Nakamura v. Honolulu Community College et al
Filing
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ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS, DOC. NOS. 18 , 20 & 22 ; AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT, DOC. NO. 35 - - Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 6/18/13. "Plai ntiff is given leave to amend as described in this Order by July 15, 2013. Failure to file an Amended Complaint by July 15, 2013 will result in automatic dismissal of this action. Plaintiff is instructed to comply with Rule 8 when filing an Amended C omplaint." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Bruce Ryan Nakamura served by first class mail at the address of record on June 18, 2013.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
BRUCE RYAN NAKAMURA,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
HONOLULU COMMUNITY
)
COLLEGE, KIMBERLEY M.
)
GALLANT, CATHERINE
)
GRIMALDI, ERIKA L. LACRO,
)
MICHAEL T. ROTA, KENNETH S. )
KATO, BRIAN K. FURUTO, JOHN )
MORTON,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 13-00054 JMS-BMK
ORDER: (1) GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISMISS, DOC. NOS. 18, 20 & 22;
AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT, DOC. NO.
35
ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS, DOC.
NOS. 18, 20 & 22; AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT, DOC. NO. 35
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court are three nearly identical Motions to Dismiss filed by
various Defendants,1 and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint. Doc. No. 35.
Because Plaintiff Bruce Ryan Nakamura (“Plaintiff”) has failed to establish subject
1
On February 26, 2013, Defendants Kimberley Gallant and Erika Lacro filed the first
Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 18. On March 1, 2013, Defendants Brian Furuto, Catherine
Grimaldi, and Kenneth Kato filed the second Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 20. Finally, on
March 8, 2013, Defendants John Morton and Michael Rota filed the third Motion to Dismiss
(collectively, the “Motions to Dismiss”). Doc. No. 22. The three Motions to Dismiss raise the
same issues.
matter jurisdiction and failed to state a cognizable claim for relief, the Motions to
Dismiss are GRANTED. The court gives Plaintiff leave to amend and therefore,
the Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED AS MOOT.
II. BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2013, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action
against Honolulu Community College (“HCC”) and numerous current and former
HCC employees2 alleging reverse discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
various state law claims.3 Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 1, 2, 94-96. Plaintiff seeks
general and punitive damages, injunctive relief, interest, fees, and costs. Id. at 9799.
Plaintiff’s claims appear to be based on his dissatisfaction with actions
taken and/or not taken by HCC employees between July 2010 and December 2012
in response to multiple complaints by Plaintiff about alleged unwanted attention
and/or harassment by an HCC student. During the relevant time, Plaintiff was a
student at HCC and worked part-time in an HCC computer lab. Plaintiff contends
2
The Complaint named Defendants: Kimberley M. Gallant; Catherine Grimaldi; Erika
L. Lacro; Michael T. Rota; Kenneth S. Kato; Brian K. Furuto, and John Morton. Doc. No. 1,
Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff does not specify whether Defendants are named in their individual or
official capacities.
3
In addition to reverse discrimination (Count 1), Plaintiff asserts the following claims:
failure to promote an academic environment conducive to learning (Count 2); dereliction of duty
(Count 3); and gross negligence (Count 4). Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 94-96.
2
that, rather than protect him from this other student’s unwanted attention and/or
harassment, Defendants warned Plaintiff not to harass or contact the other student.
Plaintiff alleges that the other student is mentally ill, that he is not, and that
Defendants’ conduct toward Plaintiff constitutes reverse discrimination. Plaintiff
further alleges that these actions have harmed his academic studies and general
well-being.
On February 26, March 1, and March 8, 2013, Defendants filed
Motions to Dismiss. Doc. Nos. 18, 20, and 22. On May 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed a
Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 31, and on May 28, 2013, Defendants filed
a joint Reply. Doc. No. 32. On June 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend
Complaint. Doc. No. 35. A hearing was held on June 17, 2013.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.
Rule 12(b)(1): Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss
claims over which it lacks proper subject matter jurisdiction. The court may
determine jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) so long as “the jurisdictional issue is [not] inextricable from the merits of
a case.” Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195
(9th Cir. 2008). The moving party “should prevail [on a motion to dismiss] only if
3
the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled
to prevail as a matter of law.” Casumpang v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &
Warehousemen’s Union, 269 F.3d 1042, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and
quotation marks omitted); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495,
499 (9th Cir. 2001).
“A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe
Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack,
the court may dismiss a complaint when its allegations are insufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction. When the allegations of a complaint are examined to
determine whether they are sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, all
allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. City of Carson,
353 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2003). In a facial attack on jurisdiction, the court
limits its analysis to the allegations of and the documents attached to the complaint.
Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2003).
In a factual attack on jurisdiction, the court may review evidence
outside the complaint and need not presume the truthfulness of allegations in the
complaint. Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. Once the moving party presents evidence
4
to rebut the truthfulness of allegations in the complaint, however, the opposing
party must provide sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n.2).
B.
Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss
a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” A Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is proper when there is either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal
theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.’” UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, ---F.3d---, 2013 WL 1092793, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar.
