Ramsey v. Hawaii Paroling Authority, State of Hawaii et al

Filing 14

ORDER Granting Defendants' Motion To Dismiss For Failure to State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted in re 4 . Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 2/13/12. (gls, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants re gistered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

WILLIAM RAMSEY,

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
HAWAII PAROLING AUTHORITY; )
STATE OF HAWAII; ROY REEBER; )
ALBERT TUFONO; GAIL
)
MURANAKA; JOHN DOES 1-10;
)
JANE DOES 1-10; DOE
)
CORPORATIONS; DOE
)
PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; AND DOE
)
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 1-10,
)
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 11-00694 JMS/KSC
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 26, 2011, Plaintiff William Ramsey (“Plaintiff”) filed a
Complaint in the First Circuit Court of the State of Hawaii, asserting that
Defendants Roy Reeber, Albert Tufono, and Gail Muranaka (collectively,
“Individual Defendants”), the Hawaii Paroling Authority (the “HPA”), and the
State of Hawaii (the “State”) (collectively together, “Defendants”), violated his due
process and equal protection rights when the HPA required him to participate in

the Sex Offender Treatment Program (“SOTP”) after Plaintiff had already served
his sentence for Sex Assault in the Third Degree. Defendants subsequently
removed the action to this court.
Currently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, in which
they argue that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Based on the following, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
As alleged in the Complaint, on August 18, 1994, Plaintiff was

convicted of Sex Assault in the Third Degree, punishable by up to five years
imprisonment, after a jury trial. Compl. ¶ 12. On October 28, 1994, Plaintiff was
sentenced to five years imprisonment. Id. ¶ 13. The Complaint asserts that
because Plaintiff could be sentenced up to a maximum of five years only, the State
could not order Plaintiff to complete any classes related to this conviction after he
completed his five-year sentence. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
Although Plaintiff completed his five-year sentence on August 17,
1999, Plaintiff remained in prison to serve a ten-year sentence for a burglary
conviction. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17. In 2010, Plaintiff appeared before the HPA for a parole
hearing, where HPA members Reeber and Muranaka were present. Id. ¶ 22. At
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the hearing, the HPA allegedly agreed that the State could not order Plaintiff to
participate in the SOTP because he had already “maxed out” on his sentence. Id.
¶ 24. Nonetheless, the Order Granting Parole, which Plaintiff signed, states that
Plaintiff must complete the SOTP. Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiff asserts that the HPA’s reversal that Plaintiff must complete
the SOTP violates his procedural and substantive due process rights, and equal
protection rights.
B.

Procedural Background
On October 26, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the First Circuit

Court of the State of Hawaii asserting claims against Defendants titled (1) Equal
Protection; (2) Injunction; and (3) Due Process. On November 16, 2011,
Defendants removed the action to this court.
On November 18, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff filed an Opposition on February 3, 2012, and Defendants filed their Reply
on February 10, 2012. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the court determines
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without a hearing.
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///
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss
a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This
tenet -- that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the
complaint -- “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations
in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of
action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice
and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”).
Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, “the factual allegations that are taken
as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to
require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and
continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Factual allegations that only permit
the court to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct” do not show that the pleader
is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the Complaint must be dismissed for a variety
of reasons. The court addresses their arguments in turn.
A.

Claims Against the State, the HPA, and Individual Defendants in Their
Official Capacities
Defendants correctly argue that neither states, state agencies, nor state

officials acting in their official capacities is generally considered a person for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989); Kaimowitz v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 951 F.2d 765, 767 (7th
Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1991). The only
exception to this rule is for state officials acting in their official capacities when
sued for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. See Will, 492 U.S. at 71
n.10 (explaining that state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective
relief are “persons” under § 1983 because “official-capacity actions for prospective
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relief are not treated as actions against the State”); see also Wolfe v. Strankman,
392 F.3d 358, 364-365 (2004) (permitting § 1983 claims for prospective injunctive
and declaratory relief against state officials acting in their official capacities).
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that his claims are proper pursuant to
Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), which held that local government entities are “persons” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. Plaintiff ignores, however, that he did not bring suit
against any local government entities, but rather brought this action against the
State, a State agency, and the State’s employees. Monell does not save Plaintiff’s
claims. See Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ.,
616 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has
expressly declined to extend Monell’s theory of municipal liability under § 1983 to
state entities”).
The court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against the State
and the HPA, and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the
Individual Defendants in their official capacities.
///
///
///

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B.

