Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC et al v. The Queen's Medical Center et al

Filing 275

ORDER Denying 220 Defendants' Written Statement of APPEAL from MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER Denying Defendants' Motion For Leave To File Dispositive Motions. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 8/7/14. (gab, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
PACIFIC RADIATION ONCOLOGY,
LLC, a Hawai`i Limited
Liability Corporation, et
al.,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THE QUEEN’S MEDICAL CENTER, a )
)
Hawai`i Non-Profit
)
Corporation, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 12-00064 LEK-KSC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ WRITTEN STATEMENT OF APPEAL
FROM MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS
On June 25, 2014, Defendants/Counter Claimants Queen’s
Medical Center, a Hawai`i Non-Profit Corporation, Queen’s
Development Corp., a Hawai`i for Profit Corporation,
Noreen D.S.W. Mokuau, William G. Obana, M.D., Arthur A. Ushijima,
Mark H. Yamakawa, Paula Yoshioka, Sharlene K. Tsuda,
Richard C. Keene, Clinton Yee, Naleen N. Andrade, M.D.,
Ernest H. Fukeda, Jr., Robb Ohtani, M.D., Neil J. Hannahs,
Christine M. Gayagas, Peter K. Hanashiro, Robert K. Nobriga,
Eric K. Yeaman, Julia C. Wo, Caroline Ward Oda,
Peter Halford, M.D., Barry Weinman, each individually and in his
or her capacity as Officer and Trustee of Queen’s Medical Center
(collectively “Defendants”), filed their Written Statement of
Appeal from Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying Defendants’ Motion

for Leave to File Dispositive Motions (“Appeal”).
220.]

[Dkt. no.

Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants Pacific Radiation

Oncology, LLC, a Hawai`i Limited Liability Corporation, PRO
Associates, LLC, a Hawai`i Limited Liability Corporation,
John Lederer, M.D., Laeton Pang, M.D., Eva Bieniek, M.D.,
Vincent Brown, M.D., Paul DeMare, M.D., and Thanh Huynh, M.D.
(collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed their memorandum in opposition
on July 14, 2014, and Defendants filed their reply on July 31,
2014.

[Dkt. nos. 237, 265.]

The Court finds this matter

suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule
LR7.2(e) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).

The

Court issued its summary ruling denying the Appeal on
August 1, 2014.

[Dkt. no. 269.]

The instant order is this

Court’s decision on the Appeal, and this order supersedes the
August 1, 2014 summary ruling.
After careful consideration of the Appeal, supporting
and opposing memoranda, and the relevant legal authority,
Defendants’ Appeal is HEREBY DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background relevant to the
Appeal is set forth in this Court’s May 30, 2014 Order Denying
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim (“5/30/14

2

Order”),1 and this Court adopts and incorporates by reference the
background section of the 5/30/14 Order.

[Dkt. no. 198.2]

In

the 5/30/14 Order, this Court noted that the dispositive motions
deadline had expired, and extended the deadline only to the
extent that the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a
substantive motion regarding Defendants’ Counterclaim.
2450815, at *7.

2014 WL

This Court stated that “no other substantive

motions shall be filed without prior leave of court.”

Id.

On June 12, 2014, Defendants filed their Motion for
Leave to File Dispositive Motions (“Rule 16 Motion”), seeking an
amendment to the scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4).3

[Dkt. no. 203.]

On June 13, 2014, the magistrate

judge issued an entering order denying the Rule 16 Motion
(“6/13/14 EO”).

[Dkt. no. 205.]

In the 6/13/14 EO, the

1

Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief and Damages (“Amended Complaint”) on
February 23, 2012. [Dkt. no. 44.] Defendants filed the
Counterclaim as part of their answer to the Amended Complaint on
February 25, 2014. [Dkt. no. 175.] Plaintiffs filed their
Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim (“Motion to Dismiss”)
on March 18, 2014. [Dkt. no. 185.]
2

The 5/30/14 Order is also available at 2014 WL 2450815.

