Okawaki v. Sanchez et al

Filing 14

ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 10 ; (2) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; AND (3) VACATING THE HEARING. Signed by JUDGE DAVID ALAN EZRA on 3/8/2012. Excerpt of Order: ~ The Complaint is DISM ISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as against all Defendants, with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 60 days of the filing of this Order. HEARING on Motion to Dismiss --set for 3/12/2012 at 10:30am-- is VACATED. ~ (afc) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JANIS. S. OKAWAKI,
Plaintiff
vs.
ROBERT SANCHEZ, aka LARRY
MEHAU, SHERI DOLDER, aka
MRS. LARRY MEHAU, STATE OF
HAWAII JUDICIARY, STATE OF
HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL,
STEADFAST HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT, HONOLULU
POLICE DEPARTMENT, STATE
OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF
SAFETY, CITY AND COUNTY OF
HONOLULU,
Defendants.
_____________________________

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CV. NO. 12-00017 DAE-BMK

ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; (2)
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; AND
(3) VACATING THE HEARING
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the Court finds this matter suitable for
disposition without a hearing. After considering Defendant City and County of
Honolulu’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff’s Complaint as against all Defendants with leave to amend. The hearing
on the motion is hereby vacated.
BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Robert
Sanchez, “AKA Larry Mehau,” Sheri Dolder, “AKA Mrs. Larry Mehau,” the State
of Hawaii Judiciary, the State of Hawaii State Hospital, the Steadfast Housing
Development Corporation, the Honolulu Police Department, the State of Hawaii
Department of Safety, and the City and County of Honolulu (collectively
“Defendants”).1 (“Compl.,” Doc. # 1 at 1.) On January 30, 2012, Defendant City
and County of Honolulu filed a Motion to Dismiss. (“Mot.,” Doc. # 10.) Plaintiff
did not file an opposition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(“Rule”), a motion to dismiss will be granted where the plaintiff fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter

1

On January 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Amendment to
Complaint; Scheduling Conference.” (Doc. # 6.) The Court construed this
document as a Motion to Appear at the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference By Phone.
(Doc. # 8.)
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of law for one of two reasons: “(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2)
insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” Robertson v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Allegations
of fact in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,
416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).
A complaint need not include detailed facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
However, “conclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d
802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). “The tenet that a court must accept as
true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions,” and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, “bare assertions amounting to
nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements” of a claim “are not
entitled to an assumption of truth.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
(9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences

3

from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to
relief.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
A court looks at whether the facts in the complaint sufficiently state a
“plausible” ground for relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. If a court dismisses
the complaint or portions thereof, it must consider whether to grant leave to amend.
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that leave to amend
should be granted “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the
defect”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
II.

Rule 8
Rule 8 mandates that a complaint include a “short and plain statement

of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that each allegation “be simple, concise,
and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A complaint may be dismissed under FRCP 8
if the complaint is “so verbose, confused, and redundant that its true substance, if
any, is well disguised.” Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124,
1131 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431
(9th Cir. 1969)); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Something labeled a complaint but written . . . , prolix in evidentiary detail, yet
without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what
wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint.”).
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Put slightly differently, a district court may dismiss a complaint for
failure to comply with Rule 8 where it fails to provide the defendants fair notice of
the wrongs they have allegedly committed. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178–80
(affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot determine from the complaint
who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide
discovery”); cf. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1105 n.4
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding dismissal under Rule 8 was in error where “the complaint
provide[d] fair notice of the wrongs allegedly committed by defendants and [did]
not qualify as overly verbose, confusing, or rambling”). Rule 8 requires more than
“the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” and “[a] pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The propriety of dismissal for failure to
comply with Rule 8 does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without
merit.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179.
III.

Pro Se Litigants
“Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir.
2003). The Court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, accept all allegations
of material fact as true, and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the
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plaintiff. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “[p]ro se
litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King
v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Leave to amend should be granted if
it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defects of his or her
complaint. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed
because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Mot. at 5.) The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff to provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim[s] showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “to state
its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to
a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2), 10(b). The Court finds
that Plaintiff’s Complaint, liberally construed, fails to satisfy these requirements.
Plaintiff’s 27-page Complaint is confusing, rambling, and
disorganized. As best the Court can discern, the Complaint includes allegations
that: (1) Plaintiff’s probation officer, Robert Sanchez, is Larry Mehau, “the
Godfather of Hawaiian Organized Crime” and works in concert with the Japanese
organized crime group, the Yakuza, to “terrorize her life for money ([her] trust)
and power in Hawaii,” (Compl. at 3–7); (2) Mr. Mehau told Plaintiff that she “must
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relinquish all power and financial responsibility of [her] private company and
personal trust to Mr. Mehau as part of [her] probation and conditional release” (id.
at 9); (3) Mr. Mehau forced Plaintiff to live at the Steadfast Housing group home
where one of Mr. Mehau’s “boys” threatened to kill her with a samurai sword (id.
at 11–13); (4) an Indian state hospital worker, who is part of the Yakuza, engaged
in terroristic threatening and gang warfare (id. at 17–18); and (5) Mr. Mehau
engaged in federal racketeering when he allegedly cancelled a birthday cake for
Plaintiff when Plaintiff was at the State Hospital (id. at 18). Plaintiff also claims
that “[t]he new leadershipp [sic] in the State of Hawaii will be the Okawaki
Family. . . . [T]he Okawaki Family will be a Monarchy of the Universe.” (Id. at
25–26.)
Construing the Complaint liberally, the Court cannot determine the
basis of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants. Although Plaintiff labels a section
of her Complaint “Federal Racketeering” and makes scattered references to federal
racketeering, Plaintiff does not allege the factual elements of a racketeering claim.2
2

