Faith Action For Community Equity et al v. State of Hawaii et al

Filing 154

ORDER DENYING COUNTERMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 126 , 136 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 2/23/2015. "A question of fact exists as to whether HDOT intentionally discriminated against people of vari ous national origins. This questions of fact precludes the countermotions for summary judgment. The parties are ordered to contact the Magistrate Judge assigned to this case to schedule a settlement conference at the earliest available date." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
FAITH ACTION FOR COMMUNITY
EQUITY; TOCHIRO KOCHIRO
KOVAC, individually and on
behalf of a class of persons
in the State of Hawaii who,
because of their national
origins, have limited English
proficiency

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF HAWAII; HAWAII
)
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; )
GLENN OKIMOTO, in his
)
official capacity as the
)
Director of the Hawaii
)
Department of Transport,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 13-00450 SOM/RLP
ORDER DENYING COUNTERMOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORDER DENYING COUNTERMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiffs Faith Action for Community Equity and

Tochiro Kochiro Kovac (collectively, “FACE”) bring this putative
class action against the State of Hawaii, the Hawaii Department
of Transportation (“HDOT”), and its Director.

FACE alleges that

HDOT’s policy of offering the state driver’s license examination
in English only is the product of intentional discrimination, and
therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection and Title VI’s prohibition against national origin
discrimination in federally funded programs.

Before the court are countermotions for summary
judgment.

The court denies the motions, determining that a

question of fact exists as to whether HDOT intentionally
discriminated against people of various national origins when it
stopped providing translated driver’s license exams.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
In 2001, the written portion of the state’s English-

language driver’s license exam was translated into seven
languages: Tagalog, Mandarin, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, and
Samoan.

See Decl. of Tammy Lee ¶ 3, ECF No. 126-2, PageID

# 1822; Decl. of Scott Haneberg ¶ 2, ECF No. 126-3, PageID
# 1828; Internal HDOT e-mail of Oct. 9, 2009, ECF No. 135-10,
PageID # 2272 (listing the seven languages that the written
driver’s license exam had been translated into).
Effective July 10, 2006, sections 371-31 to 371-37 of
Hawaii Revised Statutes provided for the state to offer persons
with limited English proficiency better access to state services
and programs.

Section 371-33 expressly required state agencies

to take reasonable steps to ensure meaningful access to services,
programs, and activities by persons with limited English
proficiency.

Section 371-34 required each state agency to

establish a plan for language access no later than July 1, 2007,
and to update that plan every two years.

2

Effective July 1, 2012,

these requirements were generally recodified as sections 321C-1
to 321C-7.
According to an e-mail from Rey Domingo of HDOT, 4,199
foreign language exams were administered in the City and County
of Honolulu in 2007.

See ECF No. 135-10, PageID # 2273; see also

ECF No. 135-13, PageID # 2289 (indicating that 4,177 tests were
administered in 2007).
On June 13, 2008, a new Hawaii law took effect that
prohibited leaving children under the age of nine unattended in
vehicles.

See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 291C-121.5.

Section 286-

108(a)(3) of Hawaii Revised Statutes was amended to require that
applicants for driver’s licenses be tested on their knowledge of
this prohibition.

Because the previously translated tests did

not include any question about the prohibition against leaving
unattended minors in vehicles, the counties stopped using the
translated exams.

See Lee Decl. ¶ 6, PageID # 1823; Haneberg

Decl. ¶ 5, PageID # 1829.
Tammy Lee, the former Title VI specialist in the Office
of Civil Rights of HDOT, says that, in 2008, HDOT and the Office
of Civil Rights began gathering data to determine which languages
the written driver’s license exam had to be translated into.
Lee Decl. ¶ 7, PageID # 1823.

See

Lee received an e-mail in October

2008 informing her that translated driver’s license tests were no
longer being offered.

See ECF No. 135-6, PageID #s 2235-36.

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Lee

responded to that e-mail, stating that she had not known about
the requirement that the exam test for knowledge of the new
prohibition, but she saw “the importance of all licensed drivers
understanding the criminal offense of leaving a child unattended
in a vehicle.

