L. et al v. State of Hawaii, Department of Education et al
Filing
32
ORDER AFFIRMING HEARINGS OFFICER'S NOVEMBER 29, 2011 DECISION: "On the basis of the foregoing, the Hearings Officer's November 29, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision is HEREBY AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED.". Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on September 25, 2012. (bbb, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
RACHEL L., individually and
)
on behalf of her minor child, )
JULIA L.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT
)
OF EDUCATION, and KATHRYN
)
MATAYOSHI, in her official
)
capacity as Acting
)
Superintendent of the Hawaii )
Public Schools,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 11-00756 LEK-BMK
ORDER AFFIRMING HEARINGS OFFICER’S NOVEMBER 29, 2011 DECISION
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Rachel L. (“Mother”),
individually and on behalf of her minor child, Julia L.’s
(“Student,” both collectively “Plaintiffs”), appeal from the
Administrative Hearings Officer’s (“Hearings Officer”)
November 29, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decision (“Decision”1) dismissing Plaintiffs’ Request for
Impartial Due Process Hearing (“RIH”), pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004 (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
June 12, 2012.
Plaintiffs filed their opening brief on
Defendants the Department of Education, State of
Hawaii, and Kathryn Matayoshi, in her official capacity as
1
The Decision is Exhibit 14 to the Administrative Record on
Appeal (“ROA”), at 122-152.
Superintendent of the Hawaii Public Schools (“Defendants” or “the
DOE”), filed their answering brief on July 16, 2012.
came on for hearing on August 27, 2012.
This appeal
Appearing on behalf of
Plaintiffs was Keith Peck, Esq., and appearing on behalf of
Defendants was Gary Suganuma, Esq.
After careful consideration
of the supporting and opposing memoranda, and the arguments of
counsel, the November 29, 2011 Decision is HEREBY AFFIRMED.
I.
Factual and Administrative Background
At the time in question, Student was twelve years old
and in the sixth grade at Redemption Academy.
Student is
eligible for special education and related services under the
IDEA in the category of autism.
Student’s former home school was
Kaelepulu Elementary School (“Former Home School”), and her
current home school is Kailua Intermediate School (“Current Home
School”).
Student attended Redemption Academy from 8:00 a.m.
until 1:00 p.m. and received services from Pacific Autism Center
from 1:15 p.m. until 3:30 p.m.
Mother has a doctorate in
clinical psychology and has worked for a local children’s
hospital in the area of pediatric trauma for seven years.
She
has a regular caseload and also handles emergencies, so she is
always at the hospital from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and sometimes
until 8:00 at night.
Mother and Student’s other parent (“Parent
#2,” collectively “Parents”) adopted student at twenty-two
months.
[Decision at 1, 4-5.]
2
Student’s Former Home School began preparing for
Student’s annual Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) meeting
approximately three months before an April 21, 2011 annual review
deadline.
On January 18, 2011, Student Services Coordinator
Peggy Yogi sent Mother an e-mail with a checklist of things to do
in order to prepare for Student’s annual IEP.
The e-mail stated
that Melanie Calleon would be Student’s Care Coordinator for the
The e-mail was sent to Mother’s email address,2 and
year.
Ms. Calleon was copied on the email.
Ms. Calleon is a licensed
special education teacher and was previously the Student Care
Coordinator when Student was in the first, second, and third
grades.
[Id. at 5.]
On February 24, 2011, Ms. Yogi sent Mother an e-mail
informing her that Ms. Calleon would be scheduling an observation
for the next week.
The e-mail asked Mother to provide a current
report card, progress reports on the IEP, and any other data that
would be relevant to writing Student’s annual IEP.
This e-mail
was sent to Mother’s email address and copied to Ms. Calleon.
On
February 25,2001, Teri Lynn Kim, Student’s teacher at Redemption
Academy, sent Ms. Calleon an email stating that Ms. Yogi had
informed her that Ms. Calleon would be scheduling a time for
observation and asked Ms. Calleon to contact her regarding
2
Mother’s original email dress includes Student’s last
name, and is therefore omitted. The Court instead refers to this
original email address as “Mother’s email address”.
3
obtaining approval for this observation.
Ms. Kim copied her
e-mail to Mother to Mother’s email address.
On February 28,
2011, Mother sent Ms. Calleon an e-mail regarding scheduling the
observation from Mother’s email address, and asked her to please
respond to this same address.
On March 1, 2011, Ms. Calleon sent
Ms. Kim an e-mail confirming the date and time of the classroom
observation and requesting current data, reports and any other
information on academic, behavior and social areas, and copied
Mother at Mother’s email address.
Ms. Kim replied to Ms.
Calleon’s March 1, 2011 email, and offered to have a telephone
conference after the observation period and requested a DOE
standard observation form.
Mother’s email address.
Mother was copied on the email at
Ms. Calleon replied the same day to this
email, again with a copy to Mother’s email address.
Mother sent
an e-mail to Ms. Calleon on March 3, 2011 confirming that Ms. Kim
would provide Ms. Calleon with a grade update and information
about progress “re IEP.”
The email also stated that Ms. Calleon
would be provided a copy of the “bx plan.”
Like the previous
emails, Mother sent this e-mail from Mother’s email address.
[Id. at 6-7.]
On March 4, 2011, Ms. Calleon observed Student for
approximately two hours in Student’s classroom at Redemption
Academy.
On March 22, 2011, Ms. Calleon sent an e-mail to
Ms. Kim to request Student’s report cards and information about
4
Ms. Kim’s availability between April 5 and April 15, 2011.
Ms. Calleon also sent an e-mail to Mother on March 22, 2011
asking for a copy of the “bx plan” referred to in Mother’s e-mail
of March 3, 2011 because it was not provided to Ms. Calleon when
she did her classroom observation.
The e-mail also asked about
Mother’s availability during the first two weeks of April so that
Ms. Calleon could schedule Student’s annual IEP meeting.
e-mail was sent to Mother’s email address.
