Uyeshiro et al v. Irongate Azrep BW LLC
Filing
69
ORDER denying 56 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by JUDGE ALAN C KAY on 03/24/2014. (gab, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ROBIN Y. UYESHIRO and DONNA Y.L.)
)
LEONG,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
IRONGATE AZREP BW LLC, a
)
Delaware limited liability
)
)
company,
)
)
Defendant.
)
Civ. No. 13-00043 ACK-BMK
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs
Robin Y. Uyeshiro and Donna Y.L. Leong’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendant Irongate’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case is a contract dispute arising out of a Sales
Contract between Plaintiffs and Irongate for the purchase of a
condominium unit in the Trump International Hotel & Tower at
Waikiki Beach Walk in Honolulu, Hawaii. In their First Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims against Irongate for: (1)
unjust enrichment, (2) breach of contract, (3) violation of
Hawaii Revised Statutes (“H.R.S.”) Chapter 480 (Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices), (4) violation of H.R.S. Chapter 480
(Unfair Methods of Competition), and (5) fraudulent
misrepresentation. A complete discussion of the relevant factual
background and contractual provisions is set forth in this
Court’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant
Irongate’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No.
55 at 3-14.)
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in state
court on December 31, 2012. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1.) On January 28,
2013, Irongate removed the action to this Court, citing both
federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Irongate filed a Motion To Dismiss the Complaint on February 19,
2013. (Dkt. No. 6.) The Court granted the motion on September 13,
2013,1/ dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint without prejudice,
except as to Plaintiffs’ claims under Hawaii Revised Statutes
section 514B-94 and the federal Interstate Land Sales Act, which
the Court dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. No. 27.) Plaintiffs
timely filed a First Amended Complaint on October 11, 2013, (Doc.
No. 28 (“FAC”),) and Irongate filed its Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim on October 25, 2013. (Doc. No. 40
(“MTD”).) The hearing on the motion was held on January 27, 2014.
1/
On June 14, 2013, the Court granted the parties’ joint
request for a continuance of the hearing on the motion to
dismiss. (Doc. No. 20.) The hearing was therefore held on
September 12, 2013. (Doc. No. 25.)
2
On February 3, 2014, the Court issued its Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Irongate’s Motion
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 55 (“2/3/14
Order”).) In the order, the Court denied Irongate’s motion as to
Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment, but granted it as to the
remainder of Plaintiffs’ claims, all of which the Court dismissed
without prejudice. Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for
Reconsideration on February 17, 2014. (Doc. No. 56 (“Mot.”).)
Irongate filed its memorandum in opposition on March 3, 2014,
(Doc. No. 62,) and Plaintiffs filed their reply on March 17,
2014. (Doc. No. 64.) The Court finds this matter suitable for
disposition without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d).
STANDARD
In the Ninth Circuit, a successful motion for
reconsideration must accomplish two goals. First, it must
demonstrate some reason why the court should reconsider its prior
decision. Na Mamo O ‘Aha ‘Ino v. Galiher, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1058,
1059 (D. Haw. 1999). Second, it must “set forth facts or law of a
strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its
prior decision.” Id. Courts have established three grounds
justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3)
the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1178–79 (9th
3
Cir. 1998); Great Hawaiian Financial Corp. v. Aiu, 116 F. R. D.
612, 616 (D. Haw. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 863 F.2d 617
(9th Cir. 1988).2/
Mere disagreement with a previous order is an
insufficient basis for reconsideration. See Leong v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572 (D. Haw. 1988). “Whether or not
to grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of
the court.” Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs argue that the 2/3/14
Order contained manifest errors of law because it applied the
incorrect standard of review to Irongate’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the Court erroneously
2/
The District of Hawaii has implemented these standards in
Local Rule 60.1, which states, in relevant part:
Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory
orders may be brought only upon the following
grounds:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Discovery of new material facts not
previously available;
Intervening change in law;
Manifest error of law or fact.
Motions asserted under Subsection (c)
of this rule must be filed and served
not more than fourteen (14) days after
the court’s written order is filed.
