Hernando v. Hamamoto et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TITLED AS "PLAINTIFF'S MOTION OBJECTING TO COURT'S RULING/ORDERS" re 42 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 12/9/13. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Mariano V. Hernando served by first class mail at the address of record on December 9, 2013.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MARIANO V. HERNANDO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PATRICIA HAMAMOTO; KATHRYN
MATAYOSHI; in her individual
and official capacity; KERRY
TOM; GLENN KUNITAKE; MARLENE
AKAU; KATHLEEN O’MALLEY;
SUSAN KITSU; and RONN NOZOE,
each in his/her individual
capacity,
Defendants.
____________________________
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CIVIL NO. 13-00140 SOM/BMK
ORDER DENYING MOTION TITLED
AS “PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
OBJECTING TO COURT’S
RULING/ORDERS”
ORDER DENYING MOTION TITLED AS
“PLAINTIFF’S MOTION OBJECTING TO COURT’S RULING/ORDERS”
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiff Mariano V. Hernando filed the Complaint in
this matter on March 22, 2013.
See ECF No. 1.
2013, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
On September 12,
See ECF No. 25.
On
October 1, 2013, Hernando filed his opposition to the motion.
See ECF Nos. 28 and 34.
Although the motion for summary judgment
was scheduled to be heard on November 4, 2013, the court
cancelled the hearing and informed the parties on October 29,
2013, that the motion would be decided without a hearing pursuant
to Local Rule 7.2(d).
See ECF No. 36.
On November 26, 2013, the
court granted the motion for summary judgment.
See ECF N0. 39.
Judgment in favor of Defendants was entered that same day.
See
ECF No. 40.
On December 3, 2013, Hernando filed an “Objection” to
the order granting summary judgment.
See ECF No. 42.
Plaintiff’s objection was filed pursuant to Rule 46 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs objections at
trial.
Hernando’s sole objection is that this court was required
to have held a hearing on the motion, instead of ruling without a
hearing.
The court construes Hernando’s “objection” as a motion
brought under Rule 59(e) or 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rather than an objection under Rule 46.
Because there
is no requirement that this court hold a hearing, and because
Hernando, an attorney, was given an opportunity to file a written
opposition to the motion, Hernando’s motion is denied.
III.
THE COURT DENIES HERNANDO’S MOTION.
Hernando’s “Objection” of December 3, 2013, appears to
seek relief from the order granting summary judgment and the
subsequent judgment, arguing that this court was required under
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution to provide him with a
hearing.
The court construes Hernando’s “Objection” as a motion
seeking relief under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes motions to alter or amend a judgment.
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Such motions
“may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments
or present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of
judgment.”
11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995).
A
“district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or
denying” a Rule 59(e) motion.
McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d
1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2810.1).
See also Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039,
1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (“denial of a motion for reconsideration is
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion”).
A Rule 59(e) motion
may be granted on any of four grounds: (1) a manifest error of
law or fact on which the judgment is based; (2) newly discovered
or previously unavailable evidence; (3) manifest injustice; and
(4) an intervening change in controlling law.
McDowell, 197 F.3d
at 1255 n.1 (quoting Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1).
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits relief from final judgments, orders, or proceedings.
Such a motion may be granted on any one of six grounds:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
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(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released
or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated;
or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Like motions brought under Rule 59(e),
Rule 60(b) motions are committed to the discretion of the trial
court.
See Barber v. Haw., 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“Motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of
the district court.”).
Hernando fails to establish any reason that the court
should alter or amend the order and judgment.
Although he cites
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), neither
case stands for the proposition that a federal district court
must hold a hearing on a motion whenever a property or liberty
interest is involved.
Hernando’s procedural due process argument
is therefore unpersuasive.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that,
although a court is required to provide a person with notice and
an opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions on the
person, the “opportunity to brief the issue fully satisfies due
process requirements.”
Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101,
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1112 (9th Cir. 2005).
Accord Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v.
Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000);
Erum v. County of Kauai, 2008 WL 2598138 (D. Haw. June 30, 2008).
In Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1407, 1058-59 (9th
Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit cited this reasoning with approval
in noting that a litigant subjected to a prefiling order had
received “fair notice” and an opportunity to be heard regarding
the possibility of being declared a vexatious litigant.
If a
court need not hold an actual hearing before sanctioning someone,
it makes little sense to require the court to hold a hearing
before granting summary judgment against a party, even when the
party is claiming a deprivation of a due process right.
Unless specifically required by statute, Local Rule
7.2(d) allows this court to decide any motion without a hearing.
In this case, the court decided the motion after allowing the
parties to file written briefs on the issues.
Hernando’s written
opposition was sufficient to provide him with an opportunity to
be heard for purposes of his due process rights before this
court.
III.
Accordingly, the court denies his motion.
CONCLUSION.
The court denies Hernando’s “Objection,” which the
court deems to be a motion brought under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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There was simply no
requirement that this court hold a hearing on the motion.
Allowing Hernando to file a written opposition to the motion
provided him with an opportunity to be heard before this court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 9, 2013.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
Hernando v. Hamamoto et al, Civil No. 13-00140 SOM-BMK; ORDER DENYING MOTION TITLED AS
"PLAINTIFF'S MOTION OBJECTING TO COURT'S RULING/ORDERS"
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