International Union of Painters and Allied Trades Drywall Tapers, Finishers & Allied Workers, Local Union 1944 v. TNT Plastering & Stucco, LLP
Filing
36
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION DECISION AND AWARD AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONFIRM AND ENFORCE ARBITRATION DECISION AND AWARD re 6 ; 13 . Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 11/27/2013. (eps )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES,
DRYWALL TAPERS, FINISHERS &
ALLIED WORKERS, LOCAL UNION
1944,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CIVIL NO. 13-00238 DKW-RLP
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
VACATE ARBITRATION
DECISION AND AWARD AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO CONFIRM AND ENFORCE
ARBITRATION DECISION AND
AWARD
TNT PLASTERING & STUCCO,
LLP (2012-024)
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE
ARBITRATION DECISION AND AWARD AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CONFIRM
AND ENFORCE ARBITRATION DECISION AND AWARD
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendant TNT
Plastering & Stucco, LLP’s (“TNT LLP”) Motion to Vacate Arbitration Decision
and Award (“Motion to Vacate”); and (2) Plaintiff International Union of Painters
1
and Allied Trades, Drywall Tapers, Finishers & Allied Workers, Local Union
1944’s (“the Union”) Motion to Confirm and Enforce Arbitration Decision and
Award (“Motion to Confirm”). The motions address a February 22, 2013
Arbitration Decision and Award entered by the Joint Industrial Committee (“JIC
Decision”1) against TNT LLP and in favor of the Union. The Court held a hearing
on the motions on August 30, 2013. After careful consideration of the supporting
and opposing memoranda, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant legal
authority, and for good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Vacate
and DENIES the Motion to Confirm.
BACKGROUND
On November 30, 2012, the Union filed a Step 1 Grievance against
TNT LLP, pursuant to a labor agreement between the Union and the Hawaii Wall &
Ceiling Industry Association of Hawaii (“HWCIA” or “Association”). TNT Ex. D
(10/30/12 Step 1 Grievance). The Step 1 Grievance was prompted when John
Frigillana, the Union’s business representative, observed TNT LLP performing
drywall and acoustical ceiling work on a project on November 9, 2012. Declaration
1
The JIC is comprised of three members appointed by the Hawaii Wall & Ceiling Industry
Association of Hawaii and three members appointed by the Union, and acted as the arbitrator in
this labor matter. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Confirm at 3. The JIC Decision is attached as
Exhibit E to the Motion to Vacate and as Exhibit 10 to the Motion to Confirm.
2
of John D. Frigillana, Jr. (“3/26/13 Frigillana Decl.”) ¶ 7. According to Mr.
Frigillana, the Union was not contacted for referral of employees and no dues or
contributions to the Union trust funds were paid related to the job. Id. ¶ 8. The
Step 1 Grievance states that TNT LLP violated the labor agreement by “double
breasting and violating the Preservation of Work Clause and are also failing to
recognize the Tapers Union.” TNT Ex. D.
TNT LLP is an entity separate from TNT Incorporated (“TNT Inc.”),
which was organized and incorporated by Stephen Teriipia on December 1, 2005.
Declaration of Stephen Teriipia (“Teriipia Decl.”) ¶ 2, TNT Ex. A (Articles of
Incorporation). Mr. Teriipia is TNT Inc.’s President and sole shareholder.
Teriipia Decl. ¶ 2. On or about October 15, 2009, TNT Inc., through Teriipia,
executed the January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2010 Labor Agreement between the
HWCIA and the Union (“2010 CBA”). TNT Ex. B; see also Teriipia Decl. ¶ 5.
The HWCIA and Union later negotiated a new CBA, which is in effect from
January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2014 (“2011 CBA”). Teriipia Decl. ¶ 8.
Neither Mr. Teriipia, nor any other TNT Inc. representative, signed the 2011 CBA.
Id. ¶ 9.
During the time that TNT Inc. was a signatory to the 2010 CBA, and
prior to forming TNT LLP, Raymond J. Whitley was employed by TNT Inc. as an
3
estimator; he no longer has any role with TNT Inc. Declaration of Raymond J.
Whitley (“Whitley Decl.”) ¶ 5; Teriipia Decl. ¶ 7. On June 12, 2012, Mr. Whitley
registered TNT LLP as limited liability partnership. Whitley Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, TNT Ex.