4
“decided issues of fact as a matter of law,” and “burdened
Plaintiffs with the requirement of supporting their factual
allegations with evidence.” (Mot. at 1.) First, Plaintiffs assert
that the Court erred in determining that the terms of the Third
Party Rental Management Agreement (“TP-RMA”) were consistent with
the terms of the Sales Contract and attached documents. (See id.
at 3-7.) Plaintiffs note that the Court stated in its 2/3/14
Order that they had “presented no evidence that the TP-RMA
altered the Sales Contract,” and that the Court need not accept
as true Plaintiffs’ “legal conclusion that the provisions of the
TP-RMA constituted a material change in the condominium project.”
(Id. at 4 (quoting 2/3/14 Order at 28).) Plaintiffs argue that
this language indicates that the Court improperly required
Plaintiffs to present evidence at the motion to dismiss stage,
and improperly decided a question of fact (whether the TP-RMA was
consistent with the Sales Contract) as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs’ arguments, however, appear to misunderstand
or mischaracterize the Court’s Order, and do not demonstrate that
the Court committed manifest error in concluding that Plaintiffs
failed to state a claim for breach of contract, fraudulent
misrepresentation, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and
unfair methods of competition. As Plaintiffs correctly point out,
and as this Court stated in its 2/3/14 Order, on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as
5
true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783
(9th Cir. 2012); see also 2/3/14 Order at 14. To survive a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).
When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, “a court may consider
certain materials - documents attached to the complaint,
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters
of judicial notice - without converting the motion to dismiss
into one for summary judgment.”3/ U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903,
908 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.,
691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). Importantly, in such cases,
the Court need not accept as true allegations that contradict
documents that are referenced in the complaint or that are
properly subject to judicial notice. See Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v.
Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). Nor is the court
required to accept as true allegations that are “merely
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988
(9th Cir. 2001).
3/
Plaintiffs acknowledge as much in their reply. (See Reply
at 2 n.2.)
6
Here, Plaintiffs attached as exhibits to their First
Amended Complaint the Sales Contract (Ex. A), Condominium
Declaration (Ex. B), Unit Maintenance and Operating Agreement
(Ex. C), Developer Sponsored Transient Rental Program Agreement
(Ex. D), and Third Party Transient Rental Program Agreement (Ex.
E). (See Doc. No. 28.) The Developer’s Public Report for a
Condominium, while not attached to the First Amended Complaint,
was filed with the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs of
the State of Hawaii, and also filed as Exhibit 3 to Irongate’s
motion to dismiss. (See Doc. No. 40.) Further, all of these
documents (including the Public Report) are quoted and referenced
extensively in the First Amended Complaint. (See, e.g., FAC at 310.) As such, the Court properly considered these documents when
addressing Irongate’s motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Davis, 691
F.3d at 1160.
The specific language in the 2/3/14 Order to which
Plaintiffs object, when taken in its full context, indicates that
the Court examined the terms of the TP-RMA and the Sales Contract
and incorporated documents (all either attached as exhibits to
the First Amended Complaint or incorporated by reference) and
concluded that the terms of the TP-RMA were not inconsistent with
those of the Sales Contract. (See 2/3/14 Order at 24-28
(detailing and analyzing provisions in the TP-RMA and Sales
Contract and incorporated documents).) Plaintiffs nevertheless
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argue that the Court erroneously ignored their allegations in the
First Amended Complaint that the provisions of the TP-RMA were
inconsistent with industry custom and practices. (See Mot. at 67; Reply at 3-4.) Plaintiffs make a number of references in the
First Amended Complaint to the “customs and practices of the
hospitality industry in Hawaii.” (See FAC at 10, 18, 20, 21, 27,
29.) Plaintiffs allege that certain provisions of the TP-RMA are
“not customary,” or inconsistent with such customs and practices;
however, as the Ninth Circuit has made clear, the Court was not
obligated to accept as true Plaintiffs’ allegations that the TPRMA constituted a material change to the Sales Contract (based on
the Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding customary practices) where
those allegations conflicted with the clear language of the TPRMA and contract documents properly before the Court. See, e.g.,
Lazy Y Ranch, 546 F.3d at 588.4/
Moreover, many of Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding
custom are conclusory in nature. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 80 (allegation
4/
Further, a careful reading of the 2/3/14 Order reveals
that, in stating that the Plaintiffs “presented no evidence” of
inconsistencies between the TP-RMA and the Sales Contract, the
Court was merely contrasting the instant case with the Goldberg
v. 401 N. Wabash Venture LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Ill.
