Mizukami v. Edwards et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, DENYING 4 PETITION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF & DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING 3 APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS: "On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff's Complaint, filed February 21, 2012, is H EREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit, and Plaintiff's Petition for Injunctive Relief & Declaratory Judgment, also filed February 21, 2012, are HEREBY DENIED AS MOOT. The Cler k of Court is directed to (1) serve the present Order on Attorney Thomas Collins and on Hawai'i State Attorney General David Louie, who in turn are asked to notify the respective named Defendants whom they represent or have represented that this Order has been entered, and (2) close this case. IT IS SO ORDERED." Signed by District JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on February 29, 2012. (bbb, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electro nic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
DONNA EDWARDS; THOMAS D.
COLLINS III; The STATE OF
)
)
HAWAII and Gov. NEAL
ABERCROMBIE, Hon. BERT I.
)
AYABE judge of Circuit Court )
of First Circuit, Hon. DANIEL )
)
R. FOLEY judge Intermediate
Court of Appeals, DOES 1-10, )
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
GLENN MIZUKAMI,
CIVIL NO. 12-00103 LEK-BMK
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, DENYING PETITION FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF & DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,
AND DENYING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
On February 21, 2012, pro se Plaintiff Glenn K.
Mizukami (“Plaintiff”) filed a Verified Complaint (“Complaint),
an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit
(“Application”), and a Petition for Injunctive Relief &
Declaratory Judgment (“Petition”).
The Court finds these matters
suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule
LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).
After careful consideration of the Complaint and the relevant
legal authority, this Court HEREBY DISMISSES the Complaint WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Further, the Court HEREBY DENIES the Application and
the Petition as moot.
BACKGROUND
The instant case arises from several Hawai‘i state
court proceedings involving Plaintiff and Defendant Donna Edwards
(“Edwards”), his ex-wife.
The Complaint states that Plaintiff
and Edwards married and had a son in 1986, and then divorced in
1991.
[Complaint at ¶ 3.]
Edwards was apparently represented in
several state family court actions involving Plaintiff by
Defendant Thomas Collins (“Collins”).
[Id. at ¶ 4.]
Plaintiff
alleges that Edwards and Collins conspired with state court
judges Bert Ayabe (“Judge Ayabe”) and Daniel Foley (“Judge
Foley”) to deny him due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, and 1986.
[Id. at ¶ 6.]
He alleges that these state
court judges, the State of Hawai‘i, and Governor Neil Abercrombie
(collectively “State Defendants”) are vicariously liable for the
“judges’ other non-discretionary torts pretensed (sic) in ‘scope
of office’”.
[Id. at ¶ 7.]
Plaintiff alleges that, under family court support
orders entered in 2001 and 2002, the state courts denied Edwards’
claims for child support, but awarded her over $30,000 in
attorneys’ fees.
On appeal, Judge Foley awarded Edwards and
Collins $8,613 and $7,054 in attorneys’ fees.
[Id. at ¶¶ 15-20.]
According to Plaintiff, Collins then “filed illegal Nonconsensual
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Lien 6/18/04 No. 2004-123147 as trespass of Plaintiff’s Homestead
to unconstitutionally obstruct title to destroy Plaintiff’s
creditability (sic) & livelihood[.]”
[Id. at ¶ 21.]
It appears
that Plaintiff attempted to expunge the lien, but was
unsuccessful in either Circuit or Family Court, and his appeal
was denied by Judge Foley.
[Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24-25.]
Although not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff
alleges that Judge Ayabe issued several minute orders in an
unspecified state court matter in 2010 regarding a “‘postjudgment foreclosure’ of Family Court vacated voided-fees
lien[.]”
[Id. at ¶¶ 25-26.]
Plaintiff alleges that these minute
orders denied Plaintiff due process and equal protection, and
that Judge Ayabe “tampered” with court records and the Circuit
Court Clerk’s Record on Appeal (“ROA”) to discard one of the
minute orders.
[Id. at ¶¶ 28-30.]
On appeal, Judge Foley
allegedly “complicitly denied Plaintiff’s repeated Motions to
correct tampered ROA,” refused to recuse himself, and dismissed
the appeal.
[Id. at ¶¶ 32-34.]
“exceeding $300,000”.
Plaintiff seeks damages
[Id. at ¶ 48.]
In his concurrently filed Petition, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief to expunge the lien and “award Plaintiff
$350,000 reparation” [Petition at ¶ 1,] and a declaratory
judgment that the various defendants deprived him of his rights
and are liable for “exemplary damages of at least $1,200,000”
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[id. at ¶ 2].
