Motelewski v. Maui Police Department et al
Filing
161
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 112 AND GRANTING THE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 128 . Signed by Judge BARRY M. KURREN on 1/28/2013. ~ Motions for Reconsiderati on re: the "ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION S FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT" docket entry no. 90 ~ (afc)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants regi stered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications will be served by first class mail on January 29, 2013.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
TRACY MOTELEWSKI,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MAUI POLICE DEPARTMENT, et )
al.
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________ )
CV. No. 11-00778 BMK
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART THE
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND
GRANTING THE COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND GRANTING THE COUNTY’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before the Court are motions by Plaintiff Tracy Motelewski and
Defendant County of Maui seeking reconsideration of the Court’s August 30, 2012
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Motions for
Summary Judgment. (Docs. # 112, 128.) After careful consideration of the
motions, the supporting and opposing memoranda, and the attached
documentation, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the
Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. # 112) and GRANTS the County’s motion (Doc. # 128.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Generally, motions to reconsider are appropriate if the court ‘(1) is
presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial
decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in
controlling law.’” Abordo v. Dept. of Public Safety, Civ. No. 12-00503 LEKBMK, 2012 WL 5954998, at *1 (D. Haw. Nov. 28, 2012) (quoting School Dist.
No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.
1993)). “A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court ‘to rethink
what the court had already thought through, rightly or wrongly.’” Id. (quoting
Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.
1983)).
DISCUSSION
I.
The Court Grants in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Plaintiff seeks clarification that the Court did not rule on legal
causation when it held that “the sexual assault was not a foreseeable consequence
of the officers’ illegal arrest as a matter of law.” (Doc. # 90 at 13.) Plaintiff asserts
that: 1) the issue of legal causation was not properly before the Court; and 2) legal
causation is a question of fact reserved for the jury. (Doc. # 112.) The Court
clarifies that its August 30 Order did not determine the issue of legal causation.
At the July 13, 2012 hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel raised the issue of
legal causation by arguing that the arrest caused Galon’s sexual assault. He
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asserted that regardless of whether the sexual assault occurred within the scope of
employment, the County was liable for the sexual assault because the arrest
occurred within the scope of employment. His argument implicated the issue of
whether Galon’s sexual assault was an intervening and superceding cause of
Plaintiff’s injuries.
Whether Galon’s sexual assault of Plaintiff was an intervening and
superceding cause of damages to Plaintiff is an important issue in this case.
Although the issue of legal causation was presented at the hearing, the briefing
focused on respondeat superior. Legal causation was only mentioned in the
context of the § 1983 and negligent training and supervision claims, and the Court
indicated it would mostly decide those issues in a later opinion. (Docs. # 34 at 14.)
The County correctly observes that some cases cited to in the briefs refer to legal
causation, but those issues are raised in the context of negligent training and
supervision. Because the legal causation issue raised in the motion for
reconsideration was a peripheral issue at the hearing, the Court withholds ruling on
it until a more complete record has been made.
There may be additional facts relevant to legal causation that were
omitted from the briefs regarding respondeat superior. It is also unclear whether
the legal causation issue in the instant motion is distinct from the causation issues
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raised with respect to Plaintiff’s other claims. The briefing on the motion for
reconsideration does not specifically identify all of the claims and theories affected
by the discussion of intervening and superceding cause, which makes the issue too
abstract for the Court to rule upon. Finally, cases cited to in the briefs refer to an
intervening act breaking the chain of causation stemming from a negligent act. See
Taylor-Rice v. State, 979 P.2d 1086, 1102 (Haw. 1999) (State’s failure to improve
guardrail still a substantial cause of a negligent car crash); see generally
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448 (“The act of a third person in committing an
intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting
therefrom, although the actor’s negligent conduct created a situation which
afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless
the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the
likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.”). However, the arrest
of Plaintiff was arguably an intentional act leading to damages stemming from the
sexual assault. Determining whether the same rules of legal causation apply when
the initial act is intentional, as Plaintiff’s arrest arguably was, may be necessary to
dispose of the legal causation issue in this case. This discussion may prove
unnecessary when the specific claims and theories regarding legal causation are
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fully fleshed out. Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
in part by clarifying that it has not ruled on the issue of legal causation because it is
inappropriate make that determination absent a fully developed record. The Court
denies Plaintiff’s request to vacate or amend the August 30 Order because it is
unnecessary in light of the above explanation.
II.
The Court Grants the County’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The County asserts that Officer Gunderson’s theft of Plaintiff’s
money is not attributable to the County because he committed the theft for purely
personal reasons. (Doc. # 128 at 3.) The Court agrees.
The Court’s August 30, 2012 Order established that Hawaii Courts
follow the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228. (Doc. # 90 at 9.) Under that
section, an action is attributable to an employer only if the action “of the kind [the
employee] is employed to perform” and the action “is actuated at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master.”
The Court’s August 30, 2012 Order denied summary judgment to the
County regarding Gunderson’s theft because Gunderson arguably took the money
for work-related reasons. (Doc. # 90 at 14.) In support of its motion, the County
relies on Gunderson’s deposition testimony that he initially seized Plaintiff’s
money intending to submit it as evidence, but later changed his mind in his patrol
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car and decided to keep the money for himself. (Doc. # 128 Ex. B at 70-71.) Once
he decided to keep the money, he testified that he had no intention of distributing it
to other members of the MPD and he took the money to benefit himself. (Id. at
72.) In light of the above testimony, the Court concludes that the initial seizure of
the money is attributable to the County, but that Gunderson’s decision to steal the
money is not attributable to the County because he stole the money for purely
personal reasons. Thus, the theft is not attributable to the County.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the County’s motion
for reconsideration, and GRANTS IN PART the Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, January 28, 2013
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/S/ Barry M. Kurren
Barry M. Kurren
United States Magistrate Judge
Motelewski v. County of Maui, et al., Civ. No. 11-00778 BMK, ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
GRANTING THE COUNTY’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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