Reimer v. Kuki'o Golf And Beach Club, Inc. et al
Filing
177
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW re 176 173 . Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 04/22/2014. (eps)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic n otifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
CIVIL 12-00408 LEK-BMK
JEFFREY REIMER, an
individual,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
KUKI’O GOLF AND BEACH CLUB,
)
)
INC., a Hawaii corporation;
MELANIE AIONA, an individual; )
)
DOES 1-10; and ROE
)
CORPORATIONS 1-10,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Before the Court is Defendant Kuki`o Golf and Beach
Club, Inc.’s (“Defendant”)1 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
Law (“Motion”), filed on April 21, 2014.
[Dkt. no. 173.]
Plaintiff Jeffrey Reimer (“Plaintiff”) filed his memorandum in
opposition on April 22, 2014.
[Dkt. no. 174.]
on for hearing on April 22, 2014.
This matter came
After careful consideration of
the Motion, supporting and opposing memoranda, and the arguments
of counsel, Defendant’s Motion is HEREBY DENIED for the reasons
set forth below.
1
This Court will use the term “the Club” to refer to Kuki`o
Golf and Beach Club and the term “Kuki`o” to refer to the
development of properties, the owners of which may purchase
memberships at the Club.
STANDARD
Defendant brings the instant Motion pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50, which states, in pertinent part:
(a)
Judgment as a Matter of Law.
(1) In General. If a party has been fully
heard on an issue during a jury trial and the
court finds that a reasonable jury would not have
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for
the party on that issue, the court may:
(A) resolve the issue against the
party; and
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a
matter of law against the party on a claim or
defense that, under the controlling law, can
be maintained or defeated only with a
favorable finding on that issue.
(2) Motion. A motion for judgment as a
matter of law may be made at any time before the
case is submitted to the jury. The motion must
specify the judgment sought and the law and facts
that entitle the movant to the judgment.
The standard for judgment as a matter of law mirrors
that for granting summary judgment.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2000).
“[I]n entertaining a
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court . . . may not
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”
149.
Id. at
Rather, the court “must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.”
F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006).
Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443
Where there is sufficient
2
conflicting evidence, or if reasonable minds could differ over
the verdict, judgment as a matter of law is improper.
Pierson v.
Ford Motor Co., No. C 06-6503 PJH, 2009 WL 3458702, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 23, 2009).
Thus, “[a] district court can grant a Rule
50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law only if there is no
legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that
party on that issue.”
Krechman v. Cnty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d
1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.
Whether Plaintiff Breached the Agreement
In his contractual claims, breach of contract
(Count II) and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing (Count III), Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached
the Beach and Golf Club Membership Purchase Agreement (“the Club
Agreement”) by failing to follow the requirements for
disciplinary actions against members, which are set forth in the
Club’s Governing Documents.2
The Club’s Governing Documents
provide that, during the pendency of a proposed disciplinary
action, the member is entitled to enjoy all of the Club
2
The Club’s “Governing Documents” consist of its Articles
of Incorporation, Bylaws, Club Transfer Agreement, Membership
Plan, and the Club’s rules and regulations. The Governing
Documents apply to the Club Agreement.
3
privileges that he was entitled enjoy to before the complaint
against him.
Defendant, however, suspended Plaintiff from using
the Club pending an investigation into the profanity that
Plaintiff allegedly directed at Melanie Aiona on January 13, 2012
(“the Aiona Incident”).3
Further, although Plaintiff, through
his attorney, requested a hearing to respond to the allegations,
Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with a hearing.
Defendant
first argues that Plaintiff cannot recover damages for his
contractual claims because, even assuming, arguendo, that
Defendant breached the Club Agreement, Defendant’s breach was
excused because Plaintiff first breached the Club Agreement by
verbally abusing, or acting inappropriately toward, Aiona.
Hawai`i law recognizes the rule that one party’s
material breach of the contract excuses the other party’s
nonperformance of the contract.
See, e.g., Sw. Slopes, Inc. v.
