Mizukami v. Edwards et al

Filing 13

ORDER DENYING 11 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT: " On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment, filed March 9, 2012, is HEREBY DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to serve the present Order on Atto rney Thomas Collins and on Hawai'i State Attorney General David Louie, who in turn are asked to notify the respective named Defendants whom they represent or have represented that this Order has been entered. IT IS SO ORDERED." Signed by District JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on March 21, 2012. (bbb, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on th e Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications and Attorney Thomas Collins and on Hawaii State Attorney General David Louie were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
DONNA EDWARDS; THOMAS D.
COLLINS III; The STATE OF
)
)
HAWAII and Gov. NEAL
ABERCROMBIE, Hon. BERT I.
)
AYABE judge of Circuit Court )
of First Circuit, Hon. DANIEL )
)
R. FOLEY judge Intermediate
Court of Appeals, DOES 1-10, )
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
GLENN MIZUKAMI,

CIVIL NO. 12-00103 LEK-BMK

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
On February 21, 2012, pro se Plaintiff Glenn K.
Mizukami (“Plaintiff”) filed a Verified Complaint (“Complaint”),
an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit
(“Application”), and a Petition for Injunctive Relief &
Declaratory Judgment (“Petition”).

The Court dismissed the

Complaint with prejudice and denied the Application and Petition
as moot in a February 29, 2012 Order (“Order”).
entered the same day.

Judgment was

On March 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion

to Amend Judgment (“Motion”), asking the Court to amend the Order
and judgment of dismissal, and to accept his proposed First

Amended Complaint.1

The Court finds this matter suitable for

disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(d) of the
Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for
the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).

After careful

consideration of the Motion, Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended
Complaint, and the relevant legal authority, this Court HEREBY
DENIES the Motion.
BACKGROUND
In its Order, the Court dismissed the Complaint because
Plaintiff failed to state claims for alleged violations of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapters 661,
662, and 663; and under 28 U.S.C. § 1652.

Plaintiff alleged that

Defendant Donna Edwards (“Edwards”), his ex-wife, and her
attorney, Defendant Thomas Collins (“Collins”), conspired with
state court judges Bert Ayabe (“Judge Ayabe”) and Daniel Foley
(“Judge Foley”) to deny him due process in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.

[Complaint at ¶¶ 1-6.]

He alleges that

these state court judges, the State of Hawai‘i, and Governor
Neil Abercrombie (collectively “State Defendants”) are
vicariously liable for the “judges’ other non-discretionary torts
pretensed (sic) in ‘scope of office’”.

1

[Id. at ¶ 7.]

The proposed First Amended Complaint is attached to the
Motion as Exhibit 1.
2

Plaintiff alleged that, under family court support
orders entered in 2001 and 2002, the state courts denied Edwards’
claims for child support, but awarded her over $30,000 in
attorneys’ fees.

On appeal, Judge Foley awarded Edwards and

Collins $8,613 and $7,054 in attorneys’ fees.

[Id. at ¶¶ 15-20.]

According to Plaintiff, Collins then “filed illegal Nonconsensual
Lien 6/18/04 No. 2004-123147 as trespass of Plaintiff’s Homestead
to unconstitutionally obstruct title to destroy Plaintiff’s
creditability (sic) & livelihood[.]”

[Id. at ¶ 21.]

The Court ruled that, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims
sought to attack the various final state court orders, judgments,
and liens, such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Court further ruled that, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims
were not barred by Rooker-Feldman, Plaintiff failed to state a
claim against Defendants Edwards and Collins (1) because they
were not state actors, and (2) under the doctrine of res
judicata, and against the State Defendants based upon their
absolute judicial immunity.
In the instant Motion, Plaintiff appears to argue that
his claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because
he does not attack any final state court judgments, rather he
seeks “relief of lien by expungement,” [Mem. in Supp. of Motion
at 3,] and that a lien “is not a State judgment; is a private
lien filed by COLLINS without and Court’s ‘Lien-Order’. . . .”

3

[Id. (emphases in original).]

