Campbell v. State of Hawaii Department of Education et al

Filing 102

ORDER GRANTING 79 DEFENDANT STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 4/10/2015. ~ The Court hereby grants the DOE's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No . 79) on all of Campbell's remaining claims. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I

CIVIL NO. 13-00083 DKW-RLP

PATRICIA P. CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, et al.,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
STATE OF HAWAII,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On June 19, 2014, the Court granted judgment on the pleadings for
Defendant State of Hawaii, Department of Education (“DOE”) on several of
Campbell’s claims. Dkt. No. 76. The DOE now moves for summary judgment on
Campbell’s remaining claims brought under Title VII and Title IX. Because these
remaining claims each fail as a matter of law, summary judgment for the DOE is
granted.
BACKGROUND
The Court set forth the background of this case in its previous order granting
judgment on the pleadings, and will not revisit all of those facts here. In short,

Campbell alleges discrimination and retaliation by the DOE, her former employer,
over the course of several years while employed as a music teacher on the Island of
Maui.
Campbell is a Caucasian female. She was employed by the DOE from 2000
until she resigned in July of 2009. From 2004 to 2007, she taught band and music
at Maui High School and King Kekaulike High School (“KKHS”) on Maui. While
at KKHS, Campbell describes conduct by students that she believes to be
discriminatory based on her race and sex:
The harassment included notes placed on my desk, spray painting
“Die bitch Die” around my car, students calling me “fucking haole,”
“fucking cunt,” “fucking bitch,” and even “nigga” amongst other
derogatory demeaning slurs at school. I was even threatened by a
student who told me she had a gun. I took pictures and kept notes of
the harassment and complained about the harassment to my
supervisors. The harassment occurred from 2004, and continued
through 2007.
Decl. of Patricia Campbell (“Campbell Decl.”) ¶ 5. Campbell reported these and
other incidents of harassment by students to KKHS Principal Scofield, Vice
Principals Barbara Oura and Anthony Jones, and DOE Superintendent Patricia
Hamamoto. Campbell Decl. ¶ 6. However, Campbell asserts that she was never
informed of the outcome of the investigations by school administrators into the
students’ conduct.
While at KKHS, Campbell also complained about Mr. Saiki, the athletic
director, alleging that he “allow[ed] the football team to run through the band
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during the Homecoming performance in November 2006 on the football field.
Other male bandleaders said this would never happen to them. When I complained
about what happened, nothing came from my complaints.” Campbell Decl. ¶ 12.
In August 2007, Campbell requested, and was granted, a 12-month leave of
absence without pay for health reasons. She was further granted an additional 12month leave of absence until July of 2009. Decl. of Alvin Shima (“Shima Decl.”)
¶¶ 7–8. As a result of this and other conduct, Campbell filed charges of
discrimination on February 15, 2008 (amended on February 19, 2008) and
November 15, 2010. Campbell Decl. Exs. 3, 4, 5. In her 2008 charge, Campbell
asserted discrimination based on race, sex, and retaliation when:
- School administrators did not take “appropriate, corrective action” in
response to her complaints about student behavior.
- Principal Scofield did not complete Campbell’s work performance
evaluation.
- Several students made allegations against Campbell of verbal and
physical abuse. As a result of that investigation, Campbell was not
placed on paid leave.
- Principal Scofield assigned Campbell an “excessive class schedule.”
- The school administration denied Campbell the opportunity to
participate in a state championship game.
- At a meeting with Vice-Principal Jones, Jones yelled that Campbell is
“always ragging” and “need[s] to stop ragging.”
- Campbell was denied a transfer request that she made as a result of
the hostile work environment that she felt she was subject to.
Campbell Decl. Exs. 3, 4.
In December of 2009, the DOE sent Campbell a letter, informing her that
she was being recommended for termination because her authorized leave without
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pay had expired in July 2009, and she had failed to report to work. Shima Decl.
Ex. 1 at 16. Campbell then filed a notice of separation, explaining that she felt she
was in a hostile work environment, did not feel safe, and would not return to work
for health reasons. Shima Decl. Ex. 1 at 15.
In Campbell’s 2010 charge of discrimination, she asserted discrimination
based on retaliation, alleging that:
In August 2010, Vanessa Hurst (my then-supervisor) at Thomas
Merton Institute (employer) talked with my former principal Susan
Scofield at King Kekaulike High School. I have reason to believe
Scofield informed Hurst about my protected activity. Subsequently,
on September 7, 2010, Hurst discharged me from my position.
Campbell Decl. Ex. 5.
On November 8, 2012, in response to her two charges of discrimination, the
EEOC issued Campbell a right to sue letter, which Campbell received on
November 27, 2012. Campbell Decl. Ex. 14. Campbell proceeded to file her
complaint in this action on February 19, 2013, which she later amended. The
amended complaint asserted eleven different counts, one of which was dismissed
by Campbell (Dkt. No. 48), and six of which were dismissed by the Court’s
previous order (Dkt. No. 76). The following counts remain: Title IX sex
discrimination (Count 1); Title IX deliberate indifference (Count 2); Title VII race
and sex discrimination and hostile work environment (Count 9); and Title VII