C (Partnership Registration Statement for TNT LLP). TNT LLP operates under
Mr. Whitley’s general contractor’s license and Mr. Whitley is TNT LLP’s General
Partner and Responsible Managing Employee. Whitley Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. Mr. Teriipia
is a general partner in TNT LLP, but maintains that his role is confined to providing
advice to Mr. Whitley and that he never contributed any money to the formation of
TNT LLP. Teriipia Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. According to Mr. Whitley, none of TNT
Inc.’s employees have ever worked for TNT LLP, nor did TNT LLP purchase any of
TNT Inc.’s equipment. Whitley Decl. ¶ 6. Mr. Whitley asserts that he never
executed any documents with the Union while employed by TNT Inc. Whitley Decl.
¶ 5; Teriipia Decl. ¶ 7. And, like Mr. Teriipia, Mr. Whitley did not execute the 2011
CBA. Whitley Decl. ¶ 9. That is, TNT LLP has never been a signatory to any
CBA with the Union. Id. ¶ 10.
The Step 1 Grievance that was mailed to TNT LLP stated that the
Union would proceed to Step 2 of the grievance procedure set out in the 2011 CBA if
4
TNT LLP did not comply with its terms by December 4, 2012.2 TNT Ex. D. The
Step 1 Grievance was sent to the attention of Raymond Whitley at TNT LLP’s
address, and names TNT LLP at the top of the grievance as the “Employer.”
3/26/13 Frigillana Decl., Ex. 5 (USPS Certified Mail Receipt). TNT LLP did not
respond to the Step 1 Grievance. 3/26/13 Frigillana Decl. ¶ 8.
The Union thereafter submitted the grievance to the JIC on December
10, 2012 (“Step 2 Grievance”). 3/26/13 Frigillana Decl., Ex. 6 (Step 2 Grievance).
On December 11, 2012, Tabitha Field, the Union’s administrative assistant, mailed
the Step 2 Grievance to TNT LLP “c/o Raymond Whitley” to the same address used
to send the Step 1 Grievance. Declaration of Tabitha Field (“Field Decl.”) ¶ 3.
Ms. Field received the certified mail receipt showing that the Step 2 Grievance was
received by Sandi Whitley on December 12, 2012 at 92-852 Palailai Street, TNT
LLP’s registered address. Id., Ex. 6-3 (USPS Certified Mail Receipt); TNT LLP
Ex. C (TNT LLP Partnership Registration Statement). On January 7, 2013, Ms.
Field mailed to TNT LLP, the JIC notice of hearing listing the date and time of the
hearing as January 24, 2013. Id. ¶ 4. Ms. Field states that she received the
2
The Step 1 Grievance seeks the following remedies: back pay, compensatory damages, back
union dues, delinquent contributions, liquidated damages, injunctive relief to prevent future
violations, and other monetary relief for adversely affected employees, trust funds and others.
See TNT Ex. D.
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certified mail receipt showing that the hearing notice was received by Mr. Whitley
on January 8, 2013 at 92-852 Palailai Street. Id., Ex. 7-4 (USPS Certified Mail
Receipt).
According to Mr. Frigillana, “a hearing was held on January 24, 2013,
but was reconvened to February 22, 2013 to allow for a second notice of hearing to
the employer.” 3/26/13 Frigillana Decl. ¶ 10. On February 13, 2013, Ms. Field
mailed the notice of the February 22, 2013 JIC hearing to TNT LLP, using the
address on the return receipts from the prior mailings to prepare the mailing
envelopes. She sent the notice of hearing to TNT LLP via certified mail and regular
mail. Field Decl. ¶ 5. Ms. Field did not receive the certified mail receipt for this
mailing; instead, she “received as ‘unclaimed’ the certified notice to the employer.”
Id.
On February 22, 2013, Mr. Frigillana appeared before the JIC on behalf
of the Union; no representative of TNT LLP appeared at the hearing. Mr. Frigillana
presented evidence to support the Union’s charge of violations of the labor
agreements. The JIC rendered its Decision on February 22, the same day as the
hearing, finding that TNT LLP violated the 2010 and 2011 CBAs, and that TNT LLP
was an “alter ego” of TNT Inc. Decision at 7-8.