Damages Against the Individual Defendants
As to Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the Individual Defendants

in their individual capacities, parole board officials are entitled to absolute
quasi-judicial immunity “for decisions ‘to grant, deny, or revoke parole’ because
these tasks are ‘functionally comparable’ to tasks performed by judges.” See Swift
v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sellars v. Procunier,
641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981)). The basis of Plaintiff’s claims against the
Individual Defendants is that they told him at his parole hearing that he would not
need to complete the SOTP because Plaintiff had already completed his sentence
for Sex Assault in the Third Degree, yet the Order Granting Parole requires
Plaintiff to complete the SOTP. Such decision is clearly a decision to “to grant,
deny, or revoke parole.”
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Individual Defendants’
immunity extends to only their actions and decisions at the parole hearing, and not
their decision made after the parole hearing. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. Plaintiff’s
argument is not supported by the law -- quasi-judicial immunity broadly extends to
all parole decisions and is not limited to only those decisions and statements made
at a parole hearing. See Swift, 384 F.3d at 1189. As explained by Sellers, “parole
board members are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken when

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processing parole applications,” and “the same degree of protection [from civil
rights suits accorded to judges] must be accorded to the decision-making process of
parole board officials” so that the decision making process remains impartial.
Sellers, 641 F.2d at 1303 (emphasis added).
Because the Individual Defendants have absolute quasi-judicial
immunity for their decision to require Plaintiff to complete the SOTP, the court
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s damages claims against them in their individual capacities.
C.

Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims seek injunctive

relief against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities.1 For the
following reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
1.

Due Process
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated (1) his substantive due

process rights by requiring him to participate in the SOTP as a parole condition for
his burglary offense after he had already completed his sentence for Sex Assault in
the Third Degree, and (2) his procedural due process rights by stating at the parole
hearing that Plaintiff would not need to participate in the SOTP and then making it
1

The court recognizes that Plaintiff asserts a separate claim for an “injunction.” A claim
for injunctive relief, however, is not a stand-alone cause of action. See Teaupa v. U.S. Nat’l
Bank N.A., --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2011 WL 6749813, at *4 (D. Haw. Dec. 22, 2011). To the extent
Plaintiff seeks an injunction as a stand-alone claim, such claim is DISMISSED.
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a requirement of parole.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s general assertion that Defendants could
not require him to participate in the SOTP as part of the parole conditions on his
burglary conviction has no basis in law. It is well-settled that an inmate in Hawaii
has no right to parole -- “[t]here is no right under the Federal Constitution to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” Swarthout v.
Cooke, --- U.S.----, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam); Greenholtz v.
Nebraska, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), and Hawaii’s parole statute does not create a
liberty interest in parole. See, e.g., Mujahid v. Apao, 795 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (D.
Haw. 1992) (“[A] proper application of Greenholtz requires the court to conclude
that the Hawaii parole statute does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.”); Regan v. State, 2007 WL 4440956, at *2 (D. Haw. Dec. 19,
2007).
Further, the HPA may condition release on parole on “any special
terms and conditions the [HPA] finds necessary to protect the welfare and safety of
society and guard against future law violations.” Haw. Admin. R. § 23-700-35; see
also Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) §§ 353-65 and 353-69 (providing that the
HPA may establish rules having the force and effect of law and that the HPA may
not grant parole unless it appears “that there is a reasonable probability that the

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prisoner concerned will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and
that the prisoner’s release is not incompatible with the welfare and safety of
society”). As a condition to parole, the SOTP need not be limited to inmates
serving sentences for sex crimes. Indeed, the SOTP applies to any sex offender in
State custody “who would benefit from sex offender treatment,” HRS § 353E-1,
including those who have not been convicted of a sex crime and are serving
sentences for other offenses. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir.
1997) (explaining that “[u]nder the SOTP, a ‘sex offender’ is defined as someone
‘having been convicted, at any time, of any sex offense or [who] engaged in sexual
misconduct during the course of an offense,” and addressing due process claim of
inmate who had been charged, but not convicted, of a sex crime and who was
required to participate in the SOTP). Thus, because Plaintiff has no liberty interest
in parole and/or its conditions, Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s substantive
due process rights when they required that Plaintiff participate in the SOTP as
condition of parole for his burglary conviction.
What Plaintiff does have a liberty interest in, however, is not being
labeled a sex offender and required to participate in the SOTP without due process.
Yet Neal explains that Plaintiff has already received sufficient procedural due
process for this liberty interest. Specifically, Neal held that although the SOTP

