Wilson v. Fresenius Medical Care Oahu, LLC et al

Filing 69

ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Fresenius Medical Care Oahu, LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment 59 . Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 7/15/14. (gab, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants regi stered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MARTHA W. WILSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE OAHU,
LLC,
Defendant.

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CV. NO. 13-00223 HG-RLP

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT FRESENIUS
MEDICAL CARE OAHU, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 59)

Plaintiff Martha W. Wilson filed a Complaint against her
former employer, Defendant Fresenius Medical Care Oahu, LLC, for
age and gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and
negligent investigation.
Defendant Fresenius Medical Care Oahu, LLC moved for summary
judgment on all claims.
At the hearing on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff withdrew all but two claims. Plaintiff continued to
allege: (1) a federal law hostile work environment claim based on
gender harassment (Count II) and (2) a negligent investigation
claim (Count V).

Defendant Fresenius Medical Care Oahu, LLC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 59) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART.
Summary judgment in favor of Defendant is granted as to
the negligent investigation claim (Count V).
Summary judgment in favor of Defendant is denied as to
the federal law hostile work environment claim based on
gender harassment (Count II).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 6, 2012, Plaintiff Martha W. Wilson filed a
Complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, State of
Hawaii. The Complaint alleges claims against Fresenius Medical
Care Oahu, LLC (“Fresenius LLC”) and Stanley Turqueza. The claims
against Fresenius LLC were state and federal law claims for age
and gender discrimination, state and federal law claims for
hostile work environment, and a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The claims against Stanley Turqueza were for
defamation. (Civ. No. 12-1-0945(3), Ex. A, ECF No. 60.)
On April 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
in the State Circuit Court of the Second Circuit. In the First

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Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was replaced with a claim for negligent
investigation. (Ex. B, ECF No. 60.)
On May 7, 2013, Defendants Fresenius LLC and Stanley
Turqueza removed the action to federal court. (ECF No. 1.)
On November 12, 2013, the claims against Defendant Stanley
Turqueza were dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to a finding of
good faith settlement of those claims. (ECF No. 40.) Fresenius
LLC is the sole remaining defendant.
On June 6, 2014, Defendant Fresenius LLC filed DEFENDANT
FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE OAHU, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
(ECF No. 59.)
On June 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. (ECF No.
64.)
On July 3, 2014, Fresenius LLC filed a Reply. (ECF No. 65.)
On July 9, 2014, the Court held a hearing on the Motion. At
the hearing on the Motion, Plaintiff withdrew her federal and
state law claims for age and gender discrimination (Count I) and
her state law claim for hostile work environment (Count II).
After Plaintiff’s withdrawal of claims, the remaining claims to
be decided in Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment are:
Count II:

Hostile Work Environment Based on Gender
Harassment (Federal law), and

Count V:

Negligent Investigation.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Martha W. Wilson brings suit against her former
employer, Defendant Fresenius Medical Care Oahu, LLC (“Fresenius
LLC”). Plaintiff was employed by Fresenius LLC as a Clinical
Manager for its Community Dialysis Center on Lanai (“Lanai
Dialysis Center”). According to Plaintiff, a dialysis patient at
the Lanai Dialysis Center, Stanley Turqueza, subjected her to
gender-based harassment. Plaintiff claims that Fresenius LLC
failed to adequately investigate her complaints about Turqueza’s
conduct, and ratified Turqueza’s alleged harassment by
terminating Plaintiff’s employment.

Plaintiff’s Employment with Fresenius LLC
In August 2006, Fresenius LLC hired Plaintiff to work as a
Clinical Manager for the Lanai Dialysis Center. (Plaintiff Tr.
78:23-25, Ex. C to ECF No. 60.) As Clinical Manager, Plaintiff
was the highest-ranking employee at the Lanai Dialysis Center.
(Plaintiff Tr. 62:24-63:6.) Plaintiff was responsible for
coordinating all aspects of patient care, including the
scheduling of patients. (Opp. Ex. 2, ECF No. 64.)

