Torres v. Read et al

Filing 59

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT READ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON TORRES'S FEDERAL CLAIMS AND REMANDING TORRES'S STATE-LAW CLAIMS re 12 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 11/14/12. " For the reasons stated a bove, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Read on all federal claims (First, Second, and Third Causes of Action). The court remands the state-law claims (the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action) to the Circuit Court of the First Circu it, State of Hawaii. The clerk of Court is directed to send a certified copy of this order to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS READ, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
WILLIAM TORRES,

CIVIL NO. 11-724 SOM/BMK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
READ’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON TORRES’S FEDERAL
CLAIMS AND REMANDING TORRES’S
STATE-LAW CLAIMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT READ’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON TORRES’S FEDERAL CLAIMS
AND REMANDING TORRES’S STATE-LAW CLAIMS
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiff William Torres is suing Defendant Thomas Read

in his official and individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for constitutional and state-law violations in connection with an
alleged miscalculation of his sentence.

Torres claims that

Read’s miscalculation of his “maximum term release date” from
prison caused Torres to be released 53 days after he should have
been released.
Read now moves for summary judgment on all counts on
the grounds that: (1) as an employee of the State of Hawaii
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) at all times relevant to this
case, he may not be sued in his official capacity under § 1983;
(2) he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to federal
claims against him in his individual capacity; (3) the state tort
claims against him in his official capacity cannot proceed

because the state has not waived its sovereign immunity; and (4)
Torres does not plead a cognizable negligence claim.

See Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 12 (“Motion”).
The court grants Read’s motion for summary judgment on
Torres’s federal claims and remands all of Torres’s state-law
claims to state court.
II.

BACKGROUND FACTS.
This case involves a change in the way DPS calculated

an inmate’s “maximum term release date” (“MTRD”).

DPS says that

the change was a correction consistent with a state statute, and
that prior calculations had been erroneous.

The change involved

treating sentences imposed on an individual at different times as
running consecutively, although DPS had previously assumed they
ran concurrently.

The change therefore resulted in longer

custody periods for some inmates.
Torres is one of the inmates affected by the change.
The part of Torres’s life relevant to the present
motion begins on March 11, 1991, when Torres was sentenced to ten
years in prison on each of two counts of burglary in the first
degree before the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii.

See Judgment in Cr. No. 90-0399, ECF No. 13-2 (“First

Judgment”).

The First Judgment provided that the sentences on

both counts were “to be served concurrent with each other and
concurrent to any other sentence defendant is serving.”

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Id.

In a separate state case, Torres was sentenced to
probation for a separate burglary and three sexual abuse counts.
He violated the terms of his probation, leading the state court
to revoke probation and resentence him on May 17, 1991, to ten
years in prison for the burglary count and five years for each of
the sexual abuse counts, “with credit for time served.”

See

Judgment in Cr. No. 86-0994, ECF No. 13-3 (“Second Judgment”).
The Second Judgment provided that, “Said sentence is to be served
concurrently as to each Count.”

Id.

On April 23, 2000, the Hawaii Paroling Authority
released Torres from prison based on what it now says was an
incorrect calculation of his MTRD.

Decl. of Nettie Simmons

(“Simmons Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF 12-2; see also Dep’t of Corrections
Offense Data Sheet, ECF No. 13-4.
The DPS explains, “Prior to January 1, 2005, the
Department of Public Safety had a practice of treating all
sentences imposed at different times as running concurrent to
each other, unless the judgment stated they were to run
consecutively.”

Simmons Decl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 12-2.

“This

practice did not comply with HRS § 706-668.5, as it existed at
the time.”

Id.

At the time, Section 706-668.5 said, “Multiple

terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run
consecutively unless the court orders that the terms run
concurrently.”

On January 1, 2005, “a new written policy became

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effective which required that sentences imposed at different
times shall be treated as running consecutively to any other
sentence being served by the defendant, unless the judgment
stated they were to run concurrently.”

Simmons Decl. ¶ 15.

Torres did not remain free for very long after his
release in 2000.

Torres was sentenced on November 27, 2002, to

ten years in prison for each of three burglary counts, ten years
for kidnapping, and five years for unauthorized control of a
propelled vehicle.

See Judgment in Cr. No. 01-1-0548, ECF No.

13-5 (“Third Judgment”).

The Third Judgment provided for those

prison terms “to run concurrently with other.”

Id.

On October 19, 2009, Torres’s MTRD was calculated as
March 5, 2011.