2012) case, a summary judgment case that Plaintiffs attempted to
rely upon in arguing that the Court could not, as a matter of
law, determine whether the TP-RMA constituted a material change
to the Sales Contract. (See 2/3/14 Order at 27-28.) The Court was
not, as Plaintiffs assert, requiring Plaintiffs to present
evidence (as opposed to sufficient factual allegations) at the
motion to dismiss stage.
8
that “Irongate made disclaimers and representations in the Sales
Contract and Project Documents that led Plaintiffs to reasonably
believe that their ability to rent Unit 805 was not materially
limited, and that they could opt for third-party rental of Unit
805 consistently with the established custom and practice
regarding such arrangements for other condominium hotel projects
in the State of Hawaii.”)). Such conclusory allegations are
insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009) (“[T]he Federal Rules do not
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements
without reference to its factual context.”); Johnson v. Lucent
Technologies Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“Conclusory allegations and unwarranted inferences . . . are
insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”). The Court thus
committed no manifest error in concluding that the TP-RMA did not
represent a material change to the Sales Contract.
Plaintiffs next argue that the Court’s 2/3/14 Order
also erred in “rendering legal conclusions about the requirements
of the ‘First Class Standard.’” (Mot at 12.) Plaintiffs assert
that the Court concluded as a matter of law that the terms of the
TP-RMA are consistent with the First Class Standard. The actual
text of the 2/3/14 Order, however, belies this claim.
As discussed above, the Court properly considered the
contract documents in addressing Irongate’s motion to dismiss.
9
Further, the language Plaintiffs appear to object to as a “legal
conclusion” regarding the First Class Standard was language that
the Court directly quoted or paraphrased from the contract
documents themselves. (See 2/3/14 Order at 30-31 (noting the
contract documents’ characterization of the condominium units as
“hotel units” in a “resort destination operating pursuant to the
First Class Standard.” (quoting Public Report at 3)); 2/3/14
Order at 39 (referencing the quoted language on pages 30-31 of
the 2/3/14 Order and citing to the Public Report at 3).) The
Court did not, as Plaintiffs assert, make any legal conclusions
as to the meaning of the First Class Standard. Rather, the Court
concluded after examining numerous provisions in the TP-RMA and
the Sales Contract and incorporated documents that the TP-RMA was
entirely consistent with the Sales Contract. As discussed above,
because the contract documents were properly before the Court,
the Court’s consideration of those documents in reaching this
conclusion did not constitute manifest error.
Plaintiffs further argue that the Court erred in
“deciding as a matter of law that the securities-related
disclaimer” in the Condominium Declaration was a limitation on
third-party rentals. (Mot. at 16.) Again, however, a careful
reading of the Court’s 2/3/14 Order reveals this assertion to be
a mischaracterization of the order. Plaintiffs argued in their
opposition to Irongate’s motion to dismiss that, based on the
10
Sales Contract and incorporated documents, they “reasonably
believed that Irongate would not materially limit their ability
to rent” their unit, either by themselves or through a third
party agent. (Opp’n (Doc. No. 50) at 5.) In making this argument,
Plaintiffs specifically pointed to the securities-related
disclaimers in the contract documents, arguing that these
disclaimers contributed to Plaintiffs’ belief that their ability
to rent out their unit would be unrestricted. (See id. at 4-5.)
As discussed above, however, the Court was not required to take
as true Plaintiffs’ allegations that were directly contradicted
by the contract documents properly before the Court. See Lazy Y
Ranch, 546 F.3d at 588. It was thus highly relevant that one of
the securities-related disclaimers in the contract documents
contained language specifically contemplating restrictions on
rentals. The Court noted this language, among numerous other
contract provisions, in concluding that Plaintiffs’ allegations
that the TP-RMA was inconsistent with the Sales Contract were
contradicted by the contract documents themselves and thus
insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. (See 2/3/14 Order
at 24-26.) The Court did not, as Plaintiffs claim, make any
specific factual or legal findings regarding the applicability of
the securities disclaimer in the Condominium Declaration to third
party rental arrangements.