3

The deadline to file dispositive motions was August 14,
2013. [Minutes of Status Conference Re: Trial Date and Other
Deadlines, filed 3/11/13 (dkt. no. 98), at 1.] The subsequent
scheduling orders did not extend the dispositive motions
deadline. [Second Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order, filed
9/25/13 (dkt. no. 124), at 2; Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order,
filed 9/27/13 (dkt. no. 129), at 2; Amended Rule 16 Scheduling
Order, filed 10/1/13 (dkt. no. 132), at 2; Amended Rule 16
Scheduling Order, filed 2/12/14 (dkt. no. 163), at 4.]
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magistrate judge: 1) noted that the mere fact that further
dispositive motions may narrow the issues for trial was not a
sufficient basis to amend the scheduling order; 2) found that
Defendants had not been diligent in filing their dispositive
motions as to Plaintiffs’ claims, or at least in requesting an
extension of the dispositive motions deadline; and 3) found that
Defendants would not be prejudiced if he denied the Rule 16
Motion.

The instant Appeal followed.
STANDARD
The following standards apply to the review of appeals

of a magistrate judge’s pretrial order.
Any party may appeal a magistrate judge’s
nondispositive pretrial order. D. Haw. L. Civ. R.
74.1. . . .
The district judge shall consider the appeal
and shall not set aside any portion of the
magistrate judge’s order unless it is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); D. Haw. L.
Civ. R. 74.1; McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 799
(9th Cir. 1991). The district judge may also
reconsider sua sponte any matter determined by a
magistrate judge. See D. Haw. L. Civ. R. 74.1.
A.

Clearly Erroneous

The clearly erroneous standard applies to
factual findings. United States v. McConney, 728
F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984) (overruled on
other grounds); Tierney v. Torikawa, 2012 WL
2359960 *1 (D. Haw. 2012) (internal quotation
omitted). After reviewing the entire record, the
district judge must accept the magistrate judge’s
ruling unless the district judge is “left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” Burdick v. Comm’r Internal
4

Revenue Serv., 979 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir.
1992). This standard is “significantly
deferential” to the magistrate judge’s judgment.
See Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100
(9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
B.

Contrary to Law

The contrary to law standard applies to legal
conclusions and allows for de novo review.
McConney, 728 F.2d at 1200; see also Schwarzer et
al., Fed. Civ. P. Before Trial § 16:278 (2013). A
decision is contrary to law if it applies the
wrong legal standard or neglects to consider all
elements of the applicable standard. See Hunt v.
National Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th
Cir. 1989); Na Pali Haweo Cmty. Ass’n v. Grande,
252 F.R.D. 672, 674 (D. Haw. 2008).
Pauline v. Espinda, No. CIV. 13–00612 HG–RLP, 2014 WL 1370329, at
*2-3 (D. Hawai`i Apr. 7, 2014).
DISCUSSION
I.

Effect of the 5/30/14 Order
Defendants first argue that the magistrate judge

erroneously concluded that the 5/30/14 Order precludes Defendants
from filing further substantive motions.

Defendants argue that

several statements this Court made during the hearing on the
Motion to Dismiss clearly indicated that this Court contemplated
that Defendants would file further dispositive motions.

[Appeal

at 4, 6-7, 13-14 (quoting 5/19/14 Hrg. Trans., filed 7/9/14 (dkt.
no. 232), at 3-5).]

Defendants also emphasize that nothing in

the 5/30/14 Order prohibits Defendants from filing further
substantive motions.

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The 5/30/14 Order is this Court’s final ruling on the
Motion to Dismiss.

The order expressly states that, except for

Plaintiffs’ dispositive motion regarding the Counterclaim, all
other substantive motions require leave of court.
2014 WL 2450815, at *7.

5/30/14 Order,

Although this Court made statements

during the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss which indicated that
the Court was considering extending the dispositive motions
deadline as to all parties, the 5/30/14 Order supersedes this
Court’s statements during the hearing.

The 5/30/14 Order could

have amended the scheduling order to allow both Plaintiffs and
Defendants to file dispositive motions without leave of court.
However, this Court, in its discretion, decided not to do so.
Defendants are correct that the 5/30/14 Order does not
prohibit the filing of other dispositive motions.

