Reimer v. Kuki'o Golf And Beach Club, Inc. et al

Filing 59

ORDER DENYING REIMER'S 56 MOTION TO CERTIFY ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS FINAL. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on May 14, 2013. (bbb, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEPa rticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JEFFREY REIMER, an
individual,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
KUKI’O GOLF AND BEACH CLUB,
)
)
INC., a Hawaii corporation;
MELANIE AIONA, an individual; )
)
DOES 1-10; and ROE
)
CORPORATIONS 1-10,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL 12-00408 LEK-BMK

ORDER DENYING REIMER’S MOTION TO
CERTIFY ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS FINAL
Before the Court is Plaintiff Jeffrey Reimer’s
(“Reimer”) Motion to Certify Order Granting Defendants’ Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment as Final, filed on May 8, 2013
(“Motion”).

[Dkt. no. 56.]

The Court finds this matter suitable

for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rules LR7.2(d) and
LR74.2 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).
After careful consideration of the Motion and the relevant legal
authority, the Court HEREBY DENIES the Motion for the reasons set
forth below.
BACKGROUND
The relevant factual and procedural background in this

case is set forth in this Court’s April 11, 2013 Order Granting
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“4/11/13
Order”).

Reimer v. Kuki’o Golf & Beach Club, Inc., Civ. No. 12-

00408 LEK-BMK, 2012 WL 1501522 (D. Hawai`i Apr. 11, 2013).

In

the 4/11/13 Order, the Court dismissed Reimer’s claim against
Defendants Kuki’o Golf and Beach Club, Inc. (“the Club”), and
Melanie Aiona (collectively, “Defendants”) for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count I of the
Complaint), finding that the Club is a private club and thus not
subject to the ADA.

Id. at *3-4.

In the instant Motion, Reimer asks the Court to certify
its 4/11/13 Order as final and appealable pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
DISCUSSION
Rule 54(b) provides, in relevant part:
When an action presents more than one claim for
relief-whether as a claim, counterclaim,
crossclaim, or third-party claim-or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry
of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer
than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason
for delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

The Ninth Circuit has explained the

process by which a district court may direct entry of final
judgment as to one claim in a multi-claim suit:
A district court must first determine that it has
rendered a “final judgment,” that is, a judgment
that is “‘an ultimate disposition of an individual
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claim entered in the course of a multiple claims
action.’” Curtiss–Wright [Corp. v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980)], (quoting [Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436
(1956)]). Then it must determine whether there is
any just reason for delay. “It is left to the
sound judicial discretion of the district court to
determine the ‘appropriate time’ when each final
decision in a multiple claims action is ready for
appeal. This discretion is to be exercised ‘in
the interest of sound judicial administration.’”
Id. at 8, 100 S.Ct. 1460 (quoting Mackey, 351 U.S.
at 437, 76 S.Ct. 895). Whether a final decision
on a claim is ready for appeal is a different
inquiry from the equities involved, for
consideration of judicial administrative interests
“is necessary to assure that application of the
Rule effectively ‘preserves the historic federal
policy against piecemeal appeals.’” Id. (quoting
Mackey, 351 U.S. at 438, 76 S.Ct. 895).
Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Court should “consider such factors as whether the
claims under review were separable from the others remaining to
be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already
determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide
the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent
appeals.”

Curtiss–Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.

In determining whether

to grant certification, courts must consider the judicial
administrative interest in avoiding “piecemeal appeals,” as well
as the other equities involved.

Id.; see also 10 Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 3d § 2659 (1998) (“It is uneconomical for an
appellate court to review facts on an appeal following a Rule
54(b) certification that it is likely to be required to consider
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again when another appeal is brought after the district court
renders its decision on the remaining claims or as to the
remaining parties.”).
Applying these factors here, the Court concludes that
entering a separate judgment under Rule 54(b) in favor of
Defendants as to Count I of the Complaint is not “in the interest
of sound judicial administration,” and may result in unnecessary
piecemeal appeals.

While there has been a final decision as to

Count I against Reimer, Counts II (breach of contract), III
(breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing), and a
portion of Count IV (negligence) remain before this Court.
Reimer, 2013 WL 504866 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 7, 2013).

See

The Court

notes that all of the counts in the Complaint arise from the same
core of factual allegations: that the Club allegedly unlawfully
and unreasonably suspended Reimer’s access to and use of the Club
facilities after he made a comment that a Club employee perceived
as a “verbal assault,” but that Reimer claims was a manifestation
of his Traumatic Brain Injury.

Because of the substantial

factual overlap between the claims in Count I and the remaining
claims, entering a separate judgment as to Count I at this time
would likely result in multiple appeals involving the same
issues.

Under such circumstances, where there are “different

theories of adverse treatment arising out of the same factual
relationship, . . . the issues and claims at stake are not truly

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separable, and should not be separated artificially, for purposes
of Rule 54(b).”

Wood, 422 F.3d at 881.

In such circumstances,

“[a] similarity of legal or factual issues . . . weigh heavily
against entry of judgment under [Rule 54(b)].”

Id. at 882.

(alterations in original) (quoting Morrison–Knudson Co. v.
Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981)).

As such, the Court

DENIES the Motion.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Reimer’s Motion to Certify
Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as
Final, filed on May 8, 2013, is HEREBY DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, May 14, 2013.

/S/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

JEFFREY REIMER V. KUKI`O GOLF AND BEACH CLUB, INC.; CIVIL NO. 1200408 LEK-BMK; ORDER DENYING REIMER’S MOTION TO CERTIFY ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS FINAL

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