the moving party to
identify for the court those “portions of the materials on file
that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact.”
T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323).
“When the moving party has
carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more
8
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (footnote omitted).
The nonmoving party must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630.
T.W. Elec.
At least some “‘significant
probative evidence tending to support the complaint’” must be
produced.
Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).
See Addisu, 198 F.3d at
1134 (“A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely
colorable or not significantly probative does not present a
genuine issue of material fact.”).
“[I]f the factual context
makes the non-moving party’s claim implausible, that party must
come forward with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise
be necessary to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Cal. Arch’l Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818
F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 475 U.S. at 587).
Accord Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134 (“There
must be enough doubt for a ‘reasonable trier of fact’ to find
for plaintiffs in order to defeat the summary judgment
motion.”).
All evidence and inferences must be construed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
9
T.W. Elec. Serv.,
Inc., 809 F.2d at 631.
Inferences may be drawn from underlying
facts not in dispute, as well as from disputed facts that the
judge is required to resolve in favor of the nonmoving party.
Id.
When “direct evidence” produced by the moving party
conflicts with “direct evidence” produced by the party opposing
summary judgment, “the judge must assume the truth of the
evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that
fact.”
IV.
Id.
ANALYSIS.
Beckstrand alleges that Defendants miscalculated his
state sentence, which led to his unlawful reincarceration.
Beckstrand sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
Section 1983 therefore imposes two essential proof
requirements upon a claimant:
(1) that a person acting under
color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that
the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege or
10
immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632–33 (9th Cir. 1988).
Defendants argue, inter alia, that (1) they are
entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Beckstrand’s
claims, and (2) the claims are barred under the applicable twoyear statute of limitations for § 1983 actions.
A.
Defendants Do Not Establish That They Are Entitled to
Qualified Immunity.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from
liability for civil damages so long as their actions do not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Pearson v.
The doctrine will not
protect the “plainly incompetent” or those “who knowingly
violate the law.”
Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of
Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991)).
Qualified immunity balances the
need to hold government officials accountable for irresponsibly
exercising their authority, with the need to protect officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when reasonably
performing their duties.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
The Supreme Court has set forth a two-pronged test for
determining whether government officials are entitled to
11
qualified immunity.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 201 (2001).
In one prong, the court determines “whether, taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, that party has
established a violation of a federal right.”
Preschooler II,
479 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201).
In the other prong, the court determines whether this
right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s
alleged misconduct.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
The “clearly
established” test is satisfied when unlawfulness is apparent in
light of preexisting law.
Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1180
(citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
A right is “clearly established” for purposes of
qualified immunity if “the contours of the right [are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.”
Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 614-15 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
The plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that the right he or she claims was violated was a
clearly established right.
(9th Cir. 2002).
Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969
If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the defendant
reasonably believed the alleged conduct was lawful.
Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1996).
12
Trevino v.
The Ninth Circuit has stated that “an officer who acts
in reliance on a duly-enacted statute or ordinance is ordinarily
entitled to qualified immunity.”
Grossman v. City of Portland,
33 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1994).
Whether an act is a
violation of a federal right and whether the right was clearly
established at the time of the violation are pure legal
questions for the court.
See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d
1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003).
This court has the discretion to evaluate the two
prongs in any order.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“The judges of
the district courts . . . should be permitted to exercise their
sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light
of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”); Tibbetts
v. Kulongoski, 567 F.3d 529, 535 (9th Cir. 2009) (“we adopt
Pearson’s more flexible approach and proceed directly to an
analysis of Saucier’s second prong.”).
This court concludes that Beckstrand had a right to be
deemed to have completed his sentence when the Judgment and
Stipulated Order provided he had done so.
Taken in the light
most favorable to Beckstrand, the record suggests that
Beckstrand had a right to have his parole end in October 2009.
The court further concludes that the right to have a criminal
13
sentence end as of the maximum date set by the court was clearly
established well before October 2009.
With respect to the issue of when Beckstrand had a
right to have his sentence end, the court relies on the very
concept of a judgment.
Unless vacated or reversed, a judgment
represents the final determination in a case.
If prison
officials could second-guess judgments and detain or release
individuals as they deemed appropriate, judgments would be
meaningless.
