Hanson et al v. Palehua Community Association et al

Filing 52

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS re 38 , 20 , 24 . Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 4/23/13. (gls, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registe red to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

RONALD HANSON, KATHY
HANSON, and others similarly
situated,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
PALEHUA COMMUNITY
)
ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_______________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 12-00616 JMS-RLP
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO STRIKE AND
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE AND
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Ronald and Kathy Hanson (“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se,
brought this action against Defendants Palehua Community Association (“PCA”)
and State Circuit Judge Gary W.B. Chang (“Judge Chang”). Before the court are
three Motions: First, Judge Chang moves to dismiss all claims against him,
asserting a lack of jurisdiction and absolute immunity. Doc. No. 20. Second, PCA
moves to dismiss, also asserting a lack of jurisdiction and raising a collateral
estoppel/res judicata bar. Doc. No. 24. Third, Plaintiffs move to strike PCA’s
Motion to Dismiss, arguing that it was filed late. Doc. No. 38. Based on the

following, the court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike, and GRANTS the
Motions to Dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
Plaintiffs’ thirty-nine page Amended Class Action Complaint,1 filed

on November 23, 2012, makes a variety of confusing allegations against
Defendants “Palehua Community Association a Hawaii Pseudo Homeowner Assn;
and The Honorable Gary [W.B.] Chang,” as well as unidentified Doe Defendants.
Doc. No. 18, Am. Compl. at 1. It alleges federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 for violations of federal law -- alleged civil rights violations under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 -- although the Amended Complaint also mentions
criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3 & 1513; RICO violation, 18 U.S.C. § 1964; and
federal antitrust statutes, 15 U.S.C. §§ 19 & 45. Doc. No. 18 at 2, ¶¶ 16, 19.2
As best the court can glean from the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs

1

Although the Amended Complaint purports to be a class action on behalf of Plaintiffs
“and others similarly situated,” the class allegations have no effect -- no class has been certified,
and “a pro se plaintiff cannot represent a class in a class action.” Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., 2012
WL 5471149, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (citing numerous cases for the proposition that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 does not permit a pro se plaintiff to bring a class action).
2

Plaintiffs filed a similar Complaint on November 19, 2012, along with a Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). See Doc. No. 1, Complaint; Doc. No. 3, Mot. for TRO.
After the court denied the Motion for TRO, Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint on
November 23, 2012. Doc. No. 18.
2

are challenging (1) the legitimacy of the PCA, which is a homeowners association
for a subdivision in the Kapolei area of Oahu; and (2) several adverse Orders and a
final Judgment issued in Hawaii state court by Judge Chang in litigation brought
by PCA against Plaintiffs, including counterclaims by Plaintiffs against PCA. In
particular, the Amended Complaint describes proceedings in state court litigation
(the “Palehua state court action”) related to enforcement of covenants of the PCA.
Id. ¶¶ 70, 88, 101, 106; see Palehua Cmty. Ass’n v. Hanson, Civ. No. 09-1-1935-08
(GWBC) (Haw. Cir. Ct.) (available at http://hoohiki2.courts.state.hi.us/jud/
Hookiki/main.htm) (last visited April 22, 2013)). Additionally, Defendants have
provided for the record various orders and a judgment issued in the Palehua state
court action. See Doc. No. 24-2, Kozak Decl. & Exs. 4 to 11.
Plaintiffs allege that the state court rulings were entered without
authority. Doc. No. 18, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 111-13. They allege that they “have been
subjected [to] court proceeding[s] with judges lacking jurisdiction, having a
conflict of interest, and repeated acts of denial of due process by excess of
jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 13. They also allege that the PCA “has no standing or legal
authority to administer or enforce the [covenants] of a ‘dead entity’ legally
[a]dministratively dissolved November 15, 1991 by the State of Hawaii or to file or
seek relief in any court of law.” Id. ¶ 108.
3

Among other relief, the Amended Complaint seeks (1) a judgment
declaring that the orders and judgments of Judge Chang in the Palehua state court
action “are null and void due to a lack of jurisdiction,” id. at 37 ¶ 1; (2) a judgment
declaring the PCA “is legally administratively dissolved and has no standing in a
court of law,” id. ¶ 3; (3) a judgment “declaring a Federal Trustee be appointed to
facilitate the ‘wind up’ procedures of the [PCA],” id. ¶ 4; (4) a judgment “declaring
that the acts perpetuated by the Defendants were unlawful, unconstitutional, and
retaliatory against the Plaintiff’s Hanson’s [sic] and the class they seek to
represent,” id. ¶ 8; and (5) an award of “costs and expenses including attorney pro
se fees and other attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and other
provision of law or in lieu thereof an amount equal to the amounts awarded by
[Judge Chang] to the [PCA] plaintiff and counterclaim on or about October 2012
as just compensation for legal expenses to defend the State action since the summer
2006.” Id. ¶ 13.
B.