Conflict Between Patient Stanley Turqueza and Plaintiff
On December 13, 2010, while Plaintiff was treating a
dialysis patient, Stanley Turqueza, Turqueza become angry. A
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verbal altercation occurred between Plaintiff and Turqueza.
During the altercation, Turqueza told Plaintiff “F-U, you F-ing
Bitch.” Plaintiff claims that she feared Turqueza was going to
hit her, as he removed his blood pressure cuff and stood up while
yelling at Plaintiff.

(Plaintiff Tr. 152-157, ECF No. 60; H.C.

Tr. 13-15, Ex. 20, ECF No. 64; Plaintiff Decl. ¶¶ 11-20, ECF No.
64.)
On December 14, 2010, Turqueza spoke about the incident to a
social worker at the Lanai Dialysis Center. (Turqueza Decl. at ¶
14.)
On December 15 and 17, 2010, Plaintiff treated Turqueza
without incident. (Plaintiff Tr. 104.)
On December 20, 2010, Turqueza had a verbal altercation with
another dialysis patient. The altercation resulted in Turqueza
reporting the other patient to the police. Turqueza and the other
patient settled their differences on the same day. (H.C. Tr. 2427, Ex. 20, ECF No. 64; Turqueza Decl. ¶¶ 16-18.)
Later on December 20, 2010, Fresenius LLC’s Director of
Operations Alvin Cecil met with Turqueza to discuss his complaint
about Plaintiff and Turqueza’s incident with the other patient.
(Plaintiff Tr. 184-185, 188-99.) The Parties dispute what
occurred at the meeting.
It is undisputed that, as Turqueza was leaving the clinic
after his meeting with Operations Director Cecil, Plaintiff

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stopped him in the waiting area. At that time, Turqueza became
upset, and again told Plaintiff, “F-U, you F-ing bitch.”
The Parties dispute what else occurred between Turqueza and
Plaintiff at that time.

Turqueza’s Attempt to Have Plaintiff’s Nursing License Revoked
On January 6, 2011, Turqueza attempted to have Plaintiff’s
nursing license revoked by filing a complaint with the Hawaii
Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs. (Turqueza Decl. ¶
29, ECF No. 60.) Plaintiff claims that Turqueza’s complaint was
false.

Plaintiff’s Attempt to Alter Turqueza’s Treatment Schedule
Plaintiff claims that she repeatedly expressed her concerns
to Operations Director Cecil about how Turqueza’s abusive conduct
needed to be addressed, but Cecil did not take any corrective
action. Plaintiff claimed that, as a manager, she was concerned
that Turqueza’s conduct posted a safety threat to the other
patients and herself. (Plaintiff Decl. ¶¶ 27-30, ECF No. 64.)
On January 31, 2011, Plaintiff contacted Operations Director
Cecil and the Lanai Clinic’s Medical Director about changing
Turqueza’s treatment time. Plaintiff wanted to change Turqueza’s
treatment time to avoid being alone with Turqueza in the Lanai
Dialysis Center. (Plaintiff Decl. ¶¶ 27-30, ECF No. 64.)
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Plaintiff claims that she believed she would be exposing
herself and others to a dangerous situation if she was forced to
be alone with Turqueza during his treatment. (Plaintiff Decl. at
¶¶ 27-30, ECF No. 64.)
Turqueza opposed the change in his treatment time.
Plaintiff was instructed by Operations Manager Jane Idica,
at Operations Director Alvin Cecil’s request, not to move
Turqueza’s treatment time. Plaintiff moved Turqueza’s treatment
time, from 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
Plaintiff was suspended by Operations Director Cecil for
moving Turqueza’s treatment time, in violation of his
instructions. (Plaintiff Tr. 232:2-233:9, 238-39; Idica Decl. at
¶¶ 10-22, ECF No. 60; E-mails from Plaintiff to Hanna, Feb. 1,
2011, Ex. 16 at pgs. 13-15, ECF No. 64.)
On February 1, 2011, the day after Plaintiff was placed on
investigatory suspension, Plaintiff went on stress leave
(Plaintiff Tr. 250.) Plaintiff was scheduled to return from
stress leave on May 6, 2014. (Plaintiff Tr. 257.)

Fresenius LLC’s Decision to Terminate Plaintiff
Plaintiff protested her suspension and continued to complain
to Fresenius LLC about the need to address Turqueza’s conduct.

