S. v. Education, Department of, State of Hawaii et al

Filing 27

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICER'S FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - Signed by JUDGE ALAN C KAY on 4/5/13. " For the foregoing reasons, the Court REVERSES the Hearings Of ficer's finding that Parents "settled" their claims with the DOE, but AFFIRMS the Hearings Officer's finding that Parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of JTS's education at ABC School. There are no issue s for remand." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
HEYLY T.S., individually and on
behalf of his minor child,
J.T.S.,

) Civ. No. 12-00327 ACK-KSC
)
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellants, )
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF
)
EDUCATION and KATHRYN MATAYOSHI, )
in her official capacity as
)
Superintendent of the Hawaii
)
Public Schools,
)
)
Defendant-Appellees.
)
)
ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICER’S FINDINGS OF
FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
For the following reasons, the Court AFFIRMS IN PART
AND REVERSES IN PART the Administrative Hearings Officer’s
decision below. The record is clear that Parents did not settle
their claims at the pre-hearing Resolution Session. The Court
therefore REVERSES the Hearings Officer’s decision on that point.
The Court finds, however, that Parents are not entitled to
reimbursement for the costs of their son’s private school
education, for two reasons.
First, Parents did not present sufficient evidence to
show that the private school is an appropriate educational
placement for their son. Indeed, Parents presented almost no
evidence at all on that issue. The Court AFFIRMS the Hearings
Officer’s finding on this point.

Second, equitable considerations weigh against granting
reimbursement in this case. Parents’ actions were unreasonable
under the meaning of the IDEA. Parents enrolled their son in an
expensive private school mere days after filing their request for
a due process hearing, and before the statutorily-required
Resolution Session designed to try to resolve such disputes.
Moreover, Parents did not challenge the revised IEP that arose
from the Resolution Session negotiations, which accordingly
presumptively offered a FAPE.
For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Hearings
Officer’s finding that Parents are not entitled to reimbursement.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., was enacted by Congress to,
among other things, “ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public education
[(“FAPE”)] that emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs . . . [and] to ensure that
the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) & (B). The
IDEA provides federal money to state and local education agencies
to assist them in educating disabled children, on the condition
that the state and local agencies implement the substantive and
procedural requirements of the IDEA. See R.P. v. Prescott Unified
Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011).

