Ayres v. Obama et al
Filing
18
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION re 17 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 10/22/13. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications rec eived this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Vanessiah Ayres shall be served by first class mail at the address of record on October 23, 2013. The mailing envelope shall be addressed "Venessiah Ayres, c/o Rebecca Ayres".
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
VANESSIAH AYRES; C/O REBECCA
AYRES; C/O ANTHONY DURGANS,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA,
)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
)
INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF )
HOMELAND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT )
OF VETERAN’S AFFAIRS, BRITISH )
AIRWAYS, CLARKS SHOES, DELTA )
AIRLINES, UNIVERSITY OF
)
HAWAII, GENERAL GROWTH
)
PROPERTIES, HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC )
COMPANY, DARLANI APARTMENTS
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
CIVIL NO. 13-00371 SOM/RLP
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.
On July 26, 2013, pro se Plaintiff Vanessiah Ayres
filed a Complaint against President Barack Obama, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Department of
Veteran’s Affairs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”),
Clarks Shoes, British Airways, and Delta Airlines.
No. 1.
See ECF
Ayres also filed an Application to Proceed Without
Prepayment of Fees.
See ECF No. 4.
This court screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 and issued an order on August 8, 2013, determining that
Ayres had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
See ECF No. 5.
This court then gave Ayres leave to
amend her Complaint.
See id.
On September 16, 2013, Ayres filed
her amended Complaint, which added new Defendants but was based
on allegations and claims that were substantially similar to the
original Complaint.
See ECF No. 12.
On October 4, 2013, the court dismissed the First
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted because it failed to assert sufficient factual
content to give Ayres’s claims facial plausibility.
No. 15.
See ECF
The court entered judgment against Ayres the same day on
the grounds that further amendment would be futile.
See Clerk’s
Judgment, ECF No. 16.
Before this court is Ayres’s Motion to Reopen Civil
Complaint Case, ECF No. 16, which this court construes as a
motion for reconsideration of the order of October 4, 2013, and a
request for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.
In other
words, the court construes this document as a motion to amend the
final judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and/or a motion seeking relief from judgment under
Rule 60(b).
The court denies Ayres’s motion because (1) Ayres’s
Second Amended Complaint would be futile and subject to dismissal
under § 1915 if the court were to screen the Complaint, and (2)
Ayres fails to demonstrate that she is entitled to
reconsideration under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b).
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD.
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes motions to alter or amend a judgment.
Such motions
“may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments
or present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of
judgment.”
11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995).
A
“district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or
denying” a Rule 59(e) motion.
McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d
1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2810.1).
See also Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039,
1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (“denial of a motion for reconsideration is
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion”).
A Rule 59(e) motion
may be granted on any of four grounds: (1) a manifest error of
law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (2) newly
discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) manifest
injustice; and (4) an intervening change in controlling law.
McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1255 n.1 (quoting Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2810.1).
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits relief from final judgments, orders, or proceedings.
Such a motion may be granted on any one of six grounds:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been
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discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released
or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated;
or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Like motions brought under Rule 59(e),
Rule 60(b) motions are committed to the discretion of the trial
court.
See Barber v. Haw., 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“Motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of
the district court.”).
III.
ANALYSIS.
Having reviewed the previous orders, Ayres’s motion,
and her proposed Second Amended Complaint, this court denies
Ayres’s motion for reconsideration because Ayres fails to advance
grounds entitling her to relief.
First, Ayres’s Second Amended Complaint would be futile
and subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if the court were
to screen the Complaint.
Because Ayres has been attempting to
proceed in forma pauperis, her Second Amended Complaint would be
subject to screening under § 1915, which states that a court
“shall dismiss the case at any time” upon determining that the
action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
4
See also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (stating
that the IFP statute “accords judges not only the authority to
dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless”); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d
845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”).
In her Second Amended Complaint, Ayres supplements her
earlier claims with new allegations that are so “fantastic” and
“fanciful” as to be clearly baseless.
See Denton, 504 U.S. at
32-33 (“a court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only
if the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ a category
encompassing allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’
‘delusional’”).
and
For example, Ayres alleges that the FBI has
implanted her and her family with biochips that “subject the
plaintiff and her family to becoming a living vegetable or a New
World Order slave.”
ECF No. 17, PageID # 94.
Ayres then says,
“Once the device is perfected the biochip implant can easily
convert the plaintiff and her immediate family into a [monster]
weapon for the defense department of the United States of America
and therefore used to create unwilling murderers.”
Id.
Ayres
also accuses President Obama of premeditated murder because he
has willfully increased the power of groups like the Ku Klux Klan
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to terrorize groups like African-Americans.
Id., PageID # 100.
Even construing Ayres’s Second Amended Complaint
liberally, see Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925
(9th Cir. 2003), the court cannot identify any plausible ground
for any of Ayres’s claims.
See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
For these
reasons, Ayres’s Second Amended Complaint is deficient and fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Though leave
to amend generally should be freely given, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a), this court denies Ayres leave to amend because her
proposed amendment would be futile.
See Saul v. United States,
928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A district court does not err
in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.”).
The court sees no reason to reconsider its earlier
ruling under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b).
Under Rule 59(e), Ayres
presents no manifest error of law, intervening change in
controlling law, clear error, or manifest injustice.
Even if
Ayres’s new allegations were plausible, Ayres has not shown that
her new allegations could not have been discovered in a more
timely manner.
Ayres fares no better under Rule 60(b), having
failed to demonstrate that any of the six factors under Rule
6
60(b) applies here.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
Ayres’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, October 22, 2013.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
Ayres v. President Barack Obama, et al.; Civil No. 13-00371 SOM/RLP; ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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