This
Ms. Calleon sent
another e-mail to Mother at the same address on March 23, 2011
asking Mother to write a letter stating her desire for Student to
opt out of certain testing for the 2010-2011 school year.
[Id.
at 7-8.]
On March 30, 2011, Ms. Calleon sent Mother a letter as
an attachment to an e-mail about Student’s IEP, noting that it
due for review by April 21, 2011.
The letter offered meeting
times on April 12, 13, or 14, 2011.
It asked Mother to propose
alternatives dates and times before April 21 if those three dates
were not available, and asked for a response by April 6.
April 12, 2011 was set as the meeting date if there was no
response by April 6.
The letter offered Mother the option of
participating in the IEP meeting by telephone if she was not able
to participate in person.
The letter further stated that
Redemption Academy and Pacific Autism Center would be notified of
the three dates so they could be reserved and that both schools
5
would be notified once a date was finalized.
In addition, the
letter requested updated assessment information, report cards,
behavior support plans and relevant data because the information
had not been provided despite two previous requests.
The letter
was sent by email to Mother’s email address and was also sent by
regular mail to Mother.
Without receiving a response to her
March 30, 2011 letter and e-mail, Ms. Calleon sent Mother another
letter on April 1, 2011 that was identical to the March 30
letter, except that it changed the default date for the meeting
to April 14 if the DOE did not hear from Mother by April 6, 2011.
This letter was also sent by e-mail to Mother’s email address and
by regular mail.
[Id. at 8.]
The DOE mailed Plaintiffs a Conference Announcement
dated April 7, 2011 for a proposed conference on April 14, 2011
to review Student’s IEP plan.
Mother testified that she
responded to this announcement by sending a text message during
the noon hour on April 8, 2011 to the DOE stating that Parent #2
was leaving for the week and that the April 14, 2011 IEP meeting
needed to be cancelled.
No alternative dates were proposed.
Ms. Calleon phoned Mother back that day and left a voicemail
message requesting availability for the week beginning April 18,
2011.
Mother did not respond.
[Id. at 9.]
On April 8, 2011, the DOE sent Mother a draft IEP for
the period from April 15, 2011, through April 14, 2012.
6
In
addition to the voicemail message on April 8, 2011, the DOE
e-mailed Mother at Mother’s email address on April 11, 2011,
asking if April 19 or April 20, 2011 would be good days for the
IEP meeting.
About two hours later on April 11, 2011, receiving
no response from Mother, Ms. Calleon sent an e-mail to Mother
stating that the April 1, 2011 letter had asked for a response by
April 6 but that the DOE did not hear from Mother, and notified
her that the IEP meeting would go forward on April 14, 2011, but
that Mother could participate by telephone if she was unable to
personally attend.
If Mother was not able to personally attend,
the e-mail stated that another meeting would be scheduled to
review and revise the IEP.
A copy of this e-mail was also sent
by mail on April 13, 2011.
[Id. at 10.]
At 10:28 a.m. on April 13, 2011, Mother sent a text
message to Ms. Calleon stating that Parent #2 was traveling and
that Mother had cancelled the proposed IEP meeting the previous
week.
On the morning of April 14, 2011, Ms. Calleon sent an
e-mail to Mother’s same e-mail address, acknowledging receipt of
Mother’s text message of the previous day about canceling the
April 14 IEP meeting.
The e-mail indicated that the IEP meeting
was being held to meet the annual time line and that Ms. Calleon
would schedule another meeting to revise the IEP with input from
the entire team.
She requested that Mother send her three dates,
before May 6, 2011, that she would be available to meet.
7
The DOE
held Student’s annual IEP meeting on April 14, 2011 and the only
attendees were DOE personnel.
[Id. at 11.]
On Apri1 25, 2011, the DOE wrote Parents a letter with
enclosed copies of Prior Written Notices, the Apri1 14, 2011 IEP,
a Transition Plan dated April 14, 2011, and a Parent Rights and
Procedural Safeguards notice.
The letter was signed by the
Principal of Student’s Former Home School, sent by certified mail
on April 26, 2011, and signed for by Parent #2 on May 5, 2011.
The Apri1 25 letter stated that the IEP meeting went forward on
April 14 and that the DOE would like to meet with Parents to
review the proposed program and consider their input.
The letter
asked for three dates that Parents were available to meet and
review the DOE’s proposed IEP.
The letter also allowed for
Parents to participate by telephone if they were unable to attend
in person.
On May 11, 2011, Parent #2 left the Principal a phone
message, indicating that Parent #2 wanted to discuss the IEP.
The Principal asked Ms. Calleon to return Parent #2’s telephone
call, believing it was related to scheduling the meeting.
Ms. Calleon called Parent #2 back that day and left a message.
Later on May 11, 2011, Parent #2 called Ms. Calleon back and
requested that the Principal return her call because the
Principal was the person whom Parent #2 had left the message for.
The Principal called Parent #2 back later that day and Parent #2
told Principal that the preferred time for Parents to meet for an
8
IEP was on Friday mornings after 9:00 a.m.
[Id. at 12.]
On May 12, 2011, Ms. Calleon sent the other members of
the IEP team an e-mail advising that Parents were requesting a
meeting.
Based upon the Parents’ availability and the
forthcoming end of the school year, the only day to schedule the
meeting was Friday, May 27, 2011, at 9:30 a.m.
On May 13, 2011,
Principal left a phone message at Pacific Autism Center inviting
a representative to the May 27 IEP meeting.
On May 16, 2011,
Ms. Calleon sent Redemption Academy a follow-up e-mail to one
sent May 12, 2011, inviting a representative to attend the May 27
IEP meeting.
On May 20, 2011, Ms. Calleon sent Parents a meeting
notice for the May 27, 2011 IEP meeting by regular mail.