The prison officials could then trump the entire
judicial system, pronouncing not only trial judges, but even
appellate judges, to have been mistaken and therefore not
entitled to have their rulings enforced.
The result would be a
shadowy, unreviewable system that would hold the power to
release prisoners earlier than courts had ordered, or to detain
them beyond what courts ordered.
While the present case turns on the expiration of a
parole period, if DPS has the authority to override a judge with
respect to the parole period, DPS presumably claims the right to
override a judge with respect to a custody period.
Nothing in
any law vests in the DPS the power to override a judge.
The Supreme Court established, in Hill v. United
States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 464 (1936), that the
sentence ordered by a court may be altered only by an amended
14
judgment.
In Wampler, the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland imposed a sentence on Wampler, orally
ordering a prison term and a fine.
Id. at 462.
On the same
day, the court clerk issued a commitment of imprisonment that
included not only the prison term and fine, but also included a
provision that Wampler remain imprisoned until the fine was
paid.
Id.
Wampler petitioned the court to strike this
provision, arguing that the court clerk had inserted into the
commitment a provision that the judge had not made part of his
sentence.
Id.
The prison warden in Wampler contended that there was
a practice in the District of Maryland to include this provision
in the commitment, even when not expressly stated by the court.
Id. at 465.
The warden argued that this practice should be
given the force of law.
Id.
The Supreme Court disagreed,
noting that the practice was “not published; . . . not reduced
to writing; . . . [and] lacking in the formal safeguards that
protect against mistake and perhaps against oppression.”
The Court stated,
The only sentence known to the law is the
sentence or judgment entered upon the
records of the court. If the entry is
inaccurate, there is remedy by motion to
correct it to the end that it may speak the
truth. . . . Until corrected in a direct
proceeding, it says what it was meant to
15
Id.
say, and this by an irrebuttable
presumption.
Id. at 464 (internal citations omitted).
Thus, the Supreme
Court held that the provision inserted into the commitment by
the court clerk was void.
Id. at 465.
Similarly, Judge Strance ordered that Beckstrand
receive credit from October 2004 against his indeterminate fiveyear state sentence.
The record does not indicate that Judge
Strance issued any order invalidating this credit.
Defendants
effectively invalidated the court-ordered credit when they
decided that Beckstrand was not entitled to such credit and
calculated the date his sentence expired as being beyond October
2009.
Like the clerk’s amendment in Wampler, Defendants’
calculation of Beckstrand’s sentence was invalid.
Viewed in the
light most favorable to Beckstrand, the evidence indicates that
the court ordered Beckstrand’s sentence of combined custody and
parole to end no later than October 2009.
His right to rely on
the Judgment and Stipulated Order was clearly established even
before Beckstrand allegedly furnished such documents to
Defendants in 2008.
Having determined that Beckstrand has met his burden
of showing a clearly established right, this court turns to the
question of whether Defendants demonstrate that they reasonably
16
believed their alleged conduct was lawful.
In seeking summary
judgment, Defendants contend that they were relying on
applicable law in overriding Judge Strance’s decision to
sentence Beckstrand to an indeterminate five years of
incarceration and parole combined, with credit for time served
beginning on October 31, 2004, while he was apparently in
federal custody.
In particular, Defendants point to three
sources of authority for their action.
First, they point to section 706-671 of Hawaii Revised
Statutes.
Defendants say that, under this statute, “an inmate
receives credit for time served (1) in a State or local
institution prior to sentencing (2) for the crime for which the
sentence is imposed.”
Motion, at 11.
Judge Strance gave
Beckstrand credit for time served on his federal sentence on a
different crime.
The court cannot help noting that Defendants
overstate the terms of section 706-671, as it read in 2008.
That statute addresses how credit applies “[w]hen a defendant
who is sentenced to imprisonment has previously been detained in
any State or local correctional or other institution.”
In 2008,
the statute did not expressly forbid credit for time spent in a
federal facility.3
Thus, in 2008, Defendants could not be said
3
Section 706-671 of Hawaii Revised Statutes now states
that, “when a defendant is convicted for a crime committed while
17
to have been relying on the express terms of the statute.