2

Under the IDEA, state and local education agencies are
required to identify children with disabilities and develop
annual Individual Education Programs (“IEPs”) for every child.
20 U.S.C. § 1414. An IEP is a comprehensive, individualized
document developed by a team of parents, teachers, and other
school administrators setting out the goals for the child, and
the special education and related services that are necessary to
reach those goals. Id. § 1414(d). The IDEA also provides
procedural safeguards to help ensure that the child receives a
FAPE, including an opportunity for due process hearings for
complaints alleging any violation of the IDEA. K.D. v. Dep't of
Educ., 665 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011).
When a parent disagrees with the contents of an IEP,
the parent may challenge that IEP by demanding an administrative
due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(1)(A). A
parent may also enroll the child in a private program, and, upon
establishing that the public school failed to provide a FAPE, may
seek reimbursement. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). To be awarded
reimbursement, a parent must establish that placement at a
private school was proper under the IDEA. C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo
v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.
2011)(quoting Cnty. of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing
Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
JTS is a six-year old boy who is eligible for special
education in the category of autism. (Resps.’ Ex. 5 at 1; Resps’
Ex. 7 at 55.)
The DOE determined that JTS was eligible for special
education on November 3, 2011. (Resps.’ Ex. 7, at 55.) On
November 9, 2011, an IEP meeting was held which Parents attended.
(Resps.’ Ex. 2 at 19-20.) The meeting formulated an IEP (Resps.’
Ex. 5 (“November IEP”)), and the next day the DOE sent Parents a
written notice attaching the November IEP and offering JTS
placement at public school (Resps.’ Ex. 7 at 56).
The November IEP did not offer JTS one-to-one support
during the school day. (Resps.’ Ex. 5.) Parents had strongly
emphasized the need for one-to-one services at the November 9 IEP
meeting. (Hearing Transcript (“Tr.”) at 28:22-29:3 & 118:6-18.)
Indeed the written notice accompanying the IEP stated that JTS
had demonstrated “a need for . . . one-to-one assistance in the
education setting” and that Head Start or private pre-school
would be inappropriate because they “would not provide the oneto-one assistance . . . needed.” (Resps.’ Ex. 7 at 56.)
On November 28, 2011, JTS’s father, Heyly T.S., filed a
request for a due process hearing regarding the November IEP.
(Record on Appeal (“ROA”) Ex. 1.))
On December 1, 2011, JTS’s parents signed an agreement
with a private school run by the Autism Behavior Consulting
Group, Inc. (“ABC School”), enrolling JTS at ABC School through
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November 30, 2012, at a tuition rate of $9,940 per month plus
applicable taxes. (Pets.’ Ex. 9 at 84.) JTS did not start
attending ABC School, however - and Parents therefore did not
start incurring fees - until later in the month.
On December 8, 2011, the parties participated in a
telephonic “resolution session” regarding the due process
request, as required by statute. (See Resps.’ Ex. 17 at 102-108
(“Res. Session Summary”).) At the Resolution Session, the DOE
initially offered “close adult supervision” for JTS for the first
two weeks of school. (Id. at 4.) Parents requested close
supervision for him “beyond the two week transition period and
throughout the school year.” (Id.) The DOE offered close
supervision throughout the school year, which Parents indicated
would be acceptable. (Id. at 5; see Tr. at 41:3-42:21.) The
parties did not, however, reach a written settlement agreement,
and Heyly T.S. stated that he could not commit to a settlement at
that time. (Res. Session Summary at 6; Tr. at 44:23-45:16.)
Although the Resolution Session Summary states that the DOE
offered to write its offer into the IEP, the DOE apparently did
not make that offer at the Resolution Session itself. (See Tr. at
40:1-41:2 & 240:8-16.) Rather, the DOE’s counsel contacted
Parents’ counsel either the day of the Resolution Session or the
next day to explain that the DOE had reconsidered its position
and would be scheduling a meeting to revise the IEP. (Id. at
240:8-241:2.)

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One week later, on Thursday December 15, 2011, another
IEP meeting was held, which Heyly T.S. and Parents’ counsel
attended. (Id. at 46:19-47:12.) The meeting formulated a new IEP,
which stated that “close adult supervision will be provided for
[JTS’s] transition to school and throughout the school day” and
noted that the supervision would be offered “daily” for the
duration of the IEP. (Resps.’ Ex. 6 (“December IEP”) at 11; see
Tr. at 223:23-224:20.)
Parents never enrolled JTS in public school. Instead,
JTS began attending ABC School on Monday December 19, 2011,
initially attending only part-time. (Pets.’ Ex. 10 at 85.) JTS
had never attended any other school before that week at ABC
School. (Tr. at 77:13-18.) JTS’s parents were invoiced $1,1039.79
for his first week of school. (Pets.’ Ex. 10 at 85.)
The DOE sent Parents a written notice on December 21,
2011, enclosing the December IEP and offering the amended
services at JTS’s local public school. (Resps.’ Ex. 8; Resps.’
Ex. 17 at 88.)1/ The new written notice again rejected Head Start
or private pre-school because they “would not provide the one-toone assistance . . . needed.” (Resps.’ Ex. 8.)
In January 2012, JTS gradually increased his hours of
attendance at ABC School. (Tr. at 79:15-80:9.) For January 2012,
JTS’s parents were invoiced a total of $4,159.16. (Pets.’ Ex. 10

