Ke Kailani Partners, LLC v. Ke Kailani Development LLC et al
Filing
23
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND 5 AND GRANTING AOAO'S JOINDER IN: PLAINTIFF KE KAILANI PARTNERS, LLC'S MOTION FOR REMAND 12 . Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 10/24/2013. Excerpt of Order: Re : Plaintiff's Request for Attorneys' Fees and Costs: "The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion as to Plaintiff's request for its attorneys' fees and costs incurred with respect to the Motion. The Court refers this matter to the magistrate judge to prepare findings and recommendations regarding the amount of the award." "Plaintiff's Motion for Remand...is GRANTED, including Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees and costs...." "KKD& #039;s [Ke Kailani Development LLC and Michael Fuchs, collectively, "KKD"] request for stay is DENIED." "The Court DIRECTS Plaintiff to file documentation supporting its request for attorneys' fees and costs wit h the magistrate judge by November 12, 2013. Any opposition shall be filed by November 26, 2013." "This Court HEREBY REMANDS this action to the First Circuit Court. This Court DIRECTS the Clerk's Office to transmit a cert ified copy of this order to the clerk of the First Circuit Court. This district court retains jurisdiction solely for the purposes of determining the amount of the award of removal related expenses. [Order follows hearing held October 7, 2013. Minutes of hearing: doc no. 22 ] (afc) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
KE KAILANI DEVELOPMENT, LLC, )
)
a Hawaii limited liability
)
company; MICHAEL J. FUCHS,
)
Individually; DIRECTOR OF
)
FINANCE, REAL PROPERTY
)
DIVISION, COUNTY OF HAWAII;
)
KE KAILANI COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION; THE ASSOCIATION )
)
OF VILLA OWNERS OF KE
)
KAILANI; MAUNA LANI RESORT
ASSOCIATION; JOHN DOES 1-50; )
)
JANE DOES 1-50, DOE
)
PARTNERSHIPS 1-50; DOE
)
CORPORATIONS 1-50; DOE
)
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
1-50; DOE ENTITIES 1-50; AND )
DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-50, )
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
KE KAILANI PARTNERS, LLC,
CIVIL 13-00347 LEK-BMK
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND
GRANTING AOAO’S JOINDER IN: PLAINTIFF
KE KAILANI PARTNERS, LLC’S MOTION FOR REMAND
Before the Court is Plaintiff Ke Kailani Partners,
LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Remand (“Motion”), filed on
July 30, 2013.
[Dkt. no. 5.]
On August 20, 2013, Mauna Lani
Resort Association, Ke Kailani Community Association, and the
Association of Villa Owners of Ke Kailani (collectively, “AOAO”)
filed their joinder in the Motion (“Joinder”).
[Dkt. no. 12.]
Ke Kailani Development LLC (“Ke Kailani”) and Michael Fuchs
(“Fuchs,” collectively, “KKD”) filed their Memorandum in
Opposition on September 17, 2013, and Plaintiff filed its Reply
on September 23, 2013.
[Dkt. nos. 16, 21.]
This matter came on for hearing on October 7, 2013.
Appearing on behalf of Plaintiff was Sharon Lovejoy, Esq., and
appearing on behalf of AOAO was Ramona Laree McGuire, Esq.
Appearing on behalf of KKD was Gary Dubin, Esq.
After careful
consideration of the Motion and Joinder, supporting and opposing
memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, Plaintiff’s Motion is
HEREBY GRANTED, and AOAO’s Joinder is HEREBY GRANTED, for the
reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that several banks (“Lenders”)
granted Ke Kailani a loan with an original modified principal
balance of $52,152,500 (the “Loan”).
The Loan was secured by,
inter alia, Ke Kailani’s interest in certain real property
located at the Mauna Lani resort on the Island of Hawai‘i, known
as, “Ke Kailani” (the “Property”).
With respect to the Loan, Ke
Kailani was the borrower and Fuchs was the guarantor.
[Mem. in
Supp. of Motion at 4-5.]
The instant foreclosure action arose out of KDD’s
default on the Loan.
The Lenders filed their Complaint in the
State of Hawai‘i Circuit Court of the First Circuit (“state
2
court”) on October 27, 2009 (“Foreclosure Action”).1
[Motion,
Decl. of Sharon V. Lovejoy (“Lovejoy Decl.”), Exh. A at 1.2]
After a series of transactions during the pendency of the
Foreclosure Action, Plaintiff obtained an assignment of the
Lenders’ interests with respect to the Loan, and completed the
foreclosure on the Property.