9/19/09 Sentence Computation Form, ECF No. 13-6.

On March 1, 2011, just four days before Torres was scheduled to
be released, DPS reviewed Torres’s file and realized that
Torres’s previously calculated MTRD of March 5, 2011, was based
on the old DPS practice of assuming that sentences imposed at
different times ran concurrently.
12-2.

Simmons Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No.

DPS then revised its calculation so that Torres’s sentence

in the Third Judgment ran “consecutive with [the Second Judgment]
pursuant to HRS 706-668.5,” resulting in a new MTRD of January
22, 2018.

3/1/11 Sentence Computation Form, ECF No. 13-8.

DPS

sent a letter to Torres that same day advising him of his new
MTRD.

DPS Letter to Torres, ECF No. 13-9.

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On April 4, 2011, Torres filed a “Motion to Correct
Judgment” with the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii.

ECF No. 48-5.

On April 27, 2011, the Circuit Court of

the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, issued an amended Third
Judgment.

ECF No. 13-10 (“Amended Third Judgment”).

The Amended

Third Judgment provided: “THIS SENTENCE SHALL RUN CONCURRENTLY TO
ANY OTHER SENTENCES THE DEFENDANT IS CURRENTLY SERVING.”

Id.

On

April 28, 2011, DPS received notice of the Amended Third Judgment
and released Torres that same day.

Simmons Decl. ¶ 13.

Torres filed a lawsuit with the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, complaining that “he was not
released until 53 days after his MTRD.”
1-1 (boldface in original).

Am. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No.

Torres alleges that his

“overdetention came about as a result of Defendants’
recalculation of Plaintiff’s MTRD which Plaintiff was informed of
by letter dated 3/1/2011.”

Id. ¶ 7.

removed this action to this court.

On December 2, 2012, Read

Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.

In his Amended Complaint, Torres charges that
“Defendants are responsible to gather all the documents from the
court needed for calculating an accurate MTRD for Plaintiff.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 14.

Torres complains that “Defendants chose not to

call the court, check the court docket sheet (available on the
State web page)[,] call Plaintiff’s criminal defense counsel or
the Prosecutor’s Office to see if Plaintiff was right in his
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claim or go to court and check the record and file.”

Id. ¶ 19.

Torres says, “Had Defendants[] done such investigation they would
have learned the sentencing court ordered Plaintiff’s sentence be
concurrent for the court denied the prosecutor’s motion for
extended term and denied the prosecutor’s motion for consecutive
sentence.”

Id. ¶ 21.
Torres alleges that Read, then the Administrator for

DPS’s Offender Management Office, in his individual and official
capacities, is liable for: (1)a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process violation; (2) an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment claim; and (3) a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
unreasonable search and seizure claim.

Torres also raises the

following state-law claims: (4) violations of his “corresponding”
state rights to due process, privacy, and freedom from
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy, and
excessive punishment; and (5) negligence.

Torres seeks damages

as his relief.
III.

STANDARD.
Summary judgment shall be granted when “the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010).

Fed.

See Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198

F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

The movants must support their

position that a material fact is or is not genuinely disputed by
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either “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials”; or “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

“When the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986).

The nonmoving party must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630
(9th Cir. 1987).

All evidence and inferences must be construed

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
IV.

Id. at 631.

READ IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL FEDERAL
CLAIMS.
Torres’s federal constitutional claims against Read in

his official and individual capacities are all brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

Am. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1.

Read is entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law on all of Torres’s federal
claims asserted against him in his official and individual
capacities.
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Torres’s claims against Read in his official capacity
fail as a matter of law because a state official acting in his
official capacity may not be sued pursuant to § 1983.

Section

1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable . . . .
(Emphasis added.)

Neither a state nor a state official acting in

his official capacity is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

The

court therefore grants Read’s motion for summary judgment on all
federal claims against Read in his official capacity.
Torres’s claims against Read in his individual capacity
also fail.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from

individual liability for civil damages so long as their actions
do not violate clearly established federal statutory or
constitutional rights.
(2009).

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

The qualified immunity inquiry asks whether the

officer's conduct violated a constitutional right and whether the
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
misconduct.

Id.

Torres bears the burden of showing that the

right at issue was clearly established.
290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002).
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See Sorrels v. McKee,

In Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011), the
Ninth Circuit addressed claims by a different inmate against
Read.

The plaintiff in Alston, who is represented by the same

counsel as Torres, brought a similar overdetention claim against
Read and another DPS official.

Id.

