Dela Cruz v. Child Welfare Services et al
Filing
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ORDER Granting Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment re 38 . Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 9/26/12. (gls, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
GINA DIANE INDA DELA CRUZ, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
PATRICIA McMANAMAN,
)
DIRECTOR OF CHILD WELFARE )
SERVICES, ALSO KNOWN AS
)
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES, )
ET AL.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
CIV. NO. 11-00747 JMS/RLP
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Gina Diane Inda Dela Cruz (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se,
asserts that Defendants Director of Child Welfare Services (“CWS”) Patricia
McManaman (“McManaman”)1 and social workers Carlene Greenlee (“Greenlee”)
and Patrice Bell (“Bell”) (collectively, “Defendants”)2 violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights when Plaintiff’s newborn daughter was taken into protective
1
McManaman is in fact Director of the State of Hawaii Department of Human Services
(the “DHS”). The Child Welfare Services is a division of the DHS.
2
Although Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lists only Patricia McManaman in the
caption, the court liberally construes the Amended Complaint as also naming Carlene Greenlee
and Patricia Bell as Defendants.
services and Plaintiff was prevented from having unsupervised visits with her
children.
Currently before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, in which they argue that this action should be dismissed with prejudice
because: (1) it is barred by claim preclusion, where Plaintiff previously brought
these same claims against Greenlee, Bell, and Lillian Koller (the former Director of
the DHS) in the Third Circuit Court for the State of Hawaii, Dela Cruz v. Child
Welfare Services, Civ. No. 10-0-0202 (the “State Action”), which was dismissed
on summary judgment, and (2) Plaintiff has failed to establish that McManaman
had any personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Based on the following, the court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
1.
Allegations in the Amended Complaint
As alleged in the Amended Complaint and as provided in its attached
exhibits, on December 18, 2009, Plaintiff gave birth to a baby girl at Hilo Medical
Center. Doc. No. 10, Am. Compl. ¶ 1; Am. Compl. Ex. G ¶ 1. Plaintiff disclosed
to hospital staff that she had a previous CWS case regarding her six other children
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who now live with their father (Plaintiff’s ex-husband), and the hospital staff
notified Child Protective Services (“CPS”) of Plaintiff’s new baby. See Am.
Compl. Ex. F. On December 21, 2009, Greenlee met with Plaintiff and the baby’s
father, Jamin Garcia (“Garcia”), and they agreed upon a safety plan that allowed
Plaintiff to leave the hospital with the baby. Id.
On December 23, 2009, Greenlee visited Plaintiff and Garcia at
Garcia’s house, and disclosed to Garcia’s family details regarding Plaintiff’s
previous CPS case and other confidential facts regarding Plaintiff. Am. Compl.,
¶¶ 5, 7; see also Am. Compl. Ex. G. at 6. As a result, Garcia’s family told Plaintiff
to leave the house. Am. Compl. Ex. A. That same day, Greenlee notified the
Hawaii County Police Department that Plaintiff was unable to take care of her
baby, and the baby was taken into protective custody. Am. Compl. Exs. C, G ¶ 9;
see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 9. According to Plaintiff, Greenlee should not have
used the information regarding her other CPS case to impact custody of her baby
because Plaintiff had not done anything harmful to her baby and Greenlee did not
otherwise evaluate her parenting skills. Am. Compl. Ex. G ¶¶ 4, 5. Plaintiff
further asserts that Greenlee diagnosed Plaintiff as mentally ill even though there
was no proper evaluation. Id. ¶ 5.
As to Bell, the Amended Complaint and exhibits explain that she was
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Plaintiff’s social worker on Plaintiff’s previous CPS case and began to counsel
Plaintiff regarding her newborn. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Bell has allegedly refused to allow
Plaintiff unsupervised visits with her children on the basis that Plaintiff “[is] not
ready yet,” and disregarded the progress Plaintiff has made in counseling and
parenting classes. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. The Amended Complaint further asserts that Bell
required Plaintiff to attend an anger management class, where Plaintiff was harmed
when another attendee attempted to hit Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Finally,
Plaintiff asserts that Bell “mess[ed] up my background by putting CPS classes that
my husband Gregory Dela Cruz did on me so I couldn’t get a job as a certified
nurses assistant . . . .” Id. at p. 5, ¶ 7.
Plaintiff seeks the return of her children and $20 million in damages.
2.
The State Action
On July 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Circuit Court of
the State of Hawaii (the “State Action”) asserting claims against the same
Defendants3 in this action, as well as some additional defendants. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, filed September 7, 2010, described her claims as “bad faith,
negligently interfering parental rights [sic], emotional distress, taking a child with
no proof of evidence, no probable cause, invasion of confidentiality and privacy,
3
Instead of McManaman, Plaintiff named the then-Director of the DHS, Lillian Koller.