Plaintiff asserts that, in the Foreclosure Action, the
state court accepted Plaintiff’s credit bid of $10 million, and
entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion for, inter alia,
confirmation of sale.
[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 5 (citing
Lovejoy Decl., Exh. D).]
On April 23, 2012, the state court
entered a deficiency judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
KKD in the amount of $21,594,688.55, plus post-judgment interest
(“Deficiency Judgment”).
E).]
[Id. at 5-6 (citing Lovejoy Decl., Exh.
Plaintiff contends that the Deficiency Judgment is
currently on appeal before the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate
Court of Appeals (“ICA”).
[Id. at 6 (citing Lovejoy Decl., Exh.
1
The Foreclosure Action pertains to Ke Kailani Partners,
LLC v. Ke Kailani Dev. LLC, et al., Civil No. 09-1-2523-10 (BIA)
(Foreclosure), in state court. The Foreclosure Action also
involves Counterclaims, a Third-party Complaint, and a FourthParty Complaint. These pleadings, however, were not attached to
the Notice of Removal.
2
Exhibit A is a copy of the Document List in the
Foreclosure Action. The Document List consists of multiple
documents that are not consecutively paginated. The page numbers
in this Court’s citations to the Document List refer to the pages
of Exhibit A as they appear in the cm/ecf system.
3
F).]
On April 1, 2013, KKD filed, inter alia, a motion for
stay pending appeal with the state court (“Stay Motion”).
(citing Lovejoy Decl., Exh. A at 28, Exh. H).]
[Id.
In Plaintiff’s
opposition to the Stay Motion (“Stay Opposition”), filed
April 22, 2013, Plaintiff argued that the state court should only
grant the Stay Motion if KKD posted a supersedeas bond to secure
the full amount owed under the Deficiency Judgment.
[Id. at 7
(citing Lovejoy Decl., Exh. I at 29).]
On May 14, 2013, the state court issued a minute order
stating that the stay was conditioned upon KKD posting a
supersedeas bond in the amount of just under $26 million, and
denying all other requested relief.
Exh. J).]
[Id. (citing Lovejoy Decl.,
On May 31, 2013, KKD filed objections to the minute
order (“Objections to Proposed Order”), one of which was that the
supersedeas bond amount should not exceed $1 million because,
pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-26(2), KKD is a “‘small
business concern[].’”
5).]
[Id. (quoting Lovejoy Decl., Exh. K at
KKD therefore asked the state court for affirmative relief
and that the supersedeas bond not exceed $1 million.
On June 12,
2013, Plaintiff filed its response to KKD’s Objections to
Proposed Order (“Response to Objections to Proposed Order”).
[Id. at 8 (citing Lovejoy Decl., Exh. L).]
On July 10, 2013, the
state court entered a written order with respect to the Stay
4
Motion, in which it conditioned the stay pending appeal upon KKD
posting a supersedeas bond in the amount of $25 million, and
denied all other requested relief.
[Id. (citing Lovejoy Decl.,
Exh. M).]
KKD filed the Notice of Removal on July 15, 2013, based
on federal question jurisdiction.
[Notice of Removal at 4.]
STANDARD
I.
Remand
KKD removed the instant case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441, and 1446.
[Id.]
Section 1441 provides, in pertinent
part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed
by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Section 1441 is strictly construed against
removal and courts resolve any doubts about the propriety of
removal in favor of remanding the case to state court.
Durham v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006).
The
party seeking to remove the case bears the burden of establishing
the existence of federal jurisdiction.
California ex rel.
Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
5
I.
AOAO’s Joinder
AOAO filed the Joinder pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)
and Local Rule 7.9.
[Joinder at 4.]
Local Rule 7.9 states, in
pertinent part:
Except with leave of court based on good
cause, any substantive joinder in a motion or
opposition must be filed and served within seven
(7) days of the filing of the motion or opposition
joined in. “Substantive joinder” means a joinder
based on a memorandum supplementing the motion or
opposition joined in. If a party seeks the same
relief sought by movant for himself, herself, or
itself, the joinder shall clearly state that it
seeks such relief so that it is clear that the
joinder does not simply seek relief for the
original movant. A joinder of simple agreement
may be filed at any time.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that AOAO did not
file the Joinder within seven days of the filing of the Motion.