Wow, this seems like a step back in providing

meaningful access, by not administering any DL exams in the
already approved 7 foreign languages, but I see how the safety
issue should always override providing language access.”

See ECF

No. 135-6, PageID #s 2234.
Lee says that, between 2007 and 2012, HDOT did not
receive any complaints regarding the inability of individuals
with limited English proficiency to pass Hawaii’s written
driver’s license exam given the absence of translated tests.
Lee Decl. ¶ 2, PageID # 1822.

See

But Lee herself wrote an e-mail in

September 2009 in which she notes that “[t]here have been
numerous requests for the foreign language exams.”
9, PageID # 2268.

ECF No. 135-

She also noted in an e-mail of October 2010

that “Beneficiary clients of the Hawaii County Women Infants &
Children Department of Health Program are interested in filing a
complaint with HDOT because the Kona county DMV (and other county
DMV’s) are not administering the foreign language exam.”

ECF No.

135-10, PageID # 2269.
According to an October 2009 e-mail from Rey Domingo of
HDOT that was copied to Lee, at a Hawaii Language Access

4

Conference held in September 2009, attendees indicated that they
might be filing a Title VI complaint with the United States
Department of Transportation.

See ECF No. 135-10, PageID # 2273.

Domingo also noted in that e-mail that “Translation of the
violation of leaving a child unattended in a motor vehicle exam
question may lead to reinstatement of the 7 initial languages
exam.

Translations into other languages may follow.”

Id.

Lee says that, given the lack of complaints, HDOT
decided to concentrate its resources on producing a Language
Access Plan, which would have to be updated every two years.

Id.

¶ 7, PageID # 1824.
In 2009, the Office of Civil Rights of the Title VI
Program issued the Language Access Plan for the State of Hawaii’s
Department of Transportation.

See ECF No. 127-2.

The plan noted

that, because Hawaii received federal funds, Hawaii had to ensure
that persons with limited English proficiency had meaningful
access to state services.

The report cited 67 Federal Register

41455 as setting forth a flexible and fact-dependent standard for
providing language assistance to persons with limited English
proficiency (“LEP”).

The Department of Justice Guidance

published at 67 Federal Register 41455 states:
Recipients are required to take reasonable
steps to ensure meaningful access to their
programs and activities by LEP persons.
While designed to be a flexible and
fact-dependent standard, the starting point
is an individualized assessment that balances
5

the following four factors: (1) The number or
proportion of LEP persons eligible to be
served or likely to be encountered by the
program or grantee; (2) the frequency with
which LEP individuals come in contact with
the program; (3) the nature and importance of
the program, activity, or service provided by
the program to people’s lives; and (4) the
resources available to the grantee/recipient
and costs. As indicated above, the intent of
this guidance is to suggest a balance that
ensures meaningful access by LEP persons to
critical services while not imposing undue
burdens on small business, small local
governments, or small nonprofits.
According to the 2009 Language Access Plan, based on
2006 Census Bureau statistics, 22.3% of Hawaii’s population of
approximately 1.3 million spoke a language other than English at
home.

Of that 22.3%, 18% identified themselves as speaking

English “not well” or “not at all.”
# 1875.

ECF No. 127-2, PageID

The same report identified the “top languages spoken by

Hawai`i’s LEP population in descending order . . . [as] Ilocano,
Japanese, Tagalog, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Visayan
(Cebuano), Cantonese, Other Pacific Languages (Chuukese,
Marshallese, Yapese), and Spanish.”

Id.

Scott Haneberg, the Motor Vehicle Safety Administrator
for the Motor Vehicle Safety Office of HDOT, says that, in 2010,
the Hawaii legislature considered enacting other laws and
requiring those laws to be tested on the written driver’s license
exam.

He says that, to limit resources spent on translations,

HDOT wanted to do all necessary translations at one time.

6

Accordingly, HDOT wanted to know both what additional questions
needed to be on the exams and which languages to translate the
exam into.