1/

It is not clear from the record when, exactly, Parents
notified the DOE that they were going to place JTS in private
school.
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at 86.) As of February 7, 2012, JTS was attending ABC School for
8.5 hours per day. (Tr. at 80:4-19.) Parents’ counsel indicated
at the hearing on the administrative appeal that JTS attended ABC
School, under the December 1, 2011 contract, until November 2012.
He then remained at ABC School month-to-month for two months, but
as of February 2013 has been attending his local public school.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As stated above, Heyly T.S. filed a due process request
on November 28, 2011. (ROA Ex. 1.) On January 12, 2012, the DOE
filed a motion for summary judgment, which Parents partially
opposed. (ROA Exs. 6 & 7.) The Hearings Officer held a hearing on
that motion on January 19, 2012, and denied the motion. (ROA
Ex. 8.) At that hearing, the Hearings Officer urged Parents to
amend their due process request to challenge the December IEP as
well as the November IEP; Parents, through their counsel, refused
to do so. (Jan 19, 2012 Tr. at 16:22-17:20.)
The evidentiary hearing regarding Heyly T.S.’s due
process request began on February 7, 2012. (Admin. Dec. at 3.) It
continued and was concluded on March 22, 2012. (Id.) The Hearings
Officer issued his decision on May 9, 2012, finding that: (1) the
November IEP denied JTS a FAPE because it did not provide him
with one-to-one assistance; (2) with respect to Extended School
Year services, the November IEP did provide a FAPE; (3) the
discussion at the December 8 Resolution Session and the
amendments in the December IEP “settled” Parents’ claims
regarding the November IEP; (4) Parents did not prove that ABC
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School was an appropriate placement for reimbursement purposes;
and (5) Parents did not meet their burden of proof as to any
other claims related to the November IEP. (Id. at 12-16.) Parents
appealed the Hearings Officer’s third and fourth findings only.
(Pets.’ Brief at 2.)
The Court held a hearing on the administrative appeal
on March 14, 2013, which Parents attended along with their
counsel. (Doc. No. 21.) At the hearing, the Court asked Parents’
counsel to submit, within seven days, affidavits from Parents and
ABC School discussing Parents’ attempts to break their contract
with ABC School. Parents’ counsel was to file the affidavits with
the Court within seven days (with an extension available if
necessary). The DOE would then have seven days to file a
response. (Id.) The Court stated that it only wished to receive
factual evidence, not argument or briefing.
On March 21, 2013, Parents submitted an affidavit from
Heyly T.S., but none from the private school. (Doc. No. 22.) On
March 28, contrary to the Court’s express instructions, the DOE
submitted a six-page brief discussing Heyly T.S.’s affidavit.
(Doc. No. 23.) The Court therefore gave Parents a further six
days to file their own six-page brief of argument. (Doc. No. 24.)
Parents filed their supplemental brief on April 3, 2013. (Doc.
No. 25.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the IDEA, federal courts accord considerably less
deference to state administrative proceedings than they do in
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most instances of “judicial review of . . . agency actions, in
which courts generally are confined to the administrative record
and are held to a highly deferential standard of review.”
Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist.
Office of Admin. Hearings, 652 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2011)).
The statute empowers the reviewing court to hear evidence that
goes beyond the scope of the administrative record and, based on
a preponderance of the evidence, “grant such relief as the court
determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). The
statute gives the district court “broad discretion to craft
relief.” Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student E.H., 587 F.3d
1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2009).
Nonetheless, the statutory requirement “that a
reviewing court base its decision on the ‘preponderance of the
evidence’ is by no means an invitation to the courts to
substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for
those of the school authorities which they review.”