Before 2012, it was case law, rather than the express statutory
language, that limited the credits.
That case law is the second authority Defendants point
to: the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Hawaii v. March, 94
Haw. 250, 11 P.3d 1094 (2000).
That case recognized that
section 706-761(1) was “silent as to the propriety of obtaining
credit for time served in connection with an unrelated criminal
offense.”
Id. at 254, 11 P.3d at 1098.
The court held that a
sentence crediting a defendant with time served for an unrelated
offense was illegal because it was not authorized under chapter
706 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.
Id. at 255, 11 P.3d at 1099.
What is notable is that March preceded the Judgment
and Stipulated Order entered by Judge Strance.
Judge Strance
presumably did not consider either the Judgment or the
Stipulated Order to violate governing precedent.
Beckstrand’s
criminal defense attorney and the prosecutor similarly do not
serving a sentence of imprisonment on a separate unrelated
felony conviction, credit for time being served for the term of
imprisonment imposed on the defendant for the separate unrelated
felony conviction shall not be deducted from the term of
imprisonment imposed on the defendant for the subsequent
conviction.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-671(3) (2012). This
provision, however, was enacted in 2012, after Defendants had
calculated and/or confirmed Beckstrand’s release date in 2008,
and after Defendants had allegedly held Beckstrand in custody on
the 2010 parole violation. Act 50, 2012 Haw. Sess. Laws.
18
appear to have seen any problem with the Stipulated Order giving
Beckstrand credit for time served on a federal sentence.
Defendants focus on what they say was the error by Judge Strance
and the attorneys who were involved with the state sentencing
proceedings, but Defendants do not establish that they
reasonably believed they were vested with the power to correct
that alleged error on their own.
It is, of course, Defendants who have the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of their purported belief.
The
relevant belief for which Defendants bear this burden is not the
belief that an error was committed by Judge Strance.
Rather,
Defendants must establish the reasonableness of their belief
that DPS employees were empowered to correct a judge’s purported
error.
Defendants make no showing of reasonableness with
respect to any belief that the DPS was authorized to undo the
Judgment and Stipulated Order and impose what DPS employees
deemed to be a correct application of March on Beckstrand.
Defendants overrode the judge, prosecution, and defense all at
once, without establishing why they thought it reasonable for
them to correct a perceived error.
Third, Defendants point to DPS’s policy for
calculating sentences.
See Dep’t of Pub. Safety Policy re:
Sentence Computation, attached as Exhibit “C” to Exhibit “3” of
19
Defs. CSOF 6.
Defendants say their calculation complied with
that policy.
Decl. of Thomas Read, attached as Exhibit “3” to
Defs. CSOF.
But nothing in that policy, even assuming it could
override a court order, invited DPS officials to nullify a
court-imposed sentence.
By assuming the right to ignore what they viewed as
Judge Strance’s erroneous sentence, DPS accomplished in 2008
what the prosecution could never have accomplished in 2008.
That is, the appeal time having run, the prosecutor could not,
in 2008, have appealed Judge Strance’s rulings and asked an
appellate court to declare them illegal or to nullify the
prosecutor’s own stipulation.
Defendants fail to establish the
reasonableness of any belief that they had the authority to
“reverse” Judge Strance long after the prosecution had declined
to take an appeal.
Beckstrand clearly had a right to be free of decisions
by prison officials to correct allegedly erroneous judicial
decisions.
The judicial system is designed to provide for
judicial review of orders, and DPS officials who believe they
may take it upon themselves to conduct such review on their own
cannot have the benefit of qualified immunity without showing
the reasonableness of such a belief.
showing.
20
Defendants make no such
On the present record, Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
Beckstrand notes that DPS policy states that, “in a
situation where the court order specifically conflicts or
contradicts with [sic] a statute, the staff assigned to the
computation should contact the court for clarification.”
Dep’t
of Pub. Safety Policy re: Sentence Computation, attached as
Exhibit “E” to Pl. CSOF 16.
Even though the effective date of
this policy is June 9, 2009, after Defendants had verified
Beckstrand’s sentence in 2008, Defendants do not suggest that,
before that date, there was any bar to their seeking such
clarification.