11
Plaintiffs also appear to argue that the securities
disclaimer in the Condominium Declaration contained an
exhaustive, rather than illustrative, list of the potential
restrictions on unit owners’ rights to use their units under any
potential rental program. (See Mot. at 17-18.) The disclaimer
states that “any rental program that may become available . . .
will most likely place severe restrictions on a Hotel Unit
Owner’s rights to use said Owner’s Hotel Unit, including imposing
blackout periods or other date restrictions on use of the Hotel
Unit that are in addition to the restrictions and requirements
imposed by this Declaration.” (MTD, Ex. 4 at 41-42.) Plaintiffs
argue that this provision indicated that there may be limitations
on their personal use and rental of their unit (through blackout
periods or date restrictions) under a developer-sponsored rental
program, but did not contemplate any restrictions on rentals
through third-party agents. (Mot. at 18.) This argument appears
to rest on an assumption that the disclaimer’s examples of use
restrictions are exhaustive, rather than illustrative.
The Hawaii Supreme Court has generally held that the
term “including” is “ordinarily a term of enlargement, not of
limitation.” Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 564 P.2d 135, 141 (Haw. 1977).
Generally, under Hawaii law, “[t]he term ‘including’ in no way
implies exclusivity.” Lealaimatafao v. Woodward-Clyde
Consultants, 867 P.2d 220, 226 (Haw. 1994). Rather, the term
12
“including” “connotes simply an illustrative application of the
general principle.” In re Waikoloa Sanitary Sewer Co., 125 P.3d
484, 495 (Haw. 2005). This approach is consistent with the
meaning given to the term by the U.S. Supreme Court and courts in
other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v.
Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941) (“the term
‘including’ is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes
simply an illustrative application of the general principle”);
Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n,
645 F.2d 1102, 1112 n. 26 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“It is hornbook law
that the use of the word ‘including’ indicates that the specified
list ... is illustrative, not exclusive”).
In a single case, the Hawaii Supreme Court has held
that the use of the term “including” in a contract was ambiguous
as to whether it was expressing limitation. See Hawaiian Ass’n of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. Wong, 305 P.3d 452, 463 (Haw. 2013).
That contract was distinguishable from the one on hand, however.
In Wong, the contract specified that a leased property was to be
used “only for educational, recreation (including vacation
residence for members and staff of Lessee’s school and church),
agricultural, health care and humanitarian uses. No dwellings
shall be constructed or used on the demised premises except for
faculty, administrative staff, students and employees.” Id. at
462. In the Wong case, the term “including” was embedded in a
13
clause expressly setting forth specific limitations on use.
Nevertheless, the lower court had interpreted the word
“including” as a term of enlargement, concluding that the
reference to “vacation residence” was intended as an example
(rather than a limitation) of a permissible recreational use. The
Supreme Court of Hawaii disagreed, emphasizing that such an
interpretation would render the clause “for members and staff of
Lessee’s school and church” superfluous. (Id. at 463 n.11.) The
court stated that “[i]f the parties had intended to identify
vacation residence as an example of recreational use, they could
have done so without referring to a particular category of
persons entitled to use those vacation residences.” Id. at 463.
Because the contract expressly modified “vacation residences,”
the court concluded that the parenthetical’s use of the term
“including” was at least ambiguous as to whether it was stating a
limitation on who could use the property as a vacation residence.
Id.
In the instant case, however, there is no similarly
limiting or modifying language, and interpretation of the term
“including” as illustrative would not render other language in
the clause superfluous. The contract clause at issue is a broad
disclaimer intended to generally disclaim any representations
regarding future rental programs. (See Condo. Decl. at 42.) In
this context, the use of the term “including” appears to be in
14
accordance with its customary meaning, and thus may be
interpreted as preceding illustrative (rather than exhaustive)
examples of restrictions on unit uses. Furthermore, this clause
in the Condominium Declaration was only one among many that the
Court properly relied upon in finding that the TP-RMA was
consistent with the Sales Contract and incorporated documents.
(See, e.g., 2/3/14 Order at 25-27.)
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in
dismissing their claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by improperly deciding factual issues as a
matter of law. Plaintiffs assert that “questions of
reasonableness of conduct and good faith” are questions of fact
to be decided by a jury. (Mot. at 21 (citing Amfac, Inc. v.
Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 10, 23-24 (Haw. 1992).)
The Court notes, however, that this District Court has on a
number of occasions dismissed claims for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing at the motion to dismiss stage,
where litigants have simply failed to allege facts sufficient to
support such claims. See, e.g., Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Nordic
PCL Const., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1036 (D. Haw. 2012)
(granting a motion to dismiss as to a claim for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(e), finding that the complaint only vaguely
alleged that the insurer took “actions inconsistent with their
15
obligations” under the insurance contract); Isagawa v. Homestreet
Bank, 769 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232 (D. Haw. 2011) (granting
dismissal because “Plaintiffs fail to allege any specific facts
and solely provide legal conclusions regarding Defendants’
purported violation of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.”); Sukagawa v. Countrywide Bank F.S.B., 769 F.
Supp. 2d 1211, 1217-18 (D. Haw. 2011) (same).
Moreover, Amfac is distinguishable from the instant
case because it involved the court’s interpretation of a
contractual provision requiring that performance be rendered to
the “reasonable satisfaction” of a contracting party. See id. at
23. It did not involve an analysis of whether a party
sufficiently alleged a claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. A determination of whether
performance was rendered to a party’s “reasonable satisfaction”
necessarily turned upon an analysis of reasonableness. In the
context of a claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing,
however, the Court must analyze whether a party acted in such a
way as to “deprive the other of the benefits of the agreement.”
Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Haw. 403, 427 (Haw. 2008)
(quoting Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 82 Haw. 120, 123
(Haw. 1996)). As this Court stated in its 2/3/14 Order, where (as
here) a contract provides one party with the discretion to act,
that party does not violate its duty of good faith and fair
16
dealing when it acts in a manner consistent with the contract.
See, e.g., Hawaii Leasing v. Klein, 698 P.2d 309, 313 (Haw. App.
1985) (“Good faith performance ‘emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party.’” (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 205 (1981))). Plaintiffs themselves acknowledged
as much in their opposition to the underlying motion to dismiss.
(See Opp’n to MTD (Doc. No. 50) at 26 (“A basic requirement of
the implied covenant is that a party to an agreement must not
violate the spirit of the transaction or deprive the other of the
benefit of the bargain. . . . Irongate had discretion to
establish the terms of the [rental program agreements] . . . The
implied covenant disallowed Irongate from specifying terms in
[those agreements] that violate Plaintiffs’ reasonable
contractual expectations.”).)
Further, the duty of good faith and fair dealing “is to
be applied in a manner that will effectuate . . . only the
objectively reasonable expectations of [the] parties . . . .”
Iron Horse Eng’g Co., Inc., 89 P.3d 1249, 1259 (Or. 2004)
(quoting Uptown Heights Associates v. Seafirst Corp., 320 Or.
638, 645, 891 P.2d 639 (1995)). “[T]he duty of good faith cannot
serve to contradict an express contractual term[,]” id., nor can
it be used “to create new, independent rights or duties beyond
those agreed to by the parties.” City of Gillette v. Hladky
17
Const., Inc., 196 P.3d 184, 186 (Wyo. 2008). Here, after
considering the contract documents properly before it, the Court
concluded that the terms of the TP-RMA were consistent with those
of the Sales Contract and incorporated documents. In light of
this, the Court necessarily concluded that Irongate, in setting
forth the terms of the TP-RMA, had not done so in a manner
inconsistent with the parties’ expectations based upon the terms
of the Sales Contract. Because there was no inconsistency between
the documents, the Court could determinate as a matter of law
that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of good faith
and fair dealing premised upon the terms of the TP-RMA.
To the extent Plaintiffs make further arguments in
support of the instant motion for reconsideration, they generally
appear to reiterate those Plaintiffs made in opposition to the
underlying motion to dismiss, and thus cannot support
reconsideration of the 2/3/14 Order. Mere disagreement with a
previous order is simply an insufficient basis for
reconsideration. See Leong, 689 F. Supp. at 1573.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’
Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting in Part and Denying
in Part Defendant Irongate’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
18
DATED:
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 24, 2014
________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Senior United States District Judge
Uyeshiro v. Irongate Azrep BW LLC, CV 13-00043 ACK BMK, Order Denying Motion
for Reconsideration
19
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