Lacabanne et al v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC et al

Filing 26

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 1 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 3/6/12. ("Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED for failure to comply with Rule 8. Amendment shall not be permitted, as it is apparent from the Complaint as w ell as Plaintiff David Miller's numerous other filings in this court that he has filed this action in bad faith, and that granting leave to amend would be futile.") (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEPart icipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Jon Evan Lacabanne and David Wynn Miller served by first class mail at the addresses of record on March 6, 2012.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I
CV. NO. 12-00060 SOM/BMK

JON EVAN LACABANNE and DAVID
WYNN MILLER,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
vs.
)
)
GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC,
)
)
WESTMINISTER REALTY, PETER
WINN, HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, )
LLC, and MATSON KELLEY, LLC, )
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION
On January 27, 2012, pro se Plaintiffs Jon Evan
Lacabanne and David Wynn Miller filed a Complaint against
Defendants GMAC Mortgage, LLC, Westminister Realty, Peter Winn,
Homecomings Financial, LLC, and Matson Kelley, LLC.

(Doc. # 1.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 mandates that a
complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that each allegation “be simple,
concise, and direct.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

A complaint that

is so confusing that its “‘true substance, if any, is well
disguised’” may be dismissed sua sponte for failure to satisfy
Rule 8.

Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124,

1131 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417
See also McHenry v. Renne, 84

F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969)).

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F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Something labeled a complaint
. . . prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity,
conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what
wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a
complaint.”); Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671,
673 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A complaint which fails to comply with
[Rule 8] may be dismissed with prejudice[.]”).
Put slightly differently, a complaint may be dismissed
for failure to comply with Rule 8 if it fails to provide the
defendants fair notice of the wrongs they have allegedly
committed.

See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178–80 (affirming dismissal

of complaint because “one cannot determine from the complaint who
is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough
detail to guide discovery”).

Cf. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp.

Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1105 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal was
erroneous because “the complaint provide[d] fair notice of the
wrongs allegedly committed by defendants and [did] not qualify as
overly verbose, confusing, or rambling”).

Rule 8 requires more

than “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal
quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs are appearing pro se; consequently, the
court liberally construes their pleadings.

Eldridge v. Block,

832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has

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instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the
‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam))).

Even

liberally construed, however, the purported allegations in the
Complaint are completely incoherent and utterly fail to state any
kind of claim against any Defendant that is remotely plausible on
its face.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is nonsensical and lacks any
discernible relationship to any basis for judicial relief.

It

does not contain coherent or complete sentences, let alone
identify any specific claims that Plaintiffs are advancing or
factual allegations they are making.

The court cannot make out a

single allegation from the Complaint.

The ten single-spaced

pages of the Complaint are a random collection of unintelligible
words, symbols, and initials laid out in no apparent order.

This

text does not provide Defendants with fair notice of the wrongs
they have allegedly committed.

See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d

83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)(stating that dismissal is appropriate when
the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, or unintelligible that
its true substance is well disguised).
Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED for failure to
comply with Rule 8.

Amendment shall not be permitted, as it is

apparent from the Complaint as well as Plaintiff David Miller’s
numerous other filings in this court that he has filed this

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action in bad faith, and that granting leave to amend would be
futile.

See W. Shoshone Nat’l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200,

204 (9th Cir. 1991) (grounds for denying amendment include bad
faith and futility of the amendment); Carrico v. City & Cnty. of
S.F., 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that leave to
amend is properly denied if amendment would be futile).

Cf.

Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995)
(requiring leave to amend for pro se litigants unless amendment
is futile).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, March 6, 2012.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge

Lacabanne et al. v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC et al., Civ. No. 12-00060 SOM/BMK;
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

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