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implicates an inmate’s liberty interest due to the “stigmatizing consequences” of
being labeled a “sex offender” and being subjected to mandatory treatment as a
precondition for parole eligibility,2 “an inmate who has been convicted of a sex
crime in a prior adversarial setting . . . has received the minimum protections
required by due process.” Id. at 831. In other words, the prior adjudication of the
sex crime offense provides the inmate sufficient procedural protections before
being labeled a “sex offender” and being required to participate in the SOTP.
Under such circumstances, “[p]rison officials need do no more than notify such an
inmate that he has been classified as a sex offender because of his prior conviction
for a sex crime.” Id.; Compare with Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that “prisoners who have not been convicted of a sex offense have a
liberty interest created by the Due Process Clause in freedom from sex offender
classification and conditions”).
As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff was convicted of Sex Assault in
the Third Degree. As a result, to the extent Plaintiff has a liberty interest against
being labeled improperly as a sex offender and being required to participate in the
SOTP, his jury trial on this offense afforded him procedural due process.
2

It is unclear from the allegations of the Complaint whether Plaintiff’s participation in
the SOTP was a precondition of parole eligibility, or simply a condition of his parole. From the
Order of Parole (submitted by both parties in their briefing and subject to judicial notice), it is
clear that the latter is the case. Such fact, however, does not affect the court’s analysis.
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Plaintiff’s due process claims therefore fail as a matter of law.
2.

Equal Protection
The basis of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is not clear. The

Complaint asserts that Defendants treated Plaintiff “differently from other
similarly-situated citizens without a rational basis to do so” in violation of
Plaintiff’s equal protection rights. Compl. ¶ 32. In comparison, Plaintiff’s
Opposition appears to attack the SOTP program as a whole by arguing that any
program that allows Defendants “to hold sex offenders in prison indefinitely if that
offender does not complete a course of instruction thought essential by the state”
violates Plaintiff’s liberty interests. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11-12.
As an initial matter, the allegations of the Complaint are so conclusory
that they fail to state a claim that is plausible on its face. To the extent Plaintiff
asserts that he is being treated differently than other similarly situated individuals,
the Complaint fails to identify who those similarly situated individuals may be and
how Plaintiff is being treated differently.
This pleading deficiency is not the only problem with this claim -Defendants’ actions that form the basis of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim are
subject to rational basis, not strict scrutiny review, which prevents Plaintiff from
stating a cognizable claim. Strict scrutiny applies only “if the aggrieved party is a

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member of a protected or suspect class, or otherwise suffers the unequal burdening
of a fundamental right.” United States v. Juvenile Male, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL
206263, at *8 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2012) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985)). Plaintiff has not pled that he is a member of a
protected or suspect class, and as explained above, that Plaintiff must participate in
the SOTP as a condition to parole does not implicate a fundamental right. See
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. Thus, to establish his equal protection claim, Plaintiff
“must demonstrate that he was treated differently from other similarly situated
prisoners and that the [the HPA] lacked a rational basis for its decision.” Wynn v.
Martel, 2012 WL 90404, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2012) (citing McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1973); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835
(9th Cir. 1991)).
The Complaint fails to allege these elements, and this failure cannot
be overcome. Defendants have a legitimate interest in treating sex offenders,
which the Hawaii Legislature has expressly recognized:
The legislature finds that sexual assault is a heinous
crime committed by offenders with deviant behavioral
patterns that cannot be controlled by incarceration alone.
Studies show that the recidivism rates of sex offenders
who undergo treatment are substantially lower than the
rates of those who are not treated.
See Doc. No. 13-2, Defs.’s Ex. C, S.B. No. 3371, 16th Leg. (Haw. 1992). The
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SOTP, on its face, is directed to this purpose of treating sex offenders and thereby
protect the public from further sex offenses committed by repeat offenders.
Plaintiff’s equal protection therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. Because granting leave to amend Plaintiff’s claims would be futile, this
dismissal is without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the
case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 13, 2012.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
_____________________________
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge

Ramsey v. Haw. Paroling Auth. et al., Civ. No. 11-00694 JMS/KSC, Order Granting Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

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