4

retaliation (Count 10). The DOE seeks summary judgment on the remaining four
claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ when, under the
governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. A ‘genuine
issue’ of material fact arises if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l
Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe
all evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n,
809 F.2d 626, 630–31 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the moving party has the burden of
persuading the court as to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its
burden, the nonmoving party must set forth “‘significant probative evidence’” in
support of its position. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank
v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)). “A party asserting that a fact
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cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion,” and can do so by
either “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or
that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
DISCUSSION
The Court addresses first Campbell’s claims under Title VII. Because the
analysis under Title VII directs the same result for Campbell’s Title IX claims,
Campbell’s Title IX claims are only briefly addressed beginning at page 18 of this
Order.1

1

As a threshold matter, the DOE argued in its motion that Campbell failed to bring this lawsuit
within 90 days of receiving her notices of right to sue. However, at the hearing, the DOE
recognized that the filing of the complaint in this action occurred within 90 days of Campbell’s
receipt of the notices of right to sue. See Campbell Decl. Ex. 14. Accordingly, Campbell’s filing
of the complaint was timely.
The DOE also argues that Campbell should be precluded from asserting claims for any acts
occurring prior to April 25, 2007, i.e., 300 days before the filing of her first charge of
discrimination. At the hearing, however, counsel for the DOE conceded that she was not aware
of any such limitation for Campbell’s Title IX claims. In fact, unlike Title VII discrimination
claims, Title IX does not require that plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing
suit in federal court. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706 n.41 (1979). Further,
Title VII hostile work environment claims only require that one of the acts (that is part of the
several acts creating a hostile work environment) occur within the 300 days. National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 118 (2002) (“Given, therefore, that the incidents
constituting a hostile work environment are part of one unlawful employment practice, the
employer may be liable for all acts that are part of this single claim. In order for the charge to be
timely, the employee need only file a charge within 180 or 300 days of any act that is part of the
hostile work environment.”). Accordingly, because all of the alleged acts (including those
beyond 300 days prior to the filing of the 2008 charge) are part of Campbell’s Title IX claims
and her hostile work environment claim, the Court will also consider all of those acts in
adjudicating Campbell’s Title VII discrimination claims as well.

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I.

Title VII Disparate Treatment
The parties agree that the applicable legal framework for deciding

Campbell’s race and gender discrimination claims is set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas,
Campbell must first establish that “(1) [s]he belongs to a protected class; (2) [s]he
was qualified for the position; (3) [s]he was subject to an adverse employment
action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside h[er] protected class were
treated more favorably.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th
Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802); accord Moran v. Selig,
447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006).
If Campbell can establish a prima facie case, the burden of production then
shifts to the DOE to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an
adverse employment action. If the DOE satisfies that burden, Campbell “must
show that the articulated reason is pretextual ‘either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’”
Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
The DOE concedes the first two prongs of the prima facie case, but argues
that Campbell’s disparate treatment claim fails because she has not shown either of
7

the last two elements—that is, that she suffered an adverse employment action and
that other similarly situated employees (who do not belong to the same protected
class) were treated differently. Because the Court agrees with the DOE,
Campbell’s disparate treatment claim under Title VII fails as a matter of law.
A.

