Jim Aana; et al. vs. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.

Filing 998

ORDER REGARDING LIABILITY OF A FARM OPERATION THAT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED AGRICULTURAL AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 4/3/2015. re: doc nos. 981 , 991 , 997 in 1:12-cv-00231-LEK-BMK Lead case: 1:12-cv-00231-LEK-BMK, Associated case 1:12-cv-00655-LEK-BMK(afc)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JIM AANA, et al., on behalf
of themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a DuPont
Business and Iowa
Corporation, GAY & ROBINSON,
INC., a Hawaii corporation;
ROBINSON FAMILY PARTNERS, a
general partnership
registered in Hawaii; and DOE
DEFENDANTS 1-10,
Defendants.
_____________________________
JEFFREY CASEY, et al., on
behalf themselves and all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________

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CIVIL NO. 12-00231 LEK-BMK
CIVIL NO. 12-00665 LEK-BMK

ORDER REGARDING LIABILITY OF A FARM
OPERATION THAT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH
GENERALLY ACCEPTED AGRICULTURAL AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
In the instant case, Defendant Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc. (“Defendant”) has raised a defense under the
Hawaii Right to Farm Act (“the Farm Act”), Haw. Rev. Stat.

Chapter 165.

Specifically, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 165-4 provides

that:
No court, official, public servant, or public
employee shall declare any farming operation a
nuisance for any reason if the farming operation
has been conducted in a manner consistent with
generally accepted agricultural and management
practices. There shall be a rebuttable
presumption that a farming operation does not
constitute a nuisance.
(Emphasis added.)

At the March 30, 2015 status conference

regarding trial exhibits, the parties pointed out that they have
significantly different positions on the effect of non-compliance
with generally accepted agricultural and management practices
(“GAAMP”).

This Court directed the parties to submit letter

briefs on the issue.

[Minutes, filed 3/30/15 (dkt. no. 981).]

Defendant filed its letter brief on April 1, 2015.
991.]

[Dkt. no.

Plaintiffs Jim Aana, et al., on behalf of themselves and

all others similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed
their letter brief on April 2, 2015.

[Dkt. no. 997.]

Defendant’s position is that, if Plaintiffs establish
that Defendant failed to comply with GAAMP, and they prove all of
the other elements of their claims, it is only liable for the
dust impacts it created beyond the “dust impacts that would be
caused by GAAMP-compliant farming.”

[Def.’s Letter Br. at 2.]

In essence, Defendant contends that the Farm Act creates at least
a partial immunity from nuisance claims for all farming

2

operations,1 regardless of whether or not they comply with GAAMP.
In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that “there is no language within

1

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 165-2 states, in pertinent part:
“Farming operation” means a commercial
agricultural . . . facility or pursuit conducted,
in whole or in part, including . . . the planting,
cultivating, harvesting, and processing of
crops . . . . “Farming operation” includes but
shall not be limited to:
(1) Agricultural-based commercial operations
as described in section [205-2(d)(15)];
(2) Noises, odors, dust, and fumes emanating
from a commercial agricultural or an
aquacultural facility or pursuit;
(3) Operation of machinery and irrigation
pumps;
(4)

Ground and aerial seeding and spraying;

(5) The application of chemical fertilizers,
conditioners, insecticides, pesticides, and
herbicides; and
(6) The employment and use of labor.
. . . .
“Nuisance” means any interference with reasonable
use and enjoyment of land, including but not
limited to smoke, odors, dust, noise, or
vibration; provided that nothing in this chapter
shall in any way restrict or impede the authority
of the State to protect the public health, safety,
and welfare. “Nuisance” as used in this chapter,
includes all claims that meet the requirements of
this definition regardless of whether a
complainant designates such claims as brought in
nuisance, negligence, trespass, or any other area
of law or equity . . . .
(Brackets in original.)
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the Hawaii Right to farm Act that grants any immunity or
privilege to non-GAAMP farmers and there is absolutely no
language within HRS Chapter 165 that limits the damages that may
be assessed against a non-GAAMP farmer.”

[Pltfs.’ Letter Br. at

2 (emphases in original).]
DISCUSSION
I.

Reliance on the Court’s Prior Statements
This Court first notes that both letter briefs cite

statements that this Court made during the March 3, 2015 hearing
on the parties’ motions in limine (“March 3 Hearing”).

See

March 3 Hearing Trans., filed 3/9/15 (dkt. no. 953), at 57-59.
The issue currently before this Court, however, was not presented
in the motions in limine that it addressed at the March 3
Hearing.

Thus, any statements that this Court made regarding the

issue during the March 3 Hearing were not substantive rulings,
and this Court does not construe them as the law of the case.
The instant Order supersedes this Court’s statements concerning
the GAAMP non-compliance issue at the March 3 Hearing.
II.

Effect of Non-compliance with GAAMP
This Court has diversity jurisdiction over the instant

case and is bound by the decisions of the Hawai`i Supreme Court
in ruling on substantive issues regarding Plaintiffs’ state law
claims.