In any event, Defendants do not satisfy their
burden with respect to qualified immunity.
B.
The Two-Year Statute of Limitations Bars Beckstrand’s
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Violation Claims, But
Not His Fourth Amendment Claim.
The statute of limitations period for § 1983 actions
is “a State’s personal injury statute of limitations.”
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
Owens v.
See Harvey v. Waldron, 210
F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The length of the limitations
period for § 1983 actions is governed by state law”); Cabrera v.
City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“State law determines the statute of limitations for § 1983
suits”).
The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983
21
actions in Hawaii is section 657-7 of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes, the two-year “general personal injury” provision.
Allen v. Iranon, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1238 (D. Haw. 1999) (“In
Hawaii, the statute of limitations for actions under Section
1983 is two years from the date of the violation.”); Pele
Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 595, 837 P.2d 1247, 1259
(1992) (“We hold that the two-year statute of limitations set
forth in HRS § 657-7 governs § 1983 actions.”).
The parties
agree that the two-year statute of limitations applies.
See
Motion, at 6; Pl. Mem. Opp’n, at 5-6.
Although state law governs the applicable statute of
limitations, federal law governs when a cause of action begins
to accrue.
Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1013; Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 379.
Beckstrand filed his complaint on September 30, 2011.
To be
timely under Hawaii law, his claims against Defendants must have
accrued on or after September 30, 2009.
Defendants argue that Beckstrand’s § 1983 claims are
barred under the two-year statute of limitations because
Beckstrand’s cause of action accrued in 2008, when Beckstrand
was repeatedly informed that his state sentence expired on
October 1, 2011.
First, Simmons informed Beckstrand by
telephone that DPS would not apply the credit Beckstrand claimed
to his sentence, even though Beckstrand’s Judgment and the
22
Stipulated Order appeared to provide for that credit.
CSOF ¶ 13; Pl. CSOF ¶ 13.
Defs.
Second, Read concurred with Simmons
that Beckstrand’s claimed credit was inapplicable, and relayed
this concurrence to Beckstrand by telephone.
Pl. CSOF ¶ 13.
Defs. CSOF ¶ 15;
Third, Beckstrand signed the Order of Parole,
acknowledging that his Term of Parole would expire on October 1,
2011.
Defs. CSOF ¶ 20; Pl. CSOF ¶ 20.
Defendants rely on RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of
Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002), in which the Ninth
Circuit stated, “in determining when an act occurs for statute
of limitations purposes we look at when the ‘operative decision’
occurred, . . . and separate from the operative decisions those
inevitable consequences that are not separately actionable.”
Id. at 1058.
Defendants argue that, because the confirmation of
Beckstrand’s parole past 2009 (and, likely, his eventual
reincarceration) was an “inevitable consequence” of their 2008
communications or “operative decisions,” Beckstrand’s cause of
action against Defendants accrued in 2008.
Thus, Defendants
allege, Beckstrand’s complaint is untimely.
Beckstrand argues that his claims are not barred by
the two-year statute of limitations.
First, he contends that
his causes of action accrued on December 19, 2010, when he was
arrested for violating parole.
Second, he argues that his
23
causes of action could not possibly have accrued prior to
October 30, 2009, because his “injury,” for purposes of his
unlawful incarceration claims, could only have accrued after the
term of his parole expired.
Third, Beckstrand argues that he is
entitled to equitable tolling based on his “sincere belief” that
his sentence expired on October 30, 2009.
Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the
basis for the claim.
Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 379.
The accrual of
a § 1983 claim depends on the substantive basis of the claim.
Id. at 380.
In Counts I and II, Beckstrand alleges that his Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when Defendants
wrongfully refused to credit him for his federal sentence in
accordance with the Judgment and Stipulation Order.
¶¶ 47-58.
Compl.
The substantive basis for these claims is Defendants’
alleged miscalculation of his sentence.
that this had occurred.
Beckstrand knew in 2008
Defendants explained to Beckstrand in
2008 that he was not eligible for the credit that he claimed.
Beckstrand responds that, although he knew of the DPS
calculation in 2008, he was not injured by that calculation in
2008.
This court disagrees.
