Sheikh v. State of Hawaii Department of Human Services et al

Filing 50

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 31 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 37 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 37 . Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 3/31/2014. ~ The Court hereby grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts and denies Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. The clerk of court is directed to close the case. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receiv e electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I

CIVIL NO. 12-00701 DKW-BMK

LAYLA SHEIKH,

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES; THE STATE
OF HAWAII; JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1-15,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Layla Sheikh (“Plaintiff” or “Sheikh”), a refugee who immigrated to
the United States from Somalia in 1998, initiated this action against the State of
Hawai‘i and the Hawai‘i Department of Human Services (“Defendants”), alleging
a denial of due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, and a denial of access to

the courts, all because her child custody termination proceedings in state court
were conducted without a needed interpreter. Because Sheikh concedes the State
has not waived sovereign immunity, and because she seeks to collaterally attack
the State’s custody determination, in violation of Rooker-Feldman, the State’s
motion for summary judgment is granted.
BACKGROUND
In 2010, the Hawai‘i Family Court of the Second Circuit awarded
permanent custody of Plaintiff’s two children to the Hawai‘i Department of Human
Services (“DHS”), following years-long efforts by DHS to work with Plaintiff to
allow her to keep her children. Plaintiff appealed the permanent custody decision,
which the Intermediate Court of Appeals of the State of Hawai‘i (“ICA”)
summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i then denied
Plaintiff’s application for writ of certiorari. See Decl. of Kendall J. Moser (“Moser
Decl.”) Exs. B, C.
Plaintiff initiated this action on December 27, 2012, requesting “[t]hat
the adoption of Plaintiff’s children, M.A.A. and H.H.W., be set aside, and the
children returned to Plaintiff.” Complaint at 13. Specifically, Sheikh asserts the
following claims, all of which allegedly arose out of her custody proceedings:
Count I:

42 U.S.C. § 1983, denial of due process by conducting
custody termination proceedings without an interpreter;

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Count II:

42 U.S.C. § 1983, denial of Plaintiff’s right to effective
assistance of counsel by conducting custody termination
proceedings without an interpreter;

Count III:

42 U.S.C. § 1983, denial of Plaintiff’s right to access to
the courts by conducting custody termination
proceedings without an interpreter;

Count IV:

Declaratory relief related to illegal drug use and a
determination of neglect; and

Count V:

Declaratory relief related to use of medical marijuana and
a determination of neglect.

Complaint at 10–13. Although filed in December 2012, Sheikh did not serve the
Complaint on Defendants until July 2013.
Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiff
counter-moves for partial summary judgment, asserting that the denial of an
interpreter during her custody proceedings was a violation of her constitutional
rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ when,
under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. A

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As part of the briefing on Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff sought a belated extension to file her reply
brief after it was due. Dkt. no. 48. The Court grants the request only because Plaintiff is
appearing pro se. The reply does not alter the Court’s conclusion that Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment.

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‘genuine issue’ of material fact arises if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am.
Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must
construe all evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630–31 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the moving party
has the burden of persuading the court as to the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party satisfies its burden,
the nonmoving party must set forth “‘significant probative evidence’” in support of
its position. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion,” and can do so by either “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited
do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1).

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DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment because Plaintiff’s claims
are barred by sovereign immunity, which Defendants have not waived. Plaintiff
candidly admits that “the State Defendants have not waived their sovereign
immunity . . . .” Plaintiff’s Opp. at 6. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III.
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states cannot be sued in federal
court, whether by their own citizens or citizens of another state. Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 275 (1986). The Eleventh Amendment also bars federal court
actions against state agencies or instrumentalities, such as DHS. Shaw v. State of
Cal. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir. 1986).
Congress has the power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of states, but must do
so by enacting a statute which “explicitly and by clear language indicate[s] on its
face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States.” Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 332 (1979).
There is no dispute between the parties that neither the State of
Hawaii nor DHS have waived sovereign immunity for claims brought pursuant to
Section 1983. Nor did Congress abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity
when enacting Section 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65–
66 (1989). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Counts
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I, II, and III.2 To the extent that sovereign immunity may not warrant summary
judgment on Counts IV and V, the Court nevertheless grants summary judgment
on those counts as well, as discussed below.
Defendants also move for summary judgment because this action is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff counters that her Complaint “is
not seeking to re-litigate the underlying State Court judgment.” Plaintiff’s Opp.
at 4. The Court concludes, however, that at least as to Counts IV and V, Plaintiff is
effectively seeking appellate review of the family court’s custody determination.
This is evident by Plaintiff’s prayer, which asks this Court to “set aside” the State’s
custody determination.
This Court may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court
decisions. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983), collectively referred to as Rooker-Feldman), “‘a losing party in state
court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the
state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim
that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Bennett v.

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In opposition, Plaintiff contends that summary judgment should be denied because of the
existence of unidentified Doe defendants. However, as dictated by the Rule 16 Scheduling
Order, the deadline to join additional parties expired nearly six months ago on November 8,
2013. Plaintiff made no effort to either amend the scheduling order or to name any new
defendants. Indeed, even now, Plaintiff has not identified any new defendants that are not
subject to immunity. It is too late to defer entry of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor
based on nothing more than hypothetical musings.

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Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal district
courts of jurisdiction to conduct direct reviews of state court judgments even when
a federal question is presented. Jurisdiction is lacking even if the state court
decision is challenged as unconstitutional. Litigants who believe that a state
judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights must appeal that
decision through their state courts and then seek review in the United States
Supreme Court.
The Court recognizes that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to a
constitutional challenge that does not require review of a final state court decision.
See Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.
2001). This, however, is not such a case. Here, Counts IV and V ask this Court to
reconsider some of the grounds determined by DHS and the family court to be a
basis for placing custody of Sheikh’s children with DHS. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 73
(“Plaintiff[] request[s] a judicial declaration that a parent’s use of medical
marijuana does not in and of itself constitute neglect under Hawaiian law.”). That
is, the present action is essentially an attempt by Plaintiff to have this Court review
and overturn the family court’s decision. The Court is without jurisdiction to act
upon such a request. Accordingly, Defendants are also entitled to summary
judgment on Counts IV and V.
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CONCLUSION
The Court hereby grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
on all counts and denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. The
clerk of court is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: HONOLULU, HAWAI‘I, March 31, 2014.

Sheikh v. Hawaii Department of Human Servs., et al.; CV 12-00701 DKW/BMK;
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
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