DISCUSSION
This district court has recognized that:
A court may deny leave to proceed in forma
pauperis at the outset if it appears from the
facts of the proposed complaint that the action is
frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Minetti v. Port of
Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998).
As such, pro se plaintiffs proceeding in
forma pauperis “must also be given an opportunity
to amend their complaint unless it is absolutely
clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could
not be cured by amendment.” Tripati v. First
Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 [(9th Cir.
1987)] (internal citations omitted).
Lopez-Ruiz v. Tripler Army Med. Ctr., Civil No. 11-00065 SOM/KSC,
2011 WL 466784, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 4, 2011) (some alterations
in original).
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, this Court
will liberally construe his pleadings.
See Eldridge v. Block,
832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has
instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful
pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam))).
Plaintiff brings the instant action for alleged
violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; Haw. Rev. Stat.
Chapters 661, 662, and 663; and under 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
[Complaint at ¶¶ 9-10.]
The Complaint also asserts that this
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Court has subject jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332, and 1367.
Plaintiff’s reliance on these statutes
is misplaced.
I.
Claims Barred by Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
As a preliminary matter, to the extent Plaintiff’s
claims seek to attack the various final state court orders,
judgments, and liens, such claims are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine.
“As courts of original jurisdiction, federal
district courts have no authority to review the final
determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.”
Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995).
This legal
theory, commonly referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
(Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983),
collectively referred to as Rooker-Feldman), precludes federal
adjudication of a claim that “amounts to nothing more than an
impermissible collateral attack on prior state court decisions.”
Id.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “‘a losing party in
state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be
appellate review of the state judgment in a United States
District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state
judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”
Bennett
v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson
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v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)).
The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine divests federal district courts of jurisdiction to
conduct direct reviews of state court judgments even when a
federal question is presented.
Jurisdiction is lacking even if
the state court decision is challenged as unconstitutional.
Litigants who believe that a state judicial proceeding has
violated their constitutional rights must appeal that decision
through their state courts and then seek review in the United
States Supreme Court.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, does
not apply to a general constitutional challenge that does not
require review of a final state court decision in a particular
case.
See Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d
1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff is directly attacking the various state
court proceedings, and this Court cannot review these claims.
To
be clear, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court
cannot review and overturn the final determinations of a state
court.
See id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, construed most favorably
to Plaintiff, at most alleges that Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights were violated; if the Court were to adjudicate this claim,
it would have to review the state court proceedings, which it is
barred from doing.
To the extent Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by
Rooker-Feldman, the Court nevertheless finds that he fails to
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state a claim against Defendants Edwards, Thomas, and the State
Defendants, as set forth below.
II.
Claims Against Edwards and Collins
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Edwards and
Collins pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states, in pertinent
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a plausible § 1983
claim against Edwards and Collins, who were not state-actors
acting under the color of law.
[A] person “subjects” another to the deprivation
of a constitutional right, within the meaning of §
1983, “if he does an affirmative act, participates
in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform
an act which he is legally required to do that
causes the deprivation of which complaint is
made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
Cir. 1978). The requisite causal connection may
be established when an official sets in motion a
“series of acts by others which the actor knows or
reasonably should know would cause others to
inflict” constitutional harms. Id.
Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175,
1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (some citations omitted).
Generally,
private actors are not acting under color of state law.
See
Price v. Hawai‘i, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991).
A
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private actor acts under color of law for § 1983 purposes when
the allegedly improper conduct is fairly attributable to the
State.
Id.
Although Plaintiff alleges that Edwards and/or Collins
conspired with the state court judges in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1986, the allegations are insufficient to establish a conspiracy
to violate his federal rights.
A plaintiff must allege an
“‘agreement or meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional
rights” between a private party and the government.
Fonda v.
Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1970)).
“To be liable as a co-conspirator, a private defendant
must share with the public entity the goal of violating a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002).
Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d
The Ninth Circuit requires a
“substantial degree of cooperation” between the government and a
private citizen before finding such a conspiracy.
Id.
Here,
Plaintiff has made no allegations which, if proved, could
establish the substantial cooperation required by the Ninth
Circuit.
The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a federal
claim against Edwards and Collins.
To the extent Plaintiff
alleges non-federal claims against Edwards and Collins, the Court
is without diversity jurisdiction to hear these purely state law
claims, and declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.
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Moreover, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff
previously brought nearly identical claims in this district court
against Defendants Edwards and Collins in Civil No. 09-00550
SOM/BMK.
The district court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s
Complaint and denied as moot his Application to Proceed Without
Prepayment of Fees, on the grounds that his claims relating to
these same state court proceedings were barred by Rooker-Feldman.
[Order Dismissing Complaint; Order Denying Plaintiff’s
Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees, filed 11/18/09
(dkt. no 5).]