Beckstrand had an injury that gave
him standing to seek redress in 2008.
24
He could, for example,
have sought a writ of mandamus requiring Defendants to comply
with Judge Strance’s order.
This court distinguishes an injury for standing
purposes from an injury giving rise to damages.
That is, even
if Beckstrand could not have sustained a damage claim in 2008,
he had standing to seek injunctive relief then.
The law in the Ninth Circuit is that a claimant may
have an injury-in-fact for standing purposes if there is “the
possibility of future injury.”
Krotter v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency
v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2010)).
The Ninth
Circuit has held that the threat of future harm is sufficient if
the threat is “credible” and “both real and immediate, not
conjectural or hypothetical.”
Id. (holding that the plaintiffs
adequately pled an injury-in-fact by alleging that they had an
increased risk of future identity theft stemming from the theft
of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data) (quoting
Cent. Delta Water, 306 F.3d at 947, and City of L.A. v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)); Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist.,
306 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2002).
Citing United States Supreme Court cases on the issue,
the Second Circuit has held, “an injury-in-fact differs from a
‘legal interest’; an injury-in-fact need not be capable of
25
sustaining a valid cause of action under applicable tort law.
An injury-in-fact may simply be the fear or anxiety of future
harm.”
Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263-64 (2d
Cir. 2006).
The Second Circuit explained:
For example, exposure to toxic or harmful
substances has been held sufficient to
satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact
requirement even without physical symptoms
of injury caused by the exposure, and even
though exposure alone may not provide
sufficient ground for a claim under state
tort law. See [Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990)] (“Our threshold
inquiry into standing ‘in no way depends on
the merits of the [plaintiff’s claim.]’”)
(quoting [Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975)]); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig. (Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co.),
996 F.2d 1425, 1434 (2d Cir. 1993)
(rejecting argument that “injury in fact
means injury that is manifest, diagnosable
or compensable”) (internal quotation marks
omitted), overruled in part on other grounds
by Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537
U.S. 28, 123 S. Ct. 336, 154 L. Ed. 2d 368
(2002); Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, §
1785.1 (“[T]his requisite of an injury is
not applied too restrictively. If plaintiff
can show that there is a possibility that
defendant’s conduct may have a future
effect, even if injury has not yet occurred,
the court may hold that standing has been
satisfied.”). The risk of future harm may
also entail economic costs, such as medical
monitoring and preventative steps; but
aesthetic, emotional or psychological harms
also suffice for standing purposes. See
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154, 90 S. Ct. 827,
25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970). Moreover, the fact
that an injury may be outweighed by other
26
benefits, while often sufficient to defeat a
claim for damages, does not negate standing.
See Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419
F.3d 568, 574-75 (holding that the increased
risk that a faulty medical device may
malfunction constituted a sufficient injuryin-fact even though the class members’ own
devices had not malfunctioned and may have
actually been beneficial).
Id.
Beckstrand could have alleged in 2008 that his rights
would be violated by being required to comply with parole
conditions after his indeterminate five-year term had expired.
An allegation that he was already being so required would have
constituted a present injury, but a present injury was not
required.
In 2008, he could have anticipated a threat of injury
that would have been credible for Article III standing purposes.
With respect to the requirement that the threat of injury also
be “real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical,” he
could have noted that authority to calculate the end of his
sentence was vested by statute in DPS, and that his parole term
was supposed to end in October 2009.
Indeed, it might have
taken from 2008 until October 2009 for him to prevail in court,
so an action filed in 2008 would not have been premature.
The court does not read the requirement that the
threat be “real and immediate” as requiring proof of an injury
about to occur in a matter of days.
27
For purposes of the present
discussion, the court concludes that Beckstrand’s injury was
sufficiently “real and immediate, not conjectural or
hypothetical” before 2009.
Counts I and II are barred by the
two-year statute of limitations.
Another way to view the situation is to say that
Counts I and II were ripe before 2009.
The Ninth Circuit has
explained that “[t]he constitutional component of ripeness
overlaps with the ‘injury in fact’ analysis for Article III
standing.”
Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.
2010) (citing Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d
1134, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States Parole Comm’n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)).