On
May 24, 2011, Ms. Calleon sent an e-mail to Mother at the same
email address requesting confirmation that Mother had received
the meeting notice for the May 27, 2011 meeting.
On May 25,
2011, Principal called Parent #2 to ask if Parents were coming to
the May 27 revision IEP.
Parent #2 told her that they were not.
Principal thereafter instructed Ms. Calleon to notify the rest of
the IEP team that the meeting was cancelled.
[Id. at 12-13.]
On June 4, 2011, Mother sent Ms. Calleon an e-mail in
reply to Ms. Calleon’s e-mail dated May 24, 2011 stating that
“this is no longer my active email for quite some time” and
informing Ms. Calleon of Mother’s new e-mail address.
11-12.]
[Id. at
According to Mother, she informed the DOE that her
9
e-mail address had changed at a meeting with a DOE autism
specialist and Ms. Yogi on February 11, 2011, but that
Ms. Calleon was not at this meeting.
Mother did not send any DOE
personnel any written notice, either by letter or e-mail, that
her e-mail address had changed prior to June 4, 2011.
[Id. at
4.]
The April 14, 2011 IEP provided Student with the same
Extended School Year (“ESY”) services as in her previous IEP.
She was to receive services after a break of one day, and begin
ESY services on the second day.
On June 14, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their RIH with the
DOE.
[ROA at 4-7.]
The RIH asserts that Student’s IEP dated
April 14, 2011 denied Student a Free Appropriate Public Education
(“FAPE”).
The RIH sought the following:
1.
Award reimbursement to Petitioners for
expenses related to the evaluation, consultation
and observations for Student in assessment of
Students’ needs by privately obtained
professionals;
2.
award reimbursement to Petitioners for any
educational and related expenses incurred for
[her] education and related expenses through the
Pacific Autism Center and through support
providers[.]
[Id. at 6-7.]
The Hearings Officer convened the due process hearing
on September 29, 2011, and the parties filed written closing
arguments.
[Decision at 4.]
10
The Hearings Officer framed the issues presented as
whether the April 14, 2011 IEP resulted in a denial of FAPE
because:
a. The IEP was conducted without a parent in
attendance even though the parent timely informed
the Respondent of her unavailability.
b. The IEP was insufficient because the DOE
developed no Behavioral Support Plan for the
offered placement.
c. The Extended School Year services were
improperly constituted where they failed to
consider Student’s individual needs during breaks.
d. The offered “Transition Plan” is
insufficient to support the Student’s transfer
from her current program into the offered program
and placement, “and is not an element of the IEP
offer.”
[Id. at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).]
A.
Parental Participation at the April 14, 2011 Meeting
The Hearings Officer ruled that Plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the April 14, 2011 IEP was improperly conducted
without a parent in attendance resulting in a denial of FAPE.
The Decision states as follows:
In the present case, the Hearings Officer
concludes that the DOE made reasonable efforts to
find a mutually convenient date for the IEP
meeting. The DOE tried to accommodate Mother’s
desire to have Parent #2 attend the meeting as
well as Mother. The DOE sent a draft IEP of great
length on April 8, 2011 so that Mother and Parent
#2 would be apprised in advance of what the DOE
was thinking for this potentially lengthy and
complicated IEP. As discussed more fully below,
the DOE adequately communicated the proposed IEP
meeting date to Mother, presented some alternative
dates, and received no cooperation from Mother in
scheduling the meeting. Mother never presented
any alternative dates.
11
In addition, the DOE was faced with the
statutory deadline of April 21, 2011 per the
annual review requirement of 20 U.S.C.
§1414(d)(4)(A) and 34 C.F.R. §300.324(b). This
situation is basically the same as the one facing
the school district in the [E.P. v. San Ramon
Valley Unified School District, No. C05-01390 MJJ,
2007 WL 1795747 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2007),] case.
Holding the IEP meeting before the statutory
deadline was not an instance of scheduling the
meeting for the convenience of the DOE
representatives’ schedules.
Further, the DOE always recognized that the
Apri1 14, 2011 IEP was not necessarily the final
version of the IEP. There was ample time to
revise that IEP before the start of the next
school year, and the DOE promptly initiated steps
to set up a revision IEP meeting where Parents
would be in attendance and personally submit their
concerns. Parents inexplicably failed to
participate in the revision meeting set up to meet
their schedule demands.
Petitioners rely on the portion of the
Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified School
District[, 317 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2002),] opinion
that states: “After-the-fact parental involvement
is not enough.” 317 F.3d at 1078. That statement
was made, however, with reference to a factual
context where there was no need for the IEP
meeting to be held on the date chosen by the
district other than the convenience of the
district representatives’ schedule, no
acknowledgment by the district that the IEP
prepared at the meeting without the parents was
only “proposed,” and no effort by the district to
promptly schedule an IEP with the parents to go
over the “proposed” IEP.
In E.P. v. San Ramon Valley Unified School
District, supra, the district offered the parents
another IEP meeting later in the school year
(which was much later than in this case where the
additional IEP meeting was offered well before the
relevant school year started). The parents relied
on the above statement from the Shapiro case, but
the Court did not view that statement as a per se
test. There, as here, the district did not
present a completed IEP to the parents on a “takeit-or-leave-it” basis and offered a “safety net”
12
of an additional IEP meeting to consider the
parents’ concerns. The statement from the Shapiro
case relied upon by Petitioners herein must be
viewed in the entire context of events. Here, as
in the E.P. v. San Ramon Valley Unified School
District case, the statement does not compel a
decision by the Hearings Officer in favor of
Petitioners.
[Id. at 20-21.]
The Hearings Officer also found that “Mother
failed to reasonably cooperate in setting up a meeting date prior
to the statutory deadline.
To the contrary, her actions
undermined the DOE’s ability to set up that meeting.”
[Id. at
21.]