Adverse Employment Action

Campbell has failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment
action. An adverse employment action is one that “materially affects the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Team
Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and alteration
omitted) (discussing adverse employment action in the context of a plaintiff’s
claim of “disparate treatment discrimination” under Title VII); see Kang v. U. Lim
Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 818- 819 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff established a prima
facie case of disparate treatment when the employer subjected the plaintiff to
adverse employment actions, including verbal and physical abuse, discriminatory
overtime, and termination, which all “constituted a material change in the terms
and conditions of [the plaintiff’s] employment”) (internal quotation omitted);
Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1126 (holding that “[t]he removal of or substantial
interference with work facilities important to the performance of the job constitutes
a material change in the terms and conditions of a person’s employment” and
qualified as an adverse employment action, but also concluding that the employer’s
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failure to respond to grievances was not an adverse employment action because “it
did not materially affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the
[plaintiff’s] employment”).
Campbell alleges in her charge of discrimination that the DOE did not take
“appropriate, corrective action” in responding to her complaints of harassment by
students. Campbell Decl. Ex. 4 (“First Charge of Discrimination”) at 1. However,
Campbell has provided no evidence to dispute that “[Campbell’s] referrals were
investigated by the vice principals and students were disciplined when there was
evidence of student misconduct.” Decl. of Beth Schimmelfennig
(“Schimmelfennig Decl.”) Ex. 2, at 3. In fact, the DOE provided documentation of
the investigations of students (including what discipline, if any, was meted out)
referred by Campbell. Schimmelfennig Decl. Ex. 2, at 12–51; Decl. of Anthony
Jones (“Jones Decl.”) Ex. 2. Nothing indicates that the DOE’s response to
Campbell’s complaints of student conduct was inappropriate or incomplete, and
more importantly, the Court concludes that the DOE’s response did not materially
affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of Campbell’s
employment.
Similarly, it was not an adverse employment action for Principal Scofield to
send a letter to Campbell containing students’ allegations of verbal and physical
abuse by Campbell. First Charge of Discrimination at 2. Such a notification was
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the obligation of the principal when the allegations by students were made, and this
notification itself did not affect the terms or conditions of Campbell’s employment.
Further, Campbell’s complaint that she should have been placed on paid leave
pending an investigation of the student’s allegations is ironic and unavailing. By
not being placed on leave pending an investigation, Campbell was in fact allowed
to work as usual, without any change in the terms and conditions of her
employment. Ultimately, the investigation into the students’ allegations against
Campbell resulted in a finding that she had engaged in some inappropriate
behavior. The DOE, however, opted not to take any action against Campbell, in
spite of the findings of the investigation, which Campbell does not dispute.2
Schimmelfennig Decl. Ex. 2, at 4. Thus, there was no material change to the terms
or conditions of Campbell’s employment as a result of the complaints by students
and the subsequent investigation.
Campbell also asserts that she suffered an adverse employment action when
she was assigned what she terms an “excessive class schedule” in 2006. First
Charge of Discrimination at 2. But Campbell provides no evidence to suggest her
schedule was excessive relative to any other teacher (much less any similarly
situated teacher). Indeed, the DOE’s evidence shows the contrary. Decl. of Susan

2

Nor was the investigation itself an adverse employment action. The DOE’s Civil Rights
Compliance Office was obligated to investigate the allegations by students and parents of
Campbell’s inappropriate conduct.

10

Scofield (“Scofield Decl.”) ¶ 22. There was thus nothing adverse about
Campbell’s schedule.
There was also nothing materially adverse about many other incidents
alleged by Campbell. For example, Campbell complains that she was “denied . . .
the opportunity to attend a State Championship Game to direct the school band.”
First Charge of Discrimination at 2. This isolated incident, even if true, did not
materially alter the terms and conditions of Campbell’s employment. Additionally,
Campbell’s inability to obtain a transfer in 2007 was also not an adverse
employment action. Campbell does not rebut the DOE’s evidence that Campbell
simply failed to follow established DOE transfer request procedures. Decl. of
Robyn Honda (“Honda Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–9. Campbell cannot assert that the denial of
an improper transfer request (that was improper by Campbell’s own fault) would
somehow be an adverse employment action here. Further, the fact that the DOE
misplaced a copy of Campbell’s 2006 evaluation is not an adverse action, as it did
not alter the terms and conditions of her employment in any material way.
In sum, because numerous employment actions cited by Campbell were not
“adverse” within the meaning of McDonnell Douglas, Campbell has failed to
establish the third prong of a prima facie case for disparate treatment.

11

B.