To the extent the instant matter again raises these
claims against the same parties, they are barred as to these
defendants by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
See Spinney
v. Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods., Inc., No. Civ. 05-00747
ACK/KSC, 2006 WL 1207400, at *5 (D. Hawai‘i May 3, 2006) (“The
three critical issues to which Hawaii courts look in determining
whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
applicable are: (1) ‘Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in
question?’ (2) ‘Was there a final judgment on the merits?’ and
(3) “Was the party against whom the [doctrine] is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?’”)
(citations omitted).
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On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s claims
against Edwards and Collins are barred as a matter of law.
The
Court further FINDS that granting Plaintiff leave to amend his
claims against Edwards and Collins would be futile.
See Flowers
v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A
district court . . . does not abuse its discretion in denying
leave to amend where amendment would be futile.”).
The claims
against Edwards and Collins are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
III. Claims Against State Defendants
All of Plaintiff’s claims against the State Defendants
are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
“Few doctrines
were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their
judicial jurisdiction.”
(1967).
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-4
Judicial immunity “is an immunity from suit, not just
from the ultimate assessment of damage . . . [and] is not
overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice. . . .”
Mireless
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is
based on the policy that “judges should be at
liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences.”
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213,
18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967) (applying judicial
immunity to § 1983 action). As the United States
Supreme Court explained in the case of Forester v.
White:
If judges were personally liable for
erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche
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of suits, most of them frivolous, but
vexatious, would provide powerful incentives
for judges to avoid rendering decisions
likely to provoke such suits. The resulting
timidity would be hard to detect or control
and would manifestly detract them from
independent and impartial adjudication.
Forester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27, 108 S.
Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988).
Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit,
not just from ultimate assessment of damages.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286,
116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991). “Accordingly, judicial
immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad
faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily
cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery
and eventual trial.” Id. Judicial immunity
applies “however erroneous the act may have been,
and however injurious in its consequences it may
have proved to the plaintiff.” Moore v. Brewster,
96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996) (superceded
by statute on other grounds). “Grave procedural
errors or acts in excess of judicial authority do
not deprive a judge of this immunity.” Id.
(quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995, 109
S. Ct. 561, 102 L. Ed. 2d 587 (1988)). Even if
the judges acted incorrectly, with improper
motive, or as part of a conspiracy, they are
immune from suit for acts performed pursuant to
their official functions. “[J]udges of courts of
superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to
civil actions for their judicial acts, even when
such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and
are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355,
356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978)
(citation omitted); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554
(“[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is
accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”).
Two limitations on the doctrine of judicial
immunity exist.
First, Judges are absolutely immune from
civil liability for actions taken in their
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official capacities, unless committed in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11-12; Stump, 435 U.S. at 360;
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
. . . .
Second, only judicial acts are protected by
absolute judicial immunity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at
12. The United States Supreme Court in Stump
explained that “whether an act by a judge is a
‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the nature of the act
itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally
performed by a judge, and to the expectations of
the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the
judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S.
at 362; see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-229.
Sakuma v. Assoc. of Condo. Owners of Tropics at Waikele ex rel.
its Bd. of Dirs., Civil No. 08-00502 HG/KSC, 2009 WL 89119, at
*3-4
(D. Hawai‘i Jan. 13, 2009).
The allegations here relate
solely to judicial acts taken by the judges in their official
capacities, and were not committed in the complete absence of
jurisdiction.
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s claims
against the State Defendants are barred by the doctrine of
judicial immunity.
The Court further FINDS that granting
Plaintiff leave to amend his claims against the State Defendants
would be futile; that is, the deficiencies identified above
cannot be cured by amendment.
See Flowers, 295 F.3d at 976;
Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1987) (stating that pro se plaintiffs must be given an
opportunity to amend their complaint unless it is absolutely
clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured
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by amendment).
The claims against the State Defendants are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Complaint,
filed February 21, 2012, is HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and
Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and
Affidavit, and Plaintiff’s Petition for Injunctive Relief &
Declaratory Judgment, also filed February 21, 2012, are HEREBY
DENIED AS MOOT.
The Clerk of Court is directed to (1) serve the
present Order on Attorney Thomas Collins and on Hawai‘i State
Attorney General David Louie, who in turn are asked to notify the
respective named Defendants whom they represent or have
represented that this Order has been entered, and (2) close this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, February 29, 2012.
/S/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
GLENN MIZUKAMI V. DONNA C. EDWARDS, ET AL; CIVIL NO. 12-00103
LEK-BMK; ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, DENYING PETITION FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF & DECLARATORY JUDGMENT; AND DENYING APPLICATION
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
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