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According to Mr. Whitley, TNT LLP received but did not respond to
the Step 1 Grievance because TNT LLP is not a signatory to any CBA with the
Union. TNT LLP asserts that it did not receive the Step 2 Grievance in the mail
because the address listed, “92-852 Palaiali Street,” is incorrect; the street name is
spelled “Palailai.” Whitley Decl. ¶¶ 11-17; Teriipia Decl. ¶¶ 13-16. According to
TNT LLP, it also did not receive the January 7, 2013 mailing from the Union
because it was sent to “92-852 Palalaia Street,” which is also incorrect. Whitley
Decl. ¶¶ 18-19, Ex. G; Teriipia Decl. ¶¶ 13-16. Accordingly, TNT LLP states that
it had no notice of the originally scheduled January 24, 2013 hearing. Whitley
Decl. ¶¶ 14-19; Teriipia Decl. ¶¶ 13-15. TNT LLP also maintains that it did not
receive the February 13, 2013 notice of hearing via certified or regular mail.
Whitley Decl. ¶¶ 15-19; Teriipia Decl. ¶¶ 15-17. It is undisputed that neither the
Union nor the JIC took additional measures to notify TNT about the February 22,
2013 arbitration hearing. Whitley Decl. ¶ 20; Teriipia Decl. ¶ 17-18. The Union
asks the Court to confirm and enforce the award and to award fees and costs, while
TNT LLP asks the Court to vacate the JIC Decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s review of the JIC Decision is limited. “Plenary review of
the merits of an arbitration award would undermine the federal policy of settling
7
labor disputes by arbitration.” McClatchy Newspapers v. Central Valley
Typographical Union No. 46, 686 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960)). Nevertheless, a court may determine whether the parties “‘agree[d] to give
the arbitrator the power to make the award he made,’ and whether the award drew its
essence from the agreement submitted for arbitration.” Id. (quoting United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960) (alteration in original)).
The Ninth Circuit has recognized only three narrow exceptions
to the general rule of deferring to an arbitrator’s decision: 1)
when the arbitrator’s award does not draw its essence from the
CBA; 2) when the arbitrator exceeds the boundaries of the issues
submitted to him; and 3) when the award is contrary to public
policy. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local
588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995).
McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co., Ltd. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local
142, AFL–CIO, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1243-44 (D. Haw. 2008).
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),3 the Court may vacate the
JIC Decision:
3
The parties do not seriously dispute the law governing the Court’s review of the JIC Decision.
Defendant argues that the FAA applies, whereas Plaintiff offers that “[w]hether the court’s
jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit also lies under the [FAA] is not clear.” Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to
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(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
DISCUSSION
TNT LLP argues that the Court must vacate the JIC Decision because
(1) the JIC and the Union failed to provide TNT LLP with notice of the hearing; (2)
the JIC exceeded its jurisdiction and powers when it found that TNT LLP was an
“alter ego” of TNT Inc. and therefore a signator to the 2010 and 2011 CBAs; and (3)
members of the JIC Committee that rendered the decision were biased. The Union
Vacate at 15. The Union acknowledges, however, that federal courts “have turned to the FAA for
guidance in labor arbitration disputes.” Id. at 16.
“In the absence of the parties’ clear intent to elect particular rules for arbitration, the
decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provide a strong presumption that the [FAA]
applies.” Donnelly v. Jewel of Kahana, LLC, Civ. 12-00347 HG-KSC, 2013 WL 1337134, at *6
(D. Haw. Mar. 28, 2013). The labor agreements in the instant case do not specify any particular
set of standards for arbitration. Accordingly, there is no “clear intent to overcome the
presumption favoring the FAA standard for judicial review of an arbitration decision.” Id. at *8.
In any event, whether the Court applies the FAA standard or some other standard, including
Hawaii’s Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, the outcome would be no different, as the FAA and
Hawaii standards for judicial review are nearly identical. Id. at *8.
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asks the Court to confirm the JIC Decision under Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”)
§ 658A-25, and argues that the JIC had the authority to determine that TNT LLP was
liable under the CBA and that TNT LLP had sufficient notice of the grievance and
JIC proceedings.
I.
TNT Did Not Receive Notice of the February 22, 2013 Hearing
TNT LLP argues that the February 22, 2013 JIC hearing and Decision
were not “fundamentally fair” because TNT LLP did not have any notice of the
hearing. The evidence demonstrates, and the Union agreed at the August 31, 2013
hearing, that TNT LLP did not receive notice of the JIC hearing set for February 22,
2013 via the certified mailing sent on February 13, 2013. See TNT Ex. H;
Frigillana Decl. ¶ 10; Whitley Decl. ¶¶ 14-21; Teriipia Decl. ¶¶ 15-18. The Union
argues, however, that the notice need only have been reasonably calculated under
the circumstances to notify TNT LLP.
