Amsterdam et al v. State of Hawaii et al

Filing 5

ORDER: (1) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 2 AND (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT. Signed by JUDGE DAVID ALAN EZRA on 2/15/2012. ~ Orde r furthermore grants Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint within forty-five (45) days of the filing of this Order ~ (afc)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications will be served by first class mail on February 16, 2012.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

THE MAMA LOA FOUNDATION,
THE MAMA LOA TRUST, C.
KAUI JOCHANAN AMSTERDAM,
PRESIDENT

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THE STATE OF HAWAII, THE
)
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, )
CHAIRPERSON, COLETTE
)
MACHADO, INDIVIDUALLY
)
AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY OF )
CHAIRPERSON AND TRUSTEE )
AND ALL TRUSTEES IN THEIR )
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
)
CAPACITY AS OFFICERS AND
)
TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF
)
HAWAIIAN AFFAIR, OHA,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

CV. NO. 12-00088 DAE-KSC

ORDER: (1) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND (2)
DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the Court finds this matter suitable for
disposition without a hearing. After reviewing Plaintiffs’ motion and complaint,
the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief (“Mot.,” Doc. # 2) and DISMISSES the
Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (“Compl,” Doc. # 1.)
On February 14, 2012, Plaintiffs The Mama Loa Foundation, The
Mama Loa Trust, and C. Kaui Jochanan Amsterdam (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
filed a Complaint and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive
Relief (“Motion”) against the State of Hawaii, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
(“OHA”), Colette Machado, and OHA trustees (collectively, “Defendants”).
Plaintiffs appear to seek to enjoin OHA and the State of Hawaii from proceeding
on a “land settlement” of certain land. (Mot. at 2.) Plaintiffs allege in both their
Motion and Complaint that OHA:
usurped the authority and violated the Civil Rights of Mama Loa also
as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the US [sic]
Constitution, have dismissed Mama Loa as the originator of the Office
of Hawaiian Affairs, which is supported by formal, legal
documentation, have advanced illegal actions similar to what the
conspirators did to Queen Liliuokalani, and have contribute [sic] to
damages suffered by Mama Loa.
(Mot. at 1–2; Compl. at 1–2.)
Based on the following, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion because
Plaintiffs have not met the standard for issuance of an injunction. The Court also
DISMISSES the Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to comply with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Temporary Restraining Order
“The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to

the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.” Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v.
Mind’s Eye Interiors, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Haw. 2002). In Winter
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008), the
Supreme Court explained that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” See also New
Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (A
plaintiff “seeking a restraining order must make a persuasive showing of
irreparable harm and likelihood of prevailing on the merits.”).
II.

Sua Sponte Dismissal
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
The court may dismiss a complaint pursuant Rule 12(b)(6) on its own

motion. See Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A
trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under [Rule] 12(b)(6). Such a dismissal
may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.”);
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Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 n.7 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (“The Court can
dismiss a claim sua sponte for a Defendant who has not filed a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”); see also Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916
F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that district court may dismiss cases sua
sponte pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without notice where plaintiff could not prevail
on complaint as alleged). Additionally, a paid complaint that is “obviously
frivolous” does not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction and may be dismissed
sua sponte before service of process. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 n.6
(9th Cir. 1984); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global
Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (“[I]t is the obligation of both district court
and counsel to be alert to jurisdictional requirements.”); Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d
287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[D]ismissal of Branson’s complaint was required
because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”).
B.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
A court may also sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to comply

with Rule 8. Rule 8 mandates that a complaint include a “short and plain statement
of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that each allegation “be simple, concise,
and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A complaint that is so confusing that its “‘true
substance, if any, is well disguised’” may be dismissed sua sponte for failure to
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satisfy Rule 8. Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir.
1969); Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a district
court has the power to sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with
Rule 8 where the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, or unintelligible that its
true substance is well disguised); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180
(9th Cir. 1996) (“Something labeled a complaint but written . . . , prolix in
evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom
plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a
complaint.”); Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“A complaint which fails to comply with [Rule 8] may be dismissed with
prejudice[.]”).
DISCUSSION
I.

Temporary Restraining Order
Plaintiffs’ Motion is deficient for several reasons. First, a court may

issue a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) without written or oral notice to the
adverse party only if the party requesting the relief provides an affidavit or verified
complaint providing specific facts that “clearly show that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse
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party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Additionally, the
movant or attorney must certify in writing “any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). Plaintiffs
failed to comply with either of these requirements. As to the first requirement,
Plaintiffs have not submitted a proper affidavit or a complaint establishing that
immediate and irreparable injury will occur. Indeed, neither the Motion nor the
Complaint explain when the alleged “settlement” will occur. As to the second
requirement, Plaintiffs have not certified in writing any efforts made to put
Defendants on notice of the Motion, nor have they proffered any reason as to why
notice should not be required.
Further, Plaintiffs’ Motion fails to establish that they are entitled to
relief. Plaintiffs’ Motion does not show that they are likely to succeed on the
merits, that they will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, or that an injunction is in the
public interest. Plaintiffs’ Motion is instead filled with conclusory, vague and
confusing allegations without any sufficient facts such that the Court can even
begin to make a reasoned decision. For example, Plaintiffs do not even properly
identify the lands at issue, nor do they discuss the legal basis for awarding

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injunctive relief or facts supporting their allegations. Without more, the Court
cannot evaluate Plaintiffs’ request.
Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief without prejudice. The Court cautions
Plaintiffs that if they choose to file a subsequent motion for a temporary restraining
order, the motion must explain and provide the factual and legal bases for such
relief.
II.

Sua Sponte Dismissal
Plaintiffs’ two-page Complaint is largely identical to their TRO

Motion and is thus similarly plagued with conclusory allegations unsupported by
any factual assertions. The Complaint also lacks numbered paragraphs and fails to
identify Plaintiffs’ causes of action. For example, the Complaint references “Civil
Rights” and the Fourteenth Amendment, but does not support such claims with any
factual allegations. These bald allegations, without more, are not sufficient to put
Defendants on notice of the claims against them, nor are they sufficient to
otherwise satisfy the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6). See
McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of
complaint where “one cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, for
what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”).
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Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “advanced illegal actions similar to
what the conspirators did to Queen Liliuokalani” but fail to identify or describe the
allegedly “illegal actions.” This is precisely the type of vague and confusing
allegation that the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have cautioned against. See
Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1131 (a complaint that is so confusing that its “‘true substance,
if any, is well disguised’” may be dismissed sua sponte for failure to satisfy Rule
8); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (Rule 8 requires more
than “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].”)
Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), courts should “freely give leave [to amend]
when justice so requires.” “Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it
is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment.” Moss v. U.S.
Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 792 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court therefore GRANTS
Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint within forty-five (45) days of the
filing of this Order. If Plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, they must
do the following: (1) Plaintiffs must clearly and concisely state how each of the
named defendants has injured them, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8. In other words, Plaintiff should list each Defendant and explain to the Court
what each Defendant, individually, did to them; (2) Plaintiffs must clearly identify
the specific causes of action alleged and the factual allegations upon which those
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claims are based; and (3) Plaintiffs must explain the basis of the Court’s
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the
Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Injunctive Relief is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 15, 2012.

_____________________________
David Alan Ezra
United States District Judge

The Mama Loa Foundation, et al. v. The State of Hawaii, et al., Cv. No. 12-00088
DAE-KSC; ORDER: (1) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF AND (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’
COMPLAINT

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