The Hearings Officer concluded that Plaintiffs failed
to show that the April 14, 2011 IEP meeting was improperly
conducted without a parent in attendance and resulted in a denial
of FAPE.
B.
[Id. at 26.]
Behavioral Support Plan
Under the April 14, 2011 IEP, Student was to attend the
Current Home School for the 2011-2012 school year, as she was
moving from elementary school to intermediate school.
The
Hearings Officer found that it “would not have been ethical to
prepare a functional behavior analysis (“FBA”) and a [behavioral
support plan (“BSP”)] for the new Home School because Student had
never been in the new Home School environment.”
[Id. at 15.]
As to whether the Student was denied FAPE because no
BSP was in place at the time of the offer, the Hearings Officer
concluded as follows:
13
Petitioners’ request for impartial hearing
alleged that the DOE’s offer of FAPE was not
appropriate because no behavioral support plan
(“BSP”) had been developed for Student at the time
of the offer. Petitioners made no mention of this
claim in either their Opening Brief or their
Closing Brief.
The DOE had developed a sufficient plan for
establishing Student’s BSP upon Student starting
at the new Home School, so that a BSP or
equivalent thereof would cover Student at the
offered placement.
Petitioners have not met their burden that
the April 14, 2011 IEP was insufficient
because of the lack of a BSP.
[Id. at 27.]
C.
Extended School Year Services
As to Plaintiff’s ESY claims, the Hearings Officer
noted that these same ESY services were provided in Student’s
previous IEP, which was developed with the Parents’ input.
He
concluded that the ESY provision “was appropriate based upon the
information available to the DOE and could have been revised if
necessary when input was received from Parents.”
[Id. at 14.]
He then ruled that:
Petitioners’ request for impartial hearing
alleged that the DOE’s offer of FAPE was not
appropriate because Extended School Year Services
(“ESY”) were improperly constituted because they
failed to consider Student’s individual needs
during breaks. Petitioners made no mention of
this claim in either their Opening Brief or their
Closing Brief.
The provision of ESY services after one day
was sufficient for Student’s individual
needs.
Petitioners have not met their burden to show
that the ESY services in the April 14, 2011 IEP
14
failed to properly consider Student’s individual
needs during school breaks.
[Id. at 27.]
D.
Transition Plan
With respect to Student’s Transition Plan, the Decision
states as follows:
Petitioners’ request for impartial hearing alleged
that the DOE’s offer of FAPE was not appropriate
because of an insufficient transition plan.
Petitioners made no mention of this claim in
either their Opening Brief or their Closing Brief.
The DOE’s transition plan was sufficient to
support the Student’s transfer to a new school
environment contemplated by the April 14, 2011
IEP.
Petitioners may be claiming through the
handwritten addition to their typed request for
impartial hearing that a transition plan needed to
be a part of the IEP. However, there is no
requirement that the IEP include a transition plan
when, as here, a student is transferring from a
private school back to the home public school.
B.B. v. State of Hawaii, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D.
Haw. 2006); James M. v. State of Hawaii, 2011 WL
1750718 (D. Haw. 2011).
Petitioners have not met their burden to show
that the offered transition plan was insufficient
or that it was required to be an element of the
IEP offer.
[Id. at 27-28.]
E.
Private Placement
Although Plaintiffs introduced evidence that Student’s
private placement would be appropriate for the 2011-2012 school
year, the Hearings Officer concluded that the issue was moot
because Plaintiffs did not establish a denial of FAPE.
28.]
15
[Id. at
The Hearings Officer ultimately concluded that
Plaintiffs failed to prove that the April 14, 2011 IEP denied
Student a FAPE.
RIH.
II.
[Id.]
The Hearings Officer therefore dismissed the
The instant action followed.
Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief
Plaintiffs argue that holding the April 14, 2011 IEP
meeting without a parent present resulted in a denial of FAPE.
They argue that the IDEA’s procedural safeguards were violated,
and that the DOE improperly changed Student’s IEP placement “from
a private regular education school, where she had been attending
for many years, to a public special education classroom.”
[Opening Br. at 2.]
A.
Lack of Parental Participation
Plaintiffs first argue that the DOE did not satisfy the
requirements for holding an IEP meeting with a parent in
attendance.
They assert that under the relevant regulations, a
meeting may be conducted without a parent present only if the DOE
is unable to convince the parents that they should attend.
[Id.
at 4 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(d), Haw. Admin. R. § 8-6046(d)).]
Plaintiffs claim that they never told the DOE that they
refused to attend IEP meetings, only that they wanted to
reschedule the April 14, 2011 meeting.
[Id. at 4-6.]
They argue
that the facts here are similar to those in Shapiro v. Paradise
Valley Unified School District, 317 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2002),
16
because the DOE prioritized its personnel’s schedules over that
of the Parents.
Further, they argue that the impending April 21,
2011 annual review date does not affect the legal requirements
for parental participation in IEP meetings.
According to
Plaintiffs, failing to hold the annual IEP by the review date
“would not have denied Student a FAPE.”
[Id. at 9.]
Plaintiffs also contend that any participation afterthe-fact does not cure the initial denial of a FAPE.
They argue
that the Parents must have been included in the creation of the
IEP at the April 14, 2011 meeting.
They suggest that the DOE
“could have required consent from the parent to extend the prior
IEP for an additional month, or postponed the meeting by having
parent agree to republish the prior IEP of April 21, 2010.”
[Id.
at 12.]
B.
Private Placement Was Appropriate
Plaintiffs next argue that the Hearings Officer erred
when he did not consider whether Student’s private placement was
appropriate.
Student’s “private regular education school was
determined appropriate by the administrative tribunal prior to
the April 11, 2011 IEP meeting.”
[Id. at 13.]
Plaintiffs also appear to invoke the IDEA’s stay-put
provision in their Opening Brief.
They state that the private
school programs were “Student’s ‘current placement’ at the time
her parent challenged the change in her placement. . . .