Bd. of Educ.

v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). Administrative proceedings
are accorded “due weight” and the reviewing court must, at least,
“consider the findings carefully[.]” Id. (citation omitted). The
reviewing court must consider the hearing officer’s findings
carefully and endeavor to respond to the hearing officer’s
resolution of each material issue. Ashland Sch. Dist., 587 F.3d
at 1183 (9th Cir. 2009). An administrative hearing officer's
“thorough and careful” findings receive particular deference.
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Anchorage Sch. Dist., 689 F.3d at 1053 (quoting R.B. ex rel. F.B.
v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.
2007)). In this case, the Hearings Officer issued a detailed
sixteen-page decision explaining the basis for each of his
conclusions thoroughly and carefully, with citations to the
record. The Court will therefore accord his findings “particular
deference.” Anchorage Sch. Dist., 689 F.3d at 1053.
DISCUSSION
I.

Resolution Session
Parents argue that the Hearings Officer was incorrect

in finding that their claims had been settled by the Resolution
Session. The Court agrees.
Pre-hearing “resolution sessions” are required by a
statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B), which also sets out the
format for any settlements reached during resolution sessions. If
“a resolution is reached to resolve the [due process] complaint
at” a resolution session, “the parties shall execute a legally
binding agreement that is . . . signed by both the parent and a
representative of the [local educational] agency . . . .” Id.
§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii).
In this case, no such written settlement agreement was
issued. Indeed, the record of the Resolution Session explicitly
states that “Parties did not come to an agreement” but “continue
to communicate to resolve all issues before the hearing.” (Res.
Session Summary at 102.) The record is thus quite clear that no
settlement was reached at the Resolution Session. Even if the
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December IEP incorporated Parents’ concerns as expressed at the
Resolution Session, the December IEP was not a “legally binding
agreement” signed by Parents and the DOE, as required by statute.
The Hearings Officer’s finding that Parents settled their claims
with the DOE was therefore erroneous.2/
II.

Reimbursement
In 1997, Congress added 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) to

the IDEA to “clarify the circumstances in which parents who
unilaterally remove their children from private school may
receive tuition reimbursement.” Dep’t of Educ. v. M.F. ex rel.
R.F., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1233 (D. Haw. 2011) (quoting M. v.
Portland Sch. Comm’n, 360 F.3d 267, 271 (1st Cir. 2004)). Parents
who unilaterally transfer a child from a public school to a
private school do so “at their own financial risk.” Forest Grove
Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009) (citation omitted).
A parent or guardian is “entitled to reimbursement only if a
federal court concludes both (1) that the public placement
violated the IDEA, and (2) that the private school placement was
proper under the [IDEA].” C.B., 635 F.3d at 1159 (citation
omitted); see Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. 4 v. Carter ex rel.
Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). If

2/

At the hearing on the administrative appeal, Counsel for
the DOE conceded that the hearings officer should not have found
that the dispute “settled” at the Resolution Session. Counsel
nonetheless suggested that the dispute was “resolved” at the
Resolution Session. This distinction is not persuasive.
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either criterion is not met, the parent or guardian may not
obtain reimbursement. C.B., 635 F.3d at 1159.
If both criteria are satisfied, the district court then
must exercise its “broad discretion” and weigh “equitable
considerations” to determine whether, and how much, reimbursement
is appropriate. Id. (quoting Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. 4, 510
U.S. at 15-16.) The court must review the conduct of both the
parents and the local educational agency. Anchorage Sch. Dist.,
689 F.3d at 1059. For instance, reimbursement may be reduced or
denied if the parents did not inform the local educational agency
that they intended to enroll their child in private school or
“upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to
actions taken by the parents.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).
Here, Parents’ claim for reimbursement fails for two
reasons: (1) Parents failed to prove that ABC School was an
appropriate placement for JTS; and (2) Parents acted unreasonably
such that reimbursement would not be proper in this case.
A.