See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint (Rule
4

12(b)(6)), 2014 WL 806224, at *13 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 27, 2014).2
The parties have not identified case law from any Hawai`i
appellate court addressing the issue raised in the parties’
letter briefs, and this Court is not aware of any.
In the absence of a governing state decision, a federal
court attempts to predict how the highest state court would
decide the issue, using intermediate appellate court decisions,
decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and
restatements as guidance.

Trishan Air, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.,

635 F.3d 422, 427 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Burlington Ins. Co.
v. Oceanic Design & Constr., Inc., 383 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir.
2004) (“To the extent this case raises issues of first
impression, our court, sitting in diversity, must use its best
judgment to predict how the Hawai`i Supreme Court would decide
the issue.” (quotation and brackets omitted)).

The parties,

however, have not identified case law from any other jurisdiction
addressing the current issue, and this Court is not aware of any.
This Court will therefore determine the issue by applying the
rules of statutory interpretation that the Hawai`i Supreme Court
follows.

See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment to Dismiss Defendant Dupont Pioneer’s Third
Affirmative Defense Based on the Hawaii Right to Farm Act, Hawaii

2

The February 27, 2014 order is also available at docket
number 608.
5

Revised Statutes, Chapter 165 (“Farm Act Order”), 2014 WL
4956489, at *3 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 30, 2014).3

The Farm Act Order

described those principles as follows:
First, the fundamental starting point for
statutory interpretation is the language of
the statute itself. Second, where the
statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
our sole duty is to give effect to its plain
and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the
task of statutory construction is our
foremost obligation to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature,
which is to be obtained primarily from the
language contained in the statute itself.
Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty
of an expression used in a statute, an
ambiguity exists.
Peterson v. Hawaii Elec. Light Co., Inc., 85
Hawai`i 322, 327-28, 944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71
(1997), superseded on other grounds by HRS
§ 269-15.5 (Supp. 1999) (block quotation format,
brackets, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
In the event of ambiguity in a statute, “the
meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
examining the context, with which the ambiguous
words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in
order to ascertain their true meaning.” Id.
(quoting HRS § 1-15(1) (1993)). Moreover, the
courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining
legislative intent, such as legislative history,
or the reason and spirit of the law. See HRS
§ 1-15(2) (1993).
2014 WL 4956489, at *3 (quoting State v. Bayly, 118 Hawai`i 1,
6-7, 185 P.3d 186, 191-92 (2008)).

Another fundamental principle

of statutory interpretation under Hawai`i law is that “courts are

3

The Farm Act Order is also available at docket number 825.
6

bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and . . . no
clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous,
void, or insignificant.”

See Beneficial Hawaii, Inc. v. Kida, 96

Hawai`i 289, 309, 30 P.3d 895, 915 (2001) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).

“The canons of statutory construction

also require this court to construe statutes so as to avoid
absurd results.”

Cnty. of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd.

P’ship, 119 Hawai`i 352, 362, 198 P.3d 615, 625 (2008) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant’s position is that the Farm Act gives every
farming operation the right to cause a certain amount of effects
that would otherwise constitute a nuisance, as that term is
defined in the Farm Act.

Thus, under Defendant’s interpretation,

all farming operations - whether they comply with GAAMP or not are immune from nuisance claims based upon the amount of farming
effects that a farming operation that complies with GAAMP would
cause.

This Court agrees with Plaintiffs that nothing in the

plain language of the Farm Act supports this interpretation.
Further, Defendant’s interpretation is contrary to other wellestablished principles of statutory construction.

First, § 165-4

expressly states that a farming operation shall not be declared a
nuisance “if the farming operation has been conducted in a manner
consistent with” GAAMP.

(Emphasis added.)

Allowing at least

partial immunity to farming operations that do not comply with
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GAAMP would render the “has been conducted” language of § 165-4
superfluous.

In addition, Defendant’s interpretation borders on

the absurd because farming operations would have no incentive to
comply with GAAMP if they received the same immunity whether they
complied or not.

This Court acknowledges that: it is the State

of Hawaii’s policy “to foster attitudes and activities” that
support farming; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 165-1 (internal quotation
marks omitted); and the Farm Act “is remedial in nature and shall
be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes[;]” Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 165-6.

Even in light of these clear statements, however,

this Court cannot find that the Hawai`i State Legislature
intended the results that Defendant advocates.

This Court

therefore predicts that the Hawai`i Supreme Court would reject
the interpretation of the Farm Act that Defendant advocates in
this case.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court CONCLUDES
that, if a plaintiff proves that a defendant farming operation
does not comply with generally accepted agricultural and
management practices, the defendant does not receive any
protection under the Hawaii Right to Farm Act, Haw. Rev. Stat.
Chapter 165.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, April 3, 2015.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

JIM AANA, ET AL. VS. PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL;
CIVIL 12-00231 LEK-BMK; JEFFREY CASEY, ET AL. VS. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL; CIVIL 12-00655 LEK-BMK; ORDER
REGARDING LIABILITY OF A FARM OPERATION THAT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH
GENERALLY ACCEPTED AGRICULTURAL AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

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