The 5/30/14

Order allows for the filing of other dispositive motions with
leave of court, i.e., with a modification of the scheduling order
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).4

The magistrate judge

applied that standard in the 6/13/14 EO.

Thus, to the extent

that Defendants’ Appeal argues that the magistrate judge’s
reading of the 5/30/14 Order was clearly erroneous, Defendants’
Appeal is DENIED.

4

Rule 16(b)(4) states: “A schedule may be modified only for
good cause and with the judge’s consent.”
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II.

Good Cause
Defendants also argue that they established good cause

to amend the scheduling order and extend the dispositive motions
deadline.

This district court has recognized that:
Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily
considers the diligence of the party seeking the
amendment. Johnson [v. Mammoth Recreations,
Inc.], 975 F.2d [604,] 609 [(9th Cir. 1992)]. In
other words, this court may modify the pretrial
schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite
the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”
Id. . . . Although the existence or degree of
prejudice to the party opposing the modification
might supply an additional reason to deny a motion
to modify a scheduling order, the focus of the
inquiry is on the moving party’s reasons for
seeking modification. Id. “If that party was not
diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. Accord In
re W. States Wholesale Nat’l Gas Antitrust
Litigation, 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013).

Ichimura v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., Civil. No. 11–00318
SOM/RLP, 2013 WL 4657598, at *3 (D. Hawai`i Aug. 29, 2013).
In the 6/13/14 EO, the magistrate judge found that
Defendants had not been diligent, based on the following:
Unlike Plaintiffs, who have only known of the
Counterclaim since February 2014, Defendants have
been on notice of Plaintiffs’ claims arguably
since February 2012. The Court recognizes that a
number of events have occurred in this case which
disrupted normal progression, but the fact remains
that Defendants had more than sufficient time to
seek summary judgment, or at minimum, seek an
extension of the dispositive motions deadline.
Indeed, nearly four months have passed since the
issuance of the Ninth Circuit Memorandum.
Defendants argue in part that they understood that
no dispositive motions would be considered pending
the appeal, even if timely filed. However, they
have not adequately explained the lengthy delay in
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filing the instant Motion. The recently
adjudicated motion to dismiss pertained to the
Counterclaim, so its pendency and disposition did
not restrict Defendants’ ability to seek leave to
file a dispositive motion as to the Amended
Complaint. . . .
This Court agrees with these findings and with the magistrate
judge’s ultimate finding that Defendants were not diligent as to
the filing of dispositive motions.

The magistrate judge’s

finding was not clearly erroneous.

To the extent that the Appeal

challenges the magistrate judge’s finding regarding lack of
diligence, the Appeal is DENIED.
III. Prejudice
In the 6/13/14 EO, the magistrate judge found that
“Defendants will not be unduly prejudiced if they are not
permitted to file dispositive motions at this late date, as
neither side is authorized to file dispositive motions concerning
the claims in the Amended Complaint.”

Defendants argue that the

magistrate judge’s ruling was clearly erroneous.

Defendants

assert that they would be prejudiced, and Plaintiffs would not be
prejudiced, if this Court prohibits them from filing a summary
judgment motion.

Insofar as the focus of the Rule 16(b)(4) good

cause inquiry is on Defendants’ diligence, see Ichimura, 2013 WL
4657598, at *3, and this Court has found that Defendants have not
been diligent as to the filing of dispositive motions, this Court
does not reach the issue of prejudice.

To the extent that the

Appeal challenges the magistrate judge’s finding regarding lack
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of prejudice, the Appeal is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendants’ Written
Statement of Appeal from Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying
Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Dispositive Motions, filed
June 25, 2014, is HEREBY DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, August 7, 2014.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

PACIFIC RADIATION ONCOLOGY, LLC VS. THE QUEEN’S MEDICAL CENTER,
ET AL; CIVIL 12-00064 LEK-KSC; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ WRITTEN
STATEMENT OF APPEAL FROM MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

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