17
Student
was placed at this school through her last agreed upon IEP, which
makes the private school her placement during the pendency of
this appeal, and makes the school district responsible for its
funding.”
C.
[Id.]
Transition Plan and Additional Supports
Plaintiffs assert that the IEP did not include any
additional supports to help student move to her proposed
placement in public intermediate school.
They state that the DOE
developed a Transition Plan, but that it was not incorporated
into the IEP and developed by the IEP team.
[Id. at 14-5.]
III. Defendants’ Answering Brief
The DOE asks the Court to affirm the Hearings Officer’s
Decision in its entirety.
The DOE asserts that Plaintiffs’
challenges to the Decision are strictly as to the law that was
applied by the Hearings Officer because the Opening Brief does
not challenge any of the Hearings Officer’s factual
determinations.
[Answering Br. at 3-4.]
As to the issues on appeal, the DOE notes that
Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief does not challenge or address the
Hearings Officer’s rulings on the BSP and ESY issues.
5 n.2.]
[Id. at 4-
The DOE contends that the only issues properly before
the Court in this appeal are: (1) whether it was proper for the
DOE to hold the April 14, 2011 IEP meeting without a parent in
attendance; and (2) whether the offered Transition Plan is
18
sufficient to support the Student’s transfer from private school
to public school.
A.
[Id. at 5.]
Unchallenged Factual Determinations
The DOE first argues that the Hearings Officer’s
Factual determinations are unchallenged, and should be accepted
as true, including the determination that Mother’s conduct
undermined the DOE’s ability to set-up Student’s annual IEP
meeting.
It argues that neither the Opening Brief nor the
Complaint contains any challenge or argument that the Hearings
Officer erred with respect to any of his factual determinations,
and accordingly, the unchallenged factual determinations should
be accepted as true.
[Id. at 22.]
As to Plaintiffs’ claims at the due process hearing
that Parents did not receive certain correspondence from the
school in an attempt to explain the Mother’s lack of
responsiveness, the DOE argues that such claims were contradicted
by the evidence.
The DOE argues that Plaintiffs’ claim that they
did not receive key correspondence from the school “is not
believable,” and opine that “Parents ignored the correspondence,
or chose not read it, but they certainly received them.
Defendants submit that there was clearly a lack of good faith on
the Parents’ part.”
[Id. at 25.]
Further, a lack of good faith
is “evident from their failure to attend the revision IEP meeting
offered to them by the school to give them a chance to provide
19
their input and voice any concerns they had with the IEP.”
B.
[Id.]
No Denial of FAPE
The DOE next argues that the Hearings Officer correctly
determined that holding Student’s annual IEP meeting without a
parent in attendance did not deny student a FAPE under the
circumstances presented.
The DOE maintains that Parents made no
effort to work with the school to schedule the IEP meeting, never
selected a date offered by the school for the IEP, did not
propose alternative dates to the school, or advise them of their
availability for the IEP.
C.
[Id.]
Transition Plan
According to the DOE, at the administrative hearing
below, Plaintiffs did not present any evidence in support of the
claim that the Transition Plan was inadequate.
Moreover, they
argue that the Transition Plan was comprehensive and included
four phases to transition Student to public school during the
summer of 2011, in which Redemption Academy and Pacific Autism
Center would work collaboratively with the Current Home School.
To the extent Plaintiffs fault the Transition Plan for not being
part of the April 14, 2011 IEP, the DOE notes that there is no
requirement that an IEP include a transition plan where the
student is transferring from a private to a public school.
at 34-35.]
20
[Id.
D.
Stay Put
The DOE contends that Student is not entitled to “stay
put” placement at Pacific Autism Center because any procedural
defect was caused by Parents.
According to the DOE, Plaintiffs
simply claim that the school’s holding of the annual IEP meeting
without them constituted a per se violation, without challenging
the content of the IEP, or the Hearings Officer’s factual
determination that Mother’s failure to reasonably cooperate in
the scheduling of the meeting prevented the DOE from holding the
meeting on a date agreeable to Parents.
[Id. at 36-37.]
The DOE urges the Court to affirm the Decision in its
entirety.
STANDARDS
I.
IDEA Overview
“The IDEA is a comprehensive educational scheme,
conferring on disabled students a substantive right to public
education and providing financial assistance to enable states to
meet their educational needs.”
Hoeft ex rel. Hoeft v. Tuscon
Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310, 108 S. Ct. 592, 597, 98 L. Ed.
2d 686 (1988)).
It ensures that “all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public education that
emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
21
employment, and independent living[.]”
20 U.S.C. §
1400(d)(1)(A).
The IDEA defines FAPE as
special education and related services that –
(A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and
without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary school, or secondary school
education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program required
under section 1414(d) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
To provide a FAPE in compliance with the
IDEA, a state educational agency receiving federal funds must
evaluate a student, determine whether that student is eligible
for special education, and formulate and implement an IEP.
generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414.
See
The IEP is to be developed by an
“IEP Team” composed of, inter alia, school officials, parents,
teachers and other persons knowledgeable about the child.
§
1414(d)(1)(B).
“Procedural flaws in the IEP process do not always
amount to the denial of a FAPE.”
L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch.
Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Once a procedural violation of the IDEA is identified, the court
“must determine whether that violation affected the substantive
rights of the parent or child.”
Id. (citations omitted).
22
“[P]rocedural inadequacies that result in the loss of educational
opportunity, or seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to
participate in the IEP formulation process, clearly result in the
denial of a FAPE.”
Id. (alteration in original) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Compliance with the IDEA does not require school
districts to provide the “absolutely best” or “potentialmaximizing” education.
J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626
F.3d 431, 439 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Rather, school districts are required to provide
only a “‘basic floor of opportunity.’”
Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ.
of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201
(1982)).