4
[and] false police report,” and sought return of all seven of her children, the erasure
of all her CPS files, and $10 million in damages. Doc. No. 39, Defs.’ Concise
Statement, Ex. B. The Amended Complaint further asserted that Bell had
prevented Plaintiff from having her children for the past three years, and that
Greenlee lied about Plaintiff in court documents and took Plaintiff’s newborn
away. Id.
On May 23, 2011, the State Action Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. On July 19, 2011, the Third Circuit Court granted the Motion
with prejudice as to all Defendants. See id. Ex. C. Judgment was entered in that
case on April 24, 2012, notice of which was served on Plaintiff on May 4, 2012.
Id. Plaintiff did not appeal that Judgment. See Doc. No. 38, Molay Decl. ¶¶ 6-7;
see also Dela Cruz v. Child Welfare Services, Civ. No. 10-0-0202 (Haw. Cir. Ct.),
docket available at http:// hoohiki2.courts.state.hi.us/jud/Hookiki/
main.htm) (last visited September 21, 2012).
B.
Procedural Background
On December 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint and an
Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (“Application”).
On December 21, 2011, the court granted Plaintiff’s Application and dismissed the
Complaint with leave to amend to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damages claim against
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McManaman and/or Greenlee and Bell in their individual capacities, and/or a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim for injunctive relief against these individuals in their official
capacities. Leave was not granted, however, for Plaintiff to assert claims against
CWS, or to assert claims against any CWS employees in their official capacities.
On January 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint. On
February 3, 2012, CWS and McManaman filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that:
(1) McManaman could not be sued in her official capacity for monetary damages
in federal court; (2) Greenlee and Bell were immune from state law claims;
(3) Plaintiff could not state a claim for perjury against Greenlee and Bell; and
(4) Plaintiff’s claims were barred by claim preclusion. At the April 9, 2012
hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff clarified that she was asserting claims
for injunctive relief against Defendants in their official capacities, and claims for
damages against Defendants in their individual capacities. See Doc. No. 27. She
further clarified that she was not asserting state law claims against Defendants. Id.
In light of this clarification, the court issued an Order which deemed moot
Defendants’ first argument that McManaman could not be sued for damages in her
official capacity, as well as their second and third arguments related to state law
claims. Id. Defendants withdrew their final argument related to claim preclusion
at the April 9, 2012 hearing because, at the time, a final judgment had not been
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entered in the State Action.
Defendants subsequently obtained a final judgment in the State Action
and on June 7, 2012, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.
That same day, the court (1) notified Plaintiff via first class mail that her
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment was due by July 17, 2012, and
(2) outlined to Plaintiff her obligations in responding to the Motion. See Doc. No.
40. Plaintiff failed to file an Opposition by July 17, 2012, and as a result,
Defendants filed a Reply on July 23, 2012. On July 30, 2012, however, Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition, which this court granted
on August 1, 2012. On September 12, 2012, the court received Plaintiff’s
Opposition,4 and Defendants filed another Reply on September 24, 2012. The
court decides this Motion without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56(a) mandates summary judgment “against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
4
On September 13, 2012, Defendants filed a second Reply stating that Plaintiff failed to
file an Opposition. Given that Plaintiff filed an Opposition, the court considers only the Reply
filed on September 24, 2012.
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to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Broussard v. Univ. of
Cal. at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 1999).
“A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of
the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323); see also Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004). “When the moving party has
carried its burden under Rule 56[(a)] its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts [and] come forward
with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (citation and internal
quotation signals omitted); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986) (stating that a party cannot “rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading” in opposing summary judgment).
“An issue is ‘genuine’ only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on
which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a dispute is
‘material’ only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
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In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248). When considering the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the
court must draw all reasonable inferences on behalf of the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587; see also Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille
Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the evidence
of [the nonmovant] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in his favor” (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, this court will liberally
construe her pleadings. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam) (holding that the Supreme Court “instructs the federal courts” to liberally
construe the inartful pleadings of pro se litigants).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that Summary Judgment must be granted on
Plaintiff’s claims because they are barred by claim preclusion, and because
Plaintiff has failed to establish that McManaman had any personal involvement in
the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Based on the following, the court
agrees.
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A.
Claim Preclusion as to All Claims Against Greenlee and Bell, and as to
the Claim for Injunctive Relief Against McManaman
The court looks to Hawaii law to determine whether the judgment in
the State Action has preclusive effect. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) (“It is now settled that a federal court must give to a
state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment
under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”); see also Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“Congress has specifically required all federal
courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the
State from which the judgments emerged would do so.”). And, as the Ninth
Circuit has stated, “[i]n Hawaii the doctrine [of claim preclusion] is applied in a
robust way.” Albano v. Norwest Fin. Haw., Inc., 244 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir.
2001).