Procedural Background
This action was filed on November 19, 2012, with the Amended

Complaint against PCA and Judge Chang filed on November 23, 2012. Doc. No.
18. Judge Chang filed his Motion to Dismiss on December 27, 2012, Doc. No. 20,

4

and PCA filed its Motion to Dismiss on January 14, 2013. Doc. No. 24.3 On
February 25, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Strike PCA’s Motion to Dismiss,
Doc. No. 38, and filed Oppositions to the two Motions to Dismiss. Doc. Nos. 39,
40. PCA filed a Reply on March 4, 2013. Doc. No. 45.
Meanwhile, also on February 25, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to
Recuse this court from this action, Doc. No. 37, which was referred to another
District Judge for disposition as required under 28 U.S.C. § 144. Proceedings on
these Motions were stayed pending resolution of the Motion to Recuse. On March
20, 2013, Judge Helen Gillmor denied the Motion to Recuse, finding that no
reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances underlying the Motion to
Recuse, would have doubts as to this court’s impartiality in this case. Doc. No. 47,
Order Denying Mot. for Recusal.4 Accordingly, the stay of proceedings was lifted,
and PCA filed an Opposition to the Motion to Strike on April 4, 2013. Doc. No.
49. Plaintiffs filed a corresponding Reply on April 11, 2013. Doc. No. 50. The
court decides the Motions without an oral hearing under Local Rule 7.2(d).

3

On January 17, 2013, three days after PCA filed its Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff sought
entry of default and filed a Motion for Default Judgment. Doc. Nos. 28, 29. The court denied
the request for entry of default and the Motion for Default Judgment on January 18, 2013. Doc.
No. 34.
4

One of Plaintiffs’ allegations in their Motion to Recuse is that the undersigned is a
“close friend” of Judge Gary Chang. Doc. No. 37, Mot. to Recuse at 4. To be clear, the
undersigned is not a “close friend” of Judge Chang.
5

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Judge Chang’s Motion to Dismiss
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for acts done by them in

the exercise of their judicial functions. See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142,
1145 (9th Cir. 2008); Mullis v. Bankr. Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385,
1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that judges are absolutely immune from civil liability
for damages for their judicial acts). The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is
based on the policy that “judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action). Forester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), explains the reasoning for this
policy:
If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions,
the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous,
but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for
judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke
such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect
or control and would manifestly detract them from
independent and impartial adjudication.
Id. at 226-27.
Moreover, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from
ultimate assessment of damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
6

“Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or
malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in
discovery and eventual trial.” Id. Judicial immunity applies “however erroneous
the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have
proved to the plaintiff.” Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir.
1996), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Tia v. Mollway,
2011 WL 2945813, at *4 (D. Haw. July 20, 2011). “A judge is not deprived of
immunity because he takes actions which are in error, are done maliciously, or are
in excess of his authority.” Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir.
1999) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978)).
That is, even if judges act incorrectly or with improper motive, they
are immune from suit for acts performed pursuant to their official functions.
“[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions
for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and
are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Sparkman, 435 U.S. at
355-56 (citation omitted); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (“[I]mmunity applies even
when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.”).
Applying these principles, the Amended Complaint fails to state a
claim against Judge Chang. He is absolutely immune. Reading Plaintiffs’
7

Amended Complaint broadly, all its allegations against Judge Chang arise out of
rulings he made in his judicial capacity in the Palehua state court action. Thus,
although the Amended Complaint alleges that Judge Chang acted as part of a
“conspiracy,” and without authority or jurisdiction, it still fails to state a claim.
See, e.g., Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355-56 (“[J]udges of courts of superior or general
jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts
are in excess of their jurisdiction[.]”).5