Similarly Situated Employees

Even if Campbell could satisfy the adversity requirement, she has also failed
to establish the final prong of a prima facie case because she has not provided
sufficient evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently.
“[I]ndividuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display
similar conduct.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.
2004). Campbell’s only evidence regarding the treatment of similarly situated
employees consists of newspaper articles about some teachers being placed on paid
leave pending investigations, Campbell Decl. Exs. 19, 26, and a statement by
another KKHS teacher that:
With other Asian male band leaders [such] as ______ Mitchell, and
Casey Nagata, the administration at KKHS (Scofield, Jones, and
Oura) supported them by allowing them unusual scheduling
preferences and conditions including purchase order authorization.
This was very different from their treatment towards Patricia
Campbell.
Decl. of Rob Harper (“Harper Decl.”) ¶ 7. This scant evidence simply fails to even
approach a showing that these employees were “similar in all material respects.”
Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010); accord Ward
v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1997). The
Court has no evidence suggesting who similarly situated individuals outside of
Campbell’s protected class may be, let alone how they might have been treated
differently.
12

Accordingly, because Campbell fails to establish either the third or fourth
elements of a prima facie claim for disparate treatment, the DOE is entitled to
summary judgment on that claim.
II.

Title VII Hostile Work Environment
Campbell’s Title VII hostile work environment claim also fails as a matter

of law. “To prevail on a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, the
plaintiff must show that her work environment was both subjectively and
objectively hostile . . . . The plaintiff also must prove that any harassment took
place because of sex.”3 Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d
1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
While the DOE contends that Campbell was not subject to words or conduct
of a sexual nature, the Court disagrees. Several of the student incidents
complained of by Campbell involved words or conduct of a sexual nature or that
were directed at Campbell’s race or gender. See, e.g., Campbell Decl. ¶ 5, and
Exs. 6 and 7 thereto. Thus, the Court finds that the first two elements of

3

The specific elements of a Title VII hostile work environment sexual harassment claim are that:
(1) [plaintiff] was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2)
this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.

Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fuller v. City of
Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995)).

13

Campbell’s hostile work environment claim are satisfied—that is, she was
subjected to conduct because of her race and gender, and it was unwelcome.
However, Campbell’s claim fails because the conduct was not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment.
“When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment Title VII is
violated.” Harris v. Forklift Syst., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). The working environment must be perceived as both
subjectively and objectively abusive. Id. at 20–21. In addition, the “conduct must
be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.”
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). When considering the
existence of a hostile work environment, the Court must view the totality of the
circumstances. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000).
When viewing these circumstances in the light most favorable to Campbell,
however, there is no indication of a workplace permeated with discriminatory
intimidation. The conduct cited by Campbell in support of her hostile work
environment claim originated from students, not DOE administrators, teachers, or
employees. High school teachers are frequently subjected to offensive language
and a certain level of insubordination from students. In consideration of that
14

reality, the student behavior that Campbell complained of simply does not rise to
the level of a hostile work environment, particularly given that the comments of a
racial or sexual nature made up only a handful of incidents over the span of the
several years that Campbell was teaching. “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments,
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, as discussed above, the evidence indicates that Campbell’s
complaints were addressed properly, and she was not mistreated. Other than the
student incidents directed towards Campbell, the only other cited incident allegedly
based on gender was the admitted comment by Vice-Principal Jones that Campbell
should stop “ragging.” However, there is no question of fact that this comment
was not of a sexual nature. The DOE’s Civil Rights Compliance Office thoroughly
investigated this incident and concluded that:
[T]here is insufficient evidence to show that Jones intended to
sexually harass Campbell, or make her feel like she was being
sexually harassed by using the word “rag” in the summary of
conference document. In addition, it was not his intention to
use the word “ragged” in the summary of conference, he meant
to use the word “raged.” Jones asserts that there was no sexual
connotation intended when the students described Campbell’s
scolding, as “ragging” at them. According to the Merriam
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, the word “rag” is defined as:
“transitive verb ragged/ragging (1739) 1: to rail at: SCOLD.”
This definition shows that the word “ragging” was used
appropriately in the summary of conference document.
15

Schimmelfennig Decl. Ex. 2, at 68. The Court adopts this same reasoning to
determine that Jones’s comments were not directed towards Campbell’s gender
and thus are not even considered in determining a hostile work environment.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the evidence does not indicate a
discriminatory work environment that was so severe and pervasive to alter the
conditions of Campbell’s work. As such, she fails to establish her hostile work
environment claim under Title VII, and the DOE is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on this claim.4
III.

Title VII Retaliation
Campbell’s final Title VII claim for retaliation also fails as a matter of law.

Under Title VII, “[t]o make out a prima facie retaliation case, [an employee] ha[s]
to show [(1)] that she engaged in protected activity, [(2)] that she suffered a
materially adverse action, and [(3)] that there was a causal relationship between the
two.” Westendorf v. W. Coast Contractors of Nev., Inc., 712 F.3d 417, 423 (9th
Cir. 2013). Just as Campbell was unable to establish that she suffered an adverse
employment action for her disparate treatment claim, she has not provided
evidence of a materially adverse action to support her retaliation claim.