An arbitrator must grant the parties a fundamentally fair hearing. The
Ninth Circuit has explained that:
Labor arbitrations do not provide the same procedural
protections as do judicial proceedings. As the district court
recognized, an arbitrator “need only grant the parties a
fundamentally fair hearing.” Bell Aerospace Co. Division of
Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, UAW, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir.
1974). A hearing is fundamentally fair if it meets “the minimal
requirements of fairness”-adequate notice, a hearing on the
10
evidence, and an impartial decision by the arbitrator. Ficek v.
Southern Pacific Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 988, 85 S. Ct. 1362, 14 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1965).
Sunshine Min. Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC, 823 F.2d
1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties
Conference Bd. v. Zcon Builders, 96 F.3d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Although
deference must be given to an arbitrator’s decisions concerning procedural issues, it
is generally recognized that the courts may consider a claim that a party to an
arbitration has been denied a fundamentally fair hearing.”); Jones v. Flowers, 547
U.S. 220, 240 (2006) (Holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause requires “that a State must provide an individual with notice and opportunity
to be heard before the State may deprive him of his property.”).
The Court agrees with TNT LLP that, by failing to provide TNT
LLP with notice, the February 22, 2013 hearing was not fundamentally fair.
Generally, “mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is
reasonably calculated to provide actual notice.” Tulsa Professional Collection
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988); see also Mennonite Bd. of Missions
v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (“Notice by mail or other means as certain to
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which
will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered
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or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably
ascertainable.”). Here, however, TNT LLP’s mailing address was misspelled on
more than one occasion, and therefore, was not properly sent to TNT LLP’s last
known address. See, e.g. Zcon Builders, 96 F.3d at 414 (holding that notice was
sufficient where it was addressed to the physical address where the relevant
corporations maintained their offices, sent to the registered agent for service of
process, the notice was actually received, and the registered agent attended the
hearing); In re La Sierra Financial Servs., Inc., 290 B.R. 718, 733 (9th Cir. BAP
2002) (“Mailing a timely notice by first class mail to a party’s last known address is
sufficient to satisfy due process. Under the ‘mailbox rule,’ upon proof that mail is
properly addressed, stamped and deposited in an appropriate receptacle, it is
presumed to have been received by the addressee in the ordinary course of the
mails.”) (citation omitted).
Moreover, unlike with regard to some of its prior mailings to TNT LLP,
which were acknowledged by certified mail return receipts, the Union – in the
specific case of the February 13, 2013 hearing notice – received the notice back
“unclaimed.” Instead of then taking a simple additional measure, such as a
telephone call, to notify TNT LLP of the February 22, 2013 arbitration hearing, the
Union did nothing. Whitley Decl. ¶ 20; Teriipia Decl. ¶¶ 17-18; Field Decl. ¶¶ 4-7.
12
What it did do was proceed undaunted with the arbitration hearing, with TNT LLP in
absentia, receiving a ruling by the JIC that same day in the Union’s favor.
Such a
process violates any minimum standard of fundamental fairness of which the Court
is aware.
The Court concludes that the notice sent to TNT LLP of the February
22, 2013 hearing was not sufficient, and therefore, TNT LLP did not receive a
hearing that was “fundamentally fair.” Accordingly, the JIC exceeded its powers
and “so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
II.
TNT LLP Is Not a Party to the CBAs and Did Not Consent to Arbitrate
Even if TNT LLP had received notice of the hearing, there is no dispute
that it is not a signatory to either the 2010 or 2011 CBA. The JIC, nevertheless,
determined at the February 22, 2013 hearing that TNT Inc. is bound by the 2011
CBA under an “evergreen clause” in the 2010 CBA, and that TNT LLP is the “alter
ego” of TNT Inc. JIC Decision at 2, 7. Under Ninth Circuit case law, however,
the JIC did not have the authority to determine that TNT LLP was the alter ego of
TNT Inc. Generally, that decision is for the Court.
In Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Conference Bd. v. Zcon
Builders, defendant Zcon Builders was a member of the Associated General
13
Contractors of California, Inc., and by virtue of its membership, was a signatory to a
CBA with the plaintiff carpenters union. 96 F.3d at 412. Zcon Builders’
shareholders and directors were also fifty percent owners of another corporation,
Sharon Hill, which was not a signatory to the CBA, and was not a member of the
contractors association. Id. The carpenters union filed a grievance against both
Zcon Builders and Sharon Hill seeking compliance with the CBA. Id. At the
arbitration hearing, a representative for Zcon Builders appeared only on behalf of
Zcon Builders and not for Sharon Hill. Thereafter, the arbitration award was
entered against both Zcon Builders and Sharon Hill, and held that Sharon Hill was
subject to the CBA as the alter ego of Zcon Builders. Id. at 413-14.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that “a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit,” and that “the
question of arbitrability—whether a collective bargaining agreement creates a duty
for the parties to arbitrate the particulate grievance—is undeniably an issue for
judicial determination.” Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit explained
that “Sharon Hill can only be required to submit to arbitration if it is bound by the
terms of the Agreement which contain the arbitration procedure.” Id. The court
rejected the union’s argument that “Sharon Hill, although not a signatory to the
Agreement, is nevertheless bound by its terms because it is an alter ego of Zcon,
14
which did sign the Agreement.” Id. This is so because the “issue of arbitrability is
clearly reserved for the Courts, and is not, itself, a proper subject of arbitration.” Id.
at 414-15.
The Zcon Builders court also held that Sharon Hill never consented to
have the arbitrator resolve the questions of arbitrability or alter ego, even though a
representative of Zcon Builders was present at the hearing. It explained that,
Sharon Hill’s “refusal to participate in the arbitration hearing, for whatever reason,
cannot be said to manifest such consent.” Id. at 416 n.4 (emphases added). The
Ninth Circuit held that “Sharon Hill did not, by its conduct, agree to submit the alter
ego issue to the arbitrator[.]” Id. at 416. Like the arbitrator in Zcon Builders, the
JIC had no authority to decide that TNT LLP was the alter ego of TNT Inc. in the
present dispute.
The Union argues that Zcon Builders is distinguishable from the
present case because the arbitrator in Zcon Builders did not rely on any language in
the CBA for finding Sharon Hill liable and based the holding solely on the corporate
structure. See Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Vacate at 24-25. Even assuming that the
Union is correct on this point, it does not alter the Ninth Circuit precedent to which
this Court is bound; that is, “arbitrability is clearly reserved for the Courts, and is
not, itself, a proper subject of arbitration.” Zcon Builders, 96 F.3d at 414-15.
15
Further, the Court is not persuaded by the Union’s conclusory argument that the
parties here “did submit to the grievance and arbitration process questions of a
signatory and nonsignatory jointly performing tapering work outside the contract.”
Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Vacate at 26. As discussed above, TNT LLP did not
receive notice of the February 22, 2013 hearing, did not participate in the hearing,
and did not voluntarily submit to have the JIC decide issues of arbitrability or alter
ego. Like Sharon Hill, TNT LLP was not a signatory to the CBA and was not
present at either the January or February 2013 JIC hearings. The Court concludes
that the JIC exceeded its authority when it determined that TNT LLP was the alter
ego of TNT Inc., and accordingly, the JIC exceeded its powers for purposes of 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) when it attempted to issue a final arbitration award against TNT
LLP.
Because the Court VACATES the JIC Decision on the grounds that the
JIC exceeded its powers and because the February 13, 2013 was not fundamentally
fair, the Court does not reach TNT LLP’s additional arguments relating to bias by
JIC panel members who are also trustees of the various Union trust funds. For the
same reasons, the Court DENIES the Union’s request to confirm and enforce the JIC
Decision, enter judgment, and award the Union its costs and fees.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant TNT
Plastering & Stucco, LLP’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Decision and Award, and
DENIES Plaintiff International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Drywall
Tapers, Finishers & Allied Workers, Local Union 1944’s Motion to Confirm and
Enforce Arbitration Decision and Award.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: HONOLULU, HAWAI‘I, November 27, 2013.
Derrick K. Watson
United States District Judge
INT’L UNION OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES, DRYWALL TAPERS,
FINISHERS & ALLIED WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 1944 V. TNT
PLASTERING & STUCCO, LLP, CIV. NO 13-00238 DKW-RLP; ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION
DECISION AND AWARD AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
CONFIRM AND ENFORCE ARBITRATION DECISION AND AWARD
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