The FAPE need only be “appropriately designed and
implemented so as to convey [the] [s]tudent with a meaningful
benefit.”
Id. at 433 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
If a parent disagrees with the contents of an IEP, the
parent may challenge the contents thereof by demanding an
administrative due process hearing to be conducted by the local
or state educational agency.
(f)(1)(A).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6),
Parents may also send their student to a private
program and seek retroactive tuition reimbursement from the
state.
See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484,
2493, 2496 (2009) (citations omitted).
Where parents
unilaterally withdraw a child from public school, they “do so at
23
their own financial risk.”
quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2496 (citations and internal
Parents challenging an IEP are
entitled to reimbursement only if “a federal court concludes both
that the public placement violated IDEA and the private school
placement was proper under the Act.”
Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c).
II.
Standard of Review
The standard for district court review of an
administrative decision under the IDEA is set forth in 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C), which provides:
In any action brought under this paragraph, the
court –
(i) shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings;
(ii) shall hear additional evidence at the
request of a party; and
(iii) basing its decision on the
preponderance of the evidence, shall grant
such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.
This standard requires that the district court give
“‘due weight’” to the administrative proceedings.
L.M. v.
Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690
(1982)) (some citations omitted).
The district court, however,
has the discretion to determine the amount of deference it will
accord the administrative ruling.
24
J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno
Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir.
1987)).
In reaching that determination, the court should
consider the thoroughness of the hearings officer’s findings,
increasing the degree of deference where said findings are
“‘thorough and careful.’”
L.M. v. Capistrano, 556 F.3d at 908
(quoting Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d
884, 892 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The district court should give
“substantial weight” to the hearings officer’s decision when the
decision “evinces his careful, impartial consideration of all the
evidence and demonstrates his sensitivity to the complexity of
the issues presented.”
Cnty. of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ.
Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation
and quotation marks omitted)).
Such deference is appropriate
because “if the district court tried the case anew, the work of
the hearing officer would not receive ‘due weight,’ and would be
largely wasted.”
Wartenberg, 59 F.3d at 891.
“[T]he ultimate
determination of whether an IEP was appropriate,” however, “is
reviewed de novo.”
A.M. ex rel. Marshall v. Monrovia Unified
Sch. Dist., 627 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Wartenberg,
59 F.3d at 891).
A court’s inquiry in reviewing IDEA administrative
decisions is twofold:
“First, has the State complied with the procedures
set forth in the Act? And second, is the
25
individualized educational program developed
through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated
to enable the child to receive educational
benefits?” [Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07]
(footnotes omitted). “If these requirements are
met, the State has complied with the obligations
imposed by Congress and the courts can require no
more.” Id. at 207.
J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir.
2010) (some citations omitted).
The burden of proof in IDEA appeal proceedings is on
the party challenging the administrative ruling.
Hood v.
Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted).
The challenging party must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the hearing decision should
be reversed.
J.W., 626 F.3d at 438 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.
Parental Participation
Plaintiffs argue that the DOE denied Mother her right
to participate in Student’s IEP meetings and therefore denied
Student a FAPE.
This Court has previously recognized that:
School districts have an affirmative obligation to
take steps to ensure that parents of a student are
present at IEP meetings or otherwise have the
opportunity to participate. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.322(a). This obligation includes scheduling
a meeting at a mutually agreed upon time and
place, providing reasonable notice of this
meeting, and using alternative methods, such as
individual or conference telephone calls, to
ensure parent participation. § 300.322(a)-(c).
Hailey M. ex rel. Melinda B. v. Matayoshi, Civil No. 10–00733
26
LEK–BMK, 2011 WL 3957206, at *24 (D. Hawai‘i Sept. 7, 2011).
When an IEP meeting is held without a parent in
attendance, the DOE must keep a record of its attempts to
facilitate parental participation as follows:
(d) Conducting an IEP Team meeting without a
parent in attendance. A meeting may be conducted
without a parent in attendance if the public
agency is unable to convince the parents that they
should attend. In this case, the public agency
must keep a record of its attempts to arrange a
mutually agreed on time and place, such as-(1) Detailed records of telephone calls made
or attempted and the results of those calls;
(2) Copies of correspondence sent to the
parents and any responses received; and
(3) Detailed records of visits made to the
parent’s home or place of employment and the
results of those visits.
34 C.F.R. § 300.322(d).
Here, the DOE kept detailed records of
its communications with Parents, and those records were not
disputed at the administrative hearing below.
Plaintiffs rely on Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 69, 317 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003), in which
the Ninth Circuit emphasized “the importance of parental
participation in the IEP process,” stating that the IDEA requires
parental presence at IEP meetings “unless they affirmatively
refuse to attend.”
The Ninth Circuit’s finding that a school
district had violated the IDEA by holding the IEP meeting without
the parents turned on facts that are somewhat distinguishable
27
from those present here.
The Shapiro school district had
scheduled the IEP meeting for a date when the parents could not
attend; when the parents asked to reschedule, the school district
refused.
Id. at 1075.
The Ninth Circuit held that it was the
convening of the meeting without any attempt to accommodate the
parents that violated the IDEA, not the mere holding of the
meeting without the parents.
Id. at 1078.
Here, the DOE
attempted to reschedule the meeting on several occasions, but
Mother was non-responsive, and the DOE then held the meeting
anyway.
With respect to Mother’s claim that she may not have
received correspondence because it was sent to her former e-mail
address, the DOE persuasively argues that such a claim is not
supported by the evidence.
For example, Mother claimed that in
February 2011 she shut down her former e-mail address and
switched to a new e-mail address.
Correspondence showed,
however, that Mother sent e-mail from the alleged former account
in early March 2011.