5

Sparkman clarified that a judge can be subject to liability for acting in the “clear
absence of all jurisdiction,” and distinguished that standard from acting “in excess of
jurisdiction” -- where, as here, immunity applies. See Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 357 & n.7. It
explained:
In [Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872),] the Court
illustrated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction
with the following examples: if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills
and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of
jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other
hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent
crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be
immune.
Id. (citing Bradley, 13 Wall. at 352). Sparkman reasoned that immunity applied because “the
court over which Judge Stump presides is one of general jurisdiction, neither the procedural
errors he may have committed nor the lack of a specific statute authorizing his approval of the
petition in question rendered him liable in damages for the consequences of his actions.” Id. at
359-60.
Here, Judge Chang, presiding over a court of general jurisdiction, made rulings regarding
a condominium property regime, contractual obligations, Hawaii tort law, and various Hawaii
court rules or practices. Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding a lack of “jurisdiction” or “authority”
are directed at Judge Chang’s rejection of their argument that the PCA was dissolved. See, e.g.,
Doc. No. 18, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 108-111, 117. Even under a broad reading of the Amended
Complaint, Judge Chang was not acting in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” and is thus
entitled to absolute immunity.
8

Moreover, to the extent the Amended Complaint seeks damages from
the State of Hawaii for actions of Judge Chang in his official capacity, the action is
also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official
capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself.”) (citations omitted);
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986) (“Relief that in essence serves to
compensate a party injured in the past by an action of a state official in his official
capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred [by the Eleventh Amendment]
even when the state official is the named defendant.”).6
In short, the claims against Judge Chang are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike
Before addressing PCA’s Motion to Dismiss, the court must first

address Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs contend that the court should strike
PCA’s Motion to Dismiss because (they claim) it was filed late -- more than twenty
one days after service of the Amended Complaint, allegedly in violation of Federal
6

Although not clear, to the extent Plaintiffs name Judge Chang as a Defendant for
purposes of prospective injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young, such claims are barred under the
Rooker/Feldman Doctrine (as argued in his Motion) and by res judicata/collateral estoppel
principles, as the court analyzes below when addressing PCA’s Motion to Dismiss.
9

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring an answer or responsive pleading
“within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint”). Rather,
Plaintiffs again argue that default should have entered against PCA on January 17,
2013, and that therefore the court should not consider PCA’s Motion to Dismiss.
The court rejects these arguments, and DENIES the Motion to Strike.
As noted above, in the court’s January 18, 2013 Order Denying
(1) Request for Entry of Default and (2) Motion for Default Judgment, Doc. No.
34, the court has already determined that default should not have entered on
January 17, 2013. The record reflects that on January 3, 2013, a summons and
proof of service was filed with the Clerk of Court, indicating that the summons and
Amended Complaint were personally served on PCA on “12/22/12.” See Doc. No.
22 (Summons and Proof of Service signed by a process server). Based on the date
indicated in that proof of service, an answer or responsive pleading was due on
January 14, 2013, and that date was duly noted on the court’s docket by the Clerk
of Court.7 See id. (entry reading “SUMMONS Returned Executed Palehua
Community Association served on 12/22/2012, answer due 1/14/2013”).
7

The twenty-one day period provided in Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i) started on Sunday,
December 23, 2012 and ran until Sunday, January 13, 2013. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A)
(instructing to “exclude the day of the event that triggers the period”). Because January 13, 2013
was a Sunday, an answer or responsive pleading was due on January 14, 2013. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(a)(1)(C) (“[I]f the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to
run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”).
10

Accordingly, PCA filed its Motion to Dismiss on January 14, 2013. Doc. No. 24.
The next day (January 15, 2013), however, an amended summons and
proof of service was filed -- and that amended proof of service, also dated January
15, 2013, indicates the summons and Amended Complaint were served on
“12/20/12.” If December 20, 2012 was the actual service date for the Amended
Complaint, then a responsive pleading would have been due on January 10, 2013
(and that date was also reflected then on the docket by the Clerk of Court. Doc.
No. 27). Based on this amended proof of service -- again, filed after PCA filed its
Motion to Dismiss -- Plaintiffs contend the Motion to Dismiss was filed late and
should be struck.
Initially, even considering Plaintiffs’ arguments, the court properly
refused to allow the Clerk of Court to enter default against PCA on January 17,
2013. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides “[w]hen a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the
party’s default.” (Emphasis added). Thus, when Plaintiffs sought the entry of
default on January 17, 2013, PCA was already “defending” based on the pending
Motion to Dismiss filed three days earlier (even assuming it had been filed late).
See, e.g., Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d
11