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In March 2011, a Fresenius LLC Ethics and Compliance Officer
completed his investigation of the incidents between Plaintiff
and Turqueza. (Ex. G to Gregory Decl., ECF No. 60.)
On May 6, 2011, the day Plaintiff returned from stress
leave, Fresenius LLC terminated Plaintiff. (Plaintiff Tr. 258;
Idica Decl. at ¶ 26.)

Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff claims that Fresenius LLC is liable for hostile
work environment gender harassment, as it ratified Turqueza’s
alleged harassment. Plaintiff claims that Fresenius LLC failed to
adequately investigate her complaints about Turqueza’s conduct,
and terminated Plaintiff, instead of taking corrective action
toward Turqueza.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To defeat
summary judgment there must be sufficient evidence that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir.
1997).
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The moving party has the initial burden of "identifying for
the court the portions of the materials on file that it believes
demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact."
T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809
F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party, however, has no
burden to negate or disprove matters on which the opponent will
have the burden of proof at trial.

The moving party need not

produce any evidence at all on matters for which it does not have
the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving party
must show, however, that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

That burden is met by pointing out to the district court

that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case. Id.
If the moving party meets its burden, then the opposing
party may not defeat a motion for summary judgment in the absence
of probative evidence tending to support its legal theory.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 282
(9th Cir. 1979). The opposing party must present admissible
evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044,
1049 (9th Cir. 1995). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”

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Nidds, 113 F.3d at 916 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
The court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872
F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1989). Opposition evidence may consist of
declarations, admissions, evidence obtained through discovery,
and matters judicially noticed.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex,

477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party cannot, however, stand on its
pleadings or simply assert that it will be able to discredit the
movant's evidence at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); T.W. Elec.
Serv., 809 F.2d at 630.

The opposing party cannot rest on mere

allegations or denials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Gasaway v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 959-60 (9th Cir.
1994). When the non-moving party relies only on its own
affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on
conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an
issue of material fact.

Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138

(9th Cir. 1993); see also National Steel Corp. v. Golden Eagle
Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Martha W. Wilson alleges that her former employer,
Fresenius Medical Care Oahu, LLC (“Fresenius LLC”), failed to
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protect her from the discriminatory misconduct of a patient,
Stanley Turqueza.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the two remaining
Counts in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint:
Count II: Hostile Work Environment Gender Harassment
(Federal Law Claim); and
Count V:

A.

Negligent Investigation.

Hostile Work Environment Claim (Count II)
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in

relevant part:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's . . .
sex . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (a)(1)(2006). Title VII guarantees the right
to be free from a hostile work environment. A hostile work
environment is one that is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is “sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21,

(1993) (quoting Meritor Sav.

Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986)).
The harassing conduct supporting a hostile work environment
claim based on gender need not be motivated by sexual desire. The
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motivation for the harassing conduct may be a “general hostility
to the presence of women in the workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). Gender-based
conduct that is abusive, humiliating, or threatening violates
Title VII when the hostile conduct “pollutes the victim’s
workplace, making it more difficult to do her job, to take pride
in her work, and to desire to stay in her position.” Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994.)
An employer is liable for harassing conduct by non-employees
where the employer knew or should have known of the conduct, but
fails to take appropriate remedial measures. In such instances,
the employer either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment.
Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 538 (9th Cir. 2006)
In order to survive summary judgment on her hostile work
environment claim, Plaintiff must show the existence of a genuine
factual dispute as to (1) whether a reasonable woman would find
the workplace so objectively and subjectively hostile to her
gender as to create an abusive working environment; and (2)
whether Fresenius LLC knew or should have known of the
harassment, but failed to take adequate remedial and disciplinary
action. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2004); Gamez-Morales v. Pac. Nw. Renal Servs., LLC, No. 05546, 2006 WL 2850476 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2006) aff'd, 304 F. App'x
572 (9th Cir. 2008).

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1.