The DOE notes that:
On cross-examination, Mother admitted that she
continued to have access to her former e-mail
account to at least late May 2011, though she
claims she rarely checked the account. On June 4,
2011, Mother sent [Student Care Coordinator
(“SCC”)] Calleon an e-mail in response to a May
24th e-mail that SCC Calleon sent to (Mother’s
former e-mail address) advising for the first time
that she preferred to be e-mailed at [new email
address]. This clearly shows that as of late May,
Mother still had access to e-mails sent to
(Mother’s e-mail address). SCC Calleon testified
28
that at no time prior to June 4, 2011 e-mail did
Mother ever notify her that her e-mail address had
changed or that she preferred receiving e-mails at
a different e-mail address. . . . Interestingly,
Mother even denied receiving SSC Calleon’s e-mail
to her dated January 18, 2011, at a time when
there is no dispute that her e-mail address was
(Mother’s e-mail address). This shows that Mother
was either irresponsible with checking her
e-mails, or she was not being truthful.
[Answering Br. at 24-25 (citations omitted).]
The Court accepts the Hearings Officer’s uncontested
findings that:
Mother failed to reasonably co-operate in setting
up a meeting date prior to the statutory deadline.
To the contrary, her actions undermined the DOE’s
ability to set up that meeting.
•
•
•
Mother claims to have informed the DOE in
early February that her e-mail address had
changed but unreasonably failed to confirm
this in writing so that all relevant DOE
personnel such as [Ms. Calleon], plus [Ms.
Kim at Redemption Academy], would be sure to
have the new address.
After supposedly changing e-mail addresses,
Mother continued to communicate with [Ms.
Calleon] using the old e-mail address. She
did not use those communications to inform
[Ms. Calleon] to use a different e-mail
address. Instead, Mother’s e-mails directed
[Ms. Calleon] to respond to the old e-mail
address. [Ms. Calleon] reasonably continued
to use the old e-mail address through the end
of May 2011, after which Mother finally
informed [Ms. Calleon] to use a different
e-mail address.
Mother’s testimony that she could anticipate
well in advance that mid-April would be a
time of emergencies at her work was not
credible, and there was no evidence that
Mother was not actually available on all days
in the mid-April time frame proposed by the
DOE.
29
•
•
•
•
•
Mother wanted at least two weeks advance
notice of a meeting so that she could plan
her work schedule but never informed the DOE
of this requirement prior to the April 14,
2011 IEP.
After the April 14 IEP, the DOE was informed
that Parents could be available only on
Fridays for the revision IEP. There was no
explanation for this extremely limited time
period of availability, and without an
explanation this was an unreasonable
restriction. Further, Parents never informed
the DOE before the April 14 IEP of this
limited time of availability.
Mother made an excuse about not easily
getting certified mail because of not being
home during the day and having to find time
to go to the post office to pick up the
certified mail, but none of the critical
communications regarding the April 14, 2011
IEP meeting were sent by certified mail.
Mother made an excuse about possibly not
receiving regular mail because one or the
other of the two children in her household
could have retrieved the mail in a way that
prevented Parents from seeing it. This was
purely speculative, and, in any event, is the
fault of Parents and not the DOE.
Parents abruptly cancelled the revision IEP
meeting without any stated reason and
Petitioners presented no evidence that
demonstrated the cancellation was reasonable.
[Decision at 21-23.]
With these uncontested facts in mind, the Court
considers similar cases in this district that have addressed
parental participation requirements.
In A.R. v. Hawaii Dept. of
Educ., Civil No. 10–00174 SOM/RLP, 2011 WL 1230403, at *8 (D.
Hawai‘i Mar. 31, 2011), the district court affirmed the Hearings
Officer’s finding that the DOE did not deny the student a FAPE
when it failed to provide a written IEP before the start of the
30
school year where the failure was the result of “obstruction and
delay” or “lack of cooperation” on the part of the student’s
mother.
The Hearings Officer in that case emphasized the
mother’s “failure to return telephone messages, failure to
follow-through with scheduling, late notice of cancellation,
pre-determination of private placement, and lack of cooperation.”
Id.
This Court recently ruled in another case, however,
that the DOE denied a student a FAPE by not allowing the mother a
reasonable opportunity to attend an IEP meeting, where the mother
was an active participant in the formulation of the IEPs and
desired to be included in the meeting, but the DOE would not
reschedule the meeting to reasonably accommodate her schedule.
This Court explained in J.T. ex rel. Renee T. v. Dep’t of
Education, Civil No. 11–00612 LEK–BMK, 2012 WL 1995274, at *23-24
(D. Hawai‘i May 31, 2012), as follows:
The DOE informed Renee T. of the meeting the
day before the meeting. Renee T. asked that they
reschedule the meeting on March 5, 2010. The DOE
was unable to contact Renee T. on March 3, 2010,
and instead held the meeting without her. The IEP
team created a provisional IEP that they later
revised on May 26, 2010 and June 22, 2010, with
Renee T. present.
Renee T.’s after-the-fact participation is
not enough to remedy the initial per se denial of
FAPE caused by her exclusion. . . .
The IEP team’s scheduling of the March 3,
2010 meeting to meet its internal deadline is not
a viable excuse. The DOE argues that the IEP team
needed to hold the meeting on March 3, 2010,
because that was what it believed to be its
31
internal deadline for creating IEPs for the
following school year. The DOE cites to no
authority that allows it to prioritize its
internal deadlines (which the DOE implicitly
concedes may not have been the actual deadline) or
otherwise disregard Renee T.’s schedule. Indeed,
just as a school district may not “prioritize[ ]
its representatives’ schedules over [those] of
[the] parents[,]” Shapiro, 317 F.3d at 1078 (some
alterations in original), the DOE cannot
prioritize its internal deadline over a parent’s
schedule, especially when the parent is given only
a day’s notice and makes a good-faith effort to
reschedule.
(Some citations omitted) (alterations in Renee T).
In the
instant case, however, it appears that Parents were given more
than a day’s notice and, as set forth by the Hearings Officer,
Parents did not make a good-faith effort to reschedule.