685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988); Ashby v. McKenna, 331 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (10th Cir.
2003) (reasoning that no default may be entered while motion to dismiss is
pending). And because default had not been entered, the court properly denied
Plaintiffs’ corresponding Motion for Default Judgment. See, e.g., Eitel v. McCool,
782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining the two-step process requiring a
proper entry of default before a court can grant default judgment).
More importantly, even if the Amended Complaint was actually
personally served on PCA on December 20, 2012, the court will not strike the
Motion to Dismiss. “Motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor
because of the limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they
are often used as a delaying tactic.” Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco
Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citations omitted).
“Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike lies within the sound discretion of
the district court.” Id. (citation omitted). Under these circumstances -- where the
amended proof of service was filed after PCA filed it Motion to Dismiss -- there is
no basis to strike the Motion. PCA could rely on the court’s docket, reflecting a
due date of January 14, 2013 for its responsive pleading.
Further, the record also reflects that, on December 20, 2012, counsel
for PCA executed a waiver of service of summons and transmitted the waiver to
12

Plaintiffs by email and letter. See Doc. No. 49-4, Kozak Decl. at 7, 10-12.
Because a waiver of service of summons was timely executed by PCA’s counsel,
the period within which to answer or otherwise respond was extended until sixty
days after December 20, 2012 (i.e., February 19, 2013). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(A)(ii) (“A defendant must serve an answer . . . (ii) if it has timely waived
service under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the request for a waiver was sent.”).
Given the waiver of service, the Motion to Dismiss was not late in any event.
In short, the court DENIES the Motion to Strike, and proceeds to
address PCA’s Motion to Dismiss.
C.

PCA’s Motion to Dismiss
PCA seeks dismissal with prejudice arguing that the relief sought in

the Amended Complaint constitutes a de facto appeal of Judge Chang’s orders and
the final judgment in the Palehua state court action, and such relief -- seeking to
vacate state court judgments or orders -- is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.8 And if any claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman, PCA also asserts a
res judicata/collateral estoppel bar. The court addresses each argument in turn.

8

The doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
13

1.

Rooker-Feldman
Under Rooker-Feldman, federal district courts are precluded from

reviewing state court judgments in “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003), explains the doctrine as
follows:
If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly
erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from
a state court judgment based on that decision, RookerFeldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal
district court. If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff
asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or
omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not
bar jurisdiction.
Id. at 1164. “To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman bar is applicable, a
district court first must determine whether the action contains a forbidden de facto
appeal of a state court decision.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir.
2013) (citing Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158). Bell reiterated that “[a] de facto appeal
exists when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous
decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that
decision.’” Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164).
14

Here, Rooker-Feldman clearly bars most of Plaintiffs’ claims. The
relief sought in the Amended Complaint is based upon allegations that the state
court was wrong. Plaintiffs did not appeal the final judgment issued in the Palehua
state court action,9 and instead filed this action seeking a federal court judgment
declaring that the orders and judgments of Judge Chang in the Palehua state court
action “are null and void due to a lack of jurisdiction.” Doc. No. 18, Am. Compl.
at 37 ¶ 1. Plaintiffs contend the state court rulings were entered without authority.
Id. ¶¶ 111-13. They allege that they “have been subjected [to] court proceeding[s]
with judges lacking jurisdiction, having a conflict of interest, and repeated acts of
denial of due process by excess of jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 13. Thus, because this
action constitutes a de facto appeal of the Palehua state court action, it is barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.10 See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164.

9

Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal of certain state court Orders, but that appeal was
dismissed by the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See
Palehua Cmty. Ass’n v. Hanson, 2011 WL 213600, at *2 (Haw. App. Jan. 12, 2011).
10

To the extent Plaintiffs are specifically asking for a federal court order staying
enforcement of state court orders, such relief is also barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2283, “which
precludes a federal court from granting ‘an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress . . .’ [and] ‘extends not only to injunctions affecting
pending proceedings, but also to injunctions against the execution or enforcement of state
judgments.’” Hicks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 346660, at *2 (D. Haw. Feb. 2, 2012)
(denying motion for emergency injunctive relief seeking to prevent enforcement action based
upon an allegedly void state court judgment); Scherbenske v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 626 F.
Supp. 2d 1052, 1058 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (denying motion for TRO seeking to enjoin state court
detainer action, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2283); Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127,
131 (5th Cir. 1990) (similar).
15

2.

Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel (Claim and Issue Preclusion)
Rooker-Feldman, however, does not bar an “allegedly illegal act or

omission by an adverse party.” Id. The Amended Complaint, besides attempting
to vacate and enjoin orders and the judgment in the Palehua state court action, also
appears to seek relief that could be construed to be based on “illegal acts” of “an
adverse party” -- that is, the acts of PCA. It alleges, for example, that PCA “has no
standing or legal authority to administer or enforce” condominium association
covenants,” Doc. No. 18, Am. Compl. ¶ 108, and seeks (among other relief) “a
Federal Trustee [to] be appointed to facilitate the ‘wind up’ procedures of the
[PCA].” Id. at 37 ¶ 4. Nevertheless, even if Rooker-Feldman does not bar such
claims, they are barred by well-accepted doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel (or “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion”).
As noted in Bumatay v. Finance Factors, Ltd., 2010 WL 3724231 (D.
Haw. Sept. 16, 2010),
Hawaii law now prefers the modern terms “claim
preclusion” and “issue preclusion” instead of “res
judicata” and “collateral estoppel.” See Bremer v. Weeks,
104 Haw. 43, 53, 85 P.3d 150, 160 (2004). Hawaii cases
sometimes merge the terms “res judicata” and “collateral
estoppel.” See, e.g., Bush v. Watson, 81 Haw. 474, 480,
918 P.2d 1130, 1136 (1996) (“Collateral estoppel is an
aspect of res judicata. . . . [C]ollateral estoppel [is] an
included doctrine [of res judicata].”) (quoting Morneau v.
Stark Enters., Ltd., 56 Haw. 420, 423, 539 P.2d 472, 475
16

(1975)); In re Dowsett Trust, 7 Haw. App. 640, 644, 791
P.2d 398, 401 (1990) (“[R]es judicata comprises two
separate doctrines or rules concerning the preclusive
effect of prior adjudication. Those doctrines or rules are
denominated ‘res judicata’ and ‘collateral estoppel.’”).
They both include a common three-pronged test. Bush,
81 Haw. at 480, 918 P.2d at 1136. Generally, the
doctrines prevent parties from relitigating claims or
issues that have already been decided by a competent
tribunal. See, e.g., Santos v. State of Hawaii, 64 Haw.
648, 651-52, 646 P.2d 962, 965 (1982).
2010 WL 3724231, at *4 n.3. “[C]laim preclusion prevents a party from
relitigating not only issues which were actually litigated in a prior action, but also
all grounds of claim and defense which might have been properly litigated in the
prior action.” Id. at *4 (citations and editorial marks omitted). And “[i]ssue
preclusion similarly prevents a subsequent suit between the parties or their privies
on a different cause of action and prevents the parties or their privies from
relitigating any issue that was actually litigated and finally decided in the earlier
action.” Id. (citation and internal marks omitted).
Here, claims against PCA (e.g., that it has no “standing” or authority
to enforce covenants) were either actually litigated in the Palehua state court
action, or could have been litigated in that action. There is a final state court
judgment, and the parties (Plaintiffs and PCA) are the same in both actions. See id.
(setting forth elements of claim preclusion under Hawaii law -- (1) a final
17

judgment on the merits, (2) both parties are the same or in privity with the parties
in the original suit, and (3) the same claims were decided or could have been raised
in the original suit) (citing Bremer, 104 Haw. at 54, 85 P.3d at 161). Thus,
Plaintiffs’ claims against PCA are plainly barred by the doctrines of claim and
issue preclusion under Hawaii law.
In sum, the Amended Complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and by principles of prior adjudication under Hawaii law. Accordingly,
the court GRANTS PCA’s Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS Defendant Judge Gary W.B. Chang’s Motion to
Dismiss. Doc. No. 20. Claims against Judge Chang are DISMISSED with
prejudice. The court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant Palehua
Community Association’s Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 38, and GRANTS PCA’s
Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 24. Claims against PCA are DISMISSED with
///
///
///
///
///
18

prejudice. There being no other claims or parties, Judgment shall issue against
Plaintiffs and in favor of Defendants. The Clerk of Court shall close the case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, April 23, 2013.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
_____________________________
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge

Hanson v. Palehua Cmty. Ass’n, Civ. No. 12-00616 JMS-RLP, Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Strike and Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

19