Severe or Pervasive Hostile Environment

To make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff was subjected
to a hostile work environment, Plaintiff must show (1) she was
subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of her gender,
(2) the verbal or physical conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the
conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of
her employment and create an abusive work environment. Freitag,
468 F.3d at 540.
In determining whether a hostile work environment existed,
the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.
Relevant factors include the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct, the severity of the conduct, whether the conduct is
physically threatening or humiliating or merely offensive, and
whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s
work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
Plaintiff has submitted evidence in support of her claims
that Turqueza verbally attacked her on two occasions, including
telling her “F-U, you F-ing bitch.” The two incidents occurred
within a week of each other. Plaintiff has also submitted
evidence to support her belief that Turqueza posed a physical
threat. Plaintiff claims that Turqueza’s conduct was based on her
gender, as Turqueza believed he could overpower a woman.
(Plaintiff Tr. 112-13, Ex. C to ECF No. 60.)

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According to Plaintiff, Operations Director Alvin Cecil did
not take Plaintiff’s complaints about Turqueza seriously.
(Plaintiff Tr. 90-91.) It is undisputed that Operations Director
Cecil prohibited Plaintiff from changing Turqueza’s treatment
time. The prohibition required Plaintiff to continue to work with
Turqueza, a patient who had repeatedly verbally abused Plaintiff
and who was actively attempting to have Plaintiff’s nursing
license revoked.
Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to support
finding that Turqueza’s harassment was based on her gender and
was sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s
employment.
Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact with
regard to the existence of a gender hostile workplace.

2.

Adequacy of Remedial Action

Employers are liable for failing to adequately remedy a
hostile work environment, of which management-level employees
knew, or should have known. Star v. West, 237 F.3d 1036, 1038
(9th Cir. 2001). An employer who knows or reasonably should have
known of the harassment can avoid liability if it undertook
remedial measures “reasonably calculated to end the harassment.”
Dawson v. Entek Intern., 630 F.3d 928, 940 (9th Cir. 2011). The
reasonableness of an employer’s remedial measures depends on the

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employer’s ability to stop the harassment and the promptness of
the employer’s response. Freitag, 468 F.3d at 539-40.
Fresenius LLC had actual knowledge of Turqueza’s conduct
toward Plaintiff. Operations Director Alvin Cecil witnessed the
December 20, 2010 incident. Turqueza and Plaintiff both reported
to various management-level employees about Turqueza’s attempt to
have Plaintiff’s nursing license revoked. (Ex. G to Gregory Decl.
ECF No. 60.) Plaintiff, on or about February 10, 2010, e-mailed
her version of events to Fresenius LLC’s Area Vice President
Sherif Hanna and Employee Relations Manager Sturman. (Ex. 15 to
ECF No. 64.)
Although Fresenius LLC was aware of Turqueza’s harassment of
Plaintiff, there is no evidence that Fresenius LLC counseled
Turqueza on his conduct toward Plaintiff. Plaintiff specifically
points to the fact that Turqueza was not given a Behavior
Contract, warning him that misconduct could affect his ability to
continue to receive treatment at the Lanai Dialysis Center.
Fresenius LLC, in addition to failing to take measures to
correct Turqueza’s conduct, continued to subject Plaintiff to an
allegedly hostile work environment, by preventing Plaintiff from
changing Turqueza’s treatment time. Fresenius LLC put Plaintiff
in a position of choosing between continuing to treat Turqueza at
a time when Plaintiff was alone with him at the clinic, and being
suspended.

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Fresenius LLC has submitted evidence of its investigation
into the conflict between Plaintiff and Turqueza.
Plaintiff, however, has raised a genuine issue of material
fact with regard to whether Fresenius LLC undertook adequate
remedial measures to end the alleged harassment by Turqueza.
Genuine issues of material fact prevent summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claim (Count II).

B.

Negligent Investigation Claim (Count V)
Plaintiff alleges, in Count V of the Amended Complaint, a

claim for negligent investigation. Plaintiff asserts that her
former employer, Fresenius LLC, breached its legal duty to
conduct a fair and objective investigation into the alleged
safety hazard posed by Stanley Turqueza. Plaintiff claims that
Fresenius LLC’s actions caused her to suffer emotional distress.
The Hawaii Workers’ Compensation law provides the exclusive
remedy for an employee to recover for a work injury against his
or her employer, except for claims arising from sexual harassment
or sexual assault and emotional distress or invasion of privacy
related thereto. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-5. An injury is considered
a work injury if there is a “causal connection between the injury
and any incidents or conditions of employment.” Tamashiro v.