14, 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.
1990)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet -- that the court must accept as
true all of the allegations contained in the complaint -- “is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
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suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not
simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient
allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party
to defend itself effectively.”).
Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, “the factual allegations that are taken
as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to
require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and
continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Factual allegations that only permit
the court to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct” do not show that the pleader
is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se; consequently, this court will liberally
construe Plaintiff’s pleadings. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th
Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally
construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)).).
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IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity and Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) 304A-108, that
Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim in Counts 2 and 3, and they urge the court
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
The court addresses each argument in turn.
A.
Defendants’ Capacities
As an initial matter, the court must determine in what capacity
Defendants are being sued. Plaintiff does not specify whether Defendants are sued
officially or individually, or both. When it is unclear whether defendants are sued
in official or individual capacities, the court must examine “[t]he course of
proceedings” to determine the capacity in which each defendant is sued. Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (requiring that
pleadings “be construed so as to do justice”).
Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff refers to each individual
Defendant by his or her job title, followed by the individual’s name. See, e.g.,
Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 1-2 (naming Defendants as follows: “the mental heath
specialist for [HCC] Kimberley M. Gallant, Educational Specialist Catherine ‘Kay’
Grimaldi, HCC Chancellor Erika L. Lacro, retired HCC Chancellor Michael T.
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Rota, retired HCC Vice-Chancellor for Administrative Services Kenneth S. Kato,
Interim HCC Vice-Chancellor for Administrative Services Brian K. Furuto, and
University of Hawaii Vice-President for Community Colleges John Morton”).
And Plaintiff’s claims appear to be based on each Defendant’s specific conduct
and/or failure to take specific action in connection with each Defendant’s position
at HCC. On the other hand, Plaintiff alleges that “all Defendants deliberately
decided not to intervene and stop [the other student’s] abusive behavior[.]” Doc.
No. 1, Compl. ¶ 52. To support this allegation, Plaintiff refers to specific
correspondence and/or communications to each individual Defendant.
Accordingly, the court construes the Complaint to allege claims against all
individual Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.
B.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
1.
Legal Framework
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI. Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states cannot be
sued in federal court, whether by their own citizens or citizens of another state.
8
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 275 (1986); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890). Similarly, a suit for damages against state officials, in their official
capacity, constitutes a suit against the state itself and therefore is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166-67. Although state officials are
literally persons, “a suit against a state official is not a suit against the official but
rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). “As such,
[a suit against a state official] is no different from a suit against the State itself.”
Id.
States and state officials may, however, be held to answer for damages
in federal court in three limited circumstances: where the state waives its sovereign
immunity, where Congress expressly abrogates state sovereign immunity with
respect to a particular federal cause of action, and where Congress creates a
statutory scheme under which states are the only possible defendants. Alaska v.
EEOC, 564 F.3d 1062, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1991) (noting that
Eleventh Amendment immunity is waivable); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342
(1979) (holding that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in
certain circumstances).
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Further, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908), held that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the unconstitutional actions of a
state official. Young held that a state official who acts in violation of federal law,
though sued in his or her official capacity, is “stripped of his official or
representative character” because “the state has no power to impart to him any
immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” Id.
The Supreme Court has limited the Young exception to suits for prospective relief
against ongoing violations of federal law. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 277-78. Thus,
relief that “serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law is
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment[.]” Id. at 278 (citing Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977)).
2.
Section 1981 Discrimination Claim
In Count 1, Plaintiff asserts a claim of reverse discrimination in
violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 against all Defendants. Section 1981 guarantees to all
persons the equal right to “enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all law and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens[.]” By its terms, this statute does not
expressly abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity. Further, courts have
consistently held that the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1981 suits against the states
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and state officials acting in their official capacities. Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that the law is well-settled
that § 1981 does not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity); Pittman v. Oregon,
Emp’t Dep’t, 509 F.3d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that § 1981 does not
contain a cause of action against states); Mitchell v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861
F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Los Angeles Community College
District was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from the plaintiff’s § 1981
claims). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff asserts Count 1 for damages against
Defendants in their official capacities, this claim is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and is therefore DISMISSED.
Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to seek prospective relief
in the form of requiring Defendants to take action aimed at stopping any further
alleged unwanted attention and/or harassment by the other HCC student -- in other
words, possibly ending continued reverse discrimination against Plaintiff. To the
extent Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from continuing to violate federal law,
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Count 1 (however, as discussed below, this
claim is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim).
///
///
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3.
State Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts state law claims for failure to promote an academic
environment conducive to learning (Count 2), dereliction of duty (Count 3), and
gross negligence (Count 4) against all Defendants. Although Hawaii has waived
its sovereign immunity as to some state tort and statutory claims, it has done so
solely with respect to state court actions. HRS § 662-3 states that “the circuit
courts of the State and . . . the State district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all tort actions on claims against the state.” HRS § 661-1 similarly grants the state
courts jurisdiction over “[a]ll claims against the State founded upon any statute of
the State[.]” Nothing in the language of these statutes suggests that Hawaii
intended to subject itself to suit in federal court. Moreover, the Hawaii legislature
has specifically declared that it intended §§ 662-3 and 661-1 to extend jurisdiction
to state courts, but not to federal courts. See Act 135 of 1984 Session Laws of
Hawaii; see also Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Dep’t of Educ., 951 F. Supp. 1484,
1491 (D. Haw. 1996) (discussing both plain language and legislative intent and
holding that §§ 661-1 and 662-2, which waived the state’s immunity for torts
committed by its employees, do not waive the State’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
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To the extent Defendants are named in their official capacities, they
are therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on these state claims.
Counts 2, 3, and 4 are DISMISSED against HCC and Defendants in their official
capacities.
C.
Section 1981 Discrimination Claim (As to Injunctive Relief and
Defendants in Their Individual Capacities)
Section 1981 is limited to a cause of action for racial discrimination in
the making or enforcement of a contract. See Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare
Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2008) (limiting § 1981 to racial
discrimination); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976), superseded by
statute on other grounds (explaining that Section 1981 “prohibits racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts”). Here,
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that could support a § 1981 discrimination claim
-- i.e., that an act of racial discrimination interfered with his ability to make or
enforce a contract. Consequently, because Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim
for discrimination under Section 1981, Count 1 is DISMISSED.
D.
Remaining State Law Claims
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities fail to state a claim. Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
warranted when there is either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence
13
of sufficient facts alleged.’” UMG Recordings, ---F.3d---, 2013 WL 1092793, at
*4. Rule 8 mandates that a complaint include a “short and plain statement of the
claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that “each allegation [] be simple, concise, and
direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A complaint that is so confusing that its “‘true
substance, if any, is well disguised’” may be dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 8.
Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969)); see
also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Something labeled a
complaint but written . . . , prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity,
conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to
perform the essential functions of a complaint.”). Rule 8 requires more than “thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” and “[a] pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotations omitted). “Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Id. (quotation signals omitted).
Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is nearly one hundred pages long, with
more than forty pages of exhibits, and comprises a confusing, at times redundant
recitation of accusations, does not satisfy these requirements. See McHenry, 84
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F.3d at 1177-80 (affirming district court’s dismissal of the complaint for violation
of Rule 8, where the complaint was “argumentative, prolix, replete with
redundancy, and largely irrelevant,” and failure to comply with court orders); see
also Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
2011) (discussing dismissals for overly lengthy complaints and observing that
“[o]ur district courts are busy enough without having to penetrate a tome
approaching the magnitude of War and Peace to discern a plaintiff’s claims and
allegations”). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is chock full of sweeping,
conclusory statements, paraded as facts, that are insufficient to support the claims
asserted. Accordingly, Counts 2, 3, and 4 against Defendants in their individual
capacities are DISMISSED.4
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court DISMISSES the Complaint.5
If Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain
4
The court recognizes that generally “verbosity or length is not by itself a basis for
dismissing a complaint,” Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1131, but finds dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint
warranted because of the numerous deficiencies noted above.
5
Because the Motions to Dismiss are granted on other grounds, the court need not
address Defendants’ argument that HRS § 304A-108 bars Plaintiff’s claims against all individual
Defendants.
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statements telling the court: (1) the treaty, constitutional right, or statutory right
Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the specific basis of this court’s jurisdiction;
(3) the name of the defendant who violated that right; (4) exactly what that
defendant did or failed to do; (5) how the action or inaction of that defendant is
connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s rights; and (6) what specific injury Plaintiff
suffered because of that defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff must repeat this process for
each person or entity that he names as a defendant. If Plaintiff fails to
affirmatively link the conduct of each named defendant with the specific injury he
suffered, the allegation against that defendant will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is
the “Amended Complaint.” The Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten
in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the Complaint by reference.
Plaintiff may include only one claim per count. Any cause of action not raised in
the Amended Complaint is waived. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.
1987).
Plaintiff is given leave to amend as described in this Order by July 15,
2013. Failure to file an Amended Complaint by July 15, 2013 will result in
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automatic dismissal of this action. Plaintiff is instructed to comply with Rule 8
when filing an Amended Complaint.
On June 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint to
include a claim that Defendants’ conduct violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. Doc. No. 35. Based on the foregoing, that
Motion is DENIED AS MOOT. However, the court advises Plaintiff that if he
chooses to file an Amended Complaint to include a discrimination claim for
violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, any state law claims must arise from
the same facts or be so related to the federal claim that they are part of the same
controversy in order for this court to have jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(providing that “in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy”).
If Plaintiff seeks to assert only state law claims against Defendants,
///
///
///
///
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this court would likely lack jurisdiction, so he should consider filing such an action
in state court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, June 18, 2013.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
Nakamura v. Honolulu Community College, et al., Civil No. 13-00054 JMS-BMK, Order:
(1) Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Doc. Nos. 18, 20 & 22; and (2) Denying as Moot
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, Doc. No. 35
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