K. v. Education, Department of, State of Hawaii et al

Filing 188

ORDER STAYING ACTION. Signed by JUDGE ALAN C KAY on 04/23/2013. (eps) -- Motions Deemed Withdrawn: 174 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Loveland Academy, L.L.C., 172 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by F. K., 170 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Education, Department of, State of Hawaii, 168 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Education, Department of, State of Hawaii, Kathryn Matayoshi. The Court STAYS all proceedings in this action other than the parties' invoice disputes relating to enforcement of the preliminary injunction issued on June 22, 2012. (Doc. No. 33 ) The stay shall remain in place for six months from the date of th is Order or until the Ninth Circuit issues an opinion in the appeal from Civ. No. 12-00240 (Ninth Circuit Case No. 13-15071), whichever is earlier. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive elec tronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE )
OF HAWAII, and KATHRYN
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MATAYOSHI,
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Defendants.
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE )
OF HAWAII, and KATHRYN
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MATAYOSHI in her official
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capacity as Superintendent of )
the Hawaii Public Schools,
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Third-Party
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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LOVELAND ACADEMY, LLC and DOE )
DEFENDANTS 1-10,
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Third-Party
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Defendants.
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)

Civ. No. 12-00136 ACK-RLP

F.K., by and through her
mother, A.K.,

ORDER STAYING ACTION
For the following reasons, the Court hereby STAYS all
proceedings in this action other than those necessary to enforce
the preliminary injunction issued on June 22, 2012 (Doc. No. 33),
for six months or until the conclusion of appeals in Plaintiffs’
IDEA administrative appeal, Civ. No. 12-00240, whichever is
earlier. The Court hereby DEEMS WITHDRAWN all parties’ motions
for summary judgment (Doc Nos. 168-75).

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., was enacted by Congress to,
among other things, “ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public education
[(“FAPE”)] that emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs . . . [and] to ensure that
the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) & (B). The
IDEA provides federal money to state and local education agencies
to assist them in educating disabled children, on the condition
that the state and local agencies implement the substantive and
procedural requirements of the IDEA. See R.P. v. Prescott Unified
Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011).
Under the IDEA, state and local education agencies are
required to identify children with disabilities and develop
annual Individual Education Programs (“IEPs”) for every child.
20 U.S.C. § 1414. The IDEA also provides procedural safeguards to
help ensure that the child receives a FAPE, including an
opportunity for due process hearings for complaints alleging any
violation of the IDEA. K.D. v. Dep't of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110,
1114 (9th Cir. 2011).
When a parent disagrees with the contents of an IEP,
the parent may challenge that IEP by demanding an administrative
due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(1)(A).
During the pendency of the parent’s complaint, unless the parties
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agree otherwise, the child must stay in the then-current
educational placement. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). The Ninth Circuit has
interpreted this “stay-put” provision as requiring the school
district to fund the child’s “current educational placement” at a
private school, when applicable. See Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 941 (9th Cir.
1990).
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1/
F.K. is a fourteen-year-old autistic girl who currently
receives education and related services under the IDEA from the
Hawaii Department of Education (“DOE”).
In March 2009, an administrative hearings officer
ordered the DOE to pay for F.K.’s education at a private school,
Loveland Academy, through the summer 2010 extended school year.
At the end of the 2009-2010 school year, the DOE began
a new IEP process for F.K, who remained at Loveland. In early
2011, the DOE offered F.K. a placement at her local public school
through an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) dated February
28, 2011. F.K.’s mother, A.K., rejected the IEP. Two DOE
administrative proceedings and two federal cases before this
Court ensued. For ease of reference, the instant action, which
was filed directly with this Court, will be referred to as “F.K.

1/

The Court and the Parties are familiar with the facts and
procedural background of this case. Only the basic outline is
recited here.
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Case 1.” The related case, which arose from F.K.’s two
administrative proceedings, will be referred to as “F.K. Case 2.”
I.

First Administrative Proceeding
On June 2, 2011, F.K., by and through A.K.

(“Plaintiffs”) filed a Request for Due Process Hearing (Case
No. 1011-126), arguing that the February 2011 IEP did not provide
F.K. with a FAPE. On October 12, 2011, a hearings officer held
that F.K. was entitled to stay put protections from June 2, 2011
through the pendency of the proceedings.
The hearings officer held an evidentiary hearing on
January 17-20 and 26 and February 16, 2012. On April 19, 2012, he
issued a decision, finding that, inter alia: (1) Plaintiffs did
not meet their burden of showing that the February 2011 IEP did
not offer FAPE; (2) the withholding of payments under Act 129 did
not constitute a unilateral placement; and (3) the DOE’s
reevaluations or proposed reevaluations of F.K. caused no harm to
F.K. and did not violate the IDEA.
II.