See Haneberg Decl. ¶ 6, PageID # 1829.
HDOT says that, between 2008 and 2013, it made no

decision to refrain from translating the written driver’s license
exam.

See Lee Decl. ¶ 11, PageID # 1826; Haneberg Decl. ¶ 9,

PageID # 1830.

It says that, during that period, it was working

with the counties to determine how to best reinstitute the
translated exams, but that, given the lack of complaints, the
shortage of personnel, and other projects, the Office of Civil
Rights concentrated primarily on other projects.

See id.

Marlene Young became the Title VI Coordinator for
HDOT’s Office of Civil Rights in 2012.

She says that, after the

legislature required that applicants be tested on their knowledge
of the prohibition against leaving children unattended in
vehicles, HDOT began working with the counties “to determine the
optimum manner and scope for the new translations.”

Decl. of

Marlene Q. Young ¶ 4, ECF No. 126-4, PageID # 1834.

She says

that the counties were responsible for having LEP persons
complete surveys to help determine which languages the test
should be translated into.

Id.

On May 14, 2013, representatives from FACE and HDOT met
to discuss translating the driver’s license exams into Ilocano,
Marshallese, and Chuukuse, in addition to the previous languages

7

the exams had been translated into.
# 2348.

See ECF No. 135-27, PageID

The Memorandum discussing what happened at that meeting

indicates that a Chuukuse interpreter named Kiku gave a “long
speech about the need for Maui’s Chuukuse to have the driver’s
license exam translated.”

Id.

Clifton Harty, HDOT’s acting Civil Rights Coordinator,
says that he worked with Young to evaluate which languages the
driver’s license exam was to be translated into.

They completed

a report on July 24, 2013.

See Decl. of Clifton Harty ¶ 8, ECF

No. 126-5, PageID # 1839.

Harty says that, although application

of the 4-factor test did not require translation into Chuukese or
Marshallese, he decided that the tests would be translated into
those languages anyway.

See id. ¶ 9, PageID #s 1839-40.

On July 24, 2013, HDOT requested funding for
translating the driver’s license exam.
# 2209.

See ECF No. 135-3, PageID

That request noted that the approximate cost of

translating the exam into Spanish, Ilocano, Chuukuse, and
Marshallese was $600 per language.

See ECF No. 135-3.

On February 14, 2014, HDOT announced that, beginning on
March 17, 2014, the Hawaii driver’s license exam would be
available in English, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese,
Tongan, Samoan, Tagalog, Ilocano, Hawaiian, Spanish, Chuukuse,
and Marshallese.

See ECF No. 135-31, PageID # 2362.1

1

Left out from this list of languages were Visayan,
Cantonese, and Yapese, which were mentioned in the 2009 Language
8

Haneberg, Young, and Harty say that they did not
intentionally discriminate against FACE or its members.

Haneberg

Decl. ¶ 14, PageID # 1831; Young Decl. ¶ 14, PageID # 1836; Harty
Decl. ¶ 11, PageID # 1840.
III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.
Summary judgment shall be granted when “the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010).

Fed.

See Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198

F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

Movants must support their

position that a material fact is or is not genuinely disputed by
either “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials”; or “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

One of the principal purposes of summary judgment is to identify
and dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

Access Plan, while Tongan, Samoan, and Hawaiian were added.
9

Summary judgment must be granted against a party that fails to
demonstrate facts to establish what will be an essential element
at trial.

See id. at 323.

A moving party without the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial--usually, but not always, the
defendant--has both the initial burden of production and the
ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary judgment.
Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102
(9th Cir. 2000).
The burden initially falls on the moving party to
identify for the court those “portions of the materials on file
that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact.”

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323).

“When the moving party has carried its burden

under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986) (footnote omitted).
The nonmoving party must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630.

T.W. Elec.

At least some “‘significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint’” must be
produced.

Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).

See Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134 (“A

10

scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not
significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of
material fact.”).

“[I]f the factual context makes the non-moving

party’s claim implausible, that party must come forward with more
persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Cal. Arch’l Bldg.

Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468
(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at
587).