“Whether framed as an
issue of standing or ripeness, the inquiry is largely the same:
whether the issues presented are definite and concrete, not
hypothetical or abstract.”
Id. (citations omitted).
Even if his limitations period began to run in 2008,
Beckstrand says the period should be equitably tolled.
As with
the applicable statute of limitations period, state law governs
whether a plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling.
Cervantes
v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993).
Under
Hawaii law, a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling of his claims
must demonstrate “(1) that he has been pursuing his right
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood
28
in his way.”
Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hawaii, 110 Haw.
338, 360, 133 P.3d 767, 789 (2006).
“Extraordinary
circumstances” are circumstances beyond the control of the
complainant that make it impossible to file a complaint within
the statute of limitations.
Id. (citation omitted).
Beckstrand does not meet the “extraordinary
circumstances” threshold.
He argues, in his Memorandum in
Opposition, that he “sincerely believed that he was entitled to
rely on the State Sentence handed down by the Hawaii Circuit
Court which ordered that Plaintiff receive such credit.”
Notwithstanding this belief, the record shows that Beckstrand
knew in 2008 that DPS would not honor the credit he claimed.
First, DPS’ calculation of Beckstrand’s sentence was
memorialized in the Parole Order, which Beckstrand signed when
he was released from prison in 2008.
Second, Beckstrand’s
parole officer informed him that he “had him until 2012.”
Third, Defendants allegedly informed Beckstrand over the
telephone that he was not entitled to the credit he claimed.
Beckstrand does not show that filing a complaint
against Defendants within the two-year statute of limitations
period was beyond his control or impossible.
In other words,
Beckstrand fails to show that an extraordinary circumstance
stood in the way of the timely filing his claims.
29
Therefore,
Beckstrand is not entitled to equitable tolling.
That is not, however, the end of the limitations
issue.
Count III is distinguishable from Counts I and II.
In
Count III, Beckstrand alleges a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights resulting from his purportedly unlawful
incarceration.
His injury, therefore, is the seventy-three-day
incarceration following his alleged parole violation.
He
sustained this injury when he was arrested in December 2010 for
an alleged 2009 parole violation; he did not know or have reason
to know of this injury in 2008.
In 2008, Beckstrand was on parole, and could have
lawfully faced incarceration for violating parole.
Unlike the
plaintiffs in RK Ventures, he simply could not have brought his
§ 1983 claim for unlawful incarceration merely upon learning,
from Defendants, that the Judgment and Stipulated Order were
inapplicable.
Beckstrand’s cause of action on Count III accrued
when he was arrested in December 2010, within the two-year
statute of limitations period.
Defendants contend that, like Counts I and II, Count
III is time-barred because Beckstrand’s incarceration beginning
in 2010 resulted from Defendants’ alleged refusal to follow the
Judgment and Stipulated Order.
While the incarceration flowed
from that alleged refusal, it does not follow that the
30
limitations period on Count III began to run from the time of
the refusal.
a given.
Incarceration was not the kind of injury that was
Even if Beckstrand knowingly violated a parole
condition, it cannot be said that every parole violation
necessarily results in incarceration.
Because incarceration was
not an inevitable result of Defendants’ alleged action, the
limitation period for Count III ran from the time of the
incarceration, not from the alleged act that ultimately caused
the incarceration.
In 2008, Beckstrand did not have a threat of
incarceration that was “both real and immediate, not conjectural
or hypothetical.”
Krotter, 628 F.3d at 1142.
In sum, Counts I and II, alleging that Defendants
wrongfully miscalculated Beckstrand’s sentence in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, are barred by the two-year
statute of limitations period.
Count III, alleging that
Defendants caused Beckstrand’s unlawful incarceration in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, is brought within the
two-year statute of limitations.
31
V.
CONCLUSION.
The court GRANTS the Motion in part.
The Court grants
summary judgment on Counts I and II to Defendants on limitations
grounds.
In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.
This order leaves Count III for further adjudication.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, September 26, 2012.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
Beckstrand v. Read et al., Civ. No. 11-00597 SOM/BMK; Order Granting in Part, Denying
in Part Defendants Thomas Read and Nettie Simmons’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
32
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