Second, Concurrent, Administrative Proceeding
During fall 2011, the DOE and Loveland negotiated over,

but were unable to agree on, times for the DOE to observe F.K.’s
education at Loveland. In December 2011, the DOE therefore
informed Loveland that it was withholding stay put payments,
under Hawaii’s “Act 129”, see Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-443(I).
On December 30, 2011, while Plaintiffs’ first
administrative proceeding (described above) was still pending,
Plaintiffs filed a new, separate Request for Due Process Hearing
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(Case 1112-067), arguing that the DOE’s withholding of payments
to Loveland violated the IDEA. In response, the DOE argued that
it was authorized under Act 129 to withhold payments to Loveland
because Loveland had restricted or denied the DOE’s attempts to
monitor F.K.’s education. The proceeding was assigned to a
different hearings officer than Plaintiffs’ first administrative
proceeding.
On February 21 and March 2, 2012, a hearing was held
on the issue of whether the DOE properly invoked Act 129 when it
withheld payment to Loveland. On April 25, 2012, the hearings
officer issued his decision. He concluded that Plaintiffs had
failed to show: (1) that the DOE’s withholding of payments
constituted a “unilateral placement” of F.K.; or (2) that the
DOE’s reevaluations or attempted reevaluations of F.K. had harmed
her education. He also found that he did not have jurisdiction to
consider A.K.’s arguments that Act 129 was preempted by federal
law.
III. Proceedings Before this Court
On March 9, 2012, in the midst of the DOE
administrative proceedings described above, Plaintiffs filed a
complaint in this Court, opening the instant action (“F.K.
Case 1”). Plaintiffs made the following claims: (1) DOE’s failure
to reimburse is a unilateral placement; (2) DOE’s failure to
reimburse violated the IDEA; (3) DOE’s failure to reimburse
violated a Hearings Officer’s order; (4) Act 129 conflicts with
the IDEA and is therefore preempted; (5) DOE’s reevaluations of
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F.K. violate the IDEA; and (6) DOE’s enforcement of Act 129
violates F.K.’s rights under the IDEA.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 2012, Plaintiffs appealed both the
hearings officers’ decisions described above to this Court, thus
opening this Court’s Civil Case No. 12-00240 (“F.K. Case 2”).
On June 22, 2012, the Court issued an order in F.K.
Case 1, granting a preliminary injunction against the DOE. (Doc.
No. 33.) The Court ordered the DOE to pay the reasonable expenses
for F.K.’s placement at Loveland from June 2, 2011 throughout the
pendency of this action. (Id. at 49-50.)
On December 12, 2012, this Court issued an order in
F.K. Case 2, affirming the two hearings officers’ April 2012
decisions. Plaintiffs timely appealed that order, and the appeal
is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit Case
No. 13-15071).
On March 28, 2013, all parties to F.K. Case 1 moved for
summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 168-75.) The Court then issued a
minute order requesting supplemental briefing on whether F.K.
Case 1 should be stayed until the appeals in F.K. Case 2 are
completed. (Doc. No. 179.) The parties filed their supplemental
briefs on April 12, 2013. (Doc. Nos. 183-85.) Plaintiffs oppose a
stay.
DISCUSSION
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself,
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for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S.
248, 254 (1936); see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997)
(“The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as
an incident to its power to control its own docket.”) The Court
finds that staying proceedings in the instant case to await
resolution of the appeal in F.K. Case 2 is in the interests of
“economy of time and effort” for the Court itself, for counsel,
and for the parties.
The Court notes and credits Plaintiffs’ argument that
the appeal in F.K. Case 2 is unlikely to wholly dispose of the
instant action, because F.K. Case 2 did not directly address the
merits of Act 129. Nonetheless, “[a] trial court may, with
propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the
fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action
before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which
bear upon the case. This rule . . . does not require that the
issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the
action before the court.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal.,
Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit
has, for instance, instructed a district court to stay its
proceedings pending the outcome of a state court action where,
depending on the outcome of the state court action, one party
could preclude the other party from relitigating some of the
issues in the federal action. See Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000). That reasoning
applies here. If the Ninth Circuit affirms this Court’s order in
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F.K. Case 2, that affirmation will directly decide, at a minimum,
F.K.’s first and fifth claims in F.K. Case 1, which are identical
to claims brought in F.K. Case 2. In fact, whatever the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in F.K. Case 2, it is very likely to affect the
claims in F.K. Case 1, given that the parties are identical and
the issues in the two cases overlap so substantially.
Plaintiffs’ argument that a stay will cause them
“irreparable harm” because the DOE is behind in tuition payments
(Doc. No. 185 at 9-10) is unconvincing. The Court has already
issued a preliminary injunction requiring DOE to make stay-put
payments to Loveland (Doc. No. 33) and has noted that any stay
will not affect enforcement of the preliminary injunction (Doc.
No. 179). Plaintiffs do not explain their grounds for believing
that the DOE will obey a permanent injunction if, as they claim,
the DOE is already disobeying a preliminary injunction.2/
A stay pending the outcome of a related proceeding may
not be “immoderate” and must have “reasonable limits.” Landis,
299 U.S. at 257. The Court therefore stays proceedings in F.K.
Case 1 for six months from the date of this Order, or until the
Ninth Circuit issues an opinion in the appeal in F.K. Case 2,
whichever is sooner. The parties shall notify the Court
immediately of any other change in circumstances that might
affect the need for this stay. In the meantime, the Court will

2/

The Court makes no ruling herein on the merits of
Plaintiffs’ allegations; the parties’ continuing invoice disputes
will be dealt with in a separate order.
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continue to preside over enforcement of its preliminary
injunction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court STAYS all
proceedings in this action other than the parties’ invoice
disputes relating to enforcement of the preliminary injunction
issued on June 22, 2012. (Doc. No. 33.) The stay shall remain in
place for six months from the date of this Order or until the
Ninth Circuit issues an opinion in the appeal from Civ. No. 1200240 (Ninth Circuit Case No. 13-15071), whichever is earlier.
The parties’ motions for summary judgment (Doc.
Nos. 168-75) are DEEMED WITHDRAWN. The motions will be
automatically reinstated after the stay is lifted or expires.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai’i, April 24, 2013

________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Sr. United States District Judge

F.K. v. Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 12-00136 ACK RLP, Order Staying Action

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