Appropriateness of Private Placement
First, Parents dispute the Hearings Officer’s finding

that Parents did not demonstrate that the private placement was
an appropriate placement for their son. The Court agrees with the
Hearings Officer that Parents did not present sufficient evidence
to show that JTS’s placement at ABC School is appropriate.
The burden is on parents seeking reimbursement to
demonstrate that the private school in which they have chosen to
enroll their child is appropriate. M.H. v. Dep’t of Educ., 685
12

F.3d 217, 246 (2d Cir. 2012). In this case, Parents presented
almost no evidence at all on this issue. Parents presented only
two witnesses at the hearing; Parents themselves. The only
evidence Parents presented regarding JTS’s current private
placement was Parents’ own subjective impressions that JTS’s
communication skills and eye contact levels had improved since
attending ABC School. (Tr. at 54:23-55:4.) Neither Parent
testified to any expertise in education or development, either in
general or particularly related to autism spectrum disorders. Nor
did either Parent testify in any degree of detail about the
programming that ABC School provides.
The Court is sensitive to Parents’ argument that at the
time of the administrative hearing, JTS had only been attending
ABC School for a short time and that it was therefore difficult
to present evidence of his progress. The Court cannot fault the
Hearings Officer, however, for moving to hear the dispute
quickly. Parents could have presented evidence of ABC’s
programming, staffing, and resources, and their fitness for JTS’s
particular needs, from a witness qualified to discuss them. They
did not.
The Hearings Officer found, and the Court affirms, that
Parents did not present sufficient evidence to show that ABC
School was an appropriate placement for purposes of
reimbursement.

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B.

Equitable Considerations
Second, even if Parents had demonstrated that the

private placement to which they moved their son was appropriate
(which they have not), reimbursement would not be automatic. If a
parent demonstrates that the school district has failed to offer
a FAPE and that the private placement is appropriate, the court
must then “exercise its ‘broad discretion’ and weigh ‘equitable
considerations’ to determine whether and how much reimbursement
is appropriate.” C.B., 635 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Florence Cnty.
Sch. Dist. 4, 510 U.S. at 15-16.) The Ninth Circuit has issued
guidance as to the equitable factors the district courts should
consider:
In making this determination, the district
court may consider all relevant equitable
factors, including, inter alia, notice to the
school district before initiating the
alternative placement; the existence of
other, more suitable placements; the parents'
efforts in securing the alternative
placement; and the level of cooperation by
the school district.
Anchorage Sch. Dist., 689 F.3d at 1059. The court must consider
the conduct of both parties to determine whether relief is
appropriate. Id.
In this case, the equitable considerations do not fall
in Parents’ favor. The purpose of the statute requiring
resolution sessions and of revisions to an IEP is to allow the
state educational agency a chance to rectify problems with a
challenged IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(I)(B)(i)(IV) (At resolution
session, “the local educational agency is provided the
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opportunity to resolve the complaint.”); see, e.g., S.J. ex rel.
S.H.J. v. Issaquah Sch. Dist. No. 411, 326 Fed. App’x 423, 426
(9th Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of reimbursement where parent
“did not provide the District with an opportunity to address his
objections to his IEP prior to his private placement”);
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.3d 773, 794 (1st Cir. 1984)
(purpose of revising challenged IEPs is to “assist in promoting
settlements”). The resolution session is held, by statute, within
fifteen days of the filing of parents’ due process request.
The record shows that Parents signed an apparently
unbreakable contract with an expensive private school only three
days after filing their request for a due process hearing, and
before the Resolution Session that is required to try to resolve
their disputes. The DOE participated in good faith in the
Resolution Session and offered at the Resolution Session many of
the items that Parents requested. Although during the Resolution
Session itself, the DOE (on the advice of counsel) avoided
promising to revise the IEP, the DOE’s counsel contacted Parents’
counsel either that same day or the next day to inform Parents
that the DOE was willing to revise the IEP; the meeting to revise
the IEP took place one week later, and at that meeting the DOE
acquiesced to Parents’ requests. Nonetheless, JTS began attending
the private school - and Parents began incurring the expenses for
which they seek reimbursement - three days after that IEP
meeting. When they received the new IEP, Parents expressly
refused to challenge it, even when requested to do so by the
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Hearings Officer. (Tr. of Jan. 19, 2012, at 16:22-17:20.)3/ To
reimburse Parents under these circumstances would contravene the
spirit of the IDEA’s procedural protections.
Parents’ counsel argued at the hearing on the
administrative appeal - for the first time - that Parents could
not withdraw JTS from ABC School after December 1, 2011, because
the school had refused to release Parents from their contract.
The Court gave Parents the opportunity to file affidavits to this
effect, and both parties filed argument about the affidavit that
Parents filed.4/ That affidavit does not demonstrate that Parents
acted reasonably when dealing with ABC School. The affidavit