He further argues that his claims

against Edwards and Collins are not barred by res judicata
because they involve allegations of conduct occurring after the
previously entered judgments in his earlier actions.

Finally, he

appears to argue that the State Defendants are not shielded by
absolute judicial immunity because they acted in the absence of
jurisdiction and should have been disqualified.

[Id. at 4-5.]

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, this Court
will liberally construe his pleadings.

See Eldridge v. Block,

832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has
instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful
pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam))).
Plaintiff states that he brings the Motion pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure allows a party to file a motion to alter or amend the
judgment “no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
under the rule.

Plaintiff’s Motion is therefore timely

There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e)

motion may be granted:
1) the motion is “necessary to correct manifest
errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is
based;” 2) the moving party presents “newly
discovered or previously unavailable evidence;” 3)
the motion is necessary to “prevent manifest
injustice;” or 4) there is an “intervening change
4

in controlling law.”
Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063
(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller
& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.
1995)); see also S.E.C. v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617
F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Reconsideration under Rule
59(e) is appropriate if (1) the district court is presented with
newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear
error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or
(3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Rule 59(e) offers “an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used
sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of
judicial resources.’”

Reliance Ins. Co. v. Doctors Co., 299 F.

Supp. 2d 1131, 1153 (D. Hawai‘i 2003) (quoting Carroll v.
Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Nor may the

reconsideration motion be “based on evidence and legal arguments
that could have been presented at the time of the challenged
decision.”

Comeaux v. Hawaii, Civ. No. 06–00341 SOM/BMK, 2007 WL

2300711, at *1 (D. Hawai‘i Aug. 8, 2007) (citation omitted).
“Whether or not to grant reconsideration is committed to the
sound discretion of the court.”

White v. Sabatino, 424 F. Supp.

2d 1271, 1274 (D. Hawai‘i 2006) (citing Navajo Nation v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d

5

1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Here, the Motion must be denied because it raises no
new evidence, no intervening change in the law, and no manifest
error of law or fact.

As to Plaintiff’s first argument, that his

claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman, the allegations in his
proposed First Amended Complaint, like those in his original
Complaint, indicate that he is, in fact, challenging final state
court decisions.

For example, his Complaint states that “FOLEY

affirmed court’s refusal to expunge as on ‘discretion of judge’
to trump State Statute”, and that “judges still abet COLLINS by
refusals to expunge lien & award reparation to make Plaintiff
whole; Homestead remains levied[.]”

[Complaint at ¶¶ 22, 36.]

Further, the Plaintiff submits as Exhibit 10b to his proposed
First Amended Complaint a single page from a Hawai‘i Bureau of
Conveyances document, No. 2004-123147, recorded on June 18, 2004,
entitled “Title of Document: Order Granting in Part and Denying
in Part Plaintiff’s Motion and Affidavit for Post-Decree Relief
Filed On April 30, 2001 and July 16, 2001, and Denying
Defendant’s Motions and Affidavit for Post-Decree Relief Filed on
June 1, 2001 and July 19, 2001.”

Thus, to the extent Plaintiff

argues that he seeks expungement by this Court of any liens
recorded against him in the Hawai‘i Bureau of Conveyances
pursuant to state court order, the Court denies the Motion.

6

Next, with respect to his argument that his claims
against Edwards and Collins are not barred by res judicata, his
argument is misplaced.

As the Court explained in its Order,

Plaintiff’s current claims are only barred to the extent they
satisfy the requirements of the res judicata doctrine; the
doctrine does not act as a blanket bar to all of the claims
against Edwards and Collins:
To the extent the instant matter again raises
these claims against the same parties, they are
barred as to these defendants by res judicata and
collateral estoppel. See Spinney v. Greenwich
Capital Fin. Prods., Inc., No. Civ. 05-00747
ACK/KSC, 2006 WL 1207400, at *5 (D. Hawai‘i May 3,
2006) (“The three critical issues to which Hawaii
courts look in determining whether the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
applicable are: (1) ‘Was the issue decided in the
prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?’ (2) ‘Was
there a final judgment on the merits?’ and (3)
“Was the party against whom the [doctrine] is
asserted a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication?’”) (citations omitted).
Order at 9.