Thus, the Court construes AOAO’s Joinder as a joinder of simple
agreement.
See Local Rule LR7.9.
Insofar as AOAO merely stated
agreement with Plaintiff that the Court should remand the instant
action, this Court GRANTS AOAO’s Joinder.
II.
Timeliness of Removal
KKD filed the Notice of Removal on July 15, 2013.
Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to the thirty-day removal period
in § 1446, KKD should have filed for removal by May 22, 2013, at
the latest.
Plaintiff therefore asserts that the Notice of
Removal was untimely.
[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 10-11.]
contends that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roth v. CHA
6
KKD
Hollywood Medical Center, L.P., 720 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2013),
announced on June 27, 2013, triggered the start of the removal
period.
Alternatively, KKD also contends that Plaintiff’s filing
of its Response to Objections to Proposed Order on June 12, 2013
was the triggering event.
If so, KKD timely filed the Notice of
Removal within the thirty-day removal period, excluding the
weekend during which KKD received the Objections to Proposed
Order by mail.
[Mem. in Opp. at 7-8.]
Section 1446 provides, in relevant part:
The notice of removal of a civil action or
proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading
setting forth the claim for relief upon which such
action or proceeding is based . . . .
. . . [I]f the case stated by the initial pleading
is not removable, notice of removal may be filed
within 30 days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which
it may be first ascertained that the case is one
which is or has become removable.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), (3).
This district court has stated:
Section 1446 provides two thirty-day periods
during which a defendant may remove an action.
The first thirty-day requirement “only applies if
the case stated by the initial pleading is
removable on its face.” Harris v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2000). . . .
The second thirty-day requirement, which applies
where no grounds for removal are evident from the
initial pleading, occurs “thirty days after
receipt by the defendant of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which
7
it may be first ascertained that the case is one
which is or has become removable.” Id.
Rossetto v. Oaktree Capital Mgmt., LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1128 (D. Hawai‘i 2009).
Further,
[t]he document that triggers the thirty-day
removal period cannot be one created by the
defendant. See S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax,
Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that an affidavit executed by the defendant’s
attorney did not commence the removal period
because it did not arise from a voluntary act by
the plaintiff); see also Smith v. Int’l Harvester
Co., 621 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (D. Nev. 1985)
(noting that answers to interrogatories or
depositions by plaintiffs may constitute “other
paper” under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)). Indeed, “a
court must take note that the ‘amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper’ must derive from
‘either the voluntary act of the plaintiff in the
state court, or other acts or events not the
product of the removing defendant’s activity.’”
Smith, 621 F. Supp. at 1007 [(quoting Potter v.
Carvel Stores of N.Y., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 462, 467
(D. Md. 1962), aff’d, 314 F.2d 45 (4th Cir.
1963))].
Id. at 1129 (emphasis in Rosetto).
Although KKD relies on Roth, it is distinguishable from
the instant case because Roth concerned the time limits for
removal based on diversity jurisdiction, 720 F.3d at 1126,
whereas KKD’s removal was based on federal question jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, insofar as Roth is inapplicable to the
instant action, it did not trigger the thirty-day removal period.
The only other event that KKD asserts triggered the
removal period is Plaintiff’s filing of its Response to
8
Objections to Proposed Order on June 12, 2013, which Plaintiff
filed in connection with the Stay Motion in the Foreclosure
Action.
KKD argues that, in its Response to Objections to
Proposed Order, Plaintiff contested KKD’S purported federal issue
for the first time, thereby triggering the removal period.
in Opp. at 8.]
[Mem.
Plaintiff, however, had previously filed its Stay
Opposition on April 22, 2013, in which Plaintiff argued that the
state court should only grant the Stay Motion if KKD posted a
supersedeas bond between 150 and 200% of the nearly $21.6 million
owed under the Deficiency Judgment.
[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at
7 (citing Lovejoy Decl., Exh. I at 29).]
Thus, insofar as
Plaintiff’s Stay Opposition sought a supersedeas bond amount in
excess of $1 million, the Court finds that KKD could have first
ascertained the basis of the Notice of Removal as early as April
22, 2013.