In sum, the Court concludes in the instant matter that
Plaintiffs were not denied a FAPE.
The DOE has an obligation to
schedule an annual IEP review and, while parental participation
is a critical component of an IEP meeting, the DOE’s requirement
to secure parental participation has to be met with reasonable
efforts.
On the specific facts of this case, the DOE did not
fall short of its obligation.
The system functions best when
parents are required to be reasonably responsive to the DOE’s
efforts to schedule the IEP.
Here, the Hearings Officer did an
admirable job of setting forth the facts in the record supporting
his conclusion that Parents failed to show that the April 14,
2011 IEP meeting was improperly conducted without a parent in
attendance.
The Court AFFIRMS the Decision on this issue.
32
II.
Transition Plan
Plaintiffs assert that the DOE developed a Transition
Plan, but that it was not incorporated into the IEP, and
therefore, the IEP did not consider Student’s unique needs and
was not designed to offer Student educational benefits.
With
respect to Student’s Transition Plan, the Hearings Officer found
that:
The DOE’s transition plan was sufficient to
support the Student’s transfer to a new school
environment contemplated by the April 14, 2011
IEP.
Petitioners may be claiming through the
handwritten addition to their typed request for
impartial hearing that a transition plan needed to
be a part of the IEP. However, there is no
requirement that the IEP include a transition plan
when, as here, a student is transferring from a
private school back to the home public school.
B.B. v. State of Hawaii, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D.
Haw. 2006); James M. v. State of Hawaii, 2011 WL
1750718 (D. Haw. 2011).
[Decision at 27-28.]
The Court concludes that the Decision correctly held
that the DOE was not required to include a Transition Plan in
this particular IEP, and that the plan was sufficient to support
the Student’s transfer to a new school environment.
As this
district court has explained:
under the IDEA, the DOE is not required to provide a
transition plan in an IEP whenever a child moves from a
private to a public school. . . . However, transition
services must be included in an IEP only in certain
circumstances such as when a child is moving from
school to post-school activities, to postsecondary
activities, to vocational training, etc. “[T]he
33
statutory provision of the IDEA specifically addressing
transition services does not mandate such services when
a transition from private to public school takes
place.” James M. v. Hawaii, Dept. of Educ., Civ. No.
10–00369 LEK, 2011 WL 1750718, at *11 (D. Haw. Feb 25,
2011) (quoting B.B. v. Hawaii, Dept. of Educ., 483 F.
Supp. 2d 1042, 1056 (D. Haw. 2006) (citing L.M. v.
Dept. of Educ., Civ. No. 05–00345 ASK/KSC, 2006 WL
2331031, at *16 (D. Haw. Aug. 9, 2006))). As E.Y. was
to move from Variety, a private school, to Kaimuki, a
public school, the DOE was not obligated to include a
transition plan in the IEP. See James M., 2011 WL
1750718, at *11 (“Given that James M. was to be moved
from Loveland, a private school, to Kahuku, a public
school, the School District was under no obligation to
provide transition services for James M.”).
L.I. v. State of Hawaii, Dep’t of Educ., Civil No. 10–00731
SOM/BMK, 2011 WL 6002623, at *6 (D. Hawai‘i Nov. 30, 2011) (some
alterations in L.I.); see also Donna S. v. Hawaii, Civil No.
12–00069 JMS–KSC, 2012 WL 4017449, *8 (D. Hawai‘i Sept. 12, 2012)
(“Given that the IDEA explicitly provides that section outlining
the requirements of an IEP shall not ‘be construed to require
. . . that additional information be included in a child’s IEP
beyond what is explicitly required in this section,’ 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(A)(ii), this omission is meaningful—a transition plan
is not required to be a part of an IEP.”); Carrie I. ex rel. Greg
I. v. Dep’t of Educ., Civil No. 11–00464 JMS–RLP, 2012 WL
2353850, at *13 n.16, *15 n.17 (D. Hawai‘i May 31, 2012) (noting
that a claim based on an IEP’s lack of a transition plan fails as
a matter of law); Dep’t of Educ., Hawaii v. C.B. ex rel. Donna
B., Civil No. 11–00576 SOM/RLP, 2012 WL 1537454, at *5 (D.
Hawai‘i May 1, 2012) (“[A]s previously stated by this court, the
34
DOE is not required to include a transition plan in an IEP
whenever a child moves from a private institution to a public
school.”); James M. ex rel. Sherry M. v. Hawaii, 803 F. Supp. 2d
1150, 1164 (D. Hawai‘i 2011) (“This Court has previously held
that while ‘the IDEA requires an IEP to have a statement of
needed transition services in some circumstances, the statutory
provision of the IDEA specifically addressing transition services
does not mandate such services when a transition from private to
public school takes place.’” (quoting L.M. v. Dep’t of Educ.,
Civ. No. 05-00345 ACK/KSC, 2006 WL 2331031, *16 (D. Hawai‘i Aug.
9, 2006)).
The Court therefore AFFIRMS the Decision with respect
to Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the Transition Plan.
III. Stay Put
Plaintiffs argue for the first time in their Opening
brief that they are entitled to “stay put,” without sufficient
discussion of the factual or legal bases for their request.
On
August 24, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Stay Put,
specifying that they seek reimbursement for Student’s special
education and related services at Pacific Autism Center from
December 1, 2011 through May 9, 2012, and additional “stay-put
payments through the conclusion of these proceedings and any
appeal.”
[Motion for Stay Put (dkt. no. 27), at 2.]
The Court
set forth a briefing schedule and will rule on Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Stay Put in due course.
35
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the Hearings Officer’s
November 29, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decision is HEREBY AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, September 25, 2012.
/S/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
RACHEL L., ET AL. V. STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL; CIVIL NO. 11-00756
LEK-BMK; ORDER AFFIRMING HEARINGS OFFICER’S NOVEMBER 29, 2011
DECISION
36
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?