Accord Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134 (“There must be enough

doubt for a ‘reasonable trier of fact’ to find for plaintiffs in
order to defeat the summary judgment motion.”).
All evidence and inferences must be construed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Inc., 809 F.2d at 631.

T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inferences may be drawn from underlying

facts not in dispute, as well as from disputed facts that the
judge is required to resolve in favor of the nonmoving party.
Id.

When “direct evidence” produced by the moving party

conflicts with “direct evidence” produced by the party opposing
summary judgment, “the judge must assume the truth of the
evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that
fact.”

Id.

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IV.

ANALYSIS.
A.

There is a Question of Fact as to Whether HDOT
Intentionally Discriminated Against People Based
on Their National Origins.

In the First Claim for Relief in the First Amended
Complaint, FACE asserts a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on
an alleged violation of its Equal Protection Clause rights.
In relevant part, § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that no State shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

This is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated be
treated alike.

See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.

Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1990).
In the Second Claim for Relief in the First Amended
Complaint, FACE asserts a violation of section 601 of Title VI,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which states: “No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
12

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”
The Ninth Circuit has stated that “violations of equal
protection and Title VI require similar proofs—-plaintiffs must
show that actions of the defendants had a discriminatory impact,
and that defendants acted with an intent or purpose to
discriminate based upon plaintiffs’ membership in a protected
class.”

Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto,

583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2009).
Intentional discrimination can occur in any of three
ways: (1) a law or policy may explicitly classify citizens on the
basis of a protected category, see, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969); (2) a facially neutral law or policy may be
applied differently on the basis of membership in a protected
category, see, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985);
or (3) a facially neutral law or policy may be applied
evenhandedly but motivated by discriminatory intent.

See, e.g.,

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977).

As noted in this court’s order of April 28,

2014, FACE alleges the third type of discrimination–-“that the
facially neutral English-only policy was motivated in part by an
animus against people from national origins where English is not
a primary language.”

See ECF No. 80, PageID # 1428.

13

There is no cause of action for disparate impact under
either the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI.

See Washington

v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that government
action is not “unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact”); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (noting that “it is beyond dispute . . .
that § 601 [of Title VI] prohibits only intentional
discrimination”).

Nevertheless, disparate impact “is not

irrelevant” to a claim of intentional discrimination.

Arlington

Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
In the context of a gender discrimination claim, the
Supreme Court stated that, while the disparate impact of a
facially neutral statute provides an “important starting point”
for judicial review, purposeful discrimination is what offends
the Constitution.

See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.

256, 274, 279 (1979).

Purposeful discrimination “implies more

than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.
It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part because of, not
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”

Id. at 279 (internal quotation omitted).

If the

statute’s impact cannot be plausibly explained on a neutral
ground, the “impact itself would signal that the real
classification made by the law was in fact not neutral.”

14

Id. at

275.

However, “it is the rare case where impact alone will be

sufficient to invalidate a challenged government action.”

Comm.

Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690,
703 (9th Cir. 2009).

“[A]bsent evidence of very stark []

disparities, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court
must look to other evidence.”

Id.

In its order of April 28, 2014, this court explained:
Plaintiffs cannot prevail in this case
by simply showing that the English-only
policy disproportionately harms LEP
individuals, or that Hawaii officials have an
animus against LEP individuals for reasons
unrelated to membership in a protected class.
For example, even if Plaintiffs could show
that the English-only policy was created in
part because officials dislike having people
in Hawaii who do not speak English, that
alone would not suffice to prevail on the
merits. Of course “language is close[ly
related to] national origin [and]
restrictions on the use of languages may mask
discrimination against specific national
origin groups or, more generally, conceal
nativist sentiment.” Yniguez v. Arizonans
for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 947-48
(9th Cir. 1995), judgment vacated on other
grounds by Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). Still,
Plaintiffs would ultimately have to
demonstrate that animus against LEP
individuals, or any particular linguistic
group, reflects an underlying animus based on
national origin.
ECF No. 80, PageID # 1429.
Foreseeable knowledge of disparate impact can provide
some basis for inferring discriminatory intent.