4

In light of the Court’s conclusion that Campbell has not established her hostile work
environment claim, the Court also grants summary judgment for the DOE on Campbell’s claim
of constructive discharge. “Where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate the severe or pervasive
harassment necessary to support a hostile work environment claim, it will be impossible for her
to meet the higher standard of constructive discharge: conditions so intolerable that a reasonable
person would leave the job.” Brooks v. San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000).

16

In the context of a retaliation claim under Title VII, “an action is cognizable
as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from
engaging in protected activity.” Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. Just as the Court
concluded in the previous section that Campbell was not subject to any conduct
material impacting the terms and conditions of her employment, none of those
same acts would be reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in
protected activity. In her second charge of discrimination, Campbell alleges one
additional adverse act to support her retaliation claim–namely that Principal
Scofield spoke to Campbell’s new supervisor and that Campbell was later
discharged from her new position as a result. Campbell Decl. Ex. 5. However, the
DOE proffered evidence that Scofield never spoke to Campbell’s supervisor,
Scofield Decl. ¶¶ 23–24, and Campbell has not rebutted this with any evidence of
her own, instead relying solely on the allegations in the charge of discrimination.
This does not satisfy Campbell’s burden of production at summary judgment.
Accordingly, Campbell’s claim for retaliation cannot stand as there is no evidence
establishing an adverse action.
In sum, the DOE is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of
Campbell’s Title VII claims. The Court now turns to the Title IX claims, which
similarly fail as a matter of law.

17

IV.

Title IX Sex Discrimination and Deliberate Indifference
The two key elements of a sex discrimination claim under Title IX are: (1)

that a person must be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program; and (2) that such action
was taken on the basis of the person’s sex. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). In determining
the first of these elements, the parties do not dispute that the Court must engage in
the same analysis of discrimination that it did for Campbell’s Title VII disparate
treatment claim. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (“The appropriateness of using Title VII substantive standards in Title
IX employment cases is by now well-established.”); Johnson v. Baptist Medical
Center, 97 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[W]hen a plaintiff complains of
discrimination with regard to conditions of employment . . . , the method of
evaluating Title IX gender discrimination claims is the same as those in a Title VII
case.”). Consequently, for the same reasons that Campbell’s discrimination claim
under Title VII fails as a matter of law, Campbell’s Title IX sex discrimination
claims also fails.
Finally, Campbell’s deliberate indifference claim under Title IX fails
because the DOE’s response to all of Campbell’s complaints was reasonable and
within proper procedure. “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ occurs ‘only where the
recipient’s response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in
18

light of the known circumstances.’” Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208
F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 648 (1999)).
Campbell’s argument for deliberate indifference focuses on the DOE’s
response to the conduct of students that she reported to KKHS administration, as
well as the specific “ragging” comment from Vice Principal Jones. As determined
by the Court in the prior sections, the DOE’s response to all of Campbell’s
referrals of improper student conduct was both thorough and reasonable.
Investigations were properly conducted and appropriate discipline was taken.5
Schimmelfennig Decl. Ex. 2, at 3, 12–51; Jones Decl. Ex. 2. If there is evidence
otherwise, Campbell did not offer any. Moreover, the “ragging” comment was not
an incident of harassment. Vice Principal Jones was the subject of a thorough
investigation by the DOE’s Civil Rights Compliance Office over allegations made
by Campbell, including the “ragging” comment. The fact that Campbell disagrees
with the conclusions of that investigation does not mean that such an investigation
was unreasonable. To the contrary, the Court concludes that the DOE took
reasonable, appropriate action in response to Campbell’s complaints and referrals.

5

Whether Campbell was privy at the time to the outcomes of all of the investigations has no
bearing on whether the DOE’s response to her referrals was reasonable for purposes of
determining deliberate indifference. The extent to which Campbell was informed at the time of
the investigations is therefore of no consequence here.

19

In short, there is no evidence of deliberate indifference by the DOE, and the
DOE is consequently entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Campbell’s
Title IX claims.
CONCLUSION
The Court hereby grants the DOE’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No.
79) on all of Campbell’s remaining claims. The Clerk of Court is directed to close
the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 10, 2015 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.

Patricia P. Campbell v. State of Hawaii, Department of Education, et al.; CV 1300083 DKW-RLP; ORDER GRANTING STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

20