Lum, 81 Hawai`i 501, 508, 918 P.2d 1157, 1164 (Ct. App. 1996)
(“The seller’s material breach of the contract excuses the
buyer’s nonperformance.” (citing 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 664
3
It is undisputed that, at the time of the Aiona Incident,
Plaintiff, through a corporate entity, owned two properties in
Kuki`o, and Plaintiff was an equity member of the Club. It is
undisputed that, Plaintiff, through the corporate entity,
currently owns one of the properties (“the Property”). It also
appears that Plaintiff is still a member of the Club, although it
is undisputed that Plaintiff has not returned to the Club since
the Aiona Incident.
4
(1991)).
This Court, however, finds that the facts of the
instant case are distinguishable from the facts of cases such as
Southwest Slopes and the case that Defendant relies upon.
[Mem.
in Supp. of Motion at 4 (citing PR Pension Fund v. Nakada, 8 Haw.
App. 480, 491 (1991)).]
This Court therefore concludes that the
defense that a breach of contract is excused by the other party’s
prior breach is inapplicable to the instant case.
Defendant’s
Motion is DENIED as to the issue regarding Plaintiff’s alleged
breach of the Club Agreement.
II.
The Duty of Care at Issue in Plaintiff’s Negligence Claim
Defendant next argues that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law because Plaintiff failed to present expert
testimony in support of his negligence claim (Count VIII).
Defendant argues that, without expert testimony, Plaintiff cannot
establish either the duty of care that Defendant owed to
Plaintiff or the breach of that duty.4
4
Plaintiff argues that whether Defendant owes Plaintiff a
duty of care is a question of law and, therefore, expert
testimony is not required. This Court does not construe
Defendant’s Motion as arguing that an expert witness was
necessary to establish the existence of a duty of care. This
Court construes Defendant’s Motion as arguing that expert
testimony was necessary to establish the nature and scope of the
duty of care, i.e. the standard of care, that Defendant owed to
Plaintiff. This Court concludes, as a matter of law, that
Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care by virtue of the
relationship established in the Club Agreement. The nature and
scope of that duty, and whether Defendant breached that duty, are
at issue in the trial.
5
Under Hawai`i law, expert testimony is not necessary to
establish “‘the applicable standard of care’” in “‘an ordinary
negligence case.’”
Barbee v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 119 Hawai`i 136,
159, 194 P.3d 1098, 1121 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Craft v.
Peebles, 78 Hawai`i 287, 298, 893 P.2d 138, 149 (1995)).
The
Hawai`i Intermediate Court of Appeals has stated:
“It is well settled that in medical
malpractice actions, the question of negligence
must be decided by reference to relevant medical
standards of care for which the plaintiff carries
the burden of proving through expert medical
testimony.’” Craft v. Peebles, 78 Hawai`i 287,
298, 893 P.2d 138, 149 (1995) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). As further explained, “[t]he
standard of care to which a doctor has failed to
adhere must be established by expert testimony
because a jury generally lacks the requisite
special knowledge, technical training, and
background to be able to determine the applicable
standard without the assistance of an expert.”
Id. (Citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Ralston v. Yim, 128 Hawai`i 42, 45-46, 282 P.3d 584, 587-88 (Ct.
App. 2012) (emphasis in Ralston).
Although the instant case involves medical evidence
regarding Plaintiff’s injuries and disabilities, the instant case
is an “ordinary negligence case.”
The jury in this case does not
need special knowledge, technical training, or a specialized
background to determine the applicable standard of care.
The
jurors are capable of determining the standard of care based on
their “common knowledge or ordinary experience.”
6
See Craft, 78
Hawai`i at 298, 893 P.2d at 149 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
This Court therefore rejects Defendant’s argument that
Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof as to his
negligence claim because he did not present expert testimony
regarding the applicable standard of care.
Defendant’s Motion is
DENIED as to this issue.
III. Effect of the March 23, 2012 Reinstatement Letter
Defendant argues that, even assuming, arguendo, that
Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages on his contractual
claims, this Court must rule that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff
is precluded from recovering contractual damages after the March
23, 2012 letter, which Defendant argues unconditionally
reinstated Plaintiff’s use of the Club.
The Hawai`i Supreme Court has recognized that:
[i]n contract or in tort, the plaintiff has a duty
to make every reasonable effort to mitigate his
[or her] damages. The burden, however, is upon
the defendant to prove that mitigation is
possible, and that the injured party has failed to
take reasonable steps to mitigate his [or her]
damages.
Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 85 Hawai`i 336, 373, 944 P.2d 1279,
1316 (1997) (alterations in Tabieros) (quoting Malani v. Clapp,
56 Haw. 507, 517, 542 P.2d 1265, 1271 (1975)).
There has been sufficient conflicting evidence such
that reasonable minds could differ over the verdict on the issue
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of whether Plaintiff’s refusal to return to the Club constituted
a failure to make every reasonable effort to mitigate his
damages.
Thus, Court concludes that there is a legally
sufficient basis to support a reasonable jury’s finding for
Plaintiff on this issue.
See Krechman, 723 F.3d at 1109.
Defendant’s Motion is DENIED as to the mitigation of damages
issue.
IV.
Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof as to Contract Damages
Defendant urges this Court to rule, as a matter of law,
that Plaintiff cannot recover contractual damages based upon the
alleged loss in the value of his Property.
Defendant emphasizes
that the governing documents for Plaintiff’s Club membership are
separate and apart from the purchase agreement for Plaintiff’s
Property, and Defendant argues that “[t]he Governing Documents
did not contemplate damages resulting to the purchased property
and from disciplinary action against a Member.”
[Mem. in Supp.
of Motion at 13.]
The Hawai`i Supreme Court has stated:
“It is now a well established principle in
the law of damages that, when one sustains a loss
by breach of a contract, he is entitled to have
just compensation commensurate with his loss” and
“that damages awarded should be in such amount as
will actually or as precisely as possible
compensate the injured party.” Ferreira v.
Honolulu Star–Bulletin, Ltd., 44 Haw. 567, 573–74,
356 P.2d 651, 655, reh’g denied, 44 Haw. 581, 357
P.2d 112 (1960). The Ferreira rule is limited by
the doctrines of legal causation and
8
foreseeability enunciated by the court in Jones
[v. Johnson] as follows:
The general rule is that in an action for
damages for breach of contract only such
damages can be recovered as are the natural
and proximate consequence of its breach; that
the damages recover-able must be incidental
to the contract and be caused by its breach;
as the cases express it, “such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of the parties at the time the
contract was entered into.”
41 Haw. [389,] 393 [(Terr. 1956)] (citation
omitted).
Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 128, 839
P.2d 10, 32-33 (1992) (some citations omitted).
Plaintiff has presented evidence that only property
owners in Kuki`o are eligible to purchase memberships in the
Club.
Plaintiff has also presented evidence that the Club and
its amenities are marketed as attractive features of the Kuki`o
properties.
Based on this and other related evidence, this Court
finds that there has been sufficient conflicting evidence such
that reasonable minds could differ over the verdict on the issue
of whether Plaintiff may recover contract damages based upon the
alleged loss in value of his Property.
Thus, this Court
concludes that there is a legally sufficient basis to support a
reasonable jury’s finding for Plaintiff on this issue, and this
Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to this issue.
9
.
Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof as to Tort Damages
Finally, Defendant argues that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s negligence claim
because Plaintiff has not carried his burden of proof as to any
damages for his negligence claim.
“It is well-settled that plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the elements of a negligence action — duty, breach of
duty, causation, and damages.”
Adams v. Yokooji, 126 Hawai`i
420, 426, 271 P.3d 1179, 1185 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Takayama v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 82 Hawai`i 486, 498–99, 923 P.2d 903, 915–16
(1996)); see also Weite v. Momohara, 124 Hawai`i 236, 253, 240
P.3d 899, 916 (Ct. App. 2010) (“Damages comprise an essential
element of a negligence claim.” (citing Cho v. State, 115 Hawai`i
373, 379 n.11, 168 P.3d 17, 23 n.11 (2007))).
There has been sufficient conflicting evidence such
that reasonable minds could differ over the verdict on the issue
of whether Plaintiff has carried his burden of proof as to the
damages associated with his negligence claim.
Thus, this Court
concludes that there is a legally sufficient basis to support a
reasonable jury’s finding for Plaintiff on this issue, and this
Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to this issue.
10
ONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law, filed April 21, 2014, is HEREBY
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, April 22, 2014.
/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
JEFFREY REIMER V. KUKI`O GOLF & BEACH CLUB, ET AL.; CIVIL 1200408 LEK-BMK; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW
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