Like Torres, Alston charged

that, when DPS reviewed his prison sentence pursuant to the new
DPS policy, DPS violated his right to be free from wrongful
incarceration by failing to review his court file to ensure that
DPS had the benefit of all relevant court documents in his case.
Id. at 1099.

Alston’s judgment “was silent as to whether the

sentence was to run concurrent or consecutive with previous
sentences.”

Id.

As in Torres’s case, the sentence in Alston was

recalculated by DPS to conform to Hawaii law.

Id.

The Ninth

Circuit held that Read was entitled to qualified immunity because
there was “no clearly established duty on a prison official to
review a prisoner’s original court records beyond those in his
institutional file on the facts of this case.”

Id. at 1100.

Torres does not dispute that DPS reviewed his
institutional file.

Rather, Torres blames Read for failing to go

beyond the scope of his file.

See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-22.

Torres

alleges that if Read had looked into Torres’s court record, Read
would have learned that the sentencing judge had denied the
prosecutor’s motion for a consecutive sentence.
situation clearly echoes the Alston decision.

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Id. ¶ 21.

This

Just as Read had

no clearly established duty to review the court file in Alston,
Read has no such duty here.
At the hearing on the present motion, Torres argued
that his Complaint addresses not only the due process and cruel
and unusual punishment issues raised in Alston, but also a Fourth
Amendment claim not raised in Alston.

Central to the Ninth

Circuit’s analysis in Alston, however, is whether prison
officials “would have understood that they were violating
Alston’s right to be free from wrongful incarceration by failing
to review his court file to ensure that they had received all
relevant court documents in his case.”

Alston, 633 F.3d at 1099.

The Alston inquiry goes to the heart of the Fourth Amendment
concept of an unreasonable seizure, and its holding therefore is
applicable to Torres’s Fourth Amendment allegations.
Alston, Read has qualified immunity here.

Pursuant to

The court therefore

grants Read summary judgment on all federal claims against him in
his individual capacity.
This decision leaves no pending federal claims against
Read.1

1

Read argues that, as this judge held in Beckstrand v.
Read, 2012 WL 4490717, at *5-6 (D. Haw. Sept. 26, 2012), a
defendant “should be allowed to rely on the very concept of a
judgment.” Reply at 3, ECF No. 51. Thus, Read says, Torres is
bound by the judgments entered by the state court. While this
court sees no inconsistency between its ruling in Beckstrand and
the present ruling, Read’s reliance on Beckstrand in the present
case contrasts with its pending appeal of that ruling.
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V.

THE COURT DECLINES TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION OVER TORRES’S STATE-LAW CLAIMS.
This case was removed to this court based on federal

question jurisdiction.

See Notice of Removal of Action to

Federal Court Based on Federal Question Jurisdiction, ECF No. 1.
Because the federal claims are no longer at issue, and because no
other basis for original jurisdiction exists, the court must
decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims against Read.
When the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the
exercise of jurisdiction over the remaining state claims is a
matter of the court’s discretion.
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

However, needless “decisions of state

law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties by procuring for them a sure-footed
reading of applicable law.”

Id. at 726.

Although the Supreme

Court has stated that dismissal or remand is not mandatory, it
has also recognized that, “in the usual case in which all
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of
factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine
--judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--will point
toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.”

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 n.7 (1988).

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The only claims remaining in this action concern
alleged state-law violations by Read.

The court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those remaining claims
and remands this case to state court.

See Calsbad Tech., Inc. v.

HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 637 (2009) (a district court may
properly remand a removed case to state court after declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims);
Cohill, 484 U.S. at 351 (a district court has discretion to
remand a case to best accommodate the values of economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity); Guzman v. Blockbuster, Inc.,
Civ. 09-00075 SOM/BMK, 2010 WL 931840, at *3 (D. Haw. Mar. 9,
2010).

Whether Torres may proceed under state law is a matter

left to the state courts to determine.
VI.

CONCLUSION.
For the reasons stated above, the court grants summary

judgment in favor of Read on all federal claims (First, Second,
and Third Causes of Action).

The court remands the state-law

claims (the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action) to the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii.
//
//
//
//
//

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The clerk of Court is directed to send a certified copy
of this order to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, November 14, 2012.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge

William Torres v. Read et al.; Civil No. 11-00724 SOM/BMK; ORDER GRANTING READ’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON TORRES’S FEDERAL CLAIMS AND REMANDING TORRES’S STATELAW CLAIMS.

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