To succeed on a civil RICO claim, Plaintiff must prove “(1) conduct (2) of
an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity and, additionally
must establish that (5) the defendant caused injury to plaintiff's business or
property.” Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
(continued...)
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Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern the factual elements of any
viable cause of action. For example, Plaintiff alleges that her state convictions and
other problems are
[B]ecause of former Honolulu City Prosecutor Peter Carlisle who was
not prosecuting the problems of Hawaii. Mr. Carlisle blames everything
on me including life, breath, and air because Mr. Carlisle thinks I am
God. . . . Because Mr. Carlisle blamed me and allowed the persecution
of me and did not prosecute those who persecuted me, the church, and
others, I and others lived for 45 years in pergatory [sic]. . . . Mr. Carlisle
never did his job as prosecutor and never helped society at large.
Therefore, organized crime leaders like Larry Mehau got away with
illegal activity without societal and legal accountability. . . . Because I
am an innocent victim (private citizen) who has to do the work of a paid
Honolulu City and County employee (prosecutor) to do my civic duty
and make society a better and safer place, I am demanding a court ruling
of $30 mmillion [sic] in compensatory and punitive damages from the
City and County of HOnolulu [sic] ($10 million in compensatory and
$20 million in punitive damages).
(Compl. at 20–21.)
Such vague and confusing allegations fail to sufficiently plead a
plausible claim. See Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1131 (a complaint that is so confusing
that its “‘true substance, if any, is well disguised’” may be dismissed sua sponte

2

(...continued)
Plaintiff also fails to specify which section of RICO Defendants allegedly
violated. “[I]t is essential to plead precisely in a RICO case . . . the RICO section
allegedly violated.” Reynolds v. East Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1251 (7th Cir.
1989), cited by Izenberg v. ETS Services, LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1203 (C.D.
Cal. 2008).
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for failure to satisfy Rule 8); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180 (“Something labeled a
complaint but written . . . , prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity,
conciseness, and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to
perform the essential functions of a complaint.”). A complaint with the factual
elements of a cause of action scattered throughout the complaint and not
organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim” may be dismissed for
failure to satisfy Rule 8(a). See Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635,
640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1172. Indeed, it is not the
Court’s responsibility to sort through pages of a rambling narrative to
discern—much less speculate— what specific claims and legal theories Plaintiff
asserts. Moreover, Plaintiff does not plead with sufficient specificity the relevant
circumstances surrounding the alleged events that form the basis of her causes of
action. For example, Plaintiff does not specify when the alleged acts occurred.
Further, the Complaint appears to ask the Court to overturn state
court decisions, including a request “that my conditional release and my probation
be lifted.” (Compl. at 17.) As a general rule, the Court may not exercise appellate
jurisdiction over state court decisions. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923).
Plaintiffs who believe that state judicial proceedings have violated their
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constitutional rights must appeal those decisions through the state courts and then
to the Supreme Court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482–83; Bennett v. Yoshina, 140
F.3d 1218, 1223 (1998) (noting that “[t]he rationale behind [the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine] is that the only federal court with the power to hear appeals from state
courts is the United States Supreme Court”).
Because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 and fails to
adequately provide Defendants notice of the basis of Plaintiff’s claims against
them, the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as against all
Defendants, with leave to amend.3
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 60 days of the filing
of this Order4 that (1) complies with Rule 8’s requirement of “simple, concise,

3

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed for
failure to provide a statement of this Court’s jurisdiction as required by Rule
8(a)(1). (Mot. at 5.) Indeed, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege sufficient
facts to show a proper basis for the court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over
the action. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936);
Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, L.P., 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Although Plaintiff’s Complaint contains scattered
references federal racketeering, these allegations appear to be frivolous and lack
merit. If Plaintiff chooses to amend her Complaint she must clearly state a basis
for this Court’s jurisdiction.
4

While this Court does not normally permit such a lengthy time period for
amendment, in this case, the Court has been advised by Plaintiff’s mother that she
is currently in State Hospital for the month of March. Therefore, the Court will
(continued...)
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and direct” allegations, and (2) contains a basis for federal subject matter
jurisdiction.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint:
(1) She must clearly state how each named Defendant has injured her.
In other words, Plaintiff should explain, in a clear and concise manner, what each
Defendant did and how those specific facts create a plausible claim for relief.
Plaintiff should not include facts that are not directly relevant to her claims; and
(2) She must clearly state the relief sought and explain the basis of
this court’s jurisdiction.
(3) She must state her claims in numbered paragraphs, each limited as
far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supersedes the
original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court
will not refer to any previous pleadings to make any amended complaint complete.
Local Rule 10.3 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without
reference to any prior pleading. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

4

(...continued)
grant Plaintiff additional time.
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1987). Failure to amend the complaint and cure the pleading deficiencies will
result in dismissal of this action with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s
Complaint as against all Defendants with leave to amend. The Hearing on the
Motion is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, March 8, 2012.

_____________________________
David Alan Ezra
United States District Judge

Velasco, et al. v. Security National Mortgage. Co., et al., CV No. 10-00239 DAEKSC; (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS; (2)
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; AND
(3) VACATING THE HEARING

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