The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s filing
of its Response to Objections to Proposed Order did not trigger
the removal period, and that KKD did not timely file the Notice
of Removal.
III. Federal Question Jurisdiction
The Court also notes that, even assuming arguendo that
the removal was timely, federal question jurisdiction does not
exist in this case.
Plaintiff argues that, in determining
whether federal law creates a cause of action so as to confer
federal question jurisdiction, a federal district court is
9
limited to the claims asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint or
pleadings.
[Id. at 14.]
According to Plaintiff, KKD contends
that Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-26, which sets forth limitations on
supersedeas bonds, raises a federal question because it refers to
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 210-1 for the definition of “small business
concern.”
Section 210-1 defines “small business concern” as “the
business concerns that are defined in the Small Business Act, as
amended (P.L. 87-367) and classified by the [Small Business
Administration of the United States Government] in its size
standards.”
[Id. at 17.]
Plaintiff asserts that, although
§ 210-1 references federal law for the definition of “small
business concern,” such a reference is insufficient to confer
federal question jurisdiction.
[Id.]
KKD argues that the determination as to whether KKD
qualifies as a “small business concern,” as defined in the
federal Small Business Act, is essential to setting the
supersedeas bond amount.
[Mem. in Opp. at 5.]
KKD asserts that,
because “small business concern” is defined by federal law,
federal question jurisdiction exists, and federal district courts
have exclusive jurisdiction to make this determination.
6.]
[Id. at
KKD contends that qualification as a “small business
concern” is a substantial federal question that “undergirds”
Plaintiff’s request for a supersedeas bond amount in excess of
$1 million pursuant to § 607-26.
10
[Id. at 13.]
Federal courts have original jurisdiction over
“all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1331. “For a case to ‘arise under’
federal law, a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint
must establish either (1) that federal law creates
the cause of action or (2) that the plaintiff’s
asserted right to relief depends on the resolution
of a substantial question of federal law.”
Peabody Coal [Co. v. Navajo Nation], 373 F.3d
[945,] 949 [(9th Cir. 2004)] (citing Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 27–28, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420
(1983)). Federal jurisdiction cannot hinge upon
defenses or counterclaims, whether actual or
anticipated. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49,
129 S. Ct. 1262, 1272, 173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009).
K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th
Cir. 2011).
This district court has stated:
Although the well-pleaded complaint rule focuses
on the “face” of the complaint, “[c]laims brought
under state law may ‘arise under’ federal law if
vindication of the state right necessarily turns
upon consideration of a substantial question of
federal law, i.e., if federal law is a necessary
element of one of the well-pleaded claims.”
Ultramar America Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412,
1414 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
Pressman v. Merdian Mortg. Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (D.
Hawai‘i 2004) (footnote omitted).
Both parties acknowledge that the Complaint in the
Foreclosure Action did not assert a cause of action under federal
law.
[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 15; Mem. in Opp. at 4.]
In
fact, KKD asserts that the purported federal question only arose
after the state court entered the Deficiency Judgment.
11
[Mem. in
Opp. at 4 (emphasis added).]
Further, even assuming, arguendo,
that the determination of whether KKD qualifies as a “small
business concern” is essential to setting the supersedeas bond
amount, the Small Business Act is not a necessary element of one
of the well-pleaded claims in the Complaint.
Thus, the instant
action does not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, does not
arise under federal law, and federal subject matter jurisdiction
does not exist in this case.
IV.
KKD’s Motion to Stay
KKD requests that, if this Court is inclined to remand,
it should stay the ruling so KKD can appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
[Mem. in Opp. at 32.]
Plaintiff contends that, in making this
request, KKD is merely trying to evade the statutory bar to
appealing an order for remand.
§ 1447(d)).]
[Reply at 16 (citing 28 U.S.C.
This Court agrees.
Section 1447(d) provides, in relevant part:
“An order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .”
The Ninth Circuit
has stated, “[t]here is no question . . . that § 1447(d) only
applies to cases remanded pursuant to § 1447(c), where there is a
defect in the removal procedure or ‘the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction.’”
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. PG & E
Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c); see also Arnold v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 277
12
F.3d 772, 775 (5th Cir. 2006) (“No appeal lies from a remand
ruling, no matter how erroneous, which is actually predicated on
lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.”).
To the extent that the basis of remand in the instant
action is the lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, any
review of this Court’s decision to remand is barred under
§ 1447(d).