Plaintiff fails to establish that he is entitled to

relief pursuant to Rule 59(e) as to this argument.
Finally, Plaintiff appears to argue that his claims
against the State Defendants are not barred by the doctrine of
judicial immunity because the state judges acted “without
jurisdiction.”

[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 5.]

As the Court

explained in its Order:
“Grave procedural errors or acts in excess of
judicial authority do not deprive a judge of
this immunity.” Id. (quoting Schucker v.
7

Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995, 109 S. Ct.
561, 102 L. Ed. 2d 587 (1988)). Even if the
judges acted incorrectly, with improper
motive, or as part of a conspiracy, they are
immune from suit for acts performed pursuant
to their official functions. “[J]udges of
courts of superior or general jurisdiction
are not liable to civil actions for their
judicial acts, even when such acts are in
excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged
to have been done maliciously or corruptly.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355, 356-57,
98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978)
(citation omitted); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554
(“[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is
accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly”).
Two limitations on the doctrine of
judicial immunity exist.
First, Judges are absolutely immune from
civil liability for actions taken in their
official capacities, unless committed in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Stump, 435 U.S.
at 360; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
. . . .
Second, only judicial acts are protected
by absolute judicial immunity. Mireles, 502
U.S. at 12. The United States Supreme Court
in Stump explained that “whether an act by a
judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the
nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is
a function normally performed by a judge, and
to the expectations of the parties, i.e.,
whether they dealt with the judge in his
judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362;
see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-229.
Sakuma v. Assoc. of Condo. Owners of Tropics at
Waikele ex rel. its Bd. of Dirs., Civil No.
08-00502 HG/KSC, 2009 WL 89119, at *3-4 (D.
Hawai‘i Jan. 13, 2009). The allegations here
relate solely to judicial acts taken by the judges
in their official capacities, and were not
committed in the complete absence of jurisdiction.
8

Order at 11-12.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the state judges
acted without jurisdiction because they should have been
disqualified, this argument challenges the state court judges’
apparent decisions not to recuse or disqualify themselves from
the underlying state court matters.

As discussed previously,

this Court cannot review such final state court decisions,
including the judicial determination to recuse or disqualify.
Again, Plaintiff’s allegations relate to actions taken by the
state judges in their official judicial capacities and are
judicial in nature.

See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct,

366 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In the context of judicial
immunity from suit, we have identified several factors to help
determine whether an act is judicial or non-judicial in
nature-whether: (1) the act is a normal judicial function, (2)
the events occurred in the judge’s chambers, (3) the controversy
centered around a case then pending before the judge, and (4) the
events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a
confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity.”).
This argument is not a proper basis for relief under Rule 59(e).
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled
to relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

“Mere disagreement

with a previous order is an insufficient basis for
reconsideration.”

White v. Sabatino, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1274
9

(D. Hawai‘i 2006).

Although Plaintiff may sincerely disagree

with the Court’s conclusions, the Motion must be denied because
it raises no new evidence, no intervening change in the law, and
no manifest error of law or fact.

To be clear, Plaintiff has not

demonstrated grounds for post-judgment relief and does not set
forth any manifest error or injustice in the Court’s Order or
final judgment.

Moreover, having reviewed Plaintiff’s proposed

First Amended Complaint and noting that it repeats many of the
deficiencies found in his original Complaint, the Court concludes
that Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended Complaint does not appear
to state claim upon which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Amend Judgment, filed March 9, 2012, is HEREBY DENIED.

The Clerk

of Court is directed to serve the present Order on Attorney
Thomas Collins and on Hawai‘i State Attorney General David Louie,
who in turn are asked to notify the respective named Defendants
whom they represent or have represented that this Order has been
entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

10

DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, March 21, 2012.

/S/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

GLENN MIZUKAMI V. DONNA C. EDWARDS, ET AL; CIVIL NO. 12-00103
LEK-BMK; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

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