3/

At the hearing on the administrative appeal, Parents’
counsel conceded that the December IEP was presumptively valid,
since Parents had the burden of proof that it was invalid, and
had declined to challenge it. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v.
Weast, 549 U.S. 49, 51 (2005) (parents have burden of proof that
an IEP does not provide a FAPE). As the Supreme Court explained:
“Petitioners in effect ask this Court to assume that every IEP is
invalid until the school district demonstrates that it is not.
The Act does not support this conclusion.” Id. at 59; see W. ex
rel. Louise W. v. The Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 395 Fed. App’x
824, 827 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Regardless of C.W.’s implications that
her IEP was deficient, the appropriateness of her IEP is not
challenged on appeal, and we must accept that her IEP offered a
free appropriate public education.”); Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott
P. ex rel. Bess P., 62 F.3d 520, 538 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 199192 IEP was not challenged and was therefore presumptively
appropriate.”). For this reason, the Court disagrees with the
reasoning of Saki v. Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 09-00209, 2008 WL
1912442, at *8 (D. Haw. Apr. 30, 2008).
4/

As noted above, the DOE filed its brief contrary to the
Court’s express instructions, and the Court then gave Parents
permission to file an opposing brief. Counsel for the DOE is
cautioned not to disobey the Court’s orders in the future, and is
reminded of the Court’s power to sanction for failure to obey the
Court’s orders. See Air Separation Inc. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd’s of London, 45 F.3d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 1995).
16

references a single conversation with the owner of the school, in
which she told Parents that someone would have to take JTS’s
place at the school. (Doc. No. 22 at ¶¶ 3-4.) Parents presented
no evidence that they tried to find another child to take JTS’s
place or attempted any further negotiations with the school,
despite the fact that JTS apparently attended the school for more
than a year.
In sum, to the extent that the contract with ABC School
was truly unbreakable, it was unreasonable for Parents to sign an
unbreakable contract for expensive school services for a full
year, when their son had never attended any school at all, let
alone that school; particularly mere days after filing a request
for a due process hearing concerning their son’s IEP, and before
the statutorily-required Resolution Session. To the extent that
the contract with ABC School was breakable, it was unreasonable
for Parents not to break it after receiving the December IEP,
which they have explicitly refused to challenge and which is
therefore presumptively valid.
Parents’ testimony at the administrative hearing shows
them to be loving parents who are intensely concerned with their
son’s health and education. Their zealousness is admirable. The
law is clear, however, that if parents wish to be reimbursed for
private school costs, they must make reasonable efforts to work
with their local educational agency before unilaterally removing
their child to a private school. In this case, Parents behaved
unreasonably under the meaning of 20 U.S.C.
17

§ 1412(i)(3)(B)(i)(ll). The Court therefore AFFIRMS the Hearings
Officer’s conclusion that Parents are not entitled to
reimbursement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court REVERSES the
Hearings Officer’s finding that Parents “settled” their claims
with the DOE, but AFFIRMS the Hearings Officer’s finding that
Parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of JTS’s
education at ABC School. There are no issues for remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai’i, April 5, 2013

________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Sr. United States District Judge

Heyly T.S. v. Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 12-00327 ACK KSC, Order Affirming in
Part and Reversing in Part Administrative Hearings Officer’s Findings of Fact
& Conclusions of Law

18