Thus, KKD’s request for stay is HEREBY DENIED, and
the Court HEREBY GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion as to remand.
V.
Allegations of Impropriety Against Foreclosure Action Judge
KKD dedicates a significant portion of the Memorandum
in Opposition to allegations of impropriety on the part of state
court judge who presided over the Foreclosure Action, Bert I.
Ayabe (“Judge Ayabe”).
[Mem. in Opp. at 16-32.]
KKD argues that
remand of the instant action to the state court would result in
the denial of KKD’s due process rights, “specifically [KKD’s]
right to a neutral judge free of appearances of impropriety.”
[Id. at 16.]
Insofar as this Court has concluded that federal
jurisdiction does not exist in this case, and KKD contends that
the issues regarding Judge Ayabe’s alleged improprieties are
currently pending review before the ICA, [id. at 31,] the Court
declines to address KKD’s allegations against Judge Ayabe.
In addition, this Court notes that KKD asks this Court
to conduct what is effectively an appellate view of Judge Ayabe’s
decisions.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from
13
ruling on such a request.
[T]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . generally
prevents this court from exercising appellate
jurisdiction over state-court decisions. D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86
(1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,
415–16 (1923). The Rooker–Feldman doctrine states
that:
a losing party in state court is barred from
seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United
States District Court, based on the losing
party’s claim that the state judgment itself
violates the loser’s federal rights.
Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1005–06 (1994)).
Castro v. Melchor, Civil No. 07–00558 LEK–BMK, 2012 WL 4092425,
at *14 (D. Hawai‘i Sept. 14, 2012) (quoting Tejada v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Trust Co., Civil No. 10–00136 SOM/KSC, 2011 WL
3240276, at *5 (D. Hawai‘i July 27, 2011)).
This Court therefore concludes that, to the extent that
the same issues in the instant action are also on appeal to the
ICA, considerations of comity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
render any consideration of KKD’s claims by this Court both
improper and imprudent.
VI.
Plaintiff’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Plaintiff asserts that KKD had no basis for removal,
and requests an award of its fees and costs incurred with respect
to the Motion.
[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 22.]
states, in pertinent part:
Section 1447(c)
“An order remanding the case may
14
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including
attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”
The Supreme Court settled the standard for
awarding attorney’s fees when remanding a case to
state court in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,
546 U.S. 132, 126 S. Ct. 704, 163 L. Ed. 2d 547
(2005). The Court held that “the standard for
awarding fees should turn on the reasonableness of
the removal.” Id. at 141, 126 S. Ct. 704. As the
Court put it, “[a]bsent unusual circumstances,
courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c)
only where the removing party lacked an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.
Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis
exists, fees should be denied.” Id.
Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th
Cir. 2008) (alteration in Lussier) (footnote omitted).
Based on this Court’s conclusions that KKD’s Notice of
Removal was untimely and that federal jurisdiction does not exist
in this case, the Court finds that KKD lacked an objectively
reasonable basis for seeking removal of the instant action.
The
Court therefore GRANTS the Motion as to Plaintiff’s request for
its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred with respect to the
Motion.
The Court refers this matter to the magistrate judge to
prepare findings and recommendations regarding the amount of the
award.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Remand, filed July 30, 2013, is HEREBY GRANTED, including
Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 28
15
U.S.C. § 1447(c), and AOAO’s Joinder in the Motion, filed August
20, 2013, is HEREBY GRANTED.
KKD’s request for stay is HEREBY
DENIED.
The Court DIRECTS Plaintiff to file documentation
supporting its request for attorneys’ fees and costs with the
magistrate judge by November 12, 2013.
Any opposition shall be
filed by November 26, 2013.
This Court HEREBY REMANDS this action to the First
Circuit Court.
This Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s Office to transmit
a certified copy of this order to the clerk of the First Circuit
Court.
This district court retains jurisdiction solely for the
purposes of determining the amount of the award of removalrelated expenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, October 24, 2013.
/S/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
KE KAILANI PARTNERS, LLC VS. KE KAILANI DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ET AL.,
ETC.; CIVIL NO. 13-00347 LEK-BMK; ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR REMAND AND GRANTING THE AOAO DEFENDANTS’ JOINDER IN:
PLAINTIFF KE KAILANI PARTNERS, LLC’S MOTION FOR REMAND
16
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