Agbannaoag et al v. Ahn et al

Filing 30

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT'S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS re 27 - Signed by Judge BARRY M. KURREN on 11/8/13. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JERRY AGBANNAOAG, ON
BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, ET AL.,

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)
)
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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF
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THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
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FIRST CIRCUIT OF THE STATE )
OF HAWAII, AS INDIVIDUALS
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ACTING IN THEIR OFFICIAL
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CAPACITIES, ET AL.,
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Defendants.
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______________________________ )

Civ. No. 13-00205 BMK
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THIS
COURT’S ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THIS COURT'S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of this
Court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27). After careful
consideration of the Motion and the supporting and opposing memoranda, the
Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration.1

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The Court elects to decide this Motion without a hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d).

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of this Court’s Order Granting
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24). In that Order, the Court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice on grounds of judicial immunity and Younger
abstention. Plaintiffs contend that this Court committed manifest error in granting
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
“A party may ask the court to reconsider and amend a previous order
pursuant to [Rule 59(e).]” White v. Sabatino, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1274
(D. Haw. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 59(e) “offers an
extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of judicial resources.” Id.
“In the Ninth Circuit a successful motion for reconsideration must
accomplish two goals.” Id. “First, it must demonstrate some reason why the court
should reconsider its prior decision.” Id. “Second, a motion for reconsideration
must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to
reverse its prior decision.” Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, there are “three
grounds justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law;
(2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or

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prevent manifest injustice.” Id. The District of Hawaii has implemented these
standards in Local Rule 60.1, which provides:
Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders may
be brought only upon the following grounds:
(a) Discovery of new material facts not previously
available;
(b) Intervening change in law;
(c) Manifest error of law or fact.
“Mere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for
reconsideration.” White, 424 F. Supp. at 1274. “Furthermore, a FRCP 59(e)
motion for reconsideration may not present evidence or raise legal arguments that
could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision.” Id.
Additionally, “recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court
before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.”
United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal.
2001) (A “motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue the motion or to
present evidence which should have been raised before.”). “Whether or not to
grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Id.
First, Plaintiffs challenge this Court’s conclusion that judicial
immunity bars their claims. In their original papers opposing Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss, they cited Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541 (1984) for the
proposition that “judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief.”
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(Order at 7.) Plaintiffs present the same argument in their Motion for
Reconsideration. However, this Court distinguished Pulliam in the Order, stating:
“Pulliam was a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, whereas Plaintiffs stated on
the record at the August 6, 2013 hearing that the present action is not brought
under § 1983.” (Order at 7 (emphasis in original).) Further, even if Plaintiffs’
claims were under § 1983, this Court noted that “Pulliam has been abrogated on
this issue.” Most importantly, however, “judicial immunity is an immunity from
suit” and bars Plaintiffs’ claims, irrespective of the type of relief sought. Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam).
With respect to this Court’s application of Younger abstention,
Plaintiffs argue that the Court “committed manifest error in reasoning that the
second, third, and fourth requirements were satisfied.” (Motion at 11.) As to the
second requirement – whether the proceeding implicates important state interests –
Plaintiffs contend “it is simply not true that the calculation of the amount of
deficiency judgments involves so significant a state interest.” (Id. at 12.) As noted
in the Order, the “State of Hawaii has significant interest in the judicial conduct of
foreclosure proceedings, which involve state residents, real estate, and local
lenders.” (Order at 10.) Even in the Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs note
how important this issue is, stating that this action may affect “tens of thousands of
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Hawaii homeowners annually being subjected to such irresponsible State Court
financial forfeitures in indefensibly blatant violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.” (Motion at 15-16.) Surely, the State has significant interest in
Plaintiffs’ allegation that state court judges are violating the constitutional rights of
its residents.
Plaintiffs also challenge this Court’s conclusion that the third and
fourth factors of the Younger abstention test favor dismissing this case. The third
factor is whether Plaintiffs may raise the federal constitutional issues in the state
proceeding, and the fourth factor is whether the federal action would interfere with
the state proceeding. San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political
Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs
argue that this Court “misapprehend[ed] that because the putative class action
representatives here lost in their individual cases they cannot bring a class action in
their representative capacities.” (Motion at 13.) However, whether Plaintiffs lost
their individual state court actions or whether Plaintiffs bring this action in their
representative capacities on behalf of a putative class are not determinative of
whether the Younger factors are met. Rather, as explained in this Court’s Order,
the third and fourth factors are met because “Plaintiffs may – and in fact did – raise
their federal constitutional challenges in the state proceedings” and because “any
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ruling in this case would likely interfere with ongoing state court proceedings.”
(Order at 11.)
In conclusion, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration does not “set
forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its
prior decision.” White, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 1274. Plaintiffs do not present
arguments that justify the “extraordinary remedy” of reversing its Order dated
September 20, 2013. Id. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration of this Court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 27).
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, November 8, 2013.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/S/ Barry M. Kurren
Barry M. Kurren
United States Magistrate Judge

Agbannaoag, et al. v. Ahn, et al., Civ. No. 13-00205 BMK; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THIS COURT'S ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS.
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