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Control Specialist, Inc., 34 P.3d 16, 20 (Haw. 2001)(defining
work injury pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-3)(internal
citation omitted). One of the primary purposes in implementing
the Hawaii Workers’ Compensation Scheme was to eliminate suits
based on negligence in the workplace. Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 919
P.2d 263, 269-70 (Haw. 1996).
In Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 176 P.3d 91
(Haw. 2008), an attorney sued her former law firm after she was
fired for fraudulent billing practices. The attorney claimed that
the law firm breached its duty to properly investigate the
allegations of fraudulent billing. 176 P.3d at 99-100. The Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the attorney’s claim was barred, because
she sought recovery for emotional distress that was unrelated to
sexual harassment or sexual assault. 176 P.3d at
In Antoku v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1233
(D. Haw. 2003), a plaintiff alleged a claim against her former
employer for failing to investigate and take remedial action to
ensure that alleged disability discrimination of plaintiff did
not continue. The court granted summary judgment in favor the
employer on the claim, as negligent-based claims are barred by
Hawaii’s Workers’ Compensation Statute. Antoku, 266 F. Supp. 2d
at 1237; Clemmons v. Hawaii Med. Servs. Ass'n, 273 F.R.D. 653,
657-59 (D. Haw. 2011)(negligence claim based on based on failure
to properly handle a sexual harassment investigation barred by

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the Workers’ Compensation Statute); Mariano v. Liberty DialysisHawaii, LLC, No. 11-00652, 2013 WL 560893 (D. Haw. Feb. 11,
2013)(“[C]ourts have enforced the exclusivity provision to bar
common law negligence claims for both physical and psychic
injuries resulting from workplace conduct.”).
Plaintiff’s claim, similar to the above cases, seeks relief
for negligent conduct and is barred by Hawaii’s Workers’
Compensation Statute’s Exclusivity Provision. Plaintiff’s claim
for negligent investigation does not fall within any exception to
the exclusivity provision.
Plaintiff relies upon Tseu ex rel. Hobbs v. Jeyte, 962 P.2d
344 (Haw. 1998). The case recognized the viability of a
negligence claim against an administrative agency for failure to
investigate, as required by its own administrative rules. Id. at
92. The Tseu case did not involve a claim against an employer,
and did not address the impact of the Workers’ Compensation
Statute’s Exclusivity Provision on such a claim.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452 (Haw.
2010), is similarly misplaced. The Blair case discussed general
negligence principles, but did not involve a claim against an
employer, nor did it address the Workers’ Compensation Statute.
Plaintiff attempts to claim that her claim is not subject to
the Workers’ Compensation Statute’s Exclusivity Provision, as

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“[d]iscrimination by a patient . . . was not a condition required
under Plaintiff’s employment contract.”
Plaintiff’s assertion is contrary to the law interpreting
the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Statute. Courts look to
whether there is a causal nexus between the injury and the
plaintiff’s employment. Tamashiro, 34 P.3d at 20. Plaintiff’s
claim for negligent investigation against Fresenius LLC, her
former employer, is an injury that arises out of and in the
course of her employment.
The Amended Complaint cites several regulations from Section
494 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations in support of
Plaintiff’s negligent investigation claim. The regulations
identified in the Amended Complaint are set forth by the
Department of Health and Human Services and govern the standards
for certification for renal disease facilities participating in
Medicare. 42 CFR § 494.1(b). The regulations do not provide
Plaintiff with a viable negligent investigation claim against
Fresenius LLC.
There are no genuine issues of material fact that the
Workers’ Compensation Statute’s Exclusivity Provision bars
Plaintiff’s claim for negligent investigation. Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for
negligent investigation (Count V).

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CONCLUSION

Defendant Fresenius Medical Care Oahu, LLC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 59) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART.
Summary judgment in favor of Defendant is granted as to
the negligent investigation claim (Count V).
Summary judgment in favor of Defendant is denied as to
the federal law hostile work environment claim based on
gender harassment (Count II).
The hostile work environment claim (Count II) is the sole
remaining cause of action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15, 2014.

/s/ Helen Gillmor
Helen Gillmor
United States District Judge

MARTHA W. WILSON v. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE OAHU, LLC, Civ. No.
13-00223 HG-RLP; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE OAHU, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF No. 59).

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