See Hispanic

Taco Vendors of Washington v. City of Pasco, 994 F.2d 676, 680
15

(9th Cir. 1993) (“The discriminatory impact of a governmental act
may be evidence of discriminatory intent.”); see also Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 487 (1997) ("[T]he impact
of an official action is often probative of why the action was
taken in the first place since people usually intend the natural
consequences of their actions.").
“Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of
credence” is circumstantial evidence of intentional
discrimination.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 134 (2000).

To determine whether HDOT intentionally

discriminated against people based on their national origins,
this court may also consider
whether the defendant’s actions were
motivated by a discriminatory purpose by
examining (1) statistics demonstrating a
“clear pattern unexplainable on grounds other
than” discriminatory ones, (2) “[t]he
historical background of the decision,”
(3) “[t]he specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision,”
(4) the defendant's departures from its
normal procedures or substantive conclusions,
and (5) relevant “legislative or
administrative history.”
Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142,
1158-59 (9th Cir. 2013).
There is a question of fact as to whether HDOT
intentionally discriminated against people of various national
origins when it ceased providing translated driver’s license
exams.

HDOT says that it stopped providing translated exams in
16

2008 given the need to add a question about leaving young
children unattended in vehicles.

HDOT then says that, given

staffing and emphasis on preparing a Language Access Plan, it
delayed conducting the studies necessary to determine which
languages to offer the exam in.

HDOT says that the translation

of the exam was further delayed because it thought the
legislature was going to require that further questions be added
to the exam and HDOT only wanted to translate the exam once.
HDOT says it always intended to offer translated exams, and that
its principals had no intention of discriminating against anyone.
Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury might determine that
HDOT did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of national
origin.
On the other hand, HDOT knew that it had administered
over 4,000 exams in various languages in 2007 in the City and
County of Honolulu alone.

It also knew that translating a single

question would have involved minimal time and resources, costing
only about $600 per language.

Given these circumstances, a jury

might reasonably infer from the delay between 2008 and 2014 that
the state intended to discriminate against various national
origins, foreseeing the disparate impact on non-U.S. citizens.
Lee claims that part of the decision not to translate the exams
sooner was the absence of complaints about not having translated
exams.

But Lee knew that, even if no formal complaints had been

17

filed, complaints had been threatened and requests had been made
to take the exams in other languages.

A jury might therefore

determine that Lee’s reason for not translating the exam sooner
was pretextual.
Although FACE characterizes HDOT’s attitude at the May
14, 2013, meeting as having been hostile, this court cannot
determine on the present record whether the comments and the
attitude allegedly displayed during the meeting reflected animus.
Ultimately, the trier of fact must decide whether HDOT
intentionally discriminated against people of various national
origins when HDOT stopped providing the translated written
driver’s license exams.

Accordingly, the countermotions for

summary judgment are denied.
B.

Kovac is Not Necessarily Precluded From Being a
Class Representative.

HDOT appears to be arguing that Kovac is not a proper
class representative because he has recently failed a translated
driver’s license exam.

See ECF No. 126-1, PageID #s 1804-05.

The court notes, however, that just because Kovac failed the exam
once does not mean that, had he been allowed to take the exam
between 2008 and 2013, he would not have passed it during that
entire period.

Nothing in the record indicates that he was

restricted to taking the exam once.

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V.

CONCLUSION.
A question of fact exists as to whether HDOT

intentionally discriminated against people of various national
origins.

This questions of fact precludes the countermotions for

summary judgment.
The parties are ordered to contact the Magistrate Judge
assigned to this case to schedule a settlement conference at the
earliest available date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 23, 2015.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge

Faith Action For Community Equity; Tochiro Kochiro Kovac, individually and on behalf of
a class of persons in the State of Hawaii who, because of their national origins, have
limited English proficiency v. State of Hawaii; Hawaii Department of Transportation;
Glenn Okimoto, in his official capacity; Civ. No. 13-00450 SOM/RLP; ORDER DENYING
COUNTERMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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