Under Hawaii law, claim preclusion prevents a party from relitigating
“not only . . . issues which were actually litigated in [a prior] action, but also . . . all
grounds of claim and defense which might have been properly litigated in the
[prior] action.” See Aganos v. GMAC Residential Funding Corp., 2008 WL
4657828, at *4 (D. Haw. Oct. 22, 2008) (quoting Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Haw. 43,
53, 85 P.3d 150, 160 (2004)). Defendants have “the burden of establishing that (1)
there was a final judgment on the merits, (2) both parties are the same or in privity
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with the parties in the original suit, and (3) the claim decided in the original suit is
identical with the one presented in the action in question.” Bremer, 104 Haw. at
54, 85 P.3d at 161. Defendants have established each of these elements.
First, the Judgment in the State Action is now final. That Judgment
was entered more than three months ago on April 24, 2012, and no appeal has been
filed. See Haw. R. App. P. 4 (“When a civil appeal is permitted by law, the notice
of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or appealable
order.”); see also Littleton v. State, 6 Haw. App. 70, 75, 708 P.2d 829, 833 (1985)
(“[A] judgment is final where the time to appeal has expired without an appeal
being taken.”) (quoting Glover v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560 (1958)).
Second, the parties in the State Action are the same as in this action.
Greenlee and Bell were Defendants in the State Action. Also, in the State Action
Plaintiff named Lillian Koller, then the Director of the DHS, as a Defendant in her
official capacity. “A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not
a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted). Thus, the
Director of the DHS, the position now held by McManaman, was a party to the
State Action.
Third, even though Plaintiff asserts some different facts between the
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State Action and this action, the claims in this action are the same as those in the
State Action. “To determine whether a litigant is asserting the same claim in a
second action, the court must look to whether the ‘claim’ asserted in the second
action arises out of the same transaction, or series of connected transactions, as the
‘claim’ asserted in the first action.” Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 71 Haw. 458, 464,
795 P.2d 276, 279 (1990) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)).
That is, claims arising out of the same transaction “constitute the same ‘claims’ for
[claim preclusion] purposes.” Id. As a result, claim preclusion “applies if the
issues ‘could have been raised in the earlier state court actions.’” Albano, 244 F.3d
at 1064 (citations omitted); see also Bremer, 104 Haw. at 53, 85 P.3d at 160
(observing that under Hawaii law “[t]he judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction . . . precludes the relitigation . . . of all grounds of claim and defense
which might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or
decided”).
Plaintiff’s claims against Greenlee, Bell, and McManaman in this
action clearly arise out of the same series of transactions as those in the State
Action -- the removal of Plaintiff’s daughter and her interactions with Bell,
Greenlee, and CWS. That is, while Plaintiff raises constitutional issues in this
action but raised tort law claims in the State Action, “all of the claims arise out of
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the same series of transactions . . . and are therefore the same claims.” Aganos,
2008 WL 4657828, at *5; see also Spinney v. Greenwich Cap. Fin. Prods., Inc.,
2006 WL 1207400, at *6 (D. Haw. May 3, 2006) (finding that the plaintiffs’ claims
for breach of contract and fraud stemming from a mortgage agreement and note
raises the same claims for purposes of claim preclusion as state action claims
brought by defendant that plaintiff defaulted on the mortgage and note).
Moreover, although Plaintiff brings a claim in this action under § 1983 which was
not contained in the State Action, Plaintiff could have brought her § 1983 claim in
the State Action.
In sum, all three requirements for claim preclusion have been met as
to Plaintiff’s claims against Greenlee and Bell, and as to her claims for injunctive
relief against McManaman. Accordingly, the court finds that the judgment in the
State Action has claim preclusive effect as to those claims, and GRANTS the
Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims against Defendants Greenlee and
Bell, and as to the claims for injunctive relief against McManaman.
B.
Claim Against McManaman for Damages
Defendants assert that summary judgment must be granted on
Plaintiff’s claims for damages against McManaman in her individual capacity
because she had no personal involvement with the alleged deprivations of
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Plaintiff’s rights.
A government official cannot be held liable for damages under
§ 1983 absent a showing of personal participation in the alleged deprivation of
rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a
person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be
a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is no
respondeat superior liability under section 1983.”).
As Defendants correctly assert, Plaintiff has presented no evidence
that McManaman participated in the alleged rights deprivation. Indeed, the only
reference to McManaman contained in the Amended Complaint is Plaintiff’s
assertion that McManaman is “responcible [sic] for her employees [sic] actions.”
Am. Compl. at 10. Even if Plaintiff did present evidence supporting this assertion,
Jones clearly establishes that McManaman is not responsible for the actions of her
employees. And in opposition, Plaintiff offers no evidence or even argument as to
why her claim against McManaman stands.
The court therefore GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Plaintiff’s claims for damages against McManaman in her individual capacity.
///
///
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment, and dismisses this action as to all claims and all parties.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, September 26, 2012.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
_____________________________
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
Dela Cruz v. Child Welfare Svcs. et al., Civ. No. 